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
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
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SELECTIONS FROM THE RECORDS OF THE BOMBAY  
GOVERNMENT.

No. XXIV.—NEW SERIES.

HISTORICAL AND OTHER INFORMATION, CONNECTED  
WITH THE PROVINCE OF OMAN, MUSKAT, BAHREIN,  
AND OTHER PLACES IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

REPORTS ON THE ISLAND OF KENN; ON BASSADORE; THE HARBOUR OF  
GRANE, AND THE ISLAND OF PHELEECHI.

The Rise and Progress of, and Past Policy of the British  
Government towards, the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf;  
their Resources, Localities, &c.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS, FROM 1716 TO 1843,  
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AND THE ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

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MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONNECTED WITH  
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CHIEFS OF THE MARITIME ARAB STATES IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

Historical Sketches of the Hoasmer, Attiober, Wlahaber, Benigas,  
Boo Jelasa, Eiman, and Amulgabine Tribes of Arabs,  
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MEMOIR DESCRIPTIVE OF THE NAVIGATION OF THE GULF  
OF PERSIA; ACCOMPANIED BY BRIEF NOTICES OF THE  
MANNERS, CUSTOMS, RELIGION, COMMERCE, AND  
RESOURCES OF THE PEOPLE INHABITING ITS SHORES.

MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR  
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE  
PERSIAN GULF.

COMPILED & EDITED BY R. HUGHES THOMAS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

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
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


1

EXTRACTS FROM BRIEF NOTES,  
CONTAINING  
HISTORICAL AND OTHER INFORMATION  
CONNECTED WITH THE  
PROVINCE OF OMAN; MUSKAT AND THE ADJOINING COUNTRY; THE  
ISLANDS OF BAHREIN, ORMUS, KISHM, AND KARRACK;  
AND OTHER PORTS AND PLACES IN  
THE PERSIAN GULF;  
PREPARED, IN THE YEAR 1818, BY  
CAPTAIN ROBERT TAYLOR,  
3RD REGIMENT BOMBAY NATIVE INFANTRY,  
ASSISTANT POLITICAL AGENT IN TURKISH ARABIA.

1







## THE PERSIAN GULF.

### PROVINCE OF OMAN.

THE two Arab tribes, Hinavi and Ghafiri, are the most prominent in the annals of the Province of Oman; the Yarabi and the Syudi, to which last belong the family of the present Imaums, being both but branches merely of the Hinavi. From the Ghafiri the Joasim are descended.

The following historical paragraphs are from authentic sources of Arabian Tradition.


Malik bin Fakham, of the Province of Nujd, the first native Arabian who entered Oman, four centuries before the Christian era, came by the route of Yemen, where he was joined by little more than a hundred persons of the Hinavi Tribe of Arabs, who were desirous of following his fortunes. Malik was of a liberal disposition, and an intrepid mind, the union of which qualities commanded the admiration and obedience of his followers.

The first settlement of these colonists was at Bahla, or, according to others, at Jaalan, two towns of the Dhahirah, or interior portion of the Province of Oman, south-westward of Muskat about seventy miles. Here they encountered and overcame the troops of the Persian Monarch, and subsequently fortified the ancient city of Rastag, situated in the central or mountainous district of Oman, thirty miles westward of Muskat.

These colonists were shortly increased, by the accession of two hundred persons of Malik's tribe, the Banu Honaifah of Nujd, and a second company of two thousand of the Hinavi from Yemen, who were attracted by the fame and increasing power of this chieftain. Successive additions of the same and other tribes, to the numbers of these Arabs, enabled them at length to expel the Persians from the province altogether, though not without severe and obstinate resistance on the part of their enemy, who received repeated reinforcements of troops.

Malik at length died, after having possessed Oman for forty years; and was interred at Zaki, a town in the central division of Oman, about





five-and-twenty miles to the westward of Muskat. This chieftain left behind him four sons, and a numerous clan of adherents, in the individuals of the tribes of Honaifah and Hinavi, whom he had with consummate policy united by the indissoluble ties of intermarriage, and collectively named Hinavi; wishing thus to commemorate the aid the superior numbers, constancy, and valour of this tribe had afforded in the attainment of his earliest successes.

In the third year of the reign of his eldest son, who succeeded to the government, a thousand men of the tribe of Obar, passing out of Nujd, settled in the interior portion of Oman, in a plain, open spot of land; and from this circumstance received and retained the appellation Banu Ghafir, the ancestors of the present tribe Ghafiri. Zaid, the son of Malik, noticed this infringement of their territory, but as he was assured by the strangers, in answer, that they considered themselves as subjects and dependents on his power, he admitted them at length to his protection, and in course of time identified them, by intermarriage, with the clan Hinavi.


The sons and descendants of Malik continued thus in the enjoyment of power until the birth of the Mahomedan Prophet (A. D. 571), when one of these, named Jalanda, a powerful and enterprising prince, first constructed a fleet, with which he seized on the island of Ormus, from the Persians, and established it as the naval rendezvous of a fleet of boats, which he gradually habituated to the pursuit of piracy.

Prince Jalanda dying after a reign of forty years (A. D. 615), in the first year of the Prophet's mission, his two sons reigned in succession to him in united and equal authority. In the sixth year of the Mission (A. D. 621) they and a large portion of their subjects were converted to Islamism, by invitation of the Prophet; and in a year after his death (A. D. 633) the two brothers departed this life, within a month of each other.

Discussions now began to divide the hitherto united tribes of Ghafiri and Hinavi, and each was governed by its respective chief until Khalif Aboobekr, hearing of a feud so dangerous to the interests of the faith, sent his General, Walid, against them, with an army of seven thousand men. Walid investigated the causes of disunion, and finding in the Ghafiri a superior inclination to be steadfast to the faith, awarded them the supremacy over the Hinavi; and this remained in their hands till the Khalifat of Ali (A. D. 655), who, feeling the Hinavi more submissive to his views and dominion, reversed the order of succession, and gave the Government into their possession, and thus it remained till the accession of the Juribah, a branch of the Hinavi, in the year of the Hijree 158 (A. D. 780).

Both the tribes having tasted of power, each remained impatient of





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the control of the other, and seized every opportunity to gain or to retain the ascendancy.

In the end of the seventeenth century Imaum Malik, of the house of Yarabi, a branch of the Tribe Hinavi, was master of all Oman, and added to his dominions, by conquest, Kung, Kishm, Ormus, and Bahrein. His son extended these conquests still further by taking possession of Kiloa, and Zanzibar in Africa.

But in the reign of his grandson, Ben Suif, the new Monarch of Persia, Nadir Shah, sent an army to conquer Oman. The Persians lost many of their number among the hills, and were repulsed. Ben Suif accordingly continued to occupy the throne till his death.

Upon his decease, Mahomed Ghafiri, Prince of Jabrin, made himself master of the greater part of Oman, and assumed the title of Imaum. His son, Al Nasir, proved unable to maintain the conquest of his father. Suif-il-Asdi, son to the last Imaum of the family of Yarabi, made himself be proclaimed Imaum, and forced Nasir to content himself with his patrimony, the principality of Jabrin.

Imaum Suif-il-Asdi was an indolent, voluptuous prince. Not content with a numerous Harem, he would occasionally attempt the chastity of the daughters of his subjects. He addicted himself to the use of wine and strong liquors, neglected his affairs, and not paying his soldiers, who were Kafree slaves, suffered them to harass and pillage his subjects. This conduct rendered him so odious, that Sultan Murshid, one of his relations, easily succeeded in getting himself proclaimed Imaum, and took possession of almost all Oman.

Muskat, however, still remained in allegiance to Imaum Suif; and he maintained himself in it, by means of four ships of war, and of the profits of its trade, but becoming yet more odious to the few subjects who still obeyed him, by perseverance in his imprudent conduct, he soon found it impossible to prolong his authority. In this extremity he resolved rather to yield up his dominions to the Persians than to his relation Imaum Murshid.

Sailing to Persia, therefore, with some vessels which still remained to him, he obtained from Nadir Shah a fleet, under the command of Mirza Taki Khan, Governor of Shiraz. The Persian Admiral, upon arriving in Oman, enticed Imaum Suif into a fit of drunkenness, and seized Muskat, with its citadels. Suif, not knowing what to do, pursued his rival Murshid with the Persian forces, till, reduced to despair by the loss of his friends, he died a voluntary death. Imaum Suif died soon after at Rastag, oppressed with the mortification of finding himself duped by the Persians.

Taki Khan, on his return to Shiraz, revolted against Nadir Shah, and sought to establish himself in the sovereignty of Farsistan. It is well





known how the Persian Monarch quashed this rebellion, and punished its author. These disturbances withdrew the attention of the Persians from the affairs of Arabia, and made them neglect to keep up the garrison in Muskat.

At the period of Taki Khan's expedition into Oman, there was at Sohar a governor of the name of Ahmed bin Sued, a native of a small town within the Imaum's dominions. This Ahmed, being a man of ability and enterprise, and seeing that after the death of the two Imaums he should be under the necessity of submitting to such potent enemies as the Persians, made his peace with the invaders so ably that Taki Khan confirmed him in his government.

During the civil wars in Persia, a Prince of Dhang, of the house of Yarabi, the Prince of Sir, and a nobleman named Bel Arrab, had shared among themselves the spoils of the last Imaum; Bel Arrab had even assumed the title.

Ahmed, seizing the Persian officers in Muskat by surprise, forced the garrison to surrender, and made himself master of the city, without any effusion of blood. Gaining to his interest the first Kadhi, who officiates as Mufti in Oman, he obtained from him a decision that he, as the deliverer of his country, deserved to be raised to the dignity of its sovereign. In virtue of this decision, Ahmed was proclaimed, at Muskat, Imaum of Oman.

As soon as Imaum Bel Arrab heard this news, he prepared to attack his rival, with an army of four or five thousand men. Ahmed, too weak for resistance, retired into a fortress among the hills, in which he was invested by his enemy, and would have been obliged to surrender himself, had he not happily escaped in the disguise of a camel-driver. Being beloved in his former government, he found means to assemble some hundreds of men, and with these marched against Bel Arrab, whose army was still encamped among the hills. He divided his little troops into detachments, who seized the passes of the valleys, and sounded their trumpets. Bel Arrab, supposing himself to be circumvented by a strong army, was struck with a panic, fled, and was slain in his flight by a son of Ahmed.

After the defeat and death of Bel Arrab, no competitor gave Imaum Ahmed bin Sued any further disturbance in the possession of the throne of Oman, except a son of Imaum Murshid, who made some unsuccessful efforts to deprive him of the sovereign authority. Notwithstanding these attempts, the Imaum yielded up to his rival the town of Nahhel, with the territory belonging to it. A brother and two sons of the last Imaum of the ancient family were permitted to live in a private station, but in circumstances so opulent that they were able to maintain three or four hundred slaves. The reigning





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Imaum married the daughter of one of those princes, thus connecting his own family with the most illustrious persons of his dominions.

Ahmed now turned to the conquest of the people of Ras-ool-Khyma, descendants of the Ghafiri, who had aided the Persians in their views. He attacked them in A. H. 1160 (A. D. 1747), by land and sea, with an army of twelve thousand men, under the command of Kandhala bin Suif, of the family of Sued, who was met at Boraimi by Rashid bin Matar, the Joasim, and Amrar bin Homaid, the Noaimi (a large tribe south of Shargah, the pirate port), at the head of an army of fourteen thousand men, which met with a total defeat.

Ahmed was at this time engaged in the siege of Khurfakhan, a town and port in the Batinah, in lat. 25° 20' N., with a fleet of eight ships, and forty of the larger description of Native vessels. The garrison of this fort was composed of one thousand Joasim, who, when they heard the fate of their brethren, gave up the fort, and, entreating the clemency of their conqueror, were permitted to return to Sir.

The ambition and exertions of Ahmed daily increased. He pushed his conquests as far as Khasab, the governor of which place, Hassan bin Abdoolla, the Shihiiyyin, who was formerly subject to the Joasim, submitted voluntarily to his government.

During a residence of ten days in the town of Khasab, he received the alarming intelligence of the revolt of a member of the house of Yarabi Jaalan. His measures were decided: he directed his cousin, Khalfan bin Mirhamad, to proceed to Ras-ool-Khyma, with the great body of his fleet, and returned himself to Muskat with three ships, to attend to the suppression of the revolt. After a delay of only four days, he proceeded to Jaalan, and attacking the rebels, overthrew them with considerable bloodshed, and took a large number of prisoners. This occurred in A. H. 1162 (A. D. 1749).

Khalfan, after repeated attempts, found he could make no impression on the Joasim. Ahmed proceeded thither in person, and after remaining for four days in the town of Ramse, returned to Muskat by land, and despatched Ali bin Suif, the Syudi, with four ships and ten Dows, directing him to cruize against the ports of Sir, with the utmost rigour, until they submitted to his authority. Ali followed up these orders so strictly, in face of Ras-ool-Khyma, Jazerat-ool-Hamra, Fasht, and Shargah, not permitting a boat to attempt the pearl fishery or a commercial voyage, that the inhabitants of all these places, with the exception of the first, were reduced to the last extremity, and obliged to acknowledge the supremacy of the Imaum, A. H. 1176 (A. D. 1763).

The Chiefs of Ras-ool-Khyma bore the blockade for a year longer, at the end of which time three of these, Sugur bin Rashid, Mahomed bin Ali, and Abdoolla bin Matar, proceeded to Rastag, to Imaum Ahmed,





and entreated that they might be relieved from the persecuting attacks of Ali bin Suif; that he would be satisfied with complete possession of the other towns, and allow them to enjoy the revenues of Ras-ool-Khyma, as a stipend for the support of the chiefs of their tribes. The Imaum granted their petition, and favoured them with gifts, and robes of honour. In this state affairs remained till the Imaum's decease, A. H. 1185 (A. D. 1771).

During two years after the succession of his son Sued, the affairs of the Hinavi languished. In A. D. 1775, the Joasim attacked the whole of Sir, and took possession of Jazerat-ool-Hamra and Shargah, and Ramse and Khurfakhan also, A. H. 1189.

Jaud, the son of Sued, dispossessed his father of power, and in A. H. 1200 (A. D. 1786) advanced against the Joasim, and re-took Khurfakhan and Jazerat-ool-Hamra, and besieged Ramse. He left Mahomed bin Khalfan in charge of the naval armament, and proceeding himself by land to the southward, reached Jabal-ool-Akhdhar, where, after some little stay, he died.

To this prince succeeded his uncle Sultan bin Ahmed bin Sued, a weak and incompetent ruler, in whose reign the Joasim re-possessioned themselves of all Sir, except Khasab, and the other towns of the Shihiiyyin.

The successor of this prince was his nephew Badr bin Halal, who found himself overpowered by the increased strength of the Joasim, who had become sectaries of the Wahabee faith, and were supported by the arms of its Head. The power of piracy was now daily gaining vigour, when Badr was murdered, and gave room for the succession of his nephew Sued bin Sultan, the present Imaum, who has continued to lose his influence and territorial possession on every side.

This historical abstract shows that the Hinavi, of which tribe the Yarabi and Syudi were branches, were the first Arabian settlers in Oman; that the Ghafiri, of which the Joasim are a branch, entered the province after the power of the Hinavi was perfectly established; that they submitted to the dominion of these; and that the Hinavi retained the supremacy over the whole of Oman, with few intervals of supersession, from the age of Imaum Malik, the founder of the Arab power in this province, till nearly the close of the eighteenth century.

The Province of Oman extends from Ras-ool-Hud to the extremity of the ports of the Beni-yas, and covers nearly two thousand square miles. It is divided into four districts,—Sir, Dhahirah, Hajar, and Batinah. The district of Sir extends from Musseldom to the end of the ports of the Beni-yas, along the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf, a depth inland of fifty or sixty miles.



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## DHABIRAH.

The district of Dhahirah, or the interior, has for its northernmost boundaries Sir and Ras-ool-Khyma, and contains the following towns, and inferior dependencies:—Boraimi, Ghabbi, Obra, Dhang, Bahla, Naziva, Jaalan, Sir, and Madrikah. The part of this district lying between Bahla, Naziva, and Madrikah is called the eastern division, or Baladoosh Shargiyyah.

## HAJAR.

The second midland district, Hajar, or the Rocky, occupies a chain of mountains, extending north and south through the centre of the Province of Oman, commencing at Muskat, and terminating in the sea at the promontory of Ras-ool-Jabal. It contains the towns and lordships of Rastag, the ancient capital of Oman; Jabal-ool-Akhdhar, Sama-il-Badbad, Hajar, and Dabba.

## BATINAH.

The third, or maritime division, called Batinah, is situated between Hajar and the sea. It is very fertile, and abounds in vegetable productions, and fruits of all kinds; and is well watered by running streams. It contains the towns and lordships of Sohar, Shinas, Mudhliah, Birkah, and Muskat.\*

## TRIBES OF OMAN.

The tribes of Oman are the Banu Noaimi, of 20,000 effective men, most of whom are shepherds, and live south-westward of Boraimi. A division of these, 400 in number, is settled at Ayman, near Shargah; Beni Katab, 8,000, within two days of Boraimi; Beni Kaab, 4,000, a branch of the Noaimi, dwell in Dhahirah, near Obra, one day to the eastward of it; Durua, 20,000, in Hajar, near Jabal-ool-Akhdhar, half a day to the north of this place; Ali Wahaibah, 30,000, twelve miles south of Rastag; Beni Mohair, 1,000 men, one day inland south of Shargah; Matarish, 500 men, nine miles south of Boo Haile, in the interior.


## MUSKAT, AND THE ADJOINING COUNTRY.

Muskat, the capital and commercial emporium of the Imaum's possessions, is situated in lat. 23° 28' N., long. 59° 19' E.

Muskat is surrounded by steep rocks, on whose rugged superficies

\* Mutrah is the best watering-place; but water is also to be had on almost any part of this coast.





not a sign of vegetation is to be seen. These, however, form its chief security; bearing on their sides and summits forts and towers impregnable except to heavy cannon, and accessible only by the narrowest paths. The town, built close to the water's edge, is walled towards the interior, and may be defended against the Arabs; but should the enemy gain a footing within the mountain passes, it would be in their power to intercept the supply of water, which is drawn from a deep well at the distance of half a mile from Muskat, and is thence conveyed, by an aqueduct, to a reservoir near the cove, where, at high-water, casks conveyed in a ship's boat may be replenished.

Although Muskat, both by nature and art, is strong towards the land side, little difficulty would probably be experienced, by a small force, in cutting out of the port, or destroying by fire, all vessels which might anchor there.

Refreshments are procurable in tolerable plenty; fish in great abundance; the beef and mutton, too, are of a very good quality.

The town of Muskat, from the want of a free circulation of air, and the proximity of a swamp, is very unhealthy; while the coasts of Persia and Arabia in general are, fortunately, the reverse.

The atmosphere in this climate, during summer, is intensely hot, but being free from moisture, and hence not admitting of the occurrence of disease, is supportable; in the winter months the temperature of the air is delightful.

Muskat Road is open, the water deep, and the bottom loose and rocky; indeed it is one of the most insecure anchorages existing.

The cove affords better shelter, but even this is not a desirable situation for a ship, as the north-west winds blow directly into it; yet the underlow prevents ships from riding with a heavy strain on their cables.


About six miles NW. by W. of Muskat lies Muskat Island; it has deep water on all sides, within which a frigate may pass at the distance of half a cable, carrying fourteen and a half fathoms. The Beloochees call it Ringole, and the Arabs Fahel.

Standing to the westward, the barren hills of Muskat are left behind, and the shore presents a sandy, level surface, covered with plantations of date trees.

#### BURKA.

Twelve or thirteen leagues W. by N. of Muskat lies Burka, the summer residence of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, which is defended by a fortified work, originally constructed by the Portuguese, but having no ditch; and being, in consequence, untenable for six hours against artillery, can serve merely to awe the surrounding Arab States, who entertain a high opinion of its strength. It in fact commands





## KHURFAKHAN—THE INTERIOR.

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the whole of Batinah, or lowland region to the southward of Siuk, and as the town is situated within a day's journey of the entrance into Dhahirah, it of necessity becomes a place of considerable trade, and communication with that quarter. Within its environs, grapes are procurable during five, and fresh dates for six months of the year; and in their respective seasons mangoes and gnavas, peaches and apricots, melons and plantains, may be purchased through the year.

As the ground in Burka roads is loose, it becomes necessary that ships should anchor in a position which will enable them to clear the shore, under sail, in the event of parting from their cables. Six islands north-westward of Burka are called Sawardi, and seven others, to the eastward, are termed Damani; on the easternmost of the Sawardi islands, which are perfectly barren, there is a brackish well, cut deep in the rock; it possesses, too, a good harbour; nor is the navigation dangerous, except between the westernmost island and the shore.

## KHURFAKHAN.

Leaving Burka, and passing a group of islets, bearing its name, the coast hollows into a deep bay, Khurfakhan, in lat. 25° 20' N. It is covered with date trees, has a sandy beach, and is free from danger. The lowland continues several miles, to the foot of mountains, which rise to a great height, on the tips of some of which snow has been seen in the month of January. At various distances along the shore, of from five to ten miles, are seen villages and towns, many of which are defended by a solitary tower. The soundings on this coast are regular, but it is nevertheless not advisable to approach the shore in the months of November, December, and January, during the prevalence of the strong south-east winds peculiar to this season of the year; indeed this coast is without the regular track of ships passing between the western side of India and the Persian Gulf.

## THE INTERIOR.

We will now pass from this delineation of the line of coast to a description of the interior portions of the same extent of country. The chain of elevated rocks which overhang the town, having nearly enclosed the cove of Muskat, recedes from the sea, and from the boundary of the sandy plain of Mattrah, to the extent of ten miles, as measured along their semicircular base; and at five miles from hence forms the narrow pass of Riu, which, independent of occasional watch-towers erected along the line of approach, over the rocks, is fortified by a mud wall and ramparts, in which there is a gateway sufficiently commodious. At this point, the chain separates into two ridges, one of which recedes towards the Dhahirah, and the other, approaching the ocean during a





course of four miles, at length enters it, and forms the Point Kurnah. The inland ridge, after shaping a vast and lofty amphitheatre, bedded with sand, broken into rough stony ground near its base, presents a bold and precipitous boundary to the Persian Gulf near Amsandam. This plain is called Batinah, to distinguish it from Hajar, or the hilly country, and is productive of dates, clover, maize, barley, the indigo plant, and all the tropical fruits and vegetables; much inferior, however, in flavour and quantity to those reared in Hajar: the former is artificially irrigated by numerous wells, while the cultivated tracts of the latter abound in springs of water, and are intersected by rivulets. The Native inhabitants of Batinah invariably present a countenance deeply tinged with the yellow hue of disease, and a gaunt, meagre form. Ethiopians and Hindoos, however, enjoy better health in this unfavourable region.

To re-touch in detail the sketch of the tract of country we have just examined, it remains to be observed, that from Muskat to Sir, with the exception of the flat on which Mattrah is situated, the whole intervening space is occupied by an unbroken mass of rocks far distant from the sea. Thence, however, to Burka and Shinas, the country opens into a semicircular plain, extending, in depth, for nearly two days' journey, towards the foot of its stupendous boundary, and admitting throughout of favourable cultivation. From Shinas to Khurfakhan, the mountains encroach so considerably on the lowland as only to leave occasional sandy hollows for the labours of the husbandman; but thence to Ras-ool-Jabal the waves lash their base, and the enormous mass, ascending perpendicularly above the ocean, admits of a ship passing directly beneath its pinnacle.

#### SOHAR, SHINAS CASTLE, KHURFAKHAN, AND DABBA.

To return to the point whence we digressed, we must remark Sohar, a town in lat.  $24^{\circ} 21' N.$ , about twenty-two leagues NW. by W. from Burka Island. It is a place of some strength, and forms the frontier against the clan Ghafiri. The next remarkable spot we reach is Shinas Castle, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 45' N.$ , and distant nearly nine leagues in a NNW. direction. To this succeeds the small cove of Khurfakhan, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 20' N.$ ; and next Dabba, distant from Julfar only half a day's journey, across the cape, which hence juts forth into the sea, and contributes to form the narrow entrance of the Persian Gulf.

#### THE OMAN.

The Oman extends from Ras-ool-Hud to Ras-ool-Khyma, and is ruled by the two tribes Hinavi and Ghafiri; to the first of which, under fealty to the Chiefs of the house of Syudi, belongs the district extending





## MUSSELDOM—AMSANDAM.

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from Ras-ool-Hud to Dabba; and the last, under their Lords of the branch Qawasim, possesses the remainder of the extent, from the lastmentioned place as far as Ras-ool-Khyma.

## CAPE MUSSELDOM, AND AMSANDAM ISLAND.

The cape or promontory above mentioned is called by the Natives Musseldom, and is formed by a chain of rocky mountains, commencing on its eastern side, in about lat.  $25^{\circ} 53'$  N., and terminating in the sea at the headland of this name. The whole of this promontory is deeply indented with wide fissures, and affords several secure anchorages. A large island, admitting a creek named Amsandam, which is situated in lat.  $26^{\circ} 22' 30''$  N., directly north-east of the promontory, forms, with the main, a channel impassable to ships from its extreme narrowness, whose depth, however, is never less than sixteen fathoms.

It has undoubtedly been riven asunder from the rocky main in some convulsion of nature, to its extreme point. The Natives have given it the name of Ras-ool-Jabal, and British navigators that of Cape Musseldom.

Amsandam is intersected by a creek running inwards for a day's journey, and its inhabitants are a part of the tribe Shihiyyin, consisting of three thousand men, who profess Mahomedanism, but are unobservant of its forms and ceremonies to the last degree, and, in fact, will entertain no religious instructors. The Chief of the Wahabees was long unable to convert them to their systems of either religion or piracy, nor would they pay him tribute. Their language is different from that of the other tribes, and as there are many individuals among them remarkable for the redness of their hair, it may fairly be concluded, as the Arabs declare, that their language is formed from corruptions of the dialects of their Portuguese and Danish ancestors, engrafted on an impure stock of the Arabic. Both these nations have settlements on Amsandam, and also at Khasab, a bay to the westward of the promontory, on the main, where there was, and exists also at present, a flourishing manufactory of cloth, of a peculiar sort, which has long been used as wrappers for head and loins throughout the two shores of the Gulf. Khasab, too, is said to contain descendants of the Portuguese, in the humble capacity of fishermen.

Three small islands, or rather large rocks, dry and barren, lie to the northward of Cape Musseldom, and are by the Arabs named Salamah. The northernmost, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 29' 30''$  N., is ten miles distant from the cape, and lies due north from the east end of Amsandam, which lies in lat.  $26^{\circ} 22' 30''$  N. The water near the rocks is deep, and the channel between them and the main wide, and free from danger. The tides, however, run here with considerable, and even dangerous rapidity. The Ghanam Islands lie off Khasab.





## TRIBE SHIHIYYIN.

From this cape to the first pirate port at Ramse, on a line of coast of little more than fifteen leagues in extent, lie, at small distances from each other, five towns belonging to the Tribe Shihiyyin, who also possess Amsandam to the eastward of the cape. These towns are named Dar Sinni, Khasab, Jadi, Julfar, and Boka. From Amsandam to Dar Sinni is three Furseekhhs to the south; thence to Khasab four; thence to Jadi two; and lastly to Boka four. Of these Khasab is now the largest; and Julfar, at which the Portuguese once entertained an establishment, protected by a fort, for the purpose of pearl fishing, is the next in size. They are occupied by the stationary and more civilized part of the tribe, who are employed in pearl fishing, in trade, and in agriculture. Their food consists of dates, wheat, barley, meat, and fish, in abundance. The remainder of the tribe is employed in gaining a precarious livelihood, by fishing in the small bays on the coast, or in the islands at the head of the cape, or else, in the character of pastoral Arabs, wandering over the arid and barren rocks of the interior portion of this country, which afford a scanty supply of burnt vegetation for their flocks. These people live on milk and cheese, and dates also, and some little fish, which they procure from their lowland clansmen on the coast, in exchange for the produce of their flocks, which are numerous. The male adults of this tribe are said to amount to fourteen thousand; are the constant and persevering enemies of the Joasim, friendly to Muskat, and easily conciliated. Their pearl fishery is worth 3,000 Tomans yearly, and they have a fleet of two hundred and fifty small boats.

## PIRATE PORTS.


## RAMSE, &amp;c.

Hence we enter on the Pirate Ports at Ramse, southward of Mussel-don, in lat. 25° 33' N., at two days' journey from Khasab. The town is composed of four hundred houses, under the government of Shaikh Abdurrahman bin Saleh, of the Tribe Tannay; and hence to Mahhara, a small village of a hundred houses, under Hussan bin Ali Tannaiye, is four Furseekhhs. Two miles off shore is here found a depth of four and a half fathoms; the anchorage is in four and a half fathoms, sand, with Ramse town SE. by E. three miles, and Ras-ool-Khyma six miles distant.

Now the chain of rocky mountains, which formed the promontory of



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## PIRATE PORTS.

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Ras-ool-Jabal, retires from the sea, forming low sandy plains, and the depth of water begins to decrease.

From hence to Shargah the coast is generally low, and thinly planted with date trees, and full of shallow creeks, well calculated to afford protection to the peculiarly constructed boats of the pirate tribes. That of Ramse is particularly safe, from a bar at its entrance, on which the surf breaks heavily. To ships it were hazardous to approach this coast during the prevalence of a north-west wind, lest they become embayed; no danger, however, is apparent to the eye between Mussel-don and Boo Haile, a line of shore nearly thirty leagues in extent. The whole of this southern shore of the Gulf, which is very imperfectly known, even by tradition, to European hydrographers, is said to abound in shoals, with a bottom generally of coral and sand, and bearing, as far as Grane, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 12' N.$ , beds of the richest pearls in the universe.

## RAS-OO-L-KHYMA.

At a distance of seven miles further, lat.  $25^{\circ} 48' N.$ , and long.  $56^{\circ} 4' E.$  we reach Ras-ool-Khyma, the centre of the Pirate Ports, and their chief town, containing a thousand houses. It bears SW.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W. from the Great Quoin, about fifty-five miles distant. The town is situated on a point of land projecting into the sea, in a north-east direction, and terminating in a bank, extending itself parallel with the coast to the westward, at the distance of two and two and a half miles off shore, with two, two and a quarter, and two and a half fathoms, hard sand, upon it. Within this point is a deep, narrow bay, which first takes a south-westerly direction, to the back of the town, along which the Dows and larger boats are sheltered, and hence proceeds further inwards in a south-easterly line. The entrance to the bay is shallow, and impeded by a strip of land, extending obliquely from the point towards the opposite shore, and forming a bar on which, at spring tides, there is scarcely eleven feet water, although at these periods there is a rise of six feet above the usual level. Small vessels, however, or gun-boats, drawing not more than three feet water, may advance within pistol-shot of the beach, and much within point-blank range of the town; but it is not safe for vessels of fourteen feet draught to approach under two and a half or three miles. The best anchorage is six fathoms, soft sand, the Point bearing SE. about four miles.

## AMULGAVINE, EJMAN, &amp;c.

Eleven miles SW. by W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W. of Ras-ool-Khyma is situated a small, low, sandy island, containing four hundred houses, defended by bastions, erected in the most commanding positions. It is insular only at high-





water, as at other times the western end is nearly connected with the main, and is called by the Arabs Jazirat-ool-Hamra. Anchorage in three fathoms, sand; with extreme of Hamra from Ras-ool-Khyma ENE. to SW.; centre of the town SE. Between this and Shargah lie the small ports and villages of Amulgavine, Ejman, and Fasht, all defended by towers held by musketeers. The first of these intermediate places consists of a group of four villages, containing together dwellings, belonging to the tribe Ahli Ali, under Shaikh Majed bin Sultan. It lies four leagues SW. by W. of the Jazira, between which and Shargah (which lies in lat.  $25^{\circ} 24' N.$ , eleven leagues south-west of that place) the coast, at five miles from Amulgavine, takes a more southerly direction.

## SHARGAH.

Shargah has five fathoms at a quarter of a mile off shore; the anchorage is with the town and fort from ESE. to SE., distant three miles, in seven fathoms. It is defended by towers, without cannon, and a frigate may approach to within two cables length of the shore, to the westward of the town; but as the soundings are irregular, it is probable there are hidden dangers.

The piratical Dows lie in a small lagoon to the westward of the town. A bank of sand, thrown up along this coast by the violence of the sea, forms a good parapet for the Native matchlockmen.

## BOO HAILE.

Three leagues south-west of Shargah lies Boo Haile, a town of two hundred houses, defended by towers, under Shaikh Ali Mahomed, of the tribe Matarish.

## KHOR HUSSAN.

At two days hence are the Khiran Beniyas, or ports lying along an extent of coast from Shargah to Huailah, a station one day's journey south of Khor Hussan, a port and town near the island of Bahrein, on which villages are very thinly scattered for two days' journey along the sea shore. This district stretches inland also for the same distance.

## THE BENIYAS.

The Beniyas are a pastoral clan, of the province of Oman. They inhabit a part of its northernmost district, called Sir, which is of a very sandy, barren soil. It is divided into three branches; one called Beniyas, another Manasir, and a third Owaimir. Those who dwell in the interior possess camels of the finest breed; while those on the coast have boats of a light construction, each carrying four persons, and equipped for fishing; the produce of which is taken to the town of



## PIRATE PORTS.

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Lahsa for sale. Their pearl fishery is accounted to produce yearly 10,000 Tomans. They do not commit piracies on the high seas, but take advantage of the approach of the smallest boats to their coast, and seize them; for which reason their conduct is not so openly stigmatized as that of the other inhabitants of Sir. They have small date groves dispersed among their sand hillocks, which yield a scanty supply of fruit, and amidst which they live during the summer, until their crop is consumed. In this season, the water is very brackish, and in the wintry months the shepherds ascend Lahsa and Qutar, to find pasture for their cattle. They can furnish twenty thousand excellent musketeers.

## HUAILAH.

Huailah lies to the southward, by one day's journey, of Khor Hassan, and is a small station of Baddoos. Its maritime population exists by pearl fishing, while that of the interior follows the occupation of husbandmen, and are less impoverished than their clansmen on the sea coast.

## ZUKHIRAH.

The port Zukhirah, under Shaikh Nasir bin Salmin, in common with the other ports of the Arabian shore, fish for pearls.

## KHOR HASSAN.

From hence three days' journey lies Khor Hassan, the former retreat of Shaikh Rahmah bin Jabir Yalahimi, a tribe derived from Nujd. The town is composed of 400 houses, among which his own is conspicuous, from its height, and from the upper story bearing the appearance of a fortification, pierced with loopholes for the convenience of musketry. Towers, too, are erected for its defence. The port within has two fathoms at high-water, and two or three feet at low-water. Ships cannot approach nearer than two or three miles, but the large Native boats come within musket-shot of the shore. The anchorage is rocky, and exposed to the north-west wind, which excites a tremendous swell. Within the space of twelve hours, five thousand Baddoos may be marched down from the interior to defend the coast.

## ZOBARA.

Near this is the port of Zobara, the inhabitants of which are allied to those of Khor Hassan; it has a town of 400 houses.

## OGAIR.

Ogair lies opposite to the island of Bahrein, and may be esteemed the chief seaport of the Wahabees. A custom house, at which all imports direct for Lahsa and Dareyah are landed, is established at this place, as their conveyance to their several destinations by land is thus





greatly shortened. All merchandize pays here ten per cent., date grounds and agricultural produce generally twenty per cent. It can boast of only forty or fifty dwellings. Hence to Dareyah six days, during two of which no water is procurable.

## KATEEF, &amp;c.

From Ogair to Kateef two days. This is a considerable seaport town, whither merchandize is brought for the interior of Arabia. A strong fort defends the town and port, and from fifty to sixty villages are scattered, at some distance from each other, containing individually about two hundred houses. From Ogair to Kateef the inhabitants are Arabs of the Uttoobee tribe; and thence to Grane is a sandy tract of country, inhabited by Baddoos. The territory intervening between Huailah and Kateef is called Beri Gattar. From Kateef to Fantas, near Grane, is half a day. From Grane the district is called Adan, and is inhabited by Baddoos; opposite to which lies the island of Jarim, on the banks of which the Amaeer tribe of Arabs fish for pearls from spring to autumn, and during the rest of the year lead a pastoral life.

The tribes inhabiting the Pirate Ports are allied, by common descent, to those Arab families who subsist under the Persian Government, on the opposite shore, at the ports of Tahiri, Aseeloo, Naabund, Congoon, Nakheeloo, Cheeroo, Charak, Sertes, Mogoo, Bastion, Shinas, Lingah, and Koong. Of these stations, Charak has shown itself most hostile to us; the rest are comparatively innocent; which in them, and indeed in every petty tribe of the Gulf, results rather from weakness and a dread of our power than from a deficiency of inclination to a life of piracy, or a conviction of its lawless character.

Of the coast on which these ports are situated, and their islands, Captain Seton, formerly Resident at Muskat, speaks as follows:—Of those islands in the Persian Gulf which are known to our navigators, the greater part have wood, water, antelopes, and wild goats; they have also verdure in the rainy season, and in some of them the Natives weave a coarse cloth of cotton. Surdy has large plantations of date trees, some wild apple and banian trees, with water, and firewood. Polior has few date trees, but a great abundance of wild thorn for firewood, and some water. Bomosa is less fertile than the two above mentioned, but possesses in a small degree the produce indigenous to the other two islands. All of them are frequented by the inhabitants of the opposite coasts, who are left undisturbed in their possession.

Koong, Lingah, Shinas, and Mogoo are close to one another, and under the control of Guzeeb bin Sawood bin Guzeeb, nephew of Sultan Suggur, of Shargah. From Mogoo to Charak is governed by Abdool Rahman bin Suggur, not, however, the son of the Joasim Chieftain.





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From Charak to Ubeed, one day's journey, is in possession of the Humadee, who possess cattle of all kinds in abundance, and are extensive husbandmen. Their Shaikh is Shaikh Abdool Ruheem. From Ubeed to Cheeroo is two hours' journey, the Shaikh Hassun Yuheea Ubeedelee: they are employed in tillage, and tending their flocks; are the friends of Syud Sued. From Cheeroo to Nakheeloo is twelve hours' journey; Shaikh, Yoosuf bin Rahmah bin Sunnud Sulbookhee; friends to the Joasim, as Sultan Suggur has married the Shaikh's sister. They have date grounds, and cattle of all kinds, and also a pearl fishery, which gives employment to about 500 small boats, for each of which the owners pay one Toman, and one for every sailor. They pay the regulated duties on culture and captures to the Wahabees, besides a tax of about 24 Tomans yearly to the Persian Government. Charak also pays 30 Tomans, and Mogoo 25 Tomans; so that the total amount of Persian revenue collected between Koong and Nakheeloo does not exceed 100, or at most 150 Tomans yearly.

From Nakheeloo to Sheeoo is Shaikh Ullag Nusooree, who is at present at variance with the Joasim. Date trees, and cattle, and trade contribute to their sustenance.

At a short distance inland from the point which forms Cape Nabor, there is a spring called Beizu Khoon, the water of which is sweet, and abundant. There is also another a little upwards, called Bidbid, which overflows so much as to enable those who inhabit its banks to cultivate a large tract with grain, and palm trees. It is a pleasant, verdant spot, presenting at once a grateful and profitable contrast to the surrounding scenery.

## INDERABIA.

The island of Inderabia belongs to Hassan bin Yuheea, Shaikh of Cheeroo; while Busheab and Shitwar are in possession of Shaikh Yoosuf bin Rahmah of Nakheeloo. Inderabia and Busheab are inhabited, and on both is fabricated a coarse cotton cloth. Shitwar, however, is uninhabited. Aseeloo belongs to Shaikh Khulfan Hurumee, the inhabitants of which are traders, shepherds, and farmers, and friends to the Imaum of Muskat. They pay the Persians 300 Tomans yearly. They have twenty or thirty large boats, and some small ones for the pearl fishery. Their revenue arises from taxes on boats, and trade. They endeavour to encourage the resort of strangers. Tahiri is a large village, with date plantations, and cattle, in allegiance to Congoon. From this village there runs a mud wall, as far up to the hills as is supposed passable for troops, with six bastions at distances near the foot of it.





CONGOON.

Congoon is a large port and town belonging to Shaikh Mahomed Khatim Nusoorree, uncle to Shaikh Ullag. Its territory extends to a small village, at a short distance to the westward of it. It pays 1,000 Tomans yearly to the Persians. The possessions of all the Shaikhs on the Persian side extend, in some places one day's, in others two days' journey inland. As far westward as Charak may be considered as in the possession of the Joasim; thence to the head of the Gulf they are in general enemies or friends, as necessity and their interest dictate.

From Congoon to Bushire the sea coast belongs to the tribes Dashtee and Tangifseeree. The Shaikh of the former is Hussain Jemal, and of the latter Ahmed Shah. Their towns and villages are further inland than those of their more easterly neighbours. A few huts, at various distances, may be seen, before which the Natives draw up their boats when returned from fishing, or a mercantile venture. The people of Dashtistan and Tangistan are little employed at sea.

BOMOSA.

Bomosa lies eleven leagues NNW.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W. from Shargah, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 54' N$ . It is an uninhabited island, about five miles long, and is remarkable from a high round hill, which is in its centre. I have not been near enough to make particular remarks.

SURDY.

Surdy lies about the meridian of Polior, and the parallel of Bomosa; and is said to be much such another island as the latter.

POLIOR.

An uninhabited island, about five miles long, and four broad. It is hilly, with few or no trees; the water is deep around this island, but from its west end runs a long ledge of dangerous rocks.

Its north end is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 20' 30'' N$ ., and its south end in lat.  $26^{\circ} 16' N$ . This island is west of the Tombs, and is twelve leagues distant from the Little Tomb.

NOBFLEUR.

A small, uninhabited island, ten miles SSW. from Polior, with deep water between them. A ledge of rugged rock and breakers run from its western extremity.

This island is low, except a saddle hill nearly in the middle of it, and has no vegetation, except a few scrubbed plants.

KENN OR KASS.

Kenn or Kass is a low, level island, well planted with trees. It was



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inhabited a few years ago, when the attacks of Joasim pirates compelled the families it contained to seek refuge on the opposite shore. Water is to be procured on its north-east end, where the town stands. It is separated from the main by a channel, said to be five miles wide, and free from danger.

This island, being low, and rocks lying off some parts of it, must be neared with caution in the night.

Its southern extremity, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 27' N.$ , is situated about ten leagues W. by N.  $\frac{1}{4} N.$  from the south end of Polior.

## INDERABIA.

Inderabia is a low, level, narrow island, with a few trees on it; is about three miles long. The strait which divides it from the main is three miles wide, and is said to be clear of danger, as is the channel between Kenn or Kass, and the main, which is considerably wider.

Ships running for shelter under this must not approach its south-east end within one mile, until a remarkable tree, which stands by itself, bears WNW.

The south end of Inderabia is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 40' N.$ , and the island is about seven leagues distant from Kenn.

## BUSHEAB.

Busheab, subject to the Shaikh of Nakheeloo, is an inhabited island of moderate height, level, and with some groves of date trees. There is a fine pearl fishery round the island.

It may be sixteen miles in length, and five or six miles broad.

This island is separated from the main by a channel of considerable width, particularly at its western end, from which runs a long ledge of rocks. It is said that rocks lie off its south-east end.

## SHITWAR.

Shitwar, a sandy islet, without trees, is close to the east end of Busheab; between them is a channel, through which you have not less than three fathoms.

Between Shitwar and the Persian Coast there is a channel five miles broad; as the bottom is rocky hereabouts, the soundings irregular towards the main, and some rippings, it is not improbable there are hidden dangers.

The south-east end of Shitwar lies in lat.  $26^{\circ} 47' N.$ , and is thirteen or fourteen leagues from the outer part of Kenn or Kass.

## NAKHEELOO,

A town under the domination of the Wahabees, is situated on the Persian shore, opposite to the island of Shitwar, and within a point





which in the charts is represented to form, with the main, the entrance of the Derabin river.

It has a square fort, with four towers, and there is a town independent of the fort. Our boats carried in regular soundings, and it appears that a frigate could anchor within shot of the town; but as it lies in a hook of land, the anchorage is wholly exposed to north-west winds.

CHEEROO.

A village subject to the Shaikh of Nakheeloo; about four miles SE. of that town. Between these places the shore is abrupt, and therefore ships should not stand under fifteen fathoms, when they will be within three quarters of a mile from the land.

I have had too little experience of the coast to the northward to give any particular remarks: the directions by McCluer, for avoiding the Verdistan Shoal, appear to be good; but in that gentleman's chart of the head of the Persian Gulf the shoal-water is carried further from Bushire than the truth.

ISLAND OF BAHREIN.

The Island of Bahrein lies opposite to the port of Ogair, is thirty-three miles in extreme breadth, and seventy in extreme length, covering about eight hundred square miles. The Chiefs of the Beni Itbah, a foreign tribe of Arabs from Grane (or Koweit), have governed its aboriginal inhabitants for more than thirty-five years with absolute power. Not so, however, their Uttoobee brethren, who yield to superior authority with difficulty. The revenue collected by them amounts to the yearly sum of 100,000 Tomans, of which 20,000 Tomans is the original revenue, and 80,000 Tomans consist of arbitrary impositions of the governors. The pearl fishery produces to them 100,000 Tomans, of 12 Piastres Roomee each, which is divided among the members of the tribe in proportions, according to their rank and consequence.

Their fishing-boats amount to 1,400 sail, of which 700 are of larger burthen, 300 intermediate, and 400 of a small size. The larger are manned by one master, fourteen divers, and fourteen assistants, in all twenty-nine men; the intermediate with one master, nine divers, and nine assistants, in all nineteen men; the least with one master, seven divers, and seven assistants, in all fifteen men. The portions of the fishery are four to the master, and two to the divers; the assistants receive for the season a settled pay of from five to six Tomans. The fishermen borrow for their support, from noted bankers, amounts both of money and grain, on which these gain a profit of thirty per cent., or





more, as circumstances may influence. The larger crews require 100 Tomans in the year, the intermediate 50 Tomans, and the least 30 Tomans. The modes of payment and indemnification are as has been related of the people of Ras-ool-Khyma. The Governor of Bahrein levies a convoy duty on the pearl fleet of 2 Tomans yearly from each boat, all of which are escorted by seven war Bugalows during the fishing season.

The aboriginal inhabitants of Bahrein, now subjected to a foreign power, suffer from the tyranny of their masters more keenly than language can express. The island abounds in water, the date, and other fruit trees. The Bahreinees are 10,000 in number. The number and names of the Uttoobees and their allies are as follows: Al Khulefe, the Governor, 600 souls; Ali Zanyed, 1,200; Ali Mauzeed, 2,000; Ali Muhavideh, 3,000; Ali Sulaim, 3,000; Ali Mao Sullim, 1,000; Ali Sumait, 900; slaves, 2,000; total number of Uttoobees and others, 13,600 souls.

There is considerable difference of opinion as to the origin of the first inhabitants of Bahrein. Some authors assert that they were ancient Persians, who, after a long residence, adopted the dialect of the inhabitants of the nearest coast; while others declare that they were descended from the Arab Tribe of Thamud, one of the oldest in Arabia (1900 B. C.), who were driven out of Yemen, or Arabia Felix, by Saba, son of Hamyar, into Hajar, or Arabia Petraea, and passed at length into Awal (Bahrein) subsequent to their dispersion by the Almighty for their want of religious faith.

Some centuries previous to Mahomedanism (A. D. 420), the idolatrous Natives were the governors of the island; but when Bahram, of the last or Sassanian dynasty of Persian Kings, achieved his partial conquest of the Arabs (A. D. 615), he possessed himself of it, and nominated a governor from the royal presence, who retained his seat until the era of the mission of Mahomed.

At this period the government of the island of Bahrein reverted to the original people, and remained with them as late as the reign of Keshan bin Abdool Malik, who vanquished them in the commencement of the eighth century (A. D. 723), and placed over them a ruler of the Oommiyyad branch of the Tribe Koraish.

They continued thus under a foreign power until the close of the Abbaside dynasty, in the eleventh century, when they again became subject to chiefs of their own race, until the sixteenth century, in the age of the Saffis (or Sophis), who took Bahrein, and deputed a Persian nobleman to the office of governor. During an interval of twenty years at this period, about the middle of the seventeenth century, Suif bin Sultan, the Yarabi, retained the island under subjection; when, in





the latter part of the same century, it was reduced by the Generals of Sultan Sulaiman the Sophi, and continued to recognise the authority of this dynasty until its close in the early part of the succeeding, or eighteenth century, in the person of Shah Sultan Hussein. Sultan the son of Suif next became possessed of the island, after a bloody and obstinate resistance; and retained the supreme authority until he was driven out by Nadir Shah, under whose power it remained until his death.

After this, during a period of fifty-seven years, it passed into the hands of four different chiefs of districts on the Persian shore of the Gulf, at no great distance from each other. The first of these was Jabara bin Yasir the Nasiri, surnamed Nasuri, Shaikh of Tahiri, who held it fourteen years; next, the family of the Shaikhs of Abooshahar retained the government for thirty years; after them, Mahomed bin Jabir, of the family of Haram Shaikhs of Aseeloo, for five years; from whom, after a sanguinary contest, it reverted once more to the Shaikhs of Abooshahar, for eight succeeding years, when the Uttoobees wrested the island from the Shaikhs of Abooshahar, and have retained it ever since.

The celebrated traveller Carsten Niebuhr gives the following more particular account of these sudden revolutions in the government of this island :—

“ Within the last few years Bahrein has had many masters. It once belonged to the Portuguese, who were deprived of it by the Shaikh of Lahsa. He was himself in turn obliged to deliver it up to the Persians, who took the island headed by Imaum Kuli Khan, Governor of Ormus, in the name of a king of the Saffi dynasty. A Prince of Oman now possessed himself of it; but ceded it to the Persians for a sum of money, through the intervention of Shaikh Mahomed Majid, who was still governor of it at the period of the Afghan invasion of Persia, and was at his death succeeded by his son, Shaikh Ahmed. The citadel, or principal fortress of the island, had at this time a distinct and different commandant, on the part of the Sophis of Persia, one of whom, Mahomed Kuli Khan, who had succeeded a former officer in this charge, delivered the surrounding territory to Shaikh Mahomed Majid, of Naband (Nabor), of the race of Haram. From him it was taken by Jabara-al-Nasur, Shaikh of Tahiri, also of this family of Haram.

“ While Nadir Shah maintained a naval force in the Persian Gulf, Taki Khan, Beglerbeg of Fars, reduced the island, and appointed a commandant of the citadel; but the moment that Taki Khan had proceeded to Oman with the fleet, Jabara reconquered the whole domain, except the citadel, which the commandant bravely defended, until





Kasim bin Jabir of Aseeloo came to his aid, and enabled him to drive Jabara from the island.

"At this time, however, as the public troubles of Persia were daily increasing, Mahomed bin Jaber, of Aseeloo, and of the race of Haram, brought the island under his own power, but was dispossessed of it by the united powers of Mir Nasr of Bender Rig, and Shaikh Nasr of Abooshahar. The first of these established a superiority over the second; and he was in turn driven out by the tribe Haram, who were themselves obliged to yield at length to Shaikh Nasr of Abooshahar. This chief, after many successive changes in the result of his military operations against the tribes Beni Hul and Haram, finally succeeded in making himself master of the island." (A. D. 1765.)

With regard to this island, Justamond, in his History of the East and West Indies, has this striking and remarkable passage:—

"This Company (the English East India) have never attempted to establish themselves on the island of Bahrein, which we are at a loss to account for. This island, which lies in the Persian Gulf, has often changed its masters. It fell, with Ormus, under the dominion of the Portuguese, and was governed by the same laws. These conquerors were afterwards deprived of it, and it has since undergone a variety of revolutions.

"Tahmasp Koly Khan restored it to Persia, to which it had belonged. His death put a period to his vast designs, and the confusion into which his empire was thrown afforded a fair opportunity to an ambitious and enterprising Arab of taking possession of Bahrein, where he still maintains his authority.

"This island, famous for its pearl fishery, even at the time when pearls were found at Ormus, Karel, Kishen, and other places in the Gulf, is now become of much greater consequence, the other banks having been exhausted, while those near it have suffered no sensible diminution. The time of fishing begins in April, and ends in October. It is confined to a tract of four or five leagues. The Arabs, who alone follow this employment, pass their nights upon the island or the coast, unless they are prevented by the wind from going on shore. They formerly paid a toll, which was received by the galliots on that station. Since the last changes, none but the inhabitants of this island pay this acknowledgment to their chief, who is not in a condition to demand it from others.

"The pearls taken at Bahrein, though not so white as those of Ceylon and Japan, are much larger than those of the former place, and of a more regular shape than those of the latter. They are of a yellowish cast, but have this recommendation, that they preserve their golden hue; whereas the whiter kind lose much of their lustre by keeping,





particularly in hot countries. The shell of both these species, which is known by the name of mother-o'-pearl, is used in Asia for various purposes.

"The annual revenue arising from the fishery in the latitude of Bahrein is computed at 3,600,000 livres (£157,500). The greatest part of the pearls that are uneven are carried to Constantinople, and other ports of Turkey, where the larger compose part of the ornaments of the head-dress, and the smaller are used in works of embroidery. The perfect pearls are of course reserved for Surat, from whence they are distributed throughout all Hindoostan. The women have so strong a passion for this luxury, and the sale of this article is so much increased by superstition, that there is not the least reason to apprehend any diminution either in the price or the demand. There are none of the Gentiles, who do not make it a point of religion to bore at least one pearl at the time of their marriage. Whatever may be the mysterious meaning of this custom, among a people whose morality and politics are couched in allegories, or where allegory becomes religion, this emblem of virgin modesty has proved advantageous to the pearl trade."

At a time when the revenue from the pearl banks of Bahrein alone was at the lowest point, under the Shaikhs of Bushire, from the weakness and imperfection of their tenure and government, Neibuhr thus speaks of it:—

"Bahrein is said at one time to have contained 365 towns and villages; but at present there is only one fortified town on the island, Awal (Bahrein), and not more than forty or fifty villages on the neighbouring islets. The remainder have doubtless been destroyed by the continual wars which have infested this country. The pearl fishery of these isles is still celebrated, but as the tribe Hul pay little or nothing for the permission to fish, the revenues of the Shaikh of Abooshahar, on account of the fishery and the date grounds, amount to no more than Rs. 100,000.

"Many persons who have been on these islands have assured me that excellent spring-water is found in a depth of two and a half fathoms, at some distance from the shore; and that the fishermen constantly dive to that depth, to replenish their jars."

Tavernier says:—"In the first place, there is a pearl fishery round the island of Bahrein, in the Persian Gulf, which belongs to the King of Persia, and there is a good fortress, garrisoned with three hundred men. The water they use in this island, and also on the Persian Coast, is salt, and of a bad taste, and it is only the Natives of the country that can drink it. With respect to strangers, it costs them a considerable sum to get it good, for they have to draw it from the sea, at a distance of from half a league to two leagues beyond the island. Those that go to





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fetch it are commonly five or six, in a bark, from which one or two of them dive to the bottom of the sea, having a bottle or two hung at their girdles, which they fill with water, and then cork them tight; for at about two or three feet from the bottom of the sea the water is sweet, and of the very best quality. When those who are let down have filled their bottles, they pull a small cord, which has one end fastened to some person in the boat, and it serves as a signal for their comrades to draw them up.

"While the Portuguese were in possession of Ormus and Muskat, every Terate or bark that went out to fish was obliged to have a passport, which cost fifteen Abbasees, and they continually employed several brigantines to sink those that had not got them; but since the Arabs have retaken Muskat, and the Portuguese have no strength in the Gulf, every man that goes a fishing pays to the King of Persia five Abbasees only, whether his success be good or bad. The merchant also pays some small trifle to the king, on every thousand oysters.

"The second pearl fishery is over against that of Bahrein, on the coast of Arabia the Happy, near the city of Katifa, which, as well as the surrounding country, belongs to an Arabian Prince. All the pearls that are fished in these places are generally sold in the Indies, because the Indians are not so difficult as we, and buy indifferently the rough ones as well as the smooth, taking the whole at a fixed price. They also carry some to Balsora, while those that are carried to Persia and Muscovy are sold at Bunder Congo, two days' journey from Ormus. In all these places I have mentioned, as well as in other parts of Asia, they like better to see the water of a yellow cast than white, because they say that those pearls in which the water is a little tinged like gold always retain their brightness, and never alter, while those that are white seldom last longer than thirty years without; when, owing as well to the warmth of the country as the heat of the body, they take a dull yellow colour."

Notwithstanding the pearls found at Bahrein and Kateef approach a little upon the yellow, they are yet in as much esteem as those of Manaar (Ceylon); and throughout all the East they say they are ripe, and never change their colour.

The history, according to Native tradition, may now be resumed from the point at which it was relinquished.

The last, or Uttoobee conquerors, of Bahrein, who reduced it in A. H. 1194 (A. D. 1779), came originally from Koweit or Grane. They were formed by the intermarriage of three large tribes of Arabs, the Beni Sabah, under Shaikh Sulaiman bin Ahmed; the Beni Yalahimah under Shaikh Jabir bin Uttoobee, and the Beni Khalifah, under Shaikh Khalifah bin Mahomed.





On the union of these tribes, for the purpose of resisting the attacks of more powerful clans in the neighbourhood of Koweit, they determined to become at once merchants and agriculturists, and that the profits arising from these occupations should be equally divided amongst the whole. From the tribe Sabah were to proceed their governors, the Yalahimah were to produce seamen, and the Khalifah to conduct the commercial concerns.

The system had been pursued with success for fifty years, when the mercantile federates became anxious to enjoy singly their lucrative branch of the original league.

With this view Khalifah bin Mahomed, an artful chief, persuaded the members of the other two tribes to permit him to pass over to the pearl shore, near Bahrein, and as the purchase and sale of these constituted the principal source of their riches, to endeavour to procure a share of that fishery for themselves, instead of continuing to purchase from other hands.

The Yalahimah conveyed their brethren to Zobara, where they completely succeeded in their object, and at length refused a share of the profits resulting from its attainment to both the other parties in the original compact. The Beni Sabah, too, who remained at Koweit, also at length threw off the third party (the Yalahimah), who, stung by the injustice of this double defection, retired to Ruaisah, a barren spot a little to the eastward of Zobara, and commenced a system of reprisal on their commerce, which brought the Khalifah to the brink of ruin. Mutual hostilities now engaged these tribes, until the Yalahimah were attacked in their retreat, and cut to pieces, with the exception of some women and children.

About this time Shaikh Nasr, Governor of Bahrein, tempted by the prosperity of the settlement at Zobara, besieged it with vigour, but sustaining a shameful defeat, quickly despatched the intelligence to his son, whom he had left to guard the island, and charged him to be resolute and vigilant against foreign attack, until he should come to his assistance.

The boat conveying this despatch was taken on its passage, and the papers perused by the Sabah, who, having heard of the meditated attack of their brethren by Shaikh Nasr, were then advancing to assist them. Aware of the defenceless state of Bahrein, they immediately proceeded to the attack, and gained possession of its principal posts previous to the arrival of Shaikh Nasr's fleet, who, finding the island in possession of an enemy, returned to Abooshahar.

The Sabah communicated their success to the Khalifah at Zobara, who hastened to collect an army, in order to join their former companions, and reduced the unconquered parts of the island. All those





## BAHREIN—ORMUS.

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who would join them, and co-operate in the reduction of Bahrein, were upheld by the promise of grants of land, money, and exclusive privileges of tenure. This service was shortly completed, and the rewards conferred, in the distribution of which the four sons of Jaber bin Uttoobee claimed a voice in the government, and were refused, although by the original compact they possessed a just hereditary right to an equal share of the benefits of a conquest, in the completion of which they had shed their blood.

On this they left the island of Bahrein in disgust, and commenced the mode of life their progenitor had pointed out to them, in which they have since persevered.

Of the four brothers, sons of Jaber bin Uttoobee Yalahimah, Rahmah bin Jaber only is alive; Abdoolla bin Jaber was inhumanly butchered by the Prince of Fars, while living under his pledged protection; Shahin bin Jaber died five years ago, on his return from pilgrimage; and Mahomed bin Jaber was lately killed while defending the family of his brother, at Khor Hassan, from the attack of the Shaikhs of Bahrein.

After this conquest, the Uttoobees paid a trifling tribute to the Persians only four times, and then discontinued it altogether.

## ISLAND OF ORMUS.

The Portuguese, by their conquest of Ormus in the sixteenth century, not only secured the command of the Persian Gulf, but gave increased life and animation to a commerce, which, after having long subsisted at Siraff,\* a port on the Persian shore, sixty leagues from Shiraz, and twice that distance from Bussora, had passed to this insular station, and transformed it from a desert to an earthly paradise, which has more than once been described in terms of splendid eloquence by celebrated authors.

Justamond, in his History of the East Indies, says:—"At the mouth of the Strait of Mocandon, which leads into the Persian Gulf, lies the island of Gombroon. In the eleventh century an Arabian conqueror built upon this barren rock the city of Ormus, which afterwards became the capital of an empire, comprehending a considerable part of Arabia on one side, and of Persia on the other. Ormus had two good harbours, and was large and well fortified; its riches and strength were entirely owing to its situation. It was the centre of trade between Persia and the Indies, which was very considerable, if we remember that the

\* A. D. 851. Vide Pinkerton's Collection, Travels, &c., Vol. I. pp. 181—185.





Persians at that time caused the greatest part of the merchandize of Asia to be conveyed to Europe from the ports of Syria and Caffa. At the time of the arrival of the foreign merchants, Ormus afforded a more splendid and agreeable scene than any city in the East. Persons from all parts of the globe exchanged their commodities, and transacted their business, with an air of politeness and attention which are seldom seen in other places of trade.

"These manners were introduced by the merchants belonging to the ports, who induced foreigners to imitate their affability. Their address, the regularity of their police, and the variety of entertainments which their city afforded, joined to the interests of commerce, invited merchants to make it a place of resort. The pavement of the streets was covered with mats, and in some places with carpets; and the linen awnings which were suspended from the tops of the houses prevented any inconvenience from the heat of the sun. Indian cabinets, ornamented with gilded vases, or China filled with flowering shrubs or aromatic plants, adorned their apartments; camels, laden with water, were stationed in the public squares; Persian wines, perfumes, and all the delicacies of the table, were furnished in the greatest abundance; and they had the music of the East in its highest perfection. In short, universal opulence and extensive commerce, a refined luxury, politeness in the men and gallantry in the women, united all their attractions to make this city the seat of pleasure."

Ormus is a rugged, hilly island, about ten miles NNE. from Karrack, and nearly of the same extent. It has not the least verdure on it: some of the hills are quite white, owing to an incrustation of salt, and large quantities of rock salt are found on the island. Notwithstanding its sterility, it was once the emporium of Persian and Indian commerce, when in the hands of the Portuguese, and is at present held in farm of the Persian King by the Imaum of Muskat, who derives a small revenue from its produce of salt. There are two cisterns of fresh water on its north-west end. An English traveller, Ralph Filch,\* who visited this island, describes it thus:—

"Ormus is an island in circuit about five-and-twenty or thirty miles, and is the driest island in the world, for there is nothing growing on it but only salt; for the water, wood, or victuals, and all things necessary, come out of Persia, which is about twelve miles from thence. All thereabout is very fruitful, from whence all kinds of victuals are sent into Ormus. The Portuguese have a castle here, which standeth near unto the sea, wherein there is a Captain for the King of Portugal,

\* See Ralph Filch's Travels, Pinkerton's Collection of Voyages, &c. &c., A. D. 1583 to 1591.



BUNDER ABBAS—KARRACK.

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having under him a convenient number of soldiers, whereof some part remain in the castle, and some in the town. In this town are merchants of all nations, and many Moors and Gentiles. There is a very great trade of all sorts of spices, drugs, silk, cloth of silk, fine tapestry of Persia, great store of pearls, which come from the isle of Bahrein, and are the best pearls of all others, and many horses of Persia, which serve all India."

BUNDER ABBAS.

The English, in their destruction of the Portuguese power in the Gulf, in conjunction with the armies of Persia, in A. D. 1622, retired to Bunder Abbas, and forced the trade with them from its favourite retreat to a point characterised thus unfavourably by the same author:—

"Three or four leagues from Ormus there was, upon the continent, an harbour called Gombroon, or Bunder Abbas. Nature seemed not to have designed it should be inhabited. It is situated at the foot of a ridge of mountains of an excessive height; the air you breathe seems to be on fire; mortal vapours continually exhale from the bowels of the earth; the fields are black and dry, as if they had been scorched with fire. Notwithstanding these inconveniences, as Bunder Abbas had the advantage of being placed at the entrance of the Gulf, the Persian Monarch chose to make it the centre of the extensive trade he intended to carry on with India. The English joined in this project. A perpetual exemption from all imposts, and a moiety of the product of the customs, were granted them, on condition that they should maintain at least two men-of-war in the Gulf. This precaution was thought necessary, to frustrate the attempts of the Portuguese, whose resentment was still to be dreaded."

From this time Bunder Abbas, which was before a poor fishing town, became a flourishing city. Bunder Abbas is situated nearly north from the town of Kishm, from which it is from four to five leagues distant: it is now farmed of the Persian Monarch by the Imaum of Muskat, who keeps an armed force in the town.

ISLAND OF KARRACK.

The Dutch in A. D. 1748, having been plundered at Bussora by the local Government, whither the trade had been carried from Bunder Abbas by the European factors, during the Afghan invasion of Persia, retired to the island of Karrack, on which they planted an establishment, which





in a short course of time created a rival attraction to the commercial body, highly prejudicial to that city.

Of this event Justamond gives the following account:—"Baron Knyphausen managed the Dutch factory at Bussora with extraordinary success. The English found themselves in imminent danger of losing the superiority they had acquired at this place, as well as in most of the seaports in India. They excited the Turkish Government to suppress a branch of trade that was useful to it, and procured an order for the confiscation of the merchandize and possessions of their rivals.

"The Dutch factor, who, under the character of a merchant, concealed the statesman, instantly took a resolution worthy of a man of genius. He retired with his dependents, and the broken remains of his fortune, to Karrack, a small island at the distance of fifteen leagues from the mouth of the river, where he fortified himself in such a manner that, by intercepting the Arabian and Indian vessels bound for the city, he compelled the Government to grant him an indemnification for the losses he had sustained by its behaviour. The fame of his integrity and abilities drew to his island the privateers of the neighbouring ports, the very merchants of Bussora, and the Europeans who traded thither. This new colony found its prosperity increase every day, when it was abandoned by its founder. The successor of this able man did not display the same talents: towards the end of the year 1765 he suffered himself to be dispossessed of his island by the Arabian Corsair Mirmahana."

By this event Bussora was freed from a rivalry that was prejudicial to its interests.

The chart of Karrack, by the late Mr. Dalrymple, said to be taken from a French manuscript, is good in detail: from carelessness, however, the north point of the compass is inserted where the west ought to be. Mistakes of this nature are dangerous to mariners, and disgraceful to their author; and here I cannot help remarking that the most gross errors of bearings abound in the quarto book called the East India Directory.

The best anchorage on the east side of the island is as follows:—

Karrack from NW. by N. to S. by W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W., the adjacent island of Korgo, N. by W. to S. by E.

Hallilla Peak, in Persia, SE. by E., in nine fathoms, sand, off shore half a mile. Ships should always be guarded against a shift of wind, so as to be able to clear the south end of Karrack in time; particularly as the bottom is loose, and the island hereabout is fringed with a coral reef. The passage between Korgo and Karrack ought not to be attempted in the night, except in cases of great necessity.

Fresh water is to be had in abundance from wells at Karrack, but, in



my opinion, its quality does not deserve the encomiums passed on it by the English who reside at Abooshahar.

The shoals along the head of the Persian Gulf are laid down to the southward of their real situation, as will appear by a reference to *La Chiffonne's* log-book for 1809-10, and a comparison with McCluer's chart, published by Mr. Dalrymple.

## BOSTANA.

Bostana is a low shelving point, with rugged hills immediately above it. Its extremity is about lat.  $26^{\circ} 30' N.$ ; it bears from Polior NNE.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E., and W. from the southern end of Kishm.

## THE ISLAND OF KISHM, AND ITS VICINITY.

The western ends of the island of Kishm lie north and south of each other, and are distant about seven miles from the north-west ends, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 38' N.$  The Coast of Persia rounds to Cape Bostana or Bestian, which in McCluer's and Heather's charts is improperly called Cape Certes.

Kishm is near the main, and extends eighteen leagues W. by S. and E. by N.; its greatest breadth is probably twenty miles; but from Luft, a town on its north side, about thirty miles in a direct line from that of Kishm, it narrows in other places considerably, down probably to seven miles, and afterwards widens very little to the westward.

Nothing can exceed the singular appearance of the coast of this island: the hills, once uniformly table, are in many places mouldered away, leaving parts of very grotesque shapes. It is said that before the inhabitants were oppressed by the Joasmee pirates, one hundred villages flourished on the island. The Natives are chiefly weavers, who supply the Gulf with loongees, and striped cotton and silk cloths; their personal appearance and character are much in their favour.

On the east side, close to the sea, lies the town of Kishm, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 57' 30'' N.$ , off which ships may, with westerly winds, securely ride, in clear ground. Kishm is walled round, and has a small oblong fort within the walls.

The whole island, as well as a large portion of the opposite coast, in which are mines of brimstone, is farmed from Persia by the Imaum of Muskat.

There is a good channel between Kishm and Larrack, but you must be careful of a bank, which is said to extend nearly two miles from a point southward of the town of Kishm, on which is a grove of date trees.

The island of Kishm tends from the town NW. to the Western Cape,





in lat.  $27^{\circ} 3' N.$ , calculated from an indifferent observation, the ship being near the land at the time it was taken. The coast then runs W. and W. by S. to Luft Point. There is a good channel between Kishm and the main, about eight miles wide from the north point of the island, and not three opposite to Old Luft, from whence it winds among several wooded islands, until you reach Bassadore, of which I will speak hereafter. The bottom is generally mud, and the deepest water is near the island, but rocky ledges run a long distance from the point of Kishm, most of which uncover at low-water. The tide falls about twelve feet. As you approach Luft the soundings become irregular, the bottom rocky, and the tide rapid.

## LUFT.

From the northern point of Luft, the coast turns abruptly to the south-east, and, beyond that, tends westerly to the extremity of the island, Bassadore Point bearing SW. by W., leaving a deep bay, which is nearly filled with low islands covered with brushwood.

The harbour of Luft is secure, and the place is admirably adapted to piratical pursuits.

The anchorage of the *Chiffonne* is as follows :—

Latitude, by a pretty good observation,  $26^{\circ} 57' NNW.$ ; point of the roadstead, NW.

Inderabia, a small wooded island, in one with NE. point, N.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E., Luft SE.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E., distant nearly three miles, in nine fathoms, mud.

There is a narrow but pretty deep channel within the low island, southward of a remarkable tree, growing out of the water, which channel leads up to the town.

Let us proceed to the southern side of the island of Kishm. Between the town of Kishm and Angar Island the coast hollows until you arrive off a small town, near which is a ruined pagoda, and about five leagues from Kishm; it then runs tolerably straight to the point opposite Angar, which, being foul, with irregular soundings, must be approached with great caution. Along the tract of coast just described it is advisable not to stand within twenty fathoms, where in some parts the ship will be less than two miles from the land.

From every recent account afforded by Natives of Kishm, most of the towns which once flourished on the island in earlier ages, and in those later times, too, in which the Dutch, Portuguese, and English nations contended for an exclusive commercial and territorial possession, are now in a state of ruin; but some are still inhabited,—among which last may be reckoned Brukth, or Urukth (the ancient Oaracta of Nearchus and Arrian), which still exists in the centre of the island; Luft, on its northern shore; Kishm, the present capital, on its north-eastern





## LUFT -- ANGAR.

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extremity; and Basidu, originally possessed by the Dutch, on its south-western point. A few villages, also, besides these towns, are scattered over the interior of the island. Water from springs is abundant, and contributes to the fertility of the soil, which produces large crops of barley, wheat, and vegetables of all kinds.

In the declivity of its hills, delicious honey is found; in its valleys are large date groves, and the soil of these situations has been found to be favourable for the production of the European fruits, which are transplanted from the Persian continent.

Its peasantry is composed chiefly of Persians, who speak their national dialect, and also comprehend the Arabic, from their intercourse with the tribe Bani Main, the governors of the island, as well as with the Arab tribes who occupy the whole of the opposite or Persian shore: the Natives are highly industrious.

Previous to the reign of Karim Khan, this island belonged to the Kings of Persia, and was kept immediately dependent on the nearest department of Bastak; so named from this town, which is nine Furseekhhs (thirty-five miles) distant northerly from the port of Mogoo, westward of Lingah. This department extended from Mogoo to Bunder Abbas, a port on the Persian main, directly north of the town of Kishm.

When Karim Khan reached the throne of Persia, Abdoolla Maini rebelled, and refused payment of the usual tribute. Previous to this, however, a prince of the Hinavi tribe of Oman held the government for eight years, at the close of which it was resumed by the Persians.

The veins of brimstone are found in a hilly tract near Khamir, a town on the Persian continent, about twenty-five miles NE. from Luft.

## ANGAR.

Angar, situated on the south side of Kishm, nearly midway between its extremes, is an island moderately high, nearly round, and about four miles long. Its south point is in lat. 26° 37' N.

There is a channel between this island and Kishm, more than a mile wide, which forms a very excellent anchorage, and as you round the northern point of Angar, proceeding to the southward is a capacious bay, with a muddy bottom: this bay is open to sea winds, but there is a flat of six fathoms, which runs from the western point of Angar towards Kishm, which in my opinion would break the force of the sea;—at any rate, ships riding here, and caught by a gale, have only to slip their cables, and run into the sound, where they would be securely sheltered. This operation might be performed at night as well as in the day-time, by taking the precaution to send a boat to anchor with a light in five fathoms, off the sandy point which forms the northern end of Angar.

To run into the sound from the south-east, keep one-third channel





over from Angar; and do not approach its shore under six fathoms, as you will in some places shoal from five to one and a half fathoms; nor near it within three cables length; and be cautious of the point on Kishm, which has been already noticed as foul.

The *Chiffonne's* marks of anchorage in the sound were the red square building on Angar, with an octagonal top, S. 75° W.

The Point, which, as seen from the ship, forms the last entrance, S. 21° E.

Point Kishm, S. 85° E., off shore one-third of a mile, in eleven fathoms, sand.

The proximity of Angar to Kishm and Persia perhaps affords some small opening to commercial pursuits; one insuperable objection, however, obtains against forming a large settlement here, namely the want of fresh water near the harbour side of the island; but to supply only a garrison, spacious tanks on Angar might be repaired, at no great expense, and should a failure of rain occur, it is said water might be procured from the neighbouring villages on Kishm.

From Angar, proceeding to the westward, you have regular soundings towards Kishm, but a mud-bank of considerable extent, called the Priscilla Bank, lies off its south-western extremity. This shoal should not be approached within five or six fathoms: it is an excellent mark in thick weather, or during the night, to run between Kishm and the Great Tomb, affording a certain indication of your position. The most southern part, in five and a half fathoms, is in lat. 26° 26' N., and white water extends about one mile further; then the water deepens rapidly towards the Great Tomb.

#### THE GREAT TOMB

Is a level island, about three miles long, and two and a half broad; on it are a few trees. It may be seen from a frigate's deck five leagues. It lies from the southern point of Angar SW.  $\frac{3}{4}$  W. eleven leagues, and four from the south-western point of Kishm; its northern end is in lat. 26° 20' N.

You may round this island within half a mile of the shore, and find tolerable anchorage under its lee against a north-wester; a bank runs three or four miles to the southward of it, and it is said water is to be obtained from a well near a banian tree at some distance from the beach, at the western end.

#### THE LITTLE TOMB,

An island rather less than the Great Tomb, appears at first in hummocks, is barren, and, like the Great Tomb, uninhabited. Being rocky at the west end, it is to be approached with caution. Its situation is about five miles W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  S. of the Great Tomb.





## BASSADORE—LINGAH—MOGOO.

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## BASSADORE.

Within the north-west end of Kishm are the ruins of Bassadore, once a flourishing town under the Portuguese.

There is an excellent harbour, but the approach to it is shoal. The *Chiffonne* going in steered E. by N. for the Point, and had, in passing over an extensive flat, so little as three fathoms, and, in returning, had even somewhat less,  $\frac{3}{4}$  N. by E. ; but the Honorable Company's cruiser *Mornington*, sailing nearer to the Persian shore, never sounded less than four fathoms.

It is very desirable that this channel should be sounded throughout its whole extent, for it would afford capital shelter in bad weather; and wood and water are to be found at Bassadore, the latter out of tanks.

## LINGAH,

The chief town of the piratical Joasmees, on the Persian side, is situated close to the sea, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 33' N.$ , about eight leagues from Kishm. The soundings are regular close to the shore, and it has a secure road to ride out a north-wester, as you can bring the outer point to bear SW. by W., and anchor, on a muddy bottom, in five fathoms.

## SHINAS AND BOSTANA.

Shinas and Bostana lie between Lingah and Cape Bostana. They are small towns, from which may be obtained refreshments for a ship or two.

## MOGOO.

This is a noble bay, secure against the prevailing winds in the Gulf. It is formed by Cape Bostana to the eastward, and Cape Certes, which, in Heather's chart, is improperly called Bestian, to the westward; the extremes, which lie NW. by W. and SE. by E. of each other, are about ten miles asunder.

The bay is of a good depth, and is capable of holding the largest fleets; the ground is tough clay, from which you with difficulty purchase the anchors; the soundings without the bay are irregular; and between Mogoo and Polior is a rocky shoal, on which is less than three fathoms. This shoal lies nearer to the main than to Polior, and is an objection against running for the bay in the night, but in the day-time the marks are so good that you may easily avoid it.

By keeping a remarkable round and lofty hill, named Charak Hill, NW., a ship will be led into Mogoo Bay.

The *Chiffonne's* marks for anchorage in Mogoo Bay are as follow :—

Against a NW. Wind.—Extremes of the land W. by N. to SE.; the town of Mogoo N. by E., off shore two miles, in five and a half





fathoms, tough clay; the points which form the bay SE. by E.  $\frac{1}{4}$  E. to W. by N.

*Against a SE. Wind.*—Polior S.  $\frac{1}{4}$  W. to S. by W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W., off shore three quarters of a mile, in six and a quarter fathoms, tough clay.

*The Shoal between Polior Island and Mogoo Bay.*—The marks of this shoal, as taken by Mr. Smart, Master of His Majesty's ship *Caroline*, in January 1810, are by compass; the island of Polior S.  $\frac{1}{4}$  W. to S. by W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W.; extremes of the Persian land NW. by W. to ENE.; the Eastern fall of Charak Hill, in one with the two points of the eastern boundary of Mogoo Bay, which in the charts is improperly called Cape Bestian, NNW. and NW. by N. These bearings were taken from a boat. The shoal is composed of coarse sand and shells.

The remainder of the coast I have scarcely visited, indeed some ports I have never seen; but from every information I could gain, I have no doubt that it is generally free from dangers as high as Congoon.

#### LARRACK ISLAND.

Captain Wainwright, of His Majesty's ship *Chiffonne*, from whom, and from Lieutenant Tanner, of the Honorable Company's Marine, I have selected all the hydrographical details exhibited in the course of this Report, describes Larrack Island as about five miles long, and four broad; of tolerable height, barren, and with very few inhabitants. He then proceeds thus:—"It lies nearly NNW. of the Great Quoin, at about seven leagues distance, its southern point being near the lat. of  $26^{\circ} 50' N$ . There is no danger within half a mile of the shore. This island has near its centre a small volcanic, conical hill, the most perfect in its form I ever saw."

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS.

The extreme general sterility of those parts of the continents of Persia and Arabia which confine the intervening Gulf has contributed to present to the view of its Natives the life of a freebooter in a more inviting form than could have been given to it had they been situated in a country of greater resources. But this reflection, however it may be admitted as a slight extenuation of their guilt, can never wholly excuse it, particularly when it is known that previous to these piratical pursuits, which are almost the growth of the present century, an extensive and lucrative commerce first gave them a fleet, and a band of able





## CONCLUDING REMARKS.

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and hardy mariners, which they have since turned to purposes so different from these civilized habits, the primary cause of their aggrandisement.

From this the British were among the first sufferers, by the attack on one of their smallest cruisers, assailed in the roads of Bushire with ammunition which had, in an hour of friendly communication previous to the attack, been solicited and bestowed on the chief of the assailing fleet. These hollow friends were, however, beaten off, with considerable loss on their side.

To proceed, then, on a plan of methodical and comprehensive detail, it were perhaps advisable, in order to prove their addiction to commercial pursuits, to premise an account of these tribes in the days of their upright and honorable exertion, previous to their conversion to the Wababee faith, which paved the way to every subsequent atrocity. These, and other particulars given in the course of this Report, relating to the Arabs of the Persian Gulf, are the results of personal investigation, or of cautious gleanings from Natives of authority, and capable of close observation.

They were originally employed, as these authorities state, in commercial enterprise, in the cultivation of extensive groves of the date tree, and the pursuit of a lucrative pearl fishery. The sale of the yearly produce of their date grounds placed the proprietors in possession of an equivalent amounting to Rs. 80,000, of which the governing power received a tenth, or Rs. 8,000. Their fleets consisted of large boats, as the Dow and Buggalow, and smaller ones, or the Buteel and Bugareh. The former visited the ports of India, Yemen, Africa, Sind, Kutch, Muskat, and Bussora, and in each of these different voyages the value of a single share of a seaman was as follows: in the voyage to India, from Rs. 50 to Rs. 60; to Yemen, Rs. 80; to Africa, Rs. 40; to Sind and Kutch, from Rs. 25 to Rs. 30; to Muskat, Rs. 12;—in the voyage to Bussora they gained nothing, but shipped a cargo of fish and dried dates for the different ports above mentioned. The lesser vessels traded generally to Bahrein and Kateef, which gave a single dividend to each sailor of from Rs. 4 to Rs. 6. They also used to visit Bussora, and load with grain for Ras-ool-Khyma, and its adjacent tributaries, which paid each seaman one share of Rs. 10; as did the voyages to the Hoolch ports of Congoon, Aseeloo, and Kishm, from Rs. 2 to Rs. 3.

From the produce of each of these voyages, the governor was entitled to one share, equal to that of a seaman, at which time the number of large vessels was sixty, and of the lesser ones two hundred.

Their pearl banks, which were famous for their extent, and the admirable quality of their produce, lay from three to six miles off shore, in six to seven fathoms water, on which four hundred boats of different






sizes annually prosecuted the fishery. Each of two hundred large boats carried a crew of one master, twelve divers, and twelve assistants, in all twenty-five persons; one hundred boats of an intermediate size were furnished each with one master, eight divers, and eight assistants, in all seventeen persons; one hundred of the smallest boats each contained one master, six divers, and six assistants, in all thirteen persons. The sale of the yearly produce of the fishery was estimated at the lowest rate at 40,000 Tomans, and each Toman at 18 Piastres Roomee. The shares of the crews of these boats were determined after the subtraction of one-fourth of the produce of each boat for the proprietor of it, as follows: for the master three shares, for the diver two shares, and for the assistant one share. The fishing season lasted for three months.

The crews of these boats used generally to borrow sums of money, sufficient to support themselves and families, from bankers resident on the spot, in the following proportions: of the larger 100 Tomans, of the intermediate 50 Tomans, and the smallest 30 Tomans, either in grain or money, or both. On the advances of grain only, the lender never gained less than fifty per cent., often one hundred per cent., as the markets indicated; but on the cash loans their faith admits of no interest being given or received.

In unfavourable seasons of the fishery, these bankers occasionally deferred the pressure of their claims until the third year, when, if the boat belonged to the debtor, they sold it, and recovered the amount of their claim; if not, the debt was paid by degrees, from the profits of the debtors, who in these cases undertook voyages to sea in the service of merchants, or themselves made a venture to some of the neighbouring ports, with fish and other cargo of their own.

By long custom, the fishermen were obliged to offer their pearls for sale first to their creditor, who enjoyed the advantage of a discount of ten per cent. if he approved of the article; if not, they were sold to the highest bidder, and the debt of the year paid off. The governor gained from each boat yearly the portion, or two shares, of a diver, with the additional privilege of purchasing at half price all pearls exceeding in value 110 Tomans. He used to be extremely rigid in the exaction of this right, and employed spies in each boat, who reported any delinquency, which was punished by the forfeiture of the full price of the gem attempted to be concealed. This effectually prevented the crime.







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## PROVINCE OF OMAN.

THE Province of Oman comprehends the south-easterly region of Arabia, extending from Ras-ool-Hud on the south, to Zobara (or to the island of Shargah) on the north-eastern coast. It is divided into two Principalities; the capital of the first is Rastag, and of the latter Seer or Julfar. Muskat is the chief seaport of the former, and Ras-ool-Khyma of the latter. It has been divided, also, from the earliest ages, between two Arab tribes, one called Beni Yemen\* or Beni Hinavi, and the other Beni Nasir† or Beni Gafree. The Imaum of Muskat is the head of the first, and possesses the line of coast from Cape Ras-ool-Geete to Cape Musseldom; and the Chief of the Joasmees of the other; his territory, extending from Musseldom to Shargah, constituting the Seer Principality.

The Hinavi tribe consists of the following families, the names of the Chiefs in 1809 being given, viz:—

- I.—The Imaum of Muskat, Syud Saiad.
- II.—Azzan, the son of Gheifs, fixed at Sohar.
- III.—Nunneed, the son of Ahmed, at Rastag.
- IV.—Nunneed, the brother of Ahmed, at Simoak.
- V.—Nunneed bin Nasser, of Zaheera.
- VI.—The Beni Gafree tribes, under Mahomed bin Nasser, excepting the Joasmees, which are independent of Muskat.

Oman was originally peopled from Persia, and subject to that Government. The first Arab tribe that settled in Oman was the Ool-Yesdee, who, under Malik bin Fukkeem-ool-Yesdee, emigrated from Nujd. On entering Oman with his followers, they halted at Jah, and preferred a request to Meerzeban, the Persian commander of the province, for a tract of country on which they might settle, which being refused, a contest ensued, in which Meerzeban was killed, the Persians were defeated, and driven out of Oman. Malik conquered the country, and being joined by other tribes from Nujd, peopled it with Arabs, and embraced Mahomedanism in the time of the Prophet.

Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, led a force into Oman from Yemen, and, having established an intercourse with the Nujd tribes, returned. This introduction of the Yemends into the province formed

\* So named from being on the right hand side of the Caaba.

† Or inhabitants of Nujd, as being on the left.





a new sect, and in time a new religion, as they embraced that schism which is known under the name of Kharej, or Seceders, but who call themselves Beazoo, or the Pures; whilst the Ool-Yesdee and other tribes have remained strict Soonites.

The Joasmsees are descended from the inhabitants of Nujd, and called the Beni Nasir or Gafree; and the Muskat Arabs from those of Yemen, and called Beni Yemen, or Beni Hinavi. The enmity between the Muskat Arabs and the Joasmsees is the remnant of the schism that arose in the time of Mahomed, and has continued to prevail in Oman to this day.

The face of the whole of Oman is rugged and hilly, but possesses many fertile valleys, occupied by different tribes, each of whom have their own castles to retire to in time of danger, or when discontented; when the chief calls in his relations and tribe, defends himself as long as he can, or, if he has the power, plunders his neighbours; hence civil wars are of frequent occurrence in the province.

Each tribe has its own Shaikh, who elects from the most powerful tribe one who rules the whole, and who adopts the name of his tribe as a nation. The succession to the Shaikhship continues hereditary in this tribe until some other becomes more powerful, or the successor shows a vicious disposition, or want of capacity, when he is deserted by all the tribes, and a new family chosen.

The whole coast of Oman was once in the possession of the Portuguese; they were expelled by the Arabs, and these were, again, partially conquered by the Persians under Taki Khan, in the reign of Nadir Shah. The Persians were again driven out by Ahmed bin Suede, the Governor of Sohar, on which occasion he was elected Imaum. Syud Ahmed attempted to reduce Ras-ool-Khyma to subjection, and would have succeeded had he not been abandoned by some of his allies, on whom he most depended, and forced to make a precipitate retreat; since which period Seer has remained independent. Hostilities, however, have continued to be carried on between the chiefs of the two principalities.

The Wahabee Arabs conquered the whole of the principality of Seer, including Ras-ool-Khyma, reducing the inhabitants to the most abject submission to their orders. By the compact entered into with the Wahabee Shaikh on his invasion of Oman, Nunneed bin Nasser of Zaheera, Azzau of Sohar, and Mahomed bin Nasser, were constituted Ameers, or territorial lords in their own right, without any dependance on Muskat.

Nunneed assisted the Wahabee Shaikh in the attack of Sohar, and Mahomed bin Nasser having also assisted him, with troops and money, and by stopping the access to reinforcements east of Semay, he deprived the Imaum of all support, but what he derived from Mukran and the





country westward of Muskat to Masseera, which reduced the Imaum to such distress, that he was compelled to make peace with the Wahabees on their own terms, which were that he and the whole of Oman should be subject to their authority, and aid their views on Bussora and India, which were, however, delayed until Sahood's return from a pilgrimage to Mecca.

It is of importance here to notice a new power, the Zahib tribe, which the Wahabee Shaikh established in the tract of country from Musseldom to Ramse, which he placed under the government of Hussain bin Ali, who was the Shaikh of Ramse, and of two strong forts, called Teguera and Bithney, which Sahood took from the Joasmees, and conciliated Hussain Ali to his support. The Imaum, anxious not to break with the Wahabees, refrained from acting against this tribe, which it would have been for his interest to have done.

Hussain bin Ali, a Joasmee Chief, was invested by the Wahabees with the fullest authority, which enabled him to compel the heads of the Joasmees residing at Lingah and Ras-ool-Khyma to cruise in conjunction with vessels from Ramse, in the service of the Wahabees, against all ships, without exception, appearing in the Gulf.

Mahomed bin Nasser Gafree, dissatisfied with the Wahabees, made advances to the Imaum, who, drawing him into a snare, seized and imprisoned him, in consequence of his having acknowledged the Wahabee power, but released him on his surrendering to His Highness Semayle, and another strong place he possessed in the mountains.


The Chief of Zaheera, having been plundered and insulted by the Wahabees, offered to join the Imaum, who, however, distrusted him; whilst the ruler of Sohar, having been deprived of half of his territory, declared his resolution rather to die than longer to submit to the Wahabees. The common danger had in fact reunited the Shaikhs of Oman, and they were determined on a vigorous resistance to Sahood, who had threatened them with a visit on his return from Mecca. They were, however, desirous of the assistance of the English, to recover Shinas, and the places on the coast near Cape Musseldom, that had been dismembered from Sohar, so as to reduce the defence of the country to one point, the passage across the isthmus.

It is probable that the Oman Chiefs of the Hinavi tribe will, on the annihilation of the Wahabee power, return to their former relations with the Imaum.


Overtures for a pacification were recently received from Ameer Hussan bin Rehma, of Ras-ool-Khyma, which have been of course peremptorily rejected. He is devoted to the interests of the Wahabees, and is not the legitimate Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma.



'SKETCH OF THE ISLAND OF KENN, In the Persian Gulf. Thos. Remon, Captn., Engineers' [45a] (1/2)









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EXTRACTS FROM A JOINT REPORT  
ON THE  
ISLAND OF KENN, IN THE PERSIAN GULF.  
ACCOMPANIED BY A MAP.

BY  
FIRST LIEUTENANT J. H. GRUBB,  
HONORABLE COMPANY'S MARINE;  
AND  
CAPTAIN T. REMON,  
BOMBAY ENGINEERS.

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*Submitted to Government on the 12th October 1822.*

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## ISLAND OF KENN.

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HAVING lately proceeded to the island of Kenn, we have the honour to submit the following Report, in which the several quarters of the island are separately described, as represented in the accompanying Sketch, namely,—

### A.—THE WEST, NORTH-WEST, AND SOUTH-WEST SIDES.

This part contains three villages, built near date plantations; one is near the south-west point, and is called Bauk; another at the north-west, Suffeel; the third does not appear to bear any name, and is about midway between the other two; the distance between these two extremes being nearly three and a quarter miles.

These villages are provided with wells, which supply the population, and also irrigate the grain fields and date trees. Some of the water is good; the remainder is indifferent, and mostly brackish.

The country for about three miles in their vicinity is moderately elevated above the sea, and nearly level, as it ascends very gradually from the sea coast to the central and higher part of the island. It is partially covered with trees, which are more numerous inland, and the ground is also clearer on the coast, having only small tufts of coarse grass, the inland part being rocky and stony.

The coast is of a bluff and rocky nature, with some small sandy bays; but being bounded by a rocky shelf, dry in many places at low-water, and which extends not less than a quarter of a mile, tolerable landing is afforded in these bays at high-water only, for light boats, and that in moderate weather.

There is no good anchorage for ships off this part of the island, the bottom being coarse sand, with patches of coral. It is exposed to a heavy swell during a moderate north-west wind, but may be safe to approach to eight or ten fathoms, a mile and a quarter or a mile and a half off shore.



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B.—THE NORTH SIDE.

This quarter comprises the ground between the villages of Suffeel and Dey, distant three and a quarter miles. Almost midway, but nearer to the latter, are the ruins of a considerable town, said to have been built by the Portuguese.

In regard to water, the description given of it at Suffeel applies to that procured at the village of Dey.

The country here is also nearly similar to that on the west side, except that it is a little more elevated near Suffeel.

The coast is also bluff and rocky, with a few sandy bays; the rocky shelf still continuing round it, but having deeper water on it. There is tolerably good landing at low-water in the bays above mentioned, during moderate weather.

The anchorage for ships is in six fathoms, sandy bottom, about one mile off shore, but it is not sheltered from the prevailing westerly winds.

C.—THE NORTH-EAST AND EASTERN SIDES.

There are no inhabitants in this quarter, but a few ruins of an old village are visible on the east side.

There are a number of wells in the low ground, the water of which is at this time brackish.

The elevated part of the island commences near this coast, and the summit of it is extremely rocky and irregular ground. The space between it and the beach is low and sandy; it is partially covered with trees, as on the other sides.

Nearly the whole of this coast has a fine sandy beach; the anchorage for ships is in six and seven fathoms, sandy bottom, one mile off shore, and is well sheltered, except from easterly winds.

D.—THE SOUTH SIDE.

This side is uninhabited just now, but there are some ruins and a small date grove near the east point, and also a few houses, in which are lodged the cattle that are occasionally grazing there, near the centre of the south coast.

There are a few wells at these two places, with pretty good water, owing, probably, to its not having been much drawn, there being no irrigation carried on, and the cattle, therefore, alone supplied with it.

The country is generally level, and is nearly the same on the western part, except that it is more stony, and in some places more elevated, especially in the centre, before alluded to. The whole of the ground is interspersed with trees and bushes. The coast is similar to that on the north side.






The anchorage for ships is in six fathoms, sand, three-quarters of a mile or a mile off shore, and, though exposed to south-east winds, is safer than that on the other sides of the island, from the circumstance of its not being a lee-shore during any of the prevailing winds.


In consequence of the whole being quite an open and exposed shore, without any harbours to shelter boats or ships, great inconvenience is likely to arise from the difficulty of communication during strong, or even moderate breezes, blowing directly on the shore, which would cause much surf on it, and, considering the badness of the anchorage ground, would also often oblige them to take shelter under the lee sides of the island.

Having experienced, during our stay at the island, the variable quality of the water in the wells, we feel a doubt whether any of it would continue good during the whole season.

Almost every part of the beach of the island is covered with a quantity of sea-weed, and, from its long exposure, we found a very offensive effluvium emitted from it. From the abundance of it on the rocky shelf which surrounds the coast, it will continually be washed up by the sea, and, it is presumed, must prove highly prejudicial to health, unless removed when necessary.









## BASSADORE.

BASSADORE POINT, on which the Position is established, forms the north-west extreme of the island of Kishm. It is a rising and plain spot of ground, the surface of which is generally rocky or stony, and elevated in its lowest part about twenty feet above the sea, which washes it on the north and west sides. From the rocky and precipitous nature of the shore, and there being no higher ground but at the distance of several miles, it is a prominent and airy situation, exposed to all, and especially the prevailing winds from the north-east and westward.

From the natural declivity towards the Point, it is in some places low, which appear liable to dampness in the rainy season.


The Position is destitute of fresh water, all the wells, which are numerous in the Arab settlement that formerly existed there, being brackish; they were found so in the early part of the last dry season. There being several reservoirs for preserving rain-water, two of which are at this time nearly full, it may be considered doubtful whether the wells are ever good for more than a short time after the rainy season.

Of the two sides of the Position washed by the sea, that on the west cannot be approached by ships, on account of the shallowness of the water, and it is only accessible to boats at high-water, a considerable mud-flat extending in that direction, dry at low-water. The north side contains good anchorage ground, where ships and boats can lay well sheltered, the former about a quarter of a mile off shore, in the harbour formed in the channel between the Kishm and Persian shores, and a bank close off Bassadore Point, dry at low-water; it is therefore considered a safe and commodious anchorage for a large number of vessels. The landing-place is also on the north shore, but it is rather an indifferent one, the sea receding some distance, over a muddy bottom, and at high-water the rocky shore making the landing difficult when any swell prevails.






**'TRIGONOMETRICAL PLAN of the HARBOUR OF GRANE OR KOWEIT in the GULF OF PERSIA. By Lieutts. J.M. Guy and G.B. Brucks, H.E.I.C. Marine' [51a] (1/2)**



**'TRIGONOMETRICAL PLAN of the HARBOUR OF GRANE OR KOWEIT in the GULF OF PERSIA. By Lieutts. J.M. Guy and G.B. Brucks,  
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EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT  
ON THE  
HARBOUR OF GRANE (OR KOWEIT), AND THE  
ISLAND OF PHELEECHI,  
IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

PREPARED, IN NOVEMBER 1839,  
BY LIEUTENANT J. FELIX JONES,  
INDIAN NAVY.

ACCOMPANIED BY  
A TRIGONOMETRICAL PLAN OF THE HARBOUR OF GRANE,  
AND THE ISLAND OF PHELEECHI;  
BY LIEUTENANTS GUY AND BRUCKS,  
INDIAN NAVY.



## GRANE AND PHELEECHI.

### GRANE.

GRANE (or KOWEIT) is in general healthy, especially since the last plague, but no more healthy than the adjacent places in the Persian Gulf. The cholera was prevalent there at the same time it made its appearance among the Natives of Karrack. They possess few or no vegetables, with the exception of onions, the country being perfectly barren: at times a supply is obtained from Bussora, or from ports on the Persian Coast. Their fruits consist of water-melons (grown there), dates, citrons, pomegranates, and marsh-melons, obtained from Bushire and Bussora.

With regard to the different supplies, and in what quantities procurable, they are invariably the same as at Karrack, but more or less scarce, and vary in price according to the state of the market, as they are totally dependent on other ports for all kinds of grain: barley and wheat they procure from Bussora and India; rice from Mangalore; dholl from Bussora and Bushire; cattle and poultry they procure from the Bedouins. Their prices also vary much, a sheep on the arrival of a Kafilah or Bedouin horde selling for a dollar, and when scarce (as at the time I visited the place) for two dollars. Teak plank for boat-building they generally have a good supply of from Bombay, and another kind of hard wood, used for knees and timbers, brought from Muskat. Stones, chunam, &c. for house-building are plentiful, the latter in abundance, very cheap, and of a superior kind. The harbour abounds in fish.

### PHELEECHI.

After leaving Grane or Koweit, I visited the island of Pheleechi. Under the directions of a pilot I ventured to take the vessel, then drawing nine feet water, over the mud-flat (connecting the island and the main) between the north end of Pheleechi and the low island of Muchaan, at





## PHELEECHI.

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high-water. I was induced to run this risk from information gained from the pilot and others, that vessels would find shelter from south-easters and south winds, not only on the east side of Pheleechi, but on the west. I carried soundings of two and a half and two fathoms over the mud-flat the whole way, with the exception of two casts of ten feet, rocks, laying directly between the two islands, and, running to the northward a short distance, anchored in what the Natives called a Bunder, sheltered from south-east winds, in three fathoms, low-water. This place is partially sheltered from south-east, and wholly from south winds, but open from south-east to north. During the time I remained there, it blew a moderate sea-breeze from south-east, without any swell, but on its shifting to the eastward in the evening, a swell immediately set in. East and south-east breezes have prevailed since I came to this part of the coast, and a Native (Shaikh of Pheleechi) informed me they have blown for the last three months with only a few days' intermission. I do not think it a safe anchorage for vessels drawing more than eight feet water, as vessels drawing more would not be able to work out, should east winds blow, and there being less water (two and a half fathoms) to pass over after leaving it. When at anchor in three fathoms, mud (low-water), I obtained the following bearings and angles :—

A tomb on point near Saidee town, bearing south ..	14° 00' E. true.
High mosque in Grane, left of it .....	39 47 "
Said Sadoo Tomb, on mount right of it .....	12 36 "
Centre of Muchaan, right of it .....	71 15 "

Said Sadoo Tomb in one with west end of Toor, or Western Town, is as far as a vessel can go with safety to the westward, as the soundings shoal suddenly when they are open. High-water here on full and change 12.30; rise and fall from six to nine feet, local causes affecting the tides; rapidity two and a half to three knots per hour on the springs; flood to the west, ebb to south-east.

The other small Bunder is on the west side of Pheleechi, distant three to four hundred yards from the shore, and situated between the town of Toor and Said Sadoo, or tomb on a mound of the chart: it has a fathom and a half on it at low-water, and would shelter a small vessel drawing less from most winds.

The island (Pheleechi) is very low, and apparently at high spring tides broken in upon by the sea in many places, and must be a perfect swamp during the rainy season. It has three towns on it, viz. Toor the western, Saidee the northern, and Grane the eastern; the former of which is the only one at present inhabited, the other two having been depopulated by the late plague. It contains seventy to eighty houses, and about a hundred and fifty inhabitants.



They possess fifteen or sixteen Buggalows, that trade to Bussora, and from forty-five to fifty small boats, made from the date branch, exclusively for fishing. They appear poor and miserable, and state the island to be unhealthy, much subject to fevers, which carry off considerable numbers of children. The town boasts of a few straggling date trees, that yield little or no fruit, and outside are a few cultivated patches, the soil a kind of loamy sand, similar to Karrack, in which they rear a few onions, melons, and a small quantity of wheat occasionally. These patches are irrigated from numerous wells of water, good during the rains, but at other times indifferent. The inhabitants depend entirely on other places for supplies, but possess a few flocks.

The highest part of the island is Said Sadoo, or tomb on a mound. I took a theodolite with me on purpose to measure its height, but finding it so insignificant a spot, estimated it at thirty-five feet above high-water mark.

I do not consider the place adapted for a coal depôt except for small iron steamers, drawing less than seven feet water when laden; steamers of this description might frequent the western small Bunder, and lie within three hundred yards of the shore: they could be easily laden by boats, as there is sufficient water close to the beach for boats to land and embark cargo at any time of the tide.





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EXTRACTS FROM BRIEF NOTES  
RELATIVE TO  
THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF  
THE ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

PREPARED, IN AUGUST 1819,  
BY MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,  
MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.



## ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

### OF THE MUSKAT ARABS, JOASMEEES, UTTOOBEEES, WAHABEES, AND OMAN.

In the following paragraphs I have endeavoured to supply the want under which this Government has hitherto laboured of an adequate knowledge of the complicated interests that prevail in the Persian Gulf, by affording a sketch of the history of each of the Powers which have contended for superiority, and of the various revolutions which have occurred in that quarter from the earliest period.

During the ascendancy of the Portuguese nation, which under Alphonso d'Albuquerque conquered all the islands in the Persian Gulf in A. D. 1507, its navigation was perfectly secure from piracy; it continued so during the reign of Shah Abbas, or until the rise of the Muskat Arabs, which may be dated from A. D. 1694-95.

On the death of Shah Abbas, the Arabs, who had from the earliest ages possessed a superiority at sea over the Persians, established an influence which they maintained until the year 1736. Their depredations during that period were carried on to a most alarming degree, extending to the Indian seas, and the ruler of Muskat became master of all the islands.

The power of the Muskat Arabs declined in the reign of Nadir Shah, who re-established the Persian influence; an ascendancy which was maintained during the subsequent reign of Kureem Khan. The tranquillity of the Gulf was, however, disturbed in some degree on the death of Nadir Shah, by the notorious freebooter Meer Mehana, and by the Chaub Shaikh, by whose refractory dispositions the trade was greatly impeded. The British Government was also involved in serious difficulties by the vacillating policy pursued by its Agents at Bussora, on that occasion, which reduced our reputation to the lowest ebb. We experienced a disastrous defeat in an attack of the Chaub, and failed also in an attempt to reduce Bunderik, belonging to Meer Mehana. In the course of a badly conducted negociation with Kureem Khan, for the purpose of retrieving our credit in the chastisement of





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those petty rulers, we involved ourselves in hostilities with the Khan, who issued orders for the seizure of all English ships which his fleets might fall in with. A good understanding with the Persian Government was in some measure restored on the re-establishment of the Factory of Bushire in 1776.

The Muskat fleet, of which we hear nothing from 1736 to 1769 or 1774, made its appearance in the latter year, to co-operate in the defence of Bussora, the reduction of which Kureem Khan was contemplating, and effected; one of the pretexts for which was stated to be the aid which the Pacha of Bagdad had granted the Imaum of Muskat, which prevented the Persians from subduing the province of Oman.

Bussora was abandoned by the Persians on the death of Kureem Khan, in A. D. 1779, and re-occupied by the Turks. The troubles that ensued in the interior of Persia on that event left the Gulf uncontrolled. The decline of the Persian influence may be dated from that period; its maintenance depended exclusively on the attachment and fidelity of its tributaries. The contests for superiority which arose between the different petty States involved the whole Gulf in a state of hostility.

The fleet of the Shaikh of Julfar (Ras-ool-Khyma), who was at this period at war with the Imaum of Muskat, being continually on the cruise, roused every petty chief to equip armed boats, manned by a lawless crew, who received no pay, but depended solely on plunder, which they committed on each other. The Uttoobee Arabs, ambitious of sharing in the spoils, conquered Bahrein from the Persians, the possession of which, supported by their allies, they have since maintained, with unimportant intermissions, against repeated efforts on the part of the Persians, assisted by the Joasmees, and of the Imaum of Muskat, for its recovery and reduction.

We now come to an important era in the history of the Persian Gulf,—the rise of the Wahabee power, of which mention is first made in the Bombay Records in 1787. The Persian and Turkish Governments were at this period in an unsettled state, and but ill calculated to oppose the progressive ascendancy of that sect.

During the whole of this period, and even up to the year 1797, the molestation which the British trade experienced in the reign of Kureem Khan may be attributed to that interference which the Government exercised in the disputes between the petty States in the Gulf: whenever we preserved a strict neutrality, we derived every advantage from the observance of that policy. To piratical depredations it was not at all exposed, nor can piracy be said to have been systematically prosecuted by any of the powers up to 1797, except by the Muskat Arabs during the period of their ascendancy.

The enterprising character of Syud Sultan, the Imaum of Muskat,





who had usurped the Government from his elder brother, led him into serious disputes with the Arabs, which brought on a war with many of them. The British flag was insulted in one or two instances, for which, however, satisfaction was rendered. The troubles that prevailed from this period to the death of Syud Sultan, in 1804, are wholly attributable to the conduct of that chieftain in the prosecution of his ambitious views of aggrandisement.

The disputes that followed the death of Syud Sultan, for the succession, threw the Government of Muskat completely under the control of the Wahabee: from that period, the influence which the former chief had established declined, and that of the latter rapidly advanced, to the establishment of its ascendancy over the Gulf,—an event which led to the systematic prosecution of piracy, under the countenance and protection of that power, even to the Indian Seas.

The history of the rise of the Muskat, the Joasmee, and the Uttoobee Arabs, respectively, satisfactorily shows that they resisted the growing power of the Wahabees to the utmost of their efforts, and that not one of the petty States in the Gulf has voluntarily engaged in piracy.

From the period of their establishment in Oman until the year 1796, I have been unable to trace a single act of aggression, even on the part of the Joasmees, against the British flag. The attack of the *Bassein*, *Snow*, and of the *Viper* cruiser, in 1797, was supposed to have been by Arabs in the interest of the deposed Prince of Oman, the elder brother of Syud Sultan. In 1802 the Wahabees had reduced to nominal submission the principality of Seer, or the Joasmee territory; nor was it until after 1804 that the Joasmees, or, what would be a more just designation, the Wahabee Joasmees, commenced their piratical depredations. On the conclusion of the treaty with them in 1806, Captain Seton represented "the whole bulk of the Joasmees desirous of returning to their former mercantile pursuits."

Whatever may have been their disposition in that respect, they had not the power of gratifying it. In 1808, when their depredations first extended to the Indian Seas, Shaikh Sultan, the Joasmee Chief, possessed only the port of Ras-ool-Khyma, and his power being shortly after completely superseded, by the appointment of Wahabee officers to the charge of districts throughout his territories, he was inveigled up to Deriah, and imprisoned by the Wahabee Shaikh. He made his escape, reached Muskat, and sought the protection of the Imanm. The Joasmees were rendered independent of their lawful Shaikh, whose territories were placed under the vicegerency of Hussan bin Ali, the Joasmee Chief of Ramse, who had acknowledged the supremacy of the Wahabee Shaikh, and carried on piracy under his express orders and





protection, on the condition of assigning to him one-fifth of the value of all captures.

The Imaum made two different attempts to reinstate the Joasmee Chief in his hereditary possessions, but failed to accomplish that object; and Shaikh Sultan, with some of his tribe, has since resided at Shargah, and occasionally at Lingah. Hussan bin Rehma is now in charge of the Government of Ras-ool-Khyma, conjointly with his brother Ibrahim bin Rehma, and it is said that one or other of the brothers always commands in every fleet that goes out on a piratical cruise. They are first cousins to Sultan bin Suggur, the legitimate Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, but devoted to the Wahabee power.

Next to the Wahabee power, the State of Muskat appears to have contributed, by its injudicious policy, to the insecurity of the Gulf. Their history proves that the Muskat Arabs were the first power in that quarter that prosecuted piracy, but they have abandoned it since 1736. Whenever the Government, however, has been efficient since that period, it has engaged in petty wars, in the prosecution of views of ambition which it has never been able to accomplish. With the most powerful fleet in the Gulf, and the means of protecting Oman against internal invasion if properly applied, the Imaum has been unable to check the depredations of the Wahabee Joasmees;—the Joasmees have maintained their independence against every attempt on the part of the Imaum to reduce their country. Equally unable has he been to reduce Bahrein, or to retain it when reduced, the Arabs possessing that island feeling themselves fully competent, as they manfully assert, and determined to defend it against attack by the Imaum, or any other Native power in the Gulf. The prosecution of those views on the part of the Imaum, leading to combinations among the Arab States either to promote or counteract them, and the general warfare that invariably ensued, have led to attacks on British vessels, and to check the trade of the Gulf.

In respect to the Uttoobee Arabs, I am disposed to think that the account of their origin and establishment as a commercial tribe of Arabs at Zobara will place their character in a very favourable light. As long as their power enabled them to oppose the Wahabees, they abstained from acknowledging allegiance to them. Inevitable necessity drove them to seek that protection: they did not, however, resort to that alternative, until after their offer to retire from their possessions on the main to Bahrein, provided the British would protect them, was declined. They cannot be charged with having committed a single act of piracy; they did not admit and promote the disposal of pirated property, until they found a renewed engagement, which they were anxious to enter into with the British, entirely disregarded. Self-existence compelled them to acknowledge a power, whose preponderance



in the Gulf they have employed every effort to check, and to which they have ever manifested a decided hostility. The Imaum of Muskat has no greater merit: with more powerful resources to maintain its independence, His Highness was equally compelled to preserve the existence of his Government by an abject submission to the authority of the Wahabee Chief. The Imaum acknowledged allegiance to the Wahabees, and his whole fleet would have engaged in piracy but for the timely interposition of the British Government in 1809.

The Records of the Bombay Government, and every other authority I have consulted, fully corroborate the fact, that previously to the establishment of the Wahabee power,—and I would except also the period from 1694-95 to 1736, during the ascendancy of the Muskat Arabs,—the tribes in the Gulf were engaged in commercial enterprise; in the cultivation of extensive groves of the date tree; and in the pursuit of a lucrative pearl fishery: their vessels resorting to the ports of India, Yemen, Africa, Sind, Kutch, and Bussora, which afforded profitable employment to the maritime portion of the population of the Gulf.

It is a very extraordinary fact,—at least I have not been able to trace anything to the contrary,—that during the whole period of the ascendancy of the Wahabee power in the Gulf, the Imaum of Muskat has not lost an inch of territory, nor a single port, that belonged to his ancestors, on the shores of Oman.

Neither has he any claim to the ports of the Joasmees. Oman has from the earliest ages been divided between two tribes, the Beni Yemen or Beni Hinavi, and the Beni Nasir or Beni Gafree. The Imaum is the head of the first, and his ancestors have possessed one of the two principalities into which the province is divided, namely Rastag, of which Muskat is the principal port.

The Chief of the Joasmees is the head of the other tribe, and has for ages possessed the other principality, called Seer or Julfar, of which Ras-ool-Khyma is the chief seaport. His ancestors settled in Oman before those of the Imaum of Muskat.





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OBSERVATIONS  
ON THE  
PAST POLICY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT  
TOWARDS THE  
ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

BY  
LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,  
ASSISTANT RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

*Submitted to Government on the 18th October 1844.*

TO WHICH ARE ANNEXED,  
COPIES OF TREATIES\* AND AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE  
HONORABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY WITH THE ARAB TRIBES OF  
THE PERSIAN GULF, OR EFFECTED THROUGH BRITISH MEDIA-  
TION, BETWEEN THE 6TH FEBRUARY 1806, AND THE 4TH MAY 1853.

[\* The Treaties for the Abolition of the Slave Trade are given in this Selection under a distinct head.]



## BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE general policy of the British Government in relation with the Arab States is fully apparent from the annexed Treaties. It remains but to be shown how far the course adopted by Government has proved adequate to the attainment of the one great and principal end,—the entire suppression of piracy, and consequent security to the trade and traders of all nations. The measures pursued in the support of this line of policy have ever been mild and conciliatory; but a constant surveillance, and an unrelenting vigilance, aided by the occasional demonstration of power (without, however, its actual exercise since 1820, one instance in 1835 alone excepted), have nevertheless been essentially necessary to render it of avail.

The gradually improving civilization and increased commercial interests of the inhabitants of the maritime Arab States, induced by these restraints to war and piracy, creating to a certain degree a desire on their own part for *perfect* tranquillity on the seas, have removed many great difficulties which at first existed, and enabled the Government of late years to diminish the great annual expenditure on account of the naval establishment employed in their watch and observation, by its reduction to the complement of one sloop of war, one brig, one schooner, and the Resident's yacht, without at the same time lessening its influence, or incurring any great danger of a renewal of former disorders.

It must nevertheless be borne in mind,—when the poverty, habits of rapine, and interminable blood feuds (the heir-loom of the Arab); and when the enticing prospects of rich booty to be obtained from a course of piracy, are considered,—that the Arabs have been so long restrained and impelled to the faithful observance, with few exceptions, of their engagements with the Government, by the dread of its power alone, and the assurance that punishment would immediately follow their slightest breach. The disorders and irregularities arising out of the blood feuds existing on land afford a pretty good proof of what would occur at sea, were it not for the restraining power of the British Government.

Experience has shown that the most solemn engagements between





## BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

these chieftains themselves, formed without the guarantee of the Government, are no security whatever for the maintenance of peace: present prospects of temporary advantage or gain are quite sufficient grounds for their being set aside and disregarded. The complete and voluntary abandonment of lawless habits, therefore, if ever to be anticipated, must be looked for in a future generation: at present it is sufficient that the presence of our naval force, aided by a firm but mild supervision, have already been attended with such good effects, and are in a fair way of promoting a radical change.

Previous to the expedition of 1820,\* under the command of Sir William Grant Keir, which had for its object the complete destruction of the forts and boats† of the piratical tribes, notwithstanding the merited chastisement which had been inflicted upon them by a naval expedition in 1809, no vessel, whether carrying a British pass and British colours, or those of any other nation, was safe; and the only effect of repeated remonstrances, and threats of retaliation, was to elicit from them the promise, while still openly avowing their determination otherwise to continue their depredations, to respect the British flag,—an engagement which they nevertheless seldom observed, and for the violation of which they invariably failed to afford redress when called upon. The slight and temporary impression which had been made by the first expedition, in 1809, in consequence of its not having been fittingly followed up by measures of precaution and general supervision, led, therefore, in the expedition of 1819-20, to the imposition of a general Treaty, consisting of eleven Articles, upon the Arab Chieftains, and the appointment of a Political Resident at Bushire, whose duty it now became to insist upon the full and strict observance of its conditions on the part of the subscribers; for which purpose the services of a naval and military force were placed at his disposal. The latter arm was at first stationed at Ras-ool-Khyma, but was thence, after a short period, for obvious reasons, removed in the first instance to Kishm, on the island of that name, a dependency of the Imaum of Muskat, and afterwards to Deristan, opposite the island of Angaum; but, in consequence of the insalubrity of the climate of those two places, was finally transferred and fixed at Bassadore,‡ a portion of the same island. Three or four

\* During a short period subsequent to the departure of this Expedition, the right was assumed of preventing the restoration of the forts and towers, which had been dismantled and destroyed; but as it was founded on no pledge on the part of the chiefs not to rebuild, it was resigned.

† The boats belonging to Lingah, Mogoo, Aseeloo, and Congoon, on the Persian Coast, were also destroyed; but, on the remonstrance of the Persian Minister, compensation was afforded by the Indian Government.

‡ Vide Report on Bassadore, at page 50 of this Selection.





years sufficed to show that a respectable naval force was fully competent to all the objects in view, and the military detachment was therefore withdrawn to Bombay; and the head quarters of the Indian Naval Squadron, after continuing some time at Mogoo, was, in consequence of the jealousy of the Persian Government, removed to Bassadore, a more unhealthy station, but possessing the superior advantage of a spacious and excellent harbour.

During the first few years subsequent to the date of the formation of this Treaty,\* it was not considered advisable or expedient to hold its conditions so strictly binding as their import and wording admitted. War at sea, if previously proclaimed, was consequently not precluded to the subscribers.

The sentiments of Government on this point were at the time thus expressed:—"Our relations to the Arab States afforded no grounds for interference to restrain their mutual attacks. It is true that Article IV. of Sir W. Grant Keir's Treaty mentions peace among themselves as one of the alterations in the condition of the Arabs introduced by that engagement, but this appears to have been rather an explanation of the intention of the flag, than any distinct stipulation; and it was explained by Sir W. Grant Keir, in the 7th paragraph of his letter accompanying the Treaty, to have been designed, among other purposes, to demonstrate our determination not to interfere with the petty feuds of the subscribing powers, while they continued to observe the stipulations of the Treaty. In these circumstances, Government could scarcely pretend to the power of imposing any restraint on the motions of vessels intended for a purpose of lawful warfare."

The total cessation of warfare at sea was nevertheless anxiously desired by most of the chieftains, and many indeed themselves entertained the belief that it was thus provided in Article IV. of the Treaty.

From the foregoing extract, however, it is seen that the Government was not prepared at that time to take upon itself the responsibility which such a line of policy must have entailed, in the investigation and settlement of such endless complaints and claims, and the redress of such grievances as must in that case have been referred to it for arbitration and decision; and the following explanation of this Article was accordingly given by Major Wilson to Shaikhs Sultan bin Suggur, Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and others, on their expressing their conviction that it involved a total prohibition of hostilities.

\* The irregular habits of the Arabs rendered it necessary, in the opinion of Sir W. Grant Keir, that the Treaty concluded by him should not be strictly enforced for a considerable period after it was concluded. The numerous petty wars between the different Chiefs of the Gulf rendered it at all times difficult to distinguish in that sea between acts of piracy and operations of lawful warfare.





## BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

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"Piratical war being in existence previous to the conclusion of this Treaty with the pacificated Arabs, it was necessary, for the purpose of introducing the new order of things which the Treaty announces in Article I,\* that these piratical wars should be brought to a termination: with this view Article IV. of the Treaty was inserted.

"The meaning of this Article, when taken in conjunction with the definition of acknowledged war to be found in Article II., becomes perfectly apparent, and it may be thus developed:—

"The pacificated Arabs shall all of them continue in their former political relations with each other, with the exception that as all piratical wars shall henceforward cease, they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other in the same piratical manner; and the flag is a symbol of this, viz. that piratical wars have ceased, and of nothing further.†

"It is not, and therefore never can be called, with propriety, the British flag; it is only the flag of certain friends of the British, who may, by the adoption of this flag, be desirous to avoid the risk of being confounded with pirates. There is nothing in these Articles which prevents the Arabs declaring war; but whenever they do so, they are required to fight after the manner of acknowledged war, which Article II. defines to be that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered, by Government against Government. The British Government has always said that it will consider all wars that are not acknowledged as piratical, and treat whoever may be engaged in them accordingly; and the latter part of Article II. states that the killing of men, and taking of goods, without proclamation, avowal, and the order of a Government, is plunder and piracy.

"The British Government being most desirous to maintain to the whole of the Arab Tribes inhabiting the shores of this Gulf the blessings of peace and tranquillity, is most ready on all occasions to offer its mediation where disputes may exist, and will always rejoice at their peaceable and happy termination; whilst it avows most distinctly its absolute determination not to tolerate for a moment any piratical practices, and it will look to the different chieftains for the maintenance of due order among all their subjects."

With reference to Article V., the irregular habits of the Arabs, who could never be brought to understand the meaning and aim of the papers required, very shortly proved the futility of the attempt to

\* ARTICLE I.—There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy, by land and sea, on the part of the Arabs who are parties to this contract, for ever.

† The true version:—The pacificated Arabs shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other; and the flag shall be a symbol of this only, and of nothing further.





enforce adherence to the provisions it contained, from the great trouble and difficulty attending it, and the irritation and ill feeling it excited.\*

No occasion has even arisen for calling into operation Articles VI. and VII.

The contending chiefs have been occasionally reminded of the existence of such an Article as the eighth, and that it may be enforced; but it has always been considered desirable to avoid all minute inquiries regarding the treatment of people who may have been captured in the course of hostilities, from the extreme difficulty of substantiating the facts, which would be invariably denied, and the destruction of an enemy palliated or accounted for by the excuse of self-defence, the ardour of the combat, or the obstinacy of the opponent.

The enterprise and resources of the piratical tribes having once been directed into a legitimate channel, and gradually given rise to habits of honest industry, and the more lawful and peaceable pursuits of civilized life, it became a great desideratum to prevent the occurrence of any accidents, such as petty wars among themselves, which, from affording an opening and pretext to the evil disposed, have a decided tendency to degenerate into piracy, and a general plunder of all defenceless vessels.

Towards the attainment of this end, it was in May 1835, immediately subsequent to the outbreak of the Beni-yas Tribes in that year, suggested, that a material check might be given to this evil, were the several tribes prohibited from cruising with their war-boats in the track of the Gulf trade, lying between the Persian Coast and the islands of Surdy and Bomosa, and thus a neutral ground established, upon which the maritime Arabs would be precluded from carrying on hostilities under any circumstances.

In January 1836 it was personally intimated by the Resident, under authority from Government, to the several chiefs from Debaye to Rasool-Khyma, that the excursions of their war-boats must be thenceforth strictly confined within a line drawn from Shaum to within ten miles south of Bomosa, and thence onward through the island of Seir Aboneid; and that the commanders of the vessels of the Gulf squadron had been instructed to seize any of the boats found on the hither side, or

\* Moreover, the refusal to grant registers would have produced no good effect, but, on the contrary, have tended to confound ships employed in authorised hostilities with those engaged in piratical depredations; and the non-observance of the conditions considered as a check to piracy was of no great importance, for piracies, since the formation of this Treaty, have usually been committed in boats of the class employed in the fishery, which did not require passes, and usually escaped to the creeks,—at all events avoided our cruisers,—leaving the infliction of their punishment to be sought at the hands of the chief who acknowledged them as subjects, from whose territory they had last set out, or in whose territory they had taken refuge.





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neutral ground, which, from their want of cargo, or their being manned or armed in such a way, admitted no doubt of their objects not being peaceful. Sultan bin Suggur having represented that he had sometimes occasion to send his war-boats round Cape Musseldom for purposes connected with the protection of his territories on the coast of Khor Fukaun,\* he was informed that previous to his doing so he must make known his wishes to, and obtain the sanction of, the Commodore at Bassadore, who was at the same time instructed that it was desirable,† if possible, that the prescribed limits should be enforced upon the Joasmee Chief, in common with others, especially from the month of October to July, the period of the great commercial intercourse between the Gulf and India.

In consideration of the late excesses of the Beni-yas, it was judged expedient to limit, for a period, the cruising of *their* armed boats to within sight of their own coast; and this was officially intimated to their chief.

The only chief absolutely requiring an establishment of war-vessels is the Shaikh of Bahrein, whose independence, from his vicinity to the Wahabee power, to which he has been long opposed, must in a great measure hinge upon his superiority at sea; yet the cruising of his armed boats could at the same time easily be confined to the limits of the isolated part of the Gulf in which his principal territory is situated.

On the occasion, therefore, of some irregularities and piratical acts, committed on the Persian Coast by the sons of the Bahrein Chief whilst in rebellion against their father, this restrictive line was subsequently made applicable to Huailah and Bahrein, by being extended from Hawlool, ten miles north of Ras Reccan, through the island of El Kraan to Ras Zoor, on the main, a measure which was assented to by the Uttoobee Chief in a letter dated the 26th March 1836.

Although the entire limits thus laid down were sufficiently defined for all the required objects, and the concurrence of the Arabian Chiefs in the establishment of the restrictive line had been by implication afforded, yet, with the exception of the letter from Abdoolah bin Ahmed at Bahrein, no formal intimation of their consent in writing had been obtained. It was therefore resolved by the Indian and Home Governments, at the suggestion of the Resident, Captain Hennell, that

\* Acquired by his taking advantage of the disturbed state of the Imaum's affairs in 1832, when he was only prevented from making further encroachments upon His Highness' dominions by the active interference of the British Government.

† Not only as guarding against the long-established predatory spirit of the Joasmee Tribe upon the most exposed point of the Gulf, but as at least affording a negative protection to our ancient ally the Imaum, against any further sudden act of aggression by sea on the part of Sultan bin Suggur.





previous to any application from the Arabian Chiefs to be permitted to declare war against each other at any future period being acceded to, they should be required to furnish a written and formal recognition of the restrictive line,\*—instructions which have since been carefully attended to.

At this period, also, (May 1835,) a favourable opportunity offering for the establishment of a peace between the hostile chieftains, by the presence at Bassadore of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, the Joasmee Chief, and Shaikh Shakboot, the father of the Beniyas Chief, and his plenipotentiary in the adjustment of the claims arising out of the late piracies of the tribe, a vessel of war was despatched to Debaye, with an invitation to Obed bin Saeed, one of the Shaikhs of that place, to join the conference. This chief promptly attended to the summons, and was immediately followed by Rashid bin Humeed, the Shaikh of Ejman, and head of the Al Naeem Tribe.

Every argument and endeavour to reconcile their jarring interests, or adjust their conflicting claims for reparation and satisfaction on account of past injuries, were entirely thrown away, especially as they deemed the guarantee of the British to any sort of arrangement a *sine quâ non*.

The proposition of a Maritime Truce for six months was, however, favourably received, and the agreement having been drawn out, was duly signed and sealed by the respective parties, upon whom it was at the same time fully impressed, that any infraction would be treated as a case of piracy, without any reference to inland disputes. To this arrangement they expressed their perfect approval and consent.†

\* One slight exception may here be mentioned. While war threatened in 1838 to take place between Bahrein and the Al Ali Tribe (under its Chief Esai bin Tarif), Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed most unaccountably and unexpectedly objected to hostilities being confined within any limits, under the impression (it was with justice supposed) that the British Government was prepared to do anything rather than see hostilities break out between himself and Aboothabee (where the seceded tribe resided), and in the hope, therefore, that hostilities would be forbidden, and his fugitive subjects compelled to return to their allegiance. Although this chief ought to have made his objections upon the establishment of the restrictive line three years previously, yet, as he was an independent chief, who had generally observed the conditions of the Treaty of 1820 more carefully than any other person in the Gulf, he was informed that it would not be held binding upon him. On its objects being, however, at the time made known to him, and its being further explained that he had everything to lose and nothing to gain by its being suspended, he tacitly withdrew his dissent.

† Of the great importance attached by the maritime Arabs to an uninterrupted pearl fishery an idea may be formed, from the circumstance that some of the principal merchants of Shargah, in a private communication with the Agent at that place, offered to guarantee to the Indian Government the sum of twenty dollars per annum for each boat that went out to the pearl banks, provided they were taken under its immediate protection, and a vessel of war especially deputed to guard them from aggression. Such a proposition of course could not be entertained, but it shows the desire of the mercantile part of the maritime Arabs for peace,





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The season of the pearl fishery having, owing to the establishment of the truce,\* passed over with unusual peace and tranquillity, it was renewed for eight months on the 13th April 1836, with undisguised satisfaction by the respective chiefs, and again on the 15th April of the following year. In September of the same year the Joasmee Chief despatched a confidential Agent, by name Mahomed bin Imuz, to wait upon the Resident, for the purpose of intimating his desire that there should be a total cessation of fighting at sea, and that a general agreement should be entered into by the chiefs on the Arabian Coast to confine their wars upon each other entirely to the land, with the understanding that any aggression at sea should be immediately treated by the British Government as an act of piracy, and redress enforced accordingly; in fact that the truce, instead of being established for six months, should be made perpetual.

The Shaikh's Agent explained that his master was led to make this request from the apprehension that on the lapse of the term of the truce, the Beniyas (who were little employed in trading pursuits) would take advantage of his vessels being scattered, in the prosecution of their trading voyages, to attack them individually, and unprepared. The Resident replied to this communication that the British Government could not, for reasons which were explained to the Agent, without its special sanction and authority, be made a party to an agreement which would cast upon it the onus and responsibility of being the arbiter in every dispute, and settlement of endless claims; moreover, the conflicting interests of the other parties appeared to offer an insuperable bar to their concurrence, and it was at all events necessary, in the first instance, to learn their sentiments upon the subject. In 1838, on the Resident's making a tour of the Arabian Coast, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur not only expressed his earnest desire for a renewal of the truce, but added that it would afford him sincere pleasure if it could be

and is strongly corroborative of the reports, which came in from all quarters, of the joy and satisfaction diffused among the inhabitants of the whole line of the Arabian Coast of this Gulf, on the intelligence reaching them of the establishment of the truce.

\* Among the parties to this truce the Chief of Bahrein was not included. He was too tangible, and too well convinced how deeply his interests would be affected by any collision with British authority and influence in this quarter to render it probable that he would risk any deviation from that commendable and peaceable line of conduct which had previously distinguished him, at least as far as his general maritime pursuits had been concerned. Independently of the above considerations, other reasons existed for the Bahrein Chief not being invited to join the truce. It was known at the time that His Highness the Imam entertained hostile intentions against the island, and it was feared, as a member of the truce, the Shaikh might have claimed the interposition of the British Government to prevent his being attacked. Afterwards arose the irreconcilable feud between himself and Esai bin Tarif, and subsequently the family quarrels, all of which rendered it expedient that the British Government should keep itself aloof from interference as much as possible.





changed into the establishment of a permanent peace upon the seas. On certain objections\* being adduced to this proposition, he urged the extension of the truce, and suspension of hostilities, for twelve instead of eight months, and Shaikh Khaleefa and the other parties consenting to this arrangement, the truce was drawn out accordingly, and duly signed by each. It was again renewed for the same period in the years 1839, 1840, 1841, and 1842 successively, without the slightest demur or objection.

Immediately, however, on the expiration of that for the year ending in April 1840, and before time and opportunity had been allowed to the Resident to make arrangements for its renewal, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur attacked Amulgavine by sea (as well as land), and had nearly succeeded in taking the place,† when the opportune arrival of the Resident permitted of his successfully using his endeavours towards a reconciliation, and the blockading force having been withdrawn, the Maritime Truce was again established and subscribed to by all parties for another year.

Government had long deemed it advisable that the suspension of hostilities should be rendered obligatory upon the several parties for a more extended period than hitherto embraced within the *annual* truce.

In 1843, it became necessary to address strong and threatening language to the Shaikh of Amulgavine, in order to induce him to fulfil the agreement which had been entered into between himself and Sultan bin Suggur, at the interposition and mediation of the British Resident, in 1840, and make the requisite *amendé*, by the destruction of certain fortified works which he had by its terms been precluded from adding to or erecting. One inducement to this chief to concede to this just

\* In reply, it was pointed out to him the little prospect there existed of the maintenance of a perpetual peace, with reference to the peculiar habits and dispositions of the Arabs: that when a definite period was assigned, as in a truce, the several tribes were contented to allow their feuds and animosities to remain in abeyance, under the idea that after a specified date it would always be in their power to indulge their deeply rooted feelings of animosity, should they feel disposed to do so. On the contrary, the circumstance alone of finding themselves precluded, by the conditions of a treaty putting an end to all future hostilities by sea, from avenging insults, or taking satisfaction for wrongs, whether real or imaginary, would so embitter the sentiments of hatred entertained towards each other, that a series of aggressions and retaliations would speedily arise, which would only tend to defeat the very object for which the peace had been negotiated.—(Extract of letter No. 11, Political Department, from Captain Hennell to Government, dated 19th April 1830.)

† "The Joasmee Chief was guilty of deception and cunning in thus taking advantage of the interim which had been unavoidably allowed to ensue between the lapse of the truce for 1839-40 and its renewal for 1840-41, as he had replied in the affirmative to a communication from the Resident, requesting to be informed whether he was willing to renew the truce for the period of the ensuing pearl fishery." He was, moreover, guilty of an infraction of one of the conditions of the Treaty of 1820, which forbade any chief engaging in hostilities without the previous knowledge and sanction of the Resident, to whom he was thereby bound to make application.





demand, and to his opponent to acquiesce,—the total removal of the obligations of the treaty thenceforward from all parties,—appeared to exhibit itself in carrying into effect the Government suggestion of lengthening the term of the truce, inasmuch as it obviated, at least during the period thus extended, the necessity he (of Amulgavine) at the time urged for the erection of any sea defences, and all parties consenting (the continuation of the annual gifts being secured to them), a Maritime Truce of *ten years* was accordingly, under the special authority of Government, entered into on the 1st June 1843.\*

These various restraints and checks to irregularities cannot be sufficiently appreciated, although the system may at first sight be viewed as exercising too great and arbitrary an influence and control over positively independent States. Thus precluded from the illicit profits to be derived from piratical depredations at sea, it became a matter of vital importance to secure to all the tribes, in common, peace and tranquillity, while engaged in the practice of their vocation on the pearl banks, and the prosecution of their carrying trade, the only means which (the barrenness and infertility of the soil of their country, producing not sufficient for the maintenance of the inhabitants, being called to mind) nature has placed within their reach for gaining a livelihood, and upon the success of which must depend the extent of commerce and degree of prosperity and happiness among them. The interests, moreover, of humanity and good policy dictate the prevention of outrage and aggression on these seas, by every precautionary measure, rather than the punishment and coercion of such when perpetrated by the rude and uncivilized tribes in these quarters.

By submitting to the Maritime Truce,† the parties have bound themselves not to engage in hostilities *on the sea* under any circumstances. On the occurrence of disputes of such a nature as not to be amicably arranged by mediation and mutual concession, but to render necessary a recourse to arms, the struggle must be held on land; but should these disputes have had their origin in depredations and unprovoked aggressions by sea, and at sea, then the aggrieved chief is entitled to

\* A copy of this Maritime Truce will be found at page 86 of this Selection. A few days before the expiration of this truce (1st June 1853) a "Perpetual Treaty of Peace," dated the 4th May 1853, was agreed upon by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast. A copy of this Treaty is also annexed.—*Editor*.

† The nature of our connection with the Arabs who were parties to the Treaty (previous to the conclusion of the Maritime Truce), and the import of Article IV. of that Treaty, no doubt gave great weight to endeavours to prevent hostilities by means of explanation and mediation, and entitled us to demand from each chief an explicit declaration of his intention to go to war with any other power in the Gulf; but that war once announced, we had no further control over the proceedings of the belligerents than might be necessary to prevent a renewal of the system of general depredation.—(Government letter No. 329, 15th March 1823.)





demand redress at the hands of the third party, or guarantee for the maintenance of the conditions of the truce inviolate; and these conditions are, with the perfect knowledge of all, only held to apply to aggressions on the sea by one boat upon another, and not to those cases where boats, drawing up on shore in the creeks and backwaters, are attacked and robbed by the Bedouins. The interference of the Resident towards redress in such cannot be claimed. Circumstances may possibly arise, calling for the temporary suspension of the operation of the restrictive line, and this contingency forms the only objection to imposing any restraint of this nature on the Arabs with whom we have treaties, arising out of the impossibility of exerting a similar control over other States not so bound, the settlement of whose disputes with the former would be involved in intricacy and difficulty.

In cases where lawless and unprovoked aggressions have been made at sea by such a power, not authorised by open war, and the remonstrances and mediatory interposition of the British authority have failed to procure redress for the injured and aggravated chief, justice and good policy would demand that the latter should be permitted to have recourse to his own means to exact it; and further, that the British authorities, having exerted their influence without effect to bring his opponent to a proper sense of his injustice, should restrain any of the other chiefs, subscribers to the truce, from interfering in any way, but certainly from affording his assistance to that opponent.

Such a precedent has not up to the present date occurred, and permission\* has, on the other hand, ever been denied to any chief,

\* Two examples may here be cited. In the middle of the year 1835, when the Shaikh of Amulgavine expressed his wish to assist the people of Charak, it was assumed as a point with him, that whatever claims of superiority he might formerly have possessed over the Charak people, now they had located themselves in Persia they had become Persian subjects, and consequently he could not, situated as he was, have any right to interfere actively in their quarrels. And again, in October 1843, when three of the Shaikhs of the Coast of Oman (Sultan bin Suggur, Suggur bin Sultan, and Muktoom bin Butye) applied for permission to afford aid to the ex-Chief Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein, in regaining his lost authority over that island, it was well known at the time that overtures had been made by the latter's opponents, Mahomed bin Khaleefa and his colleagues, to the Shaikhs of Aboothabee (Khaleefa bin Shakboot) and Amulgavine (Abdoolla bin Rashid), and that these chiefs were prepared to join them. A positive refusal was therefore imperatively called for, and was made in the following terms to the ex-chief through whom the application had been made:—"It is not hidden from you that Mahomed bin Khaleefa, Esai bin Tarif, and their colleagues, being heads of tribes inhabiting Bahrein, the British Government could not interfere in their quarrel with you; but Sultan bin Suggur and the other chiefs mentioned have no connection or interest in the war, and you are aware that if they become your active allies, Mahomed bin Khaleefa and Esai bin Tarif would undoubtedly immediately crave the assistance of Khaleefa bin Shakboot and other chiefs. The result would be confusion throughout the Gulf, and enmity between all the tribes; moreover, no benefit would accrue to yourself.

"For these reasons, it is not possible that I should grant my concurrence to the inter-





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a party to the truce, incited by avarice and a prospect of booty, and desiring without just cause to mix himself up in the quarrels of others, not subscribers to the truce, in the result of which he has no immediate interest or concern, on the grounds that if granted it would afford a plea to those bound, equally with himself, not to wage war at sea, whereon to base a similar right to espouse the cause of the opponent with whom he proposes to ally himself, and thus cause in the first instance an indirect violation of the restrictive line and Maritime Truce, whose obligations would be very shortly entirely forgotten and set aside by the allies themselves on either side necessarily becoming principals.

Piracies are now of rare occurrence in these seas. Slight cases of aggression, unattended with bloodshed, have almost annually occurred, and must ever be expected occasionally to occur, upon the pearl banks.

Their origin is almost invariably to be traced to the practice of debtors avoiding the settlement of claims against them,\* on account of advances of money (for the purchase of provisions during the unemployed portion of the year, considered as a remuneration beforehand for services to be hereafter rendered on the pearl banks), by deserting their own chief, and taking refuge with another; and the subsequent attempts of their lawful head, or of their creditors, forcibly to recover possession of their persons, or of the amount due by them, or its equivalent from the boat in which they sail, belonging to the tribe they may have joined. For such aggressions and irregularities at sea, it is incumbent upon the British Resident, by the terms and spirit of the Maritime Truce, to exact redress.

Attempts have been made to induce the several chiefs to enter into a mutual agreement among themselves, without British guarantee, to refuse refuge to such fugitives; but these have ever been rendered nugatory by Arab pride and sense of honour, as the prospect of the advantage which each chief (forming his own, and therefore of course the most favourable estimate of the popularity and attractiveness of his particular

ference in any way of the chiefs of the Coast of Oman, who are intimately connected with the British Government by agreements, and a truce among themselves made its guarantee."

It may be here remarked that in the latter case the applicants, although considering themselves in honour bound to evince at least the pretence of exertion in favour of their ancient friend and ally, yet experienced great satisfaction at having it in their power to adduce the unanswerable argument of the restraining power of the British Government, contrary to whose wishes they were not prepared to act. It must be remembered, too, and to this they were fully alive, that by assisting the ex-chief they would have given umbrage to the Wahabee ruler, Amcer Fysul, the powerful ally of his opponent, and that, moreover, they had everything to lose and nothing to gain by engaging in a profitless warfare, to the prejudice of their trade, and the interruption of the pearl fishery.

\* For an accurate and interesting description of the pearl fishery, and an account of the system of loans and advances to pearl divers, vide Welsted's Travels, Vol. I. Chap. VI. page 114.





Government and territory, whether on the grounds of leniency and indulgence in the exaction of more moderate taxes, superior military prowess and renown, or greater commercial advantages) anticipates from a numerical increase to his subjects, and consequent improved revenue and influence.

The first principle of our policy enjoining, for obvious reasons, a total non-interference in local matters concerning only themselves, and the false position in which the assumption of the right of insisting upon every fugitive being given up to his own chief would evidently place us, as being calculated to remove the only check at present existing to the tyranny and oppression of the chief over his subjects, constitute powerful arguments against affording the required guarantee, or independently striking a blow at the root of the evil, however much it may be desirable to remedy it.

The piratical Arab Chiefs, satisfied of the advantages obtained by the establishment of the Maritime Truce, which, by common consent, precluding hostilities with each other, removes the chance of a relapse into a system of general depredations, and unprovoked aggressions, are now quite as much interested in its maintenance as ourselves; and of this they exhibited ample proof in their united readiness to renew it for so long a period as ten years, or even more, had such been desired or deemed expedient. As before observed, however, it would be too much to suppose that so radical a change has been or will for a length of time to come be effected, as to admit of the total withdrawal of that influence and political control which have, from their wise and mild exercise, rendered this Gulf, whose coasts are inhabited by a brave, rapacious, and cruel people, brought up and nurtured from their childhood among scenes of bloodshed, and licentious and treacherous warfare on land, comparatively as safe and open to the trade and navigation of vessels of all nations, as the seas of any other portion of the world.





TREATIES WITH THE ARAB TRIBES OF THE  
PERSIAN GULF.

*Kuolnamah, or Agreement between SHAIKH ABDOOLLA bin KROOSH, on the part of SHAIKH ULMAS SHAIKH AMEER, SULTAN bin SUGGUR bin RASHID JOASMEE, and Captain DAVID SETON on the part of the Honorable EAST INDIA COMPANY.—Dated 6th February 1806.*

In Bunder Abbas, this 6th day of February 1806, the following was agreed, promised, and sworn to :—

ARTICLE I.

There shall be peace between the Honorable the East India Company and Sultan bin Suggur Joasmee, and the whole of his dependents and subjects, on the shores of Arabia and Persia, and they shall respect the flag and property of the Honorable East India Company and their subjects, wherever and in whatever it may be; and the same the Honorable East India Company towards the Joasmee.

ARTICLE II.

Should the Joasmees infringe the above, they shall be liable in the sum of 30,000 dollars, and on this condition Captain David Seton agrees to receive from Ameer Sultan bin Suggur the brig now lying at Muskat, and to drop the claims to the cargo, guns, &c. of the said vessel, and the *Shannon*.

ARTICLE III.

Whatever British property shall be found in the same fleet shall be restored.

ARTICLE IV.

Should any British vessel touch on the coasts of the Joasmees, for wood or water, or be forced on shore by stress of weather, or any other cause, the Joasmees shall assist and protect the said vessel, and permit it to be disposed of or carried away, as their owners shall see fit, without claim or demand.

ARTICLE V.

Should Suood compel the Joasmees to infringe this peace, they shall give three months' previous notice in all cases.

ARTICLE VI.

When the above is confirmed and ratified by both parties, the



Joasmees shall frequent the English ports, from Surat to Bengal, as before.

(Signed) ABDOOLLA bin KROOSH.  
DAVID SETON,  
Resident.

*Confirmed by the Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council on the 29th April 1806.*

*Translation of the General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf.—Dated the 8th January 1820.*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate! Praise be to God, who hath ordained Peace to be a blessing to His creatures! There is established a lasting peace between the British Government and the Arab Tribes, who are parties to this Contract, on the following conditions:—

ARTICLE I.


There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy, by land and sea, on the part of the Arabs who are parties to this Contract, for ever.

ARTICLE II.

If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall attack any that pass by land or sea, of any nation whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy, and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind, and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods; and acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by Government against Government, and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order of Government, is plunder and piracy.

ARTICLE III.

The friendly (literally the pacificated) Arabs shall carry, by land and sea, a red flag, with or without letters in it, at their option; and this shall be in a border of white, the breadth of the white in the border being equal to the breadth of the red, as represented in the margin, the whole forming the flag known in the British Navy by the title of "White pierced Red"; and this shall be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and they shall use it, and no other.







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ARTICLE IV.

The pacificated tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other; and the flag shall be a symbol of this only, and of nothing further.

ARTICLE V.

The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a paper ("Register"), signed with the signature of their chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many karahs it holds; and they shall also have in their possession another writing ("Port Clearance"), signed with the signature of their chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the Nakhoda, the number of men, the number of arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound; and if a British or other vessel meets them, they shall produce the Register and the Clearance.

ARTICLE VI.

The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulf, with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if it chooses, shall send an envoy to them also in like manner, and the envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the chief, in the paper ("Register") of their vessels, which contains the length of the vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

ARTICLE VII.

If any tribe or others shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances; and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the British, at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.

ARTICLE VIII.

The putting men to death after they have given up their arms is an act of piracy, and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe shall put to death any persons, either Mahomedans or others, after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace, and the friendly Arabs shall act against them, in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the act, and of those who ordered it.





ARTICLE IX.

The carrying off of slaves (men, women, or children) from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy; and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

ARTICLE X.

The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports, and into the ports of the allies of the British, so far as they shall be able to effect it, and they shall buy and sell therein; and if any shall attack them, the British Government shall take notice of it.

ARTICLE XI.

These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons who shall hereafter adhere thereto, in the same manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present.

*Issued at Ras-ool-Khyma, in triplicate, at mid-day, on Saturday the twenty-second of the month of Rubee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding with the eighth of January 1820), and signed by the contracting parties at the places and times under written.*

*Signed at Ras-ool-Khyma, at the time of issue, by*

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR, Major General.

(L. S.)

HUSSON bin RAHMAH, with his own hand  
(Shaikh of Hatt and Faleia, formerly of Ras-ool-Khyma).

(L. S.)

RAZIB bin AHMED, with his own hand.  
(Shaikh of Jezirat-ool-Kamia).

*Signed at Ras-ool-Khyma, on Tuesday the twenty-fifth of the month of Rubee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the eleventh of January 1820).*

(L. S.)

Signature of SHAKHBOOT, with his own hand  
(Shaikh of Aboothabee).

*Signed at Ras-ool-Khyma, at mid-day, on Saturday the twenty-ninth of the month of Rubee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the fifteenth January 1820).*

(L. S.)

Signature of HUSSON bin ALI, with his own hand  
(Shaikh of Zyah).





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Signed for MAHOMED bin HAZA bin ZAAL, Shaikh of Debaye, a Minor, at Shargah, on Friday the twelfth of the month of Rubee-oos-Sanee, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the twenty-eighth of January 1820).

(L. S.)

ZAID bin SEYF, Uncle of SHAIKH MAHOMED.

Signed at Shargah, at mid-day, on Friday the nineteenth of the month of Rubee-oos-Sanee, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the fourth of February 1820).

(L. S.)

The signature of SULTAN bin SUGGUR, with his own hand  
(Chief of Shargah).

Signed at Shargah, by the Vakeel on the part of the Shaikhs SULEMAN bin AHMED and ABDOOLLA bin AHMED, in his quality of Vakeel to the Shaikhs aforesaid, on Saturday the twentieth of the month of Rubee-oos-Sanee, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the fifth of February 1820).

(L. S.)

The signature, with his own hand, of SYUD ABDOOL JALEEL bin SYUD YAS, Vakeel of Shaikh SULEMAN bin AHMED, and Shaikh ABDOOLLA bin AHMED, of the family of Khalifa, Shaikhs of Bahrein.

Signed and accepted by SULEMAN bin AHMED, of the house of Khalifa, at Bahrein, on the ninth of Jumadee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the twenty-third of February 1820).

(L. S.)

Signed and accepted by ABDOOLLA bin AHMED, of the house of Khalifa, at Bahrein, on the ninth of Jumadee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the twenty-third of February 1820).

(L. S.)

Signed at Faleia, at noon, on Wednesday the twenty-ninth of the month of Jumadee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the fifteenth of March 1820).

(L. S.)

RASHID bin HAMID, with his own hand  
(Chief of Ejman).



*Signed at Faleia, at noon, on Wednesday the twenty-ninth of the month of Jumadee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the fifteenth of March 1820).*

(L. S.)

ABDOOLLA bin RASHID, with his own hand  
(Chief of Amulgavine).

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR, Major General.

*Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with SULTAN bin SUGGUR.*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate !

Know all men, that SULTAN bin SUGGUR has been in the presence of General Sir WILLIAM GRANT KEIR, and there have passed between them the following stipulations :—

ARTICLE I.

Sultan bin Suggur shall surrender to the General the towers, guns, and vessels, which are in Shargah, Ejman, Amulgavine, and their dependencies. The General will leave the boats which are for the pearl fishing, and fishing-boats, and the remainder of the vessels shall be at the disposal of the General.

ARTICLE II.

Sultan bin Suggur shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

ARTICLE III.

The General will not allow the troops to enter the towns to lay them waste.

ARTICLE IV.

After the execution of these engagements, Sultan bin Suggur shall be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the friendly (or pacificated) Arabs.

On these conditions there is a cessation of hostilities between the General and Sultan bin Suggur and his followers, with the exception that their boats are not to go to sea.





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*Done at Ras-ool-Khyma, on the twentieth of Rubee-ool-Awul, in the year one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the sixth of January 1820).*

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

(An exact translation)

T. P. THOMPSON,  
Captain, 17th Light Dragoons, and Interpreter.

(L. S.)

SULTAN bin SUGGUR,  
with his own hand.

Copy of the Articles entered into with Sultan bin Suggur. Witness my hand and seal.

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

*Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with HUSSON bin RAHMAH,  
Chief of Hatt and Faleia.*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!

Know all men, that HUSSON bin RAHMAH has been in the presence of General Sir WILLIAM GRANT KEIR, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:—

ARTICLE I.

The town of Ras-ool-Khyma and Maharra, and the towers which are in the date groves near the town, shall remain in the hands of the British Government.

ARTICLE II.

If any of the vessels of Husson bin Rahmah are in Shargah, or Amulgavine, or Ejman, or any of the other places to which the General shall go with the force, they shall be surrendered to the General, and the General will leave those which are for the pearl fishery, and fishing-boats.

ARTICLE III.

Husson bin Rahmah shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in his possession.

ARTICLE IV.

After the execution of these engagements, Husson bin Rahmah shall



be admitted to the terms of the General Treaty with the Friendly (literally the Pacified) Arabs.

*Issued at Ras-ool-Khyma, in the forenoon of Saturday the twenty-second of the month of Rubee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the eighth of January 1820).*

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

(An exact translation)

T. P. THOMPSON,  
Captain, 17th Light Dragoons, and Interpreter.

(L. S.)

Copy of the Articles between the General and Husson bin Rahmah. Witness my hand and seal.

The signature of Husson bin RAHMAH, with his own hand.

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

*Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with the SHAIKH of DEBAYE*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate!

Know all men, that MAHOMED bin HAZA bin ZAAL, a minor, accompanied by AHMED bin FUTEIS, has been in the presence of General Sir WILLIAM GRANT KEIR, and there have passed between them the following stipulations:—

ARTICLE I.

The people of Debaye shall surrender to the General the vessels which are in Debaye and its dependencies, and the guns which are in the towers; the General will leave the boats which are for the pearl fishery, and fishing-boats.

ARTICLE II.

The people of Debaye shall give up all the Indian prisoners, if any such are in their possession.

ARTICLE III.

The General will not allow the troops to enter the town to lay it waste; and further, as a mark of consideration towards His Highness the Imaum, Syud bin Sultan, on the part of the General, he will not demolish the fort and towers.





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ARTICLE IV.

After the execution of these engagements, Mahomed bin Haza bin Zaal and his followers shall be admitted to the same terms of peace as the remainder of the Friendly (literally the Pacified) Arabs.

On these conditions there is a cessation of hostilities between the British and Mahomed bin Haza bin Zaal and his followers ; with the exception that their boats are not to go to sea.

*Done at Ras-ool-Khyma, on the twenty-third of Rubee-ool-Awul, in the year one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the ninth of January 1820).*

(A true translation)

T. P. THOMPSON,  
Captain, 17th Light Dragoons, and Interpreter.

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

(L. S.)

Seal of AHMED FUTEIS.

Witnessed by the signature  
of SHAIKH HAMZA bin MA-  
HOMED bin JABIN AMUL-  
GAVINE, Shaikh of Kishm,  
with his own hand.

Copy of the Articles between the General and Mahomed bin Haza bin Zaal. Witness my hand and seal.

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

*Translation of the Preliminary Treaty with SHAIKH SHAKHBOOT,  
of Aboothabee.*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate !

Know all men, that SHAIKH SHAKHBOOT bin DHYAL, AL FULAHY, has been in the presence of General Sir WILLIAM GRANT KEIR, and there have passed between them the following stipulations :—

ARTICLE I.

If in Aboothabee, or any other of the places belonging to Shaikh Shakhboot, there are any of the vessels of the piratical powers which have been attacked, or may be hereafter attacked by the General during the present war against the pirates, he shall deliver such vessels to the General.



ARTICLE II.

Shaikh Shakhboot shall be admitted to the terms of the General Treaty with the Friendly Arabs.

*Done at Ras-ool-Khyma, on the twenty-fifth of Rubee-ool-Awul, in the year one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the eleventh of January 1820).*

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

(A true translation)

T. P. THOMPSON,  
Captain, 17th Light Dragoons, and Interpreter.

Copy of the Articles between the General and SHAIKH SHAKHBOOT.  
Witness my hand and seal.

(L. S.)

The signature of SHAKHBOOT,  
with his own hand.

(L. S.)

W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

*Preliminary Treaty with the SHAIKHS of BAHREIN, dated 5th  
February 1820.*

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate !

Know all men, there hath come into the presence of General Sir WILLIAM GRANT KEIR, SYUD ABDOOL JULEEL, Vakeel on the part of the SHAIKHS SOLEYMAN bin AHMED and ABDOOLLA bin AHMED, and there have passed between the General and the said ABDOOL JULEEL, on the part of the above named, the following stipulations :—

ARTICLE I.

That the Shaikhs shall not permit from henceforth, in Bahrein or its dependencies, the sale of any commodities which have been procured by means of plunder and piracy, nor allow their people to sell anything of any kind whatsoever to such persons as may be engaged in the practice of plunder and piracy ; and if any of their people shall act contrary hereto, it shall be equivalent to an act of piracy on the part of such individuals.

ARTICLE II.

That they shall deliver up all the Indian prisoners who may be in their possession.





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ARTICLE III.

The Shaikhs Soleyman bin Ahmed and Abdoolla bin Ahmed shall be admitted to the terms of the General Treaty with the Friendly Arabs.

*Issued at Shargah, in triplicate, on Saturday the twentieth of the month of Rubee-oos-Sanee, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and thirty-five (corresponding to the fifth of February 1820).*

(L. S.) (Signed) W. GRANT KEIR,  
Major General.

(The exact translation)

(Signed) T. P. THOMPSON,  
Captain, 17th Light Dragoons, and Interpreter.

(L. S.) (Signed) The above articles are accepted by me, in quality of Vakeel of the Shaikhs named above.

SYUD ABDOOL JULEEL bin SYUD YAS AL TABATABAEE.

*Articles of Agreement entered into, under the Mediation of the British Government, between SHAIKH ABDOOLLA bin AHMED, Chief of Bahrein, and RAHMAH bin JAUBIR.—Dated 7th February 1824.*

ARTICLE I.

There shall be peace for ever between Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed and Rahmah bin Jaubir, and their respective tribes, families, and connexions, on the following terms.

ARTICLE II.

Rahmah bin Jaubir engages to withdraw his protection from the tribe Aboo Soomet, which were the aggressors in the outrage which caused the misunderstanding between the two parties, and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed has full permission to revenge himself on those people for the blood spilt on that occasion.

ARTICLE III.

Rahmah bin Jaubir likewise engages to restore the five boats taken at that time, with the whole of their stores and cargoes; or an equivalent



in money, should it be found impracticable at this distant period to return the boats in the same condition they were in at the time of capture.

ARTICLE IV.

Rahmah bin Jaubir promises to give up the whole of the cargo of the boat *Nasery*, which was captured at Bahrein, and to produce a certificate from the owner of the boat that he has received full indemnification for the losses sustained on that occasion.

ARTICLE V.

The people of Bahrein shall be at liberty to proceed to Damaum, to identify the boats that may have formerly belonged to them, and to bring away all that they can prove to have been originally their property.

ARTICLE VI.

Rahmah bin Jaubir binds himself, his relations, and tribe, to abstain in future from all acts of aggression or insult against Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and the people of Bahrein, to consider them as brothers, and to assist them against all enemies.

(Signed) ABDOOLLA bin AHMED,  
RAHMAH bin JAUBIR.

*Bahrein, 7th February 1824.*

Signed, sealed, and exchanged in my presence.

(Signed) E. G. STANNUS, C.B.,  
Resident in the Gulf of Persia.

*Terms of a Maritime Truce for Ten Years, agreed upon by the CHIEFS  
OF THE ARABIAN COAST, under the Mediation of the RESIDENT IN  
THE PERSIAN GULF, dated 1st June 1843.*

We, whose seals are hereunto affixed, viz.

SULTAN bin SUGGUR, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe,  
KHALIFA bin SHAKHBOOT, Chief of the Beniyas,  
MUKTOOM bin BUTYE, Chief of the Boo Falasa,  
ABDOOLLA bin RASHID, Chief of Amulgavine,  
ABDOOL AZEEZ bin RASHID, Chief of Ejman,

being fully impressed with a sense of the evil consequences arising from our subjects and dependents being prevented carrying on the pearl





OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

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fishery without interruption on the banks, owing to the various feuds existing amongst ourselves; and, moreover, duly appreciating the general advantage to be derived from the establishment of a truce, do hereby agree to bind ourselves down to observe the following conditions:—

ARTICLE I.

That from the 1st June 1843, A. D., (the corresponding Mahomedan date 2nd Jumadee-ool-Awul, Hijree 1259), there shall be a cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective subjects and dependents; and that from the above date until the termination of the month of May 1853, A. D., an inviolable truce shall be established, during which period our several claims upon each other shall rest in abeyance.

ARTICLE II.

That in the event of any of our subjects or dependents committing any acts of aggression at sea upon those of any of the parties to this Agreement, we will immediately afford full redress, upon the same being brought to our notice.

ARTICLE III.

That in the event of any acts of aggression being committed at sea upon any of our subjects or dependents, we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident, or the Commodore at Bassadore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, provided that its occurrence can be satisfactorily proved.

ARTICLE IV.

That on the termination of the month of May 1853, by God's blessing, we will endeavour to arrange either an extension of this truce, or a firm and lasting peace; but in the event of our being unable to come to a satisfactory adjustment regarding our respective claims, we hereby bind ourselves to give notice, on or about the above date, to the British Resident, of our intention to renew hostilities after the expiration of the term now fixed upon for this truce, viz. the end of the month of May 1853.

*Signed as in the Preamble.*



*Perpetual Treaty of Peace, agreed upon on the 4th May 1853, by the CHIEFS OF THE ARABIAN COAST, under the Mediation of Captain ARNOLD BURROWES KEMBALL, Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

*Treaty of Peace in perpetuity, agreed upon by the CHIEFS OF THE ARABIAN COAST, in behalf of themselves, their Heirs and Successors, under the Mediation of the RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.*

We, whose seals are herunto affixed, SHAIKH SULTAN bin SUGGUR, Chief of Ras-ool-Khyima; SHAIKH SAEED bin TAHNOON, Chief of Aboothabee; SHAIKH SAEED bin BUTYE, Chief of Debaye; SHAIKH HUMAID bin RASHID, Chief of Ejman; SHAIKH ABDOOLLA bin RASHID, Chief of Amulgavine:

Having experienced for a series of years the benefits and advantages resulting from a Maritime Truce\* contracted amongst ourselves, under the mediation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, and renewed from time to time up to the present period; and being fully impressed, therefore, with a sense of the evil consequences formerly arising from the prosecution of our feuds at sea, whereby our subjects and dependents were prevented from carrying on the pearl fishery in security, and were exposed to interruption and molestation when passing on their lawful occasions; accordingly we, as aforesaid, have determined, for ourselves, our heirs and successors, to conclude together a lasting and inviolable peace, from this time forth in perpetuity, and do hereby agree to bind ourselves down to observe the following conditions:—

ARTICLE I.

That from this date, viz. 25th Rujub 1269 (4th May 1853), and hereafter, there shall be a complete cessation of hostilities at sea, between our respective subjects and dependents, and a perfect Maritime Truce shall endure between ourselves, and between our successors respectively, for evermore.

ARTICLE II.

That in the event (which God forbid!) of any of our subjects or dependents committing an act of aggression at sea upon the lives or property of those of any of the parties to this Agreement, we will immediately punish the assailant, and proceed to afford full redress, upon the same being brought to our notice.

\* Vide page 86 of this Selection.





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ARTICLE III.

That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea by any of those who are subscribers with us to this Engagement, upon any of our subjects or dependents, we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident, or the Commodore at Bassadore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, provided that its occurrence can be satisfactorily proved.

We further agree, that the maintenance of the peace now concluded amongst us shall be watched over by the British Government, who will take steps to insure at all times the due observance of the above Articles; and God of this is the best witness and guarantee.

ABDOOLLA bin RASHID,

HUMAIID bin RASHID,

(L. S.)

(L. S.)

Chief of Amulgavine.

Chief of Ejman.

SAEED bin BUTYE,

SAEED bin TAHNOON,

SULTAN bin SUGGUR,

(L. S.)

(L. S.)


(L. S.)

Chief of Debaye.

Chief of the Beniyas.

Chief of the Joasmees.

MEMO.—*This Treaty was approved by the Most Noble the Governor General of India in Council on the 24th August 1853.*







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MEMORANDA  
ON THE  
RESOURCES, LOCALITIES, AND RELATIONS  
OF THE  
TRIBES INHABITING THE ARABIAN SHORES  
OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

BY  
LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,  
BOMBAY ARTILLERY,  
ASSISTANT RESIDENT AT BUSHIRE.

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*Submitted to Government on the 6th January 1845.*

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## MEMORANDA

ON THE

### RESOURCES, LOCALITIES, AND RELATIONS OF THE TRIBES INHABITING THE ARABIAN SHORES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE total non-interference in the internal disputes and affairs of the piratical Arabian Chieftains, wisely enjoined as the first principle of the Government policy, added to the absence of any intercourse, commercial or otherwise, with their ports, by individuals and vessels of any nation, have precluded the attainment of any specific and accurate knowledge of inland localities, and extent of population and territory.

To fix the limits, therefore, of the lands actually belonging to, or claimed by, each tribe respectively, would, with our present information, be impossible; nor, indeed, do these often form the grounds of any great altercations or hostilities among themselves, owing to the barrenness and infertility of the soil; which being, moreover, very imperfectly cultivated, in consequence, probably, of the absence of the means or labour of irrigation, does not yield sufficient for the support\* of its inhabitants in even their common article of food,—dates,—the fruit of a tree which may be said to be generally indigenous to Arabia alone, and renders its possession, accordingly, of no worth.

Upon the success of the pearl fishery, and the profits of the carrying trade which it brings into operation, must, under these disadvantages, depend the means of obtaining the positive necessities of life, and those trifling luxuries desirable to an Arab.† It is needless to observe how

\* The Arabian ports, particularly Aboothabee, are consequently dependent upon other places for supplies of provisions, and are soon reduced to great distress by anything like an effective blockade.

† Captain McLeod, in reporting upon the Joasmee Tribe in 1823, stated as follows :—  
“ The Joasmees procure all their materials for building, as well as their warlike stores, from Muskat, Bahrein, and the Persian ports in the lower part of the Gulf. In the construction of their vessels they use no other wood than Indian teak, and, in respect to arms, those principally of Persian manufacture. They possess no articles of export, since their pearls are generally purchased by merchants on the spot, and the produce of their country is not even sufficient for their maintenance. Their only employment is fishing, diving for pearls, and importing





## CHARACTER AND SUBDIVISION OF THE TRIBES.

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materially their own condition, and, by an easily deduced corollary, the safety of the Gulf, might be affected by the failure of a single season. The attention with which this point has been considered by the Government, in framing its policy, marks the anxiety and care, attended with great expense, which have been devoted to the maintenance of perfect tranquillity and security on the pearl banks to the subjects of the several petty chieftains who, however inimically disposed, are bound there to forget their quarrels, or suffer them to rest in abeyance.

The manners and religion of the Arabs of the piratical coast, being those appertaining to the Soonee sect of Mahomedans, are already too well and generally known to call for any further description in this paper.

Of a character deceitful, vindictive, and treacherous, but brave and independent withal, they hold in utter contempt all other *nations*, professing whatever creed; the conviction of the irresistible power of the British Government, whose weight they have in two instances been collectively brought to feel, together with its subsequent occasional exercise or demonstration in individual cases, have alone reduced them to succumb to its will, and restrained them from acts of piracy. They do not at the present time hesitate to admit, that the restraints imposed upon them once withdrawn, their boats, now, in their own phraseology, ignobly employed as beasts of burthen, to carry about dates and merchandize, would again, as in former days, overrun this Gulf and the Indian Seas in search of booty.

The inhabitants are divided into a number of large tribes, acknowledging each its feudal superior, which are, again, sub-divided into branches or clans, composed of the relatives and dependents of some connexion of the general head, or of a powerful and wealthy individual.

The superior of the tribe collectively has the general control of all; possesses the right of claiming at his pleasure their military services; and appropriates the small taxes that are levied.

dates, grain, and other necessities of life, which they purchase with the price of those pearls. Their dates are chiefly brought from Bahrein and Bussora, grain and cloth from Muskat and the Persian ports. They are very poor, and, perhaps, can never find much employment in commerce, unless in carrying for others, although it is said they at one time possessed a very extensive trade." The same holds good for the tribes in general to the present day, except that their own boats are now engaged in the Indian trade.

Such was the original object of the Maritime Truce, guaranteed by Government, and entered into for the six months including the season of the pearl fishery.

At the request of some, and with the concurrence of all the Chiefs, its time was extended to eight and twelve months, and finally to ten years, during which all hostilities at sea are forbidden.





The Kazee, or Ecclesiastical Judge, constitutes the only tribunal, and decides upon all cases according to the Mahomedan law.

It is by no means uncommon for one of the branches of a tribe, to the number sometimes of several hundred individuals, in order to escape excessive taxation and oppression, or with a view to secure to themselves greater immunities and advantages, to secede from the authority and territory of their lawful and acknowledged chief into that of another,\* or to establish themselves and build a fort on some other spot,† and assert and maintain independence; nor is it a matter of great moment that the chief they are about to join, or whose friendship and countenance they must in the first place command, is a rival at implacable feud with their own: the advantages attending any numerical increase of subjects ensure them welcome asylum and protection. It will not escape observation, that the facilities thus mutually offered to seceders on the one hand, and the loss of authority and revenue consequent on their secession on the other, act, *vice versa*, as a salutary check to the tyranny and oppression of the respective chiefs.

The Arabs of the coast are more or less connected with the Bedouin tribes of the interior, either by ties of relationship, or from consideration of mutual interests and defence.

Of so great importance is their alliance or forbearance considered by the maritime chieftains, that these, particularly Sultan bin Suggur, who is especially interested in maintaining a sort of balance of power, find it their best policy to conciliate them by repeated and considerable presents.

To go over from one chief to another, with whom they may be or have been at feud, and even to plunder the territories and subjects of their patron, should he not coincide in, and follow out their views of ambition, honour, or revenge, or withhold the usual payment of blackmail, are shown by the sketches of the Arab tribes to be of constant occurrence with these fickle allies.

Khaleefa bin Shakboot may be said to possess the greater influence inland, and to command the services of the greater number of Bedouin auxiliaries.

\* The Boo Muhair, at Shargah, are an example of the former.

† The Boo Felasa, of Debaye, of the latter.





## DESCRIPTION OF THE ARABIAN COAST.

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## DESCRIPTION OF THE ARABIAN COAST.

From Koweit to Dhabran, a ruined position, four Furseekhs north of Kateef, the country bears the name of Adan. It

Memoranda, collected from living Native authorities, descriptive of the Coast of Arabia from the mouth of the River Euphrates to the Ports of the Beni-yas; by Colonel R. Taylor, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia. February, 1836.

is generally void of towns, but in the summer, some of the Beni Khalid Arabs, as the Amayir and Sobaik, inhabit Fantas and Fanaitis, two positions on the coast, a day's distance south of Koweit. Three days further on, in the same direction, is the island Balbul, slightly separated from the shore during the time of flood. Two

days south-east of Balbul is the island of Jinnah, similar to the last. South of this, three days, is the island Boo Ali, with a long point running into the sea, and a flat shallow between it and the shore, as the island last mentioned. Further south-eastward, by one day, is Ras Tannurah; a day south-east of this is Kateef. The whole country just traced is called Adan. Kateef, however, and its district southward to Ojair, together with the territory of Bahrein and Al Ahssa, and the country between the last and Ojair,—all this tract is denominated Hajar. Kateef, though, is also peculiarly named Al Khah; Bahrein, Awal; and Al Ahssa, Haajar. From Ojair to the ports of the Beni-yas, the country is named Qatar, and is so called from the greater fall of rain therein than in the other portions of the Beni Khalid territory. Ojair is about four Furseekhs south-east of Bahrein; on the coast, half a day south-east of this, is a tract of land inhabited by the Beni Khalid Arabs in the spring and autumn, and containing shallow wells, or springs of water. Two days hence is Zabara, a place forty years past of some note, and considerable population and trade. One Furseekh south of this is Ras Ashairij; three Furseekhs hence north-east Khor Hassan, the residence of the Yalahermah, a division of the Atul Arabs; hence, a day north-east, is Huailah. Two Furseekhs onwards is Yusa-fiah; then four Furseekhs to Rowaidhah; two days south of this station is Fuwairit; south-east hence, a day, is Matbakh. Two hours south of Matbakh commences a tract of land, composed of sandy hillocks, and uninhabited for an extent of four days in length from north to south; from this, south-eastward, lie the ports of the Beni-yas, the commencement of the province of Oman, and the end of that of Hajar. The whole of these districts, Adan, Hajar, and Qatar, from Koweit to the ports of the Beni-yas, belong to the Beni Khalid.

A day to the westward of Koweit is Jahrah, situated two Furseekhs south-eastward of the angle of a bay. Its site is elevated, and gives a view of all vessels passing in the Gulf near Koweit, and the island of





Pheleechi. In the ages previous to Islam, it was extremely populous, as its very extensive existing remains evince; in which ancient coins also are occasionally found. These occupy a space of ground two Furseekhs in length from north to south, by one in breadth from east to west. The soil is saline and sandy to a great extent all around, but the water is sweet in wells at a fathom deep.

To the north-east of Jahrah fourteen Furseekhs, towards the sea, is situated the town of Sabbeyyah, anciently well peopled, as here also its ruins declare. It derives its name, as is said, from the Sabeans, and is supposed to be the remains of one of their cities, built after the destruction of Babel. Moslem historians declare that it continued flourishing down to the age of the Dhurmiad Khaliphs, when it fell, and its population dispersed; some of whom are, it is asserted, still living in Khujistan. The Arabs dwell in this spot during summer, invited by its cooler temperature.

The extent of the Beni Khalid territory, inland, varies at different points: from Koweit to Dehna, the frontier of Nujd, is a distance of ten days; from Adan to the same point eight days; the same from the vicinity of the Balbul and Boo Ali districts; from Kateef thither nine days; and from Zobara to Dehna thirteen days.

On clearing the mouth of the Euphrates, bound for the Arab shore, you reach the bay or Dohat of Hajee Silo; south-east of which is the anchorage, or Khore Mughanwee; and to the south-west Khore Abdallah. Between this last and Bubean is the rocky shallow or Dieh Ras-al-Kaid, which lies off the eastern point of the island of Bubean; whence are formed two anchorages, the southern one termed Warbah, and the northern Rabac-iyyah; both which extend to the inlets or channels Khuair and Sabbeyyah.

The next point is Duwairah, the port of the Zobier, situated on the Khuair, which is interposed between Duwairah and Dohat Hajee Silo. Along the Khuair there are several islands and Khores.

Of the more remarkable positions, however, are Al Haddamah, a closed Khore; Kasr Ash Shatan-iyyah; Al Bahaith; Khuar Ath Thaa-alil; Dohat-al-Bagar, opposite to which, on Bubean, is the closed Khore Rawaishid, and Al Maghasil.

Next is Sabbeyyah, a building at the outlet of the Khuair, and opposite to Birshah, the south-eastern point of Bubean. South of this is the island of Mashkan; eastward of Mashkan is the rocky shallow Aich-al-Holaibe; and northward those of the Sabbeyyah channel. Between this island and the shallows there is a passage for smaller boats; and to the south of it is the island of Pheleechi; south of this, Ohah; and eastward of Ohah a Gussar, or shallow flat.





## DESCRIPTION OF THE ARABIAN COAST.

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Next, Ras-al-Gussar; then Dohat Khawaitir; opposite which is the bank, or Rigadh Dharub, formed entirely of mud.

Ghodhai, opposite to Koweit, with the sea between them.

Dohat Kadhimah; opposite to which, in the sea, is a shallow flat; and above this last a heap of ruins, called Kasir Yasin, in the midst of the bay.

Dohat Jaharah; Dohat Abu Talk; Dohat-om-il-Namil; opposite to which, to the eastward, is the island of the same name.

Dohat-om-il-Gashed; Dohat-as-Salaibikhat; Dohat-ash-Shuaik, the port of Koweit, to the northward of which is an island called Garain Dehdar.

Dohat-al-Fijaimah; opposite to which, on the north, in the midst of the sea, is a small shoal, on which the lesser boats do not ground; north of the shoal is Towainah, the anchorage of Koweit, and north of Towainah a shoal, called Al Akkaz.

Al Koweit; Ras Ajuzah; Benaïd-al-Gar; Ash Shi-il; Ras-al-Ardh; Bidi; Finaitis; Abu Faterrah; Al Fantas; opposite to which is a bank close to the shore.

Abu Holaifah; Al Fihaihil; Ash-shi-Acbah; Aj Jiraibah; Naga Ghallab; Azaifan; opposite to which, to the eastward, is a bank; and to the east of this last the island of Kabbar.

Ras-al-Holaifah; and within its bay, opposite, and to the north, a bank called Omad Dakh Khair.

Ras-az-Zur; Dohat Soulah; Khore-ul-Benarja; Ad Dirjud; opposite to which, eastward, is a shoal termed Hid-il-Hamarah.

Al Famisi; Bard Half; opposite to which, eastward, is a shallow flat, with five fathoms on it; eastward of this is the island Um-il-Maradim, with fifteen fathoms.

Khore Khafje; opposite and eastward of this is the island of Garah, with fifteen fathoms.

Albihaith; between this and Amudah, the next station, there is, in the sea to the eastward, the shoal Om-as-Sahal.

Al Amudah; eastward of this is the island Al Magta-ah; and eastward of this, Halat-il-Mish-aab; and further eastward, an hour and a half run, in seven fathoms, are two shoals, called Ki-taa-ebn-Omran.

Adh Dhuluf; opposite to this a shoal, stretching from the land, and an anchorage between it and Amudah; to the eastward there is, in the sea, a shoal with three fathoms water, called Maitamah; east of this is another, called Sufan; north-east of this is another, named Khalaloh, with seven fathoms; eastward again is the Aridh, or tongue, termed Aridh Khalaloh; and between Khalaloh and Al Mansi is a shoal called Abu Isaiyyah; with also a prong or tongue to the eastward, having seven fathoms on it.





As Saffanaïyyah; to the eastward is a shoal patch, or Gussar, near the shore, called Fir-in; and eastward of this a shoal termed Hidhar-is-Saffanaïyyah; east of this, in seven fathoms, the bank Al Mansi; and further east a shoal called Aridh.

Al Mafarig; east of this is a Hid, or shoal, called Abu-Ta-am; south of it another, termed Al Khat; east of this last are several shoals, with shallow, impassable divisions between them, called Mafradh, ultimately reaching the point of Ras Bildani; east of Bildani is the island of Har-gose; and east of this, in a low group, are the islands of Farsi and Arabi.

Ras Tanajib; north of this point are seven small contiguous shoals, to the east of it a bank, and eastward of this a channel: all these are connected with Bildani.

Khore Balbul; to the north of this, near the shore, are several small nameless shoals.

Merrifah; opposite this, near the land, a shoal, and south of it the bank, or Rig-el-Menilah.

Al Ghar; to the eastward is an anchorage or Khore; here is also the track for vessels called Al Telil; to the east of which are seven distinct shoals, called Kit-al-Ghar.

Musai-ni; Musallim-iyyah; opposite to this is the island of Jinnah; north of which is a shoal, termed Hidhar Jinnah.

Al Baidhah; seaward, to the east, is the rocky shoal named Al Kash.

Ras Abu Ali; opposite and eastward are the two islands, Karan and Karain, with several rocky patches between them, on most of which vessels do not strike; the passage at the point is close in shore.

Dohat Baranij; to the south, and opposite, is a long hard shoal.

Jebail-al-Hajarah; Jebail-ar-Ramal; to the east, and near the shore, is the shoal called Abu Jerjarah.

Al Ji-aill-iyyah; Om Rahim; eastward, in the sea, are the islands Al Jeraid and Al Jenna; east of these is Abu Sarafah, and many rocky patches, between Fasht-au-Najwah, and a bank termed Sayyah.

Dohat-ar-Raham-iyyah; opposite to this is the island of Tar-ut; and to the south is the bank Chashehush.

Al Kateef; Saihat; opposite to which is a bank called Al Khali.

Adh Dhahran; opposite this is the island Al Damaum; against which is the bank As Safafir; to the east of which is that of Al Jarim; south of which is that of Khirfasht; and south of this the shoal Mirwadah.

Ain-as-Seh; east of this is the shoal Al Libainah; eastward still the island Om Naasan; more easterly, the bank Ar Rihaiyyat; and hence, south-easterly towards Bahrein, comes Rasz-il-Ijair; this is the port of Lahsa; to the east is the Jazirah-il-Ijair; and to the south that of Zakhunniyyah; then follow Khashur-az-Zinah, Howar, and Salwa.





## FORTIFICATIONS—PIRATICAL PORTS.

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## FORTIFICATIONS.

A square fort, with flanking round towers, built of rough stone and coarse lime, capable of containing, in case of siege, from four to six hundred men; with detached round towers for the defence of the creek and landing-place, and to cover the wells that supply the inhabitants with water\* (situated usually at some short distance), make up the general features of Arab fortifications. The town consists of cadjan huts, constructed of date sticks and mats, around the fort on every side. Stone dwelling-houses are rare, and Shargah and Ras-ool-Khy-ma can alone boast of them.

## PIRATICAL PORTS.

The Piratical Ports one and all have their sites near a backwater, on the spit of land formed by it and the sea.

## RAS RECCAN TO CASSAAB.

These backwaters afford perfect security to their largest boats (unladen) during the stormy season. The line of coast on which they are situated possesses no harbour of any description, and is, moreover, uniformly exposed to the prevailing winds, which blow from the north-west. The anchorage, too, is bad.

From Ras Reccan to Aboothabee is crowded with shoals, and other obstacles to safe navigation.

A steamer may anchor off the several ports at a very short distance from the shore, from three-quarters to a quarter of a mile, but a sailing vessel could not take up such a position without considerable risk.

## ABOOTHABEE.

At Aboothabee it was ascertained by sounding that the *Hugh Lindsay* (in July 1839) could have lain within pistol-shot of the shore.

## AMULGAVINE.

The *Hugh Lindsay*, during the same cruise, anchored at Amulgavine in six and a half fathoms, sand, three-quarters of a mile off the western tower, south-western rocky point bearing SSE.; town fort south. Appears quite safe, having six, five and a half, five, and four and a half fathoms in shore of the vessel. The best anchorage is with the fort SSE., in five fathoms, as from thence a vessel may slip or weigh, and stand to the northward or southward, with a beaming wind. The soundings

\* The water of the wells throughout the line of coast, with very few exceptions, is exceedingly brackish, and unpalatable.



on the chart are laid too far out, as there are three fathoms within three hundred yards of the beach.

## DEBAYE.

There is good anchorage at Debaye, with the large fort E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  S., close in to the beach, in about four or three and a half fathoms, with shelter from the north-west if the reef is kept close on board, the shoal water of which is quite distinguishable from the channel. A vessel anchoring within two hundred yards of the beach would require to slip her cable in case of a north-wester coming on, but by doing this, with a spring to cast her to the southward, might stand off with ease.

Statement of the MARITIME RESOURCES OF THE PIRATICAL PORTS on the Arabian Coast.

Ports.	Buggalows engaged in the Indian and African Trades.	Their Tonnage in Morahs.	Smaller Vessels for Gulf Trade, from 500 to 1,000 Morahs.	Pearl Boats.	Remarks.
Ras-ool-Khyma ..	11	24,000	15	15	[ool-Khyma. Pays revenue 80 dollars annually to Ras-ool-Khyma. Ditto 900 to 1,000 ditto ditto. Ditto 200 ditto ditto. Ditto 1,500 ditto ditto. Ditto 50 to 75 ditto to Shargah. Ditto 100 ditto ditto. Ditto 100 ditto ditto.
Ramse .....	1	1,000	5	..	
Jazirat-ool-Hamrah ..	..	..	6	35	
Himreeah .....	..	..	..	30	
Shargah .....	6	14,750	25	400	
Heyrah .....	..	..	..	25	In addition to the places here enumerated as Joasme territory, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur possesses several small places on this as well as Coomza, Dibah, and Khorefacaun, and others on the other side of Cape Musseldom, which yield him a small revenue. His supremacy over Cassaab is merely nominal.
Fasht .....	..	..	..	25	
Khan .....	1	2,000	5	50	
Total ....	19	41,750	56	580	
Amulgavine .....	3	9,500	10	60	
Ejman .....	4	6,000	10	50	
Debaye .....	..	..	4	90	
Aboothabee .....	2	4,000	10	600	

The tax levied upon each diver and his attendant varies, under the different Arab Chieftains, from one and a half to seven dollars. The amount, too, fluctuates each season, at the will of the Shaikh.

The large Buggalows of *Ras-ool-Khyma* belong,—

Three to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, from 2,000 to 3,000 Morahs each.	
One to Soleyman bin Shekur .....	3,000
One to Ahmed Migran .....	2,500
One to Mahomed Masood .....	2,000
One to Abdoolla bin Hussein .....	3,000
One to Mahomed Soonee .....	2,000





## MARITIME RESOURCES—POPULATION.

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One to Yabur Chaabee .....	3,000	Morahs.
One to Moobaruk bin Hussein .....	2,500	"
One to Bin Joobeib .....	1,500	"
Eleven .....	24,000	"
Of <i>Ramse</i> ,—		
One to Eusuf .....	1,000	Morahs.
Of <i>Shargah</i> ,—		
One to Saleh bin Suggur .....	2,500	Morahs.
One to Mitfah .....	2,500	"
One to Rashid bin Oosman .....	2,750	"
One to Ahmed bin Abdool Rahman .....	2,500	"
One to Mahomed bin Khulfan .....	2,500	"
One to Bin Fimah .....	2,000	"
Six .....	14,750	"
Of <i>Khan</i> ,—		
One to Mahomed bin Khumees .....	2,000	Morahs.
Of <i>Amulgavine</i> ,—		
One to Abdoolla bin Rashid .....	7,000	Morahs.
One (Buteel) to ditto .....	1,500	"
One to Syud bin Rashid .....	1,000	"
Three .....	9,500	"
Of <i>Ejman</i> ,—		
One to Ali bin Rashid .....	1,500	Morahs.
One to Ali bin Jalim .....	2,000	"
One (Buteel) to Humeed bin Rashid .....	1,500	"
One to Khulfan .....	1,000	"
Four .....	6,000	"
Of <i>Aboothabee</i> ,—		
Two to Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot .....	4,000	Morahs.

## POPULATION AND CHIEFS.

The population of the several Arab towns is constantly varying, for reasons which have been before adverted to. Those of the first class—Aboothabee, Shargah, and Ras-ool-Khyma—may be said to contain from 2,000 to 3,500 houses. Of the second class, Amulgavine, Ejman, Debaye, and Jazirat-ool-Hamrah, from 1,000 to 1,500 houses; and the smaller, such as Khan, Heyrah, Fasht, &c., from 500 to 800 houses.





## JOASMEES.

The Joasmee Chief, previous to the expedition under Sir W. Grant Keir in 1820, or rather, perhaps, previous to his confinement by the Wahabees in 1811, held supremacy over Amulgavine and Ejman, and exacted tribute from the chiefs of those towns. Since that period, however, and up to the present day, these have enjoyed virtual independence, notwithstanding his repeated attempts, principally by intrigue, and on one or two occasions by actual force, to re-establish his lost authority. They have, it is true, once or twice acknowledged his general supremacy, but this was merely nominal, and lasted so long only as the danger of an attack with his superior means appeared to threaten them. Sultan bin Suggur, on the other hand, has been obliged publicly to disclaim authority over these places, and to decline responsibility for the proceedings of their inhabitants.

The following was remarked by Captain MacLeod in 1823 :—

"Sultan bin Suggur is ambitious of reducing the tribes to complete and absolute subjection, and to be considered answerable for the whole of the coast. It is impossible for us to recognise his authority any further than it is obeyed by the other chiefs, nor can we lend the influence of our name in any way to aid his views ; at the same time, we cannot directly interfere to prevent him from recovering that authority which he regards as his birthright."

Such would appear to have been the sole aim of his ambition since that period ; nor have any obstacles been opposed by the British Government to his lawful exertions towards its attainment, beyond such as are involved in the terms of the Maritime Truce.

Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmees, aged between sixty and sixty-five years, succeeded to the Shaikhdom of the tribe in 1803, upon the death of his father, Suggur, who had assumed the chief authority in 1777, upon his father Rashid bin Muttur's retiring from public life, and resigning the office.

Invited to Deriah in 1809, he proceeded to that capital, and was detained and imprisoned by the Wahabee Chief, one Hussein bin Ali, a Joasmee, being appointed in his room Wahabee vicegerent in the Seer principality. He contrived to escape from prison, and, finding his way to Yemen, embarked at Mocha, and proceeded to Muskat, and, through the Imaum's influence and protection, was established at Shargah. It was not, however, till 1813, that by the same instrumentality he recovered his lost position at Ras-ool-Khyma, when the Governor, Hussein bin Ramah, his relative, but born of a concubine, continued to exercise general control.

Sultan bin Suggur had three brothers, the one Saleh (of a slave girl), still alive, the other two, Mahomed and Muttur, deceased.





CHIEFS—JOASMEES—ABOOTHABEE—BENIYAS—DEBAYE. 103

His family of sons are as follows :—

Suggur; appointed Governor of Shargah in 1838 (vice Saleh bin Suggur); about thirty years of age; his mother from the Joasmee tribe.

Majid; about thirty years of age; Hubshee mother.

Abdoolla; about twenty-three years of age; mother from the tribe of Towanah Al Ali.

Ibrahim; about twenty-three years of age; mother the daughter of Ibrahim Moolla Ali Murzoogee.

Khelid; about seven years of age; mother from the Joasmee tribe.

Rashid (deceased); mother from the Beniyas.

Synd; own brother to Suggur.

Suggur bin Sultan has issue,—

Seif (since deceased); mother the daughter of his uncle, Mahomed bin Suggur.

Mahomed; three or four years of age.

ABOOTHABEE—BENIYAS.

The present Chief, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, aged about thirty years, having, with the assistance of his own brother, Sultan, killed the elder brother, Tahnoon, in 1833, succeeded to the chieftainship.

The father, Shaikh Shakboot bin Zheab, succeeded in 1793-94 in establishing himself in the chief authority over the tribe, which was, however, usurped in 1816 by his eldest son, Mahomed, who was in his turn deposed two years after by his brother, Shaikh Tahnoon, through the assistance of His Highness the Imaum.

Shaikh Shakboot, the father, and Shaikh Sultan the brother, continue to reside at Aboothabee, but enjoy no power or share in the Government.

Shaikh Shakboot had seven sons :

Tahnoon (murdered) .....	} Of one mother.
Mahomed .....	
Hullal .....	
Yafoor .....	
Khaleefa (present Chief) .....	
Sultan .....	
Synd (deceased) .....	

Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot has two sons, of whom the elder, Zaeed, is nine years of age.

DEBAYE.

Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye succeeded Obed bin Saeed in 1836, two years after that Chief, with the Boo Felasa (a branch of the Beniyas Tribe from Aboothabee), seceding from the main body, and asserting



their independence, had made good their position at Debaye, a port of the Beni-yas territory.

Shaikh Muktoom has one brother, Syud, of the same mother, and three sons, of whom Asher, the eldest, is ten or twelve years of age.

EJMAN.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez bin Rashid Naimee usurped the chief authority in 1841 from his brother Hamed, who had succeeded to it upon the death of his father, Rashid bin Humeed, in 1838.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez has two sons, the elder of whom is nine or ten years of age.

AMULGAVINE.

Shaikh Abdoola bin Rashid-al-Ali, (has one brother, Syud,) independent chieftain since 1820, has three sons,—Ali, seventeen or eighteen years old, mother from the Naeem Tribe, of Heyrah; Mahomed, sixteen years, and Ahmed, seventeen years, mother from the Al Ali Tribe.

LOCALITIES OF THE TRIBES.

BAHREIN.\*

Bahrein is situated in the centre of a deep triangular-shaped bight on the Arabian Coast, lying between Ras Reccan and Ras Timoor. The access, owing to the shoals in the neighbourhood (more particularly those known by the name of the Debil and Teignmouth), is not unattended with risk, although no material obstacles offer to vessels navigated with average skill and caution. When within these shoals, the harbour is good, and well sheltered. The island itself is about thirty miles in length, and from nine to six in breadth. It does not appear that grain is cultivated to any extent, but the place abounds with date groves, gardens, and fields of clover, which are unusually

\* Genealogical Table of the Al Khaleefa Ruling Family of Bahrein.

ABDOOLLA bin AHMED—Joint Rulers—SULIMAN bin AHMED (deceased 1825).		
Of one Mother..	Moo-baruk; has two sons, (one son, Mahomed, killed early in the civil war).	Khaleefa succeeded to his father's share of authority, and died 21st May 1834; had issue.....
	Nassir; has two sons. Hassan; one son. Khaleefa.	Ahmed; deceased. Humood. Mahomed.
Of one Mother..	Ahmed; two sons. Ali; one son. Mahomed; one son.	Mahomed; now Chief of Bahrein; mother the sister of Moo-baruk bin Khaleefa.
	Rashid; and a boy, two or three years old; besides several others, deceased at various ages.	Dhyj; killed in the early part of the struggle for supremacy. Ali; mother the sister of Esai bin Tarif. Ibrahim.





## BAHREIN.

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productive, owing to the facility of irrigation afforded by the numerous springs of fresh water on the island.

As no duties or customs are levied upon the imports and exports of Bahrein, the revenue of the Shaikh is principally derived from the produce of the date plantations, nearly the whole of which have been seized from the original owners by the Uttoobees. The total sum realized from this source may amount to 100,000 crowns per annum; but as this is divided in different proportions among the numerous relatives and connexions of the Uttoobee Chief, it is impossible to say what portion reaches his own coffers. Shaikh Abdoolla, however, derives a small income from the pearl boats, each of which pays from five to ten crowns, according to its size, on its return from the bank.

The chief articles of export from Bahrein consist of pearls, dried dates, and bullion. Of the former, about 350,000 crowns' worth are annually collected by the vessels belonging to the place, and something more than that quantity is brought in from other parts of the Gulf for sale. The total value of the exports may amount to about eight lakhs of dollars annually. The imports are principally from India, and are composed of rice, cotton, cloths, calicoes, spices, &c. to the extent of perhaps 600,000 dollars each year. Of these articles one-fourth may be expended in Bahrein, the remainder being re-exported to the different ports of the Gulf. About thirteen years ago the Shaikh began to levy regular customs upon the commerce of Bahrein, but after a trial of seven years the attempt was abandoned as a failure.

The only towns of any size are Munama and Muharag, near the harbour, and two smaller ones, called Ruffa and Jour, situated at some distance inland. It is said that formerly Bahrein possessed upwards of 300 villages, but at present there are not above fifty hamlets, averaging about twenty houses each. No fixed taxes are taken from the inhabitants, but whenever the Shaikh requires money, he levies forced contributions, particularly on the Bahreinees (or aborigines of the island), who, being descendants of the old Persian settlers, and consequently Sheeas in their religious tenets, are greatly oppressed. This class, perhaps, consists of about fifteen thousand individuals, while the Arab inhabitants, calling themselves Uttoobees, may be reckoned at an equal number, although those really belonging to this tribe do not exceed a thousand.

The Uttoobee Chief can muster a greater number of vessels than any other power in the Gulf. He has twelve large Buggalows, which are never employed in trade, and in cases of emergency he prohibits the departure of the merchant Buggalows which traffic with India: these consist of twenty-five, some of them of the first class, and most of the others of a respectable size. In addition to the above, twelve Buteels





and Ghoonchas are engaged in the Indian trade. The boats employed in the pearl fishery may be reckoned at about eight hundred.

The climate of the island is bad, and the inhabitants suffer more than those of other places when any contagious disease appears in the Gulf. The ravages of the cholera when it breaks out are very much greater there than in any other towns on the Arabian or Persian Coasts. The Gulf fever is also prevalent at certain seasons, and strangers sleeping on shore are liable to suffer from its deadly effects. Upon the whole, with the exception of Muskat, Kishm, and Bassadore, Bahrein may be considered the most unhealthy place in this quarter of the globe.

The power of the Bahrein Chief has of late years been much weakened, by the contumacious conduct of his sons, and the divisions which have arisen among his other relations. Some of them, particularly the family of his nephew, Khaleefa, are supposed to be friendly disposed towards the Imaum. The secession of Esai bin Tarif, with 400 followers, has also been productive of injurious consequences to Shaikh Abdoola, the more so as that person, who is a man of great courage and energy, has now closely connected himself with the Government of Muskat, and, through its influence, will probably aid materially in promoting the views of Korshid Pasha in Bahrein.

*Observations.*—Such was the description, and detail of resources, &c. of the island of Bahrein, as given by Captain Hennell in 1839. Since that period, owing to the increased dissensions, and subsequent hostilities between the members and relatives of the ruling family, the population, prosperity, and commerce of the island have gradually declined.

Numbers of the principal and most wealthy inhabitants, to avoid the effects of increased anarchy and confusion, fled, upon the commencement of actual hostilities, to Koweit on the Arabian, and Lingah and other places on the Persian Coast, where they have since temporarily located themselves, in order to watch the course of events, and return with the first signs of peace and established government, and consequent security to life and property. Although the *de facto* ruler, Mahomed bin Khaleefa, has met with no decided opposition to his authority since his ejection of the old chief, his grand uncle, from the island, in April 1843, through the assistance of the latter's aggrieved and justly disaffected subjects, Esai bin Tarif and Bushire bin Ramah, yet Abdoola bin Ahmed, refusing all compromise or understanding which does not stipulate his re-establishment in his former position and authority, continues to reside at Nabend, on the Persian Coast, having at his disposal four or five moderate sized vessels; and his intrigues and overtures, having for their object to engage in his favour the assistance and countenance of the Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul,





together with his occasional capture of the Bahrein trading vessels, proving that he has not abandoned his hostile designs, are not calculated to give confidence to the refugees.

Six large Buggalows (not including those belonging to the authorities), thirty to forty of the size employed in the Gulf trade, and from five hundred to six hundred pearl boats, probably make up at the present time the shipping of this once extremely commercial and fertile island; which, according to a rough estimate formed by Major Wilson, then Resident, numbered, in 1829, twelve large vessels, the property of the Chief Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and the other Shaikhs, his relations, mounting in all about fifty guns; twenty-one large merchant vessels now in Bahrein; five hundred common fishing and cargo boats; and fifteen hundred pearl fishing-boats.

The bulk of the population of Bahrein, which is entirely distinct from the Uttoobees, who are Soonees, consists of the aboriginal inhabitants, professing for the most part the Sheea tenets of the Mahomedan faith. These are greatly oppressed, and held in a most degraded state of vassalage by their Uttoobee masters, of which some conception may be formed from a remark by the same authority (Major Wilson) in 1829, that "the enormities practised by the Uttoobees towards the original inhabitants of Bahrein far exceed what I have ever heard of tyranny in any part of the world."

It may not be out of place here to notice the positive assertion made by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed to the Resident, on the latter's visiting Bahrein in June 1839, that "there are many parts between the islands and the main where neither Buggalows nor ships would be of any service in preventing a large fleet of boats from making its way across in the course of a few hours." He added, that "in the time of Shaikh Nasir, he had himself successfully attacked Bahrein in this manner, although his antagonist possessed a strong naval force, but which could not be made available."

This assertion, however, requires confirmation, as well from the lateness of the discovery of the important fact it disclosed, as from the circumstances arising out of his policy at the time, as connected with the Egyptian commander, Korshid Pasha, having rendered it the interest of the Uttoobee Chief to make it.

Esai bin Tarif and Bushire bin Ramah, after their successful attack upon Bahrein, removed with their dependents to Biddah, a dependency of that island, upon the Guttur Coast.

Esai and his tribe, numbering about a thousand men capable of bearing arms, possess three large Buggalows (one copper bottom), which trade to India; five Buteels, each from eighty to a hundred tons; eleven large Buteels and Buggalows; and about a hundred and thirty pearl boats.





## BIDDAH.

Biddah, inhabited principally by the Soodan Tribe, is situated on the south side of a bay, formed by two dangerous reefs running out to the sea, and approaching at their extremities so near to each other as to leave little more than room for a ship of the size of a sloop of war to be warped through. Once inside, however, the anchorage is safe, and a vessel of war can lie within something less than a mile from the town, which contains about three hundred houses, and could muster six or seven hundred fighting men.

Lieutenant Grubb, I. N., in 1822, described Biddah "as a most miserable place: not a blade of grass nor any kind of vegetation near it; the water good, procured, they said, at some distance. The anchorage in the inner harbour very good, four fathoms, being about one-eighth of a mile from the shore, surrounded by a reef nearly dry, which forms a complete basin, the entrance to which is very narrow, but deep, and free from danger. Not so in approaching it, as the water is very shoal about seven miles out, there being two and a half fathoms, sand, and a good deal of sea in a north-wester."

## WUKRA.

The town of Wukra did not exist at the time of the survey, having been since erected by the present Chief, Ali bin Nasir, who, with his tribe (the Boo Ejman) formerly resided in Biddah, but having offended the Uttoobee Shaikh, the dwellings of himself and followers were destroyed by that chief, who contemplated their forcible transfer to Bahrein. To avoid this offensive arrangement, Ali bin Nasir and his tribe took possession of the site of their present residence, at the foot of Jubbul Wukra. The town is situated upon the open sea beach, which, however, cannot be approached nearer than three miles by our vessels of war, in consequence of the coast being lined by a shallow and dangerous reef. Its fortifications consist of a small square fort, flanked by three towers, in the centre of the town, which is surrounded on the land side by a wall, with a tower on either side. Beyond the walls are two others detached, one of which, upon a slight elevation, commands the wells which supply the inhabitants with water. The place contains about 250 houses, and, including the pearl fishers and the Bedouins occasionally residing there, can collect upon emergency between five and six hundred fighting men.

## ADEED.

Adeed, on the Guttur Coast, situated on the eastern side of the entrance of the breakwater, and at the foot of the hill of that name,





## ADEED—GRANE.

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cannot be approached by our vessels of war within a distance of between three and four miles. Its defences consist of a small square fort, with two towers, in the centre of the town. On the right is a line of four towers, at some distance from each other, running towards the foot of the hills. Within these, again, and near the beach, are two other detached towers, which, with one at the back of the town, complete the defences on this side. The other is protected only by a sort of square block-house, which, situated upon a small elevation, commands the wells from which the place is supplied with water. In point of appearance it would, perhaps, be difficult to select a more wretched, desolate, and barren-looking spot in the whole of the Gulf.

## GRANE\* OR KOWEIT.

Grane or Koweit is situated at the north-west end of the Persian Gulf; has an excellent harbour, capable of containing the navy of Great Britain; without, however, any other advantage. The country around is a salt and sandy desert, of the most barren and inhospitable description, without a tree or shrub visible as far as the eye can reach, except a few bushes which mark the wells, of which the water is particularly salt and bad.

Although wanting in almost every advantage, this town presents a singular instance of commercial prosperity. Its population consists of nearly 25,000 inhabitants, who possess 31 Buggalows and Buteels, from a hundred and fifty to three hundred tons burthen, which trade constantly with India; 50 smaller boats are employed in the coasting commerce of the Gulf, and about 350 boats are engaged in fishing on the pearl banks. It can produce about 6,000 men capable of bearing arms.

The energy and courage of the people, who are closely united, and free from feuds and factions, render them respected and feared by all the other maritime tribes; and as, in fact, they are as prompt to resent insult or aggression towards themselves as they are cautious in refraining from injury and annoyance towards their peaceable neighbours, a piracy upon a Grane boat is of rare occurrence.

The Shaikh Subah, to whom the management of affairs has been made over by his father Salir, collects no taxes or customs, the port being entirely free; a small duty, levied upon the sales and purchases of the Bedouins who resort to the town, constitutes the only revenue realized by him, amounting to about 3,000 dollars annually.

It is quite unsuited for a military station, from the badness of its water. As a naval station, the same objection would not exist in a similar degree, the vessels of war watering at other places on the coast. From the character of its harbour, it would answer well as a coal dépôt.

\* A Trigonometrical Plan of Grane is given at page 52 of this Selection.





The place to the land side is surrounded by a dilapidated mud wall, with round towers for bastions; in some parts the wall is levelled to the ground, and in others the sand has been allowed to drift nearly to its top. The seaward side has never been fortified, and in no part has anything like a ditch ever existed.

The water is all brought from wells about a mile beyond the walls, that inside of the town being too bad to drink, excepting in cases of extremity.

PHELEECHI.\*

Pheleechi, an island about ten miles distant, and in fact forming one side of the harbour, is about eight miles long, by two or three wide, extremely low, and to all appearance swampy after rain or high tides. The soil, though sandy, is by no means bad, and there is plenty of fresh water at no great depth from the surface. The only village at present inhabited is Zoor, situated on the western side of the island, containing from a hundred to a hundred and fifty families, mostly engaged in fishing, and governed by one of the relatives of the Koweit Chief. The climate is said to be very bad, fever being very prevalent. On the western and protected side of the island the shoals run out so far that steamers and the smallest sized ships could not approach nearer than four miles. On the eastern side there is water enough at half this distance, but then the anchorage is exposed, and there are no inhabitants.

Koweit has unquestionably for the last twenty years been considered as closely connected with the Pashalic of Bagdad. The vessels belonging to that port all carry the Turkish flag, and Shaikh Subah, the Governor, receives an annual allowance of 200 karahs of dates from Chubda, by the express order of the Pasha, in return for which he is bound to protect Bussora from foreign aggression.

Koweit is one of the ports which have benefited by the internal disturbances and hostilities on the island of Bahrein.

KATEEF,

Situated forty miles to the north of Bahrein, possesses a very respectable and spacious fort. The citadel is strong, having been built by the Portuguese when they had possession of Bahrein; and the whole fort is in good repair, but surrounded by dense groves of date trees, which run close up to the walls on three sides, the fourth being washed by the sea. Kateef contains 500 houses, and at least a like number of fighting men.—(Lieutenant Edmunds, 1839.)

The approach by sea can only be attempted by vessels of small draft, and then only at high-water. There is, however, good anchorage for

\* Vide Trigonometrical Plan, at page 52 of this Selection.





SOHAT—OJAIR—ROUTE TO HOOFOOF.

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ships near Tirhoot, a considerable and fertile island to the eastward of Kateef, from which it is separated by a small arm of the sea. The bazar, which appears substantial, and well supplied, is outside the town. Good water is everywhere most abundant.—(Lieutenant Jopp, 1841.)

SOHAT.

A good sized place, with a fort, about thirty-five miles from Bahrein, and five from Kateef, is said to contain 1,000 fighting men, celebrated for their warlike qualities. There is a constant and bitter feud between the Chiefs of Sohata and Kateef.—(Lieutenant Edmunds, 1839.)

OJAIR.

Situated within a few yards of the sea, at the extremity of a long creek or bay, forty-five miles south of the populated part (the towns of Munama and Muharag), but only fourteen miles from the southern end of the island of Bahrein, was, during the time of the Wahabee power, the port of Nujd, but now merely consists of a custom house and small fort, with but few inhabitants and boats. It is, however, the most direct route to Lahsa, and the interior of Nujd, with which some traffic is still carried on by means of caravans of camels, and it would appear to be the most desirable point of rendezvous for an army invading Bahrein, from the defenceless end of which, as before stated, it is only fourteen miles removed. Good water is procurable at a short distance from the fort in sand-pits, but is not very plentiful.—(Lieutenant Edmunds, 1839.)

LIEUTENANT JOPP'S ROUTE, IN NOVEMBER 1841,

FROM

OJAIR TO HOOFOOF.

Distance.		Remarks.
Miles.	Furl.	
<i>First Day's March.</i>		
13	4	From Ojair to Water-pits; distance performed on camels, in four and a half hours.—Ojair is a small square fort, situated within a few yards of the sea, at the extremity of a long creek or bay. There are no other houses or buildings at Ojair. There is a governor or collector of customs, with fifteen or twenty men, at this place. Good water is procurable at a short distance from the fort, in sand-pits. Immediately on leaving Ojair you enter the desert. The first three or four miles of the road is over very heavy sand. There is undulating ground the whole way to the water-pits, where we halted for an hour.



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## ROUTE FROM OJAIR TO HOOFOOF.

Distance.		Remarks.
Miles. Furl.		
7	4	From the Water-pits to the Munzil; time two and a half hours.—The ground gradually becomes more level, and at the end of the march, a range of low hills, running north and south, are seen; Lahsa said to be close to them. No water at the Munzil, or encamping ground for the night.
<i>Second Day's March.</i>		
12	0	From the Munzil to Jishah; time four hours.—Shortly after leaving our encampment, descended into an extensive desert plain. Ground hard and firm; small hillocks on the right at some distance. After proceeding about six miles, the soil becomes more sandy, but is quite firm, and the road winds between hillocks of sand, which command it. Hence for about three miles further several small ascents occur, over very deep sand. The plain of Lahsa, with its date trees, now first seen. Three miles further, pass the village of Jishah, on the right, close to the road. It is encompassed by a wall of about 250 yards square, seven or eight feet high, with small towers at intervals. Between Ojair and Jishah there are no habitations, and of course supplies of any kind are not procurable.
4	4	From Jishah to Foozool; time an hour and a half.—About half a mile beyond Jishah, pass the village of Jufoor on the left. Same description, but larger than Jishah. Now enter the date groves, which continue for one or two miles, whence you again debouch into open country, leaving Foozool on your left. The roads through the date groves are narrow, but very good; they have watercourses on either side. These courses are in many places connected by cuts across the road, over which small bridges of date sticks are thrown, but sometimes so narrow that artillery could not pass over them. Indeed most formidable impediments might be raised to the passage of artillery, by cutting down the date trees, and laying them across the road, and by trenching the road, and connecting the watercourses. I was informed that by making a détour these groves might be avoided, but I had not an opportunity of surveying the country. Foozool is of the same description as Jishah and Jufoor, but larger than either. The houses are built of stone and clay, and have flat mud roofs.
3	0	Foozool to Hoofoof; time one hour.—A short way beyond Foozool are small watch-towers, close to the road, at intervals of four or five hundred yards from each other. They extend to the walls of Hoofoof. They are intended for the protection of the date groves, and are capable of containing fifteen or twenty men.
40	4	





## HOOFOOF.

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## HOOFOOF.

Hoofoof is the capital of Lahsa, and is a town of considerable extent. It is surrounded by an outer wall, seven or eight feet in height, and one or two in thickness, with several towers at intervals. Entering by the eastern side of the town, and passing through the suburbs by very narrow streets, you arrive after a short distance at the fort.

The fort is a square of about six or seven hundred yards each side, except to the north-west, where the wall takes a direction to the north, and thus commands the north face. The walls are built of small stones and clay. They are about twenty or twenty-five feet in height, by seven or eight feet thick, with towers forty or fifty feet in height, at intervals of forty or fifty yards. The wall is surrounded by a dry ditch fifteen or twenty feet deep, and of the same breadth. Between the ditch and the wall is a level space, with a breastwork of mud and stone, commanding the ditch and ground in front, and going all round the fort.

There are two entrances to the fort, one on the northern, and the other on the eastern side. The walls of the fort are open on the northern and western sides, but suburbs approach to the eastern and southern faces.

The gateway to the north leads into a considerable square, or open space, on the eastern side of which is the citadel. It has high walls, with towers at intervals, similar to those of the fort. Within are numerous houses, and a mosque, the dome of which is the most conspicuous object in the whole town.

The houses of Hoofoof are built of stone and clay, and are flat-roofed. The streets are narrow.

There are date groves close to the walls on the western side. To the north, these are three or four hundred yards in front. The ground beyond the suburbs on the other two sides is clear.

A market is held at Hoofoof every Thursday, to which people from the neighbouring villages bring their goods for sale.

Next in importance to Hoofoof is Muburrij, which is situated between two and three miles to the north of the former. The fort which defends it is to the west of, and detached from the town; it is surrounded by a dry ditch.

Hoofoof and Muburrij, with their dependencies, are said to contain a population of 16,000 men capable of bearing arms.

About two miles to the north-west of Hoofoof is the Aeen-ool-Nujm. This is a hot spring, of very abundant and most translucent water: it possesses no peculiar smell or taste, and is said to be most beneficial in cutaneous disorders. There is no vegetation near this spring. It is covered by an ancient dome.



Tradition asserts that a star, falling from heaven, produced this spring; others maintain that a person named Nujm built a village on this spot, and that it owes its appellation to this circumstance.

Four or five miles to the eastward of Hoofoof are the Gibul Garah. These hills are destitute of vegetation, of no great height, and are famous for the natural caves they contain. The one visited was forty paces in length, by twenty paces broad; height about twenty or twenty-five feet. Another cave was stated to be in these hills, of greater length, but not so broad. The natives resort to these caves in the hotter months of the year.

Dates appear to be the chief produce of Lahsa; rice and wheat are also cultivated in considerable quantities. Water from springs is everywhere extremely abundant, and fruit trees, lucerne, and vegetables thrive in the date groves in a most luxuriant manner.

## ROUTE FROM HOOFOOF TO KATEEF.

Distance.		Remarks.
Miles.	Furl.	
<i>First Day's March.</i>		
6	0	Hoofoof to Kulabiah; time two hours.—Pass through some date groves. The road is good. Kulabiah is a small, walled village, the houses of which are mostly built of date sticks and mats.
6	6	From Kulabiah to the Munzil; time two and a quarter hours.—Immediately on leaving Kulabiah, you enter the Sandy Desert, which continues all the way to Kateef. The ground is undulating, and in some places very heavy, but practicable for light artillery. At the Munzil an encamping ground; found pits in the sand; the water good. The water in these pits becomes brackish after a few days' exposure, when it becomes necessary to dig others.
<i>Second Day's March.</i>		
18	6	From the Munzil to the Water-pits; time six and a quarter hours.—Sandy, irregular ground for the first five or six miles, when you enter a desert plain, which continues over firm ground for four or five miles, after which for the next three miles the ground becomes more undulating, and very heavy here and there. Another plain of six miles in length is now entered, which ends at the water-pits, where we halted for an hour.
6	0	From the Water-pits to the Munzil; time two hours.—Undulating ground, sand pretty firm. Water appears to be generally obtainable in the low ground between the sand mounds. Encamped for the night near some water-pits.





## ROUTE FROM HOOFOOF TO KATEEF—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 115

Distance.		Remarks.
Miles.	Furl.	
<i>Third Day's March.</i>		
9	0	From the Munzil to some Water-pits; time three hours.—Undulating ground. Track over sand hillocks all the way. Sand generally firm, but very heavy in some places. Water good.
15	6	From the Water-pits to the Munzil; time five and a quarter hours.—For the first six miles the ground is as described in the first part of the march; it then becomes plainer, the hillocks dwindling into small mounds, and about four miles further a small plain is entered. The sand, however, is rather deep. Water at the Munzil good. From some stunted shrubs near the Munzil a supply of underwood for fires was generally obtainable.
<i>Fourth Day's March.</i>		
12	0	From the Munzil to a Date Grove; time four hours.—The first five or six miles over undulating ground; after which a plain of five or six miles, very heavy sand in some places. Halted for half an hour at some date trees, where there is a fine spring of water.
4	4	From the Date Grove to Kateef; time an hour and a half.—The ground is good all the way to Kateef. At first date trees on the left, with the fort of Damaum and the sea on the right. Afterwards enter date groves, with watercourses on each side of the road, and after passing a few little villages arrive at Kateef.
78	6	

## GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

In calculating the distances between Ojair and Hoofoof, &c. &c. it was assumed that a camel performed three miles in the hour: but this was deemed rather overrated, and that the respective distances of Ojair and Kateef from Hoofoof do not exceed thirty-five and seventy miles.

Of the two routes, that by Ojair is preferable, provided carriage can be obtained. Camels, with water, would be required to accompany an expedition by either route; and in regard to Ojair, as water is not very plentiful at that place, it might be found necessary to transport it from Bahrein.

A few days before, some heavy rain had fallen, which had rendered the sand much firmer than it would otherwise have been; but even then the transport of light artillery would have been a matter of great labour.

Two days were taken up on the road from Ojair to Hoofoof, and four from the latter place to Kateef.



CAPTAIN HAMERTON'S ROUTE (ABRIDGED), IN JANUARY 1840,  
FROM  
SHARGAH TO BRYMEE.

Names.	Hours.	Direction.	Remarks.
Shargah to Fellah.	3	S. by E.	A spot on the desert, having a well with good water, and three large trees, but no houses or tents whatever. No trace of a road.
Bir Mohafiz.	10	SSE.	The ascent the whole way was very gradual, over sandhills. No forage whatever. A fine well.
Ghureef.	3½	The road tortuous, S. by E. & SSE.	An old ruined fort, in the midst of thick babool jungle, having several wells of good water. Formerly belonged to the Shuamis of Brymee, who were driven out about fifty years ago by the Beni Kaab or Chaab. At present occupied by the Beni Kuttub Bedouin Tribe. Good forage in the cold season for camels.
Gibul Yiff.	6½	Ditto.	A high peak, so called in the country of the Beni Kaab. The track from Bir Mohafiz over hard sandhills: on its right babool jungle; some of the trees of considerable size.
Brymee.	13	S.	The road very heavy, over and winding round the base of high hills of sand, in many places so steep that the camels could not ascend or descend. At seven and a half hours (from the time of starting) entered a third range of hills, and an hour after descended into a beautiful valley (called Hurmulloh), covered with wheat fields, just coming into ear (the property of the Beni Kaab). In the valley were two large towers, called Koheel and Jiburee, for the protection of the cultivation.

## BRYMEE.

Brymee is a town of considerable size, built of sun-dried bricks, and surrounded by a wall constructed of similar material; but the greater part of the town is represented to be in a dilapidated state, and the wall a perfect ruin. On the south side of the town, however, in an open plain, is a fort, nearly square, surrounded by a dry ditch, about twenty-four feet wide, inside of which is a wall, about eight feet high, for the protection of matchlockmen while defending the ditch. About thirty feet distant, and inside of this wall, is the fort wall, about fourteen feet in height, and five in thickness at the base, and at the top only eighteen inches or two feet. It has round towers at the angles, but ill constructed,





## BRYMEE.

and the whole built of sun-dried bricks. The length of the fort, inside, Captain Hamerton found to be sixty-one paces, and the breadth sixty. On the north side, about three hundred paces distant, is another and smaller fort, about thirty-five paces in length, and fifty in breadth, the wall about fifteen feet high, and loopholed. In time of emergency Brymee could muster about 800 men for its defence, but under two chiefs, not always on the best terms with each other. The fort might offer an effectual resistance to undisciplined Arabs, with their matchlocks, but Captain Hamerton is of opinion that it could not for an hour withstand the attack of disciplined troops, with artillery.

The Arabs who hold the forts of Brymee, however, are only a branch of a tribe which occupies the adjacent district, and goes under the general appellation of the Naeem of Brymee; but the person who is considered the principal chief resides at a place called Zuneb, about eighteen miles distant from Brymee, and, if all united under him, might number 2,600 fighting men; but there are at least four chiefs, who pretend more or less to independent authority, whose submission to the Chief of Zuneb must be viewed as in some measure voluntary, and whose united power is subject to be greatly weakened by the jealousies and misunderstandings apt to spring up among them.

The principal value of Brymee would appear to be derived from its groves of date trees, easily reared, and brought to great perfection by the plentiful supply the plain on which it stands receives of water drawn by aqueducts from the adjacent hills. It is not known by whom these valuable conduits were constructed, but the Natives assign the merit to Solomon the son of David, possibly Suleiman the Magnificent; but more probably they are the work of the Persians, who conquered and held Bahrein and the Arabian Coast in the time of Nadir Shah. This latter supposition receives support from the circumstance of similar aqueducts being of common occurrence almost everywhere in Persia.

The Brymee dates are considered superior to any produced in the province of Oman. Wheat grown in the valley is of a fine description, but does not appear to be much cultivated. Fruit, such as oranges and lemons, grapes, figs, mangoes, olives, and pomegranates, grow in great perfection. Coffee, too, was formerly cultivated on the hill Hafeet, but from the indolence of the inhabitants, or other causes, its growth has been abandoned.

The fort of Brymee, as far as has been ascertained, was built by the Wahabees, who, shortly after they had established their authority on the Arabian Coast, compelled the adoption of the tenets of their creed, and the payment of the Zukat or the fifth of all property. They are



## ROUTE FROM BRYMEE TO SOHAR.

said to have had their attention first directed towards it by the inhabitants attempting to rebel, and the Wahabee General finding it necessary to summon the chiefs on the Arabian Coast to besiege and capture the place, which was soon effected, and the defences, which consisted merely of a wall of mud or sun-dried bricks, were improved, and entrusted to the charge of a Wahabee garrison. This person, who was called Bin Gendrik, was shortly afterwards succeeded by another of Soud, the Wahabee Chief's General, the famous Mootluk, to whom is principally attributed the obstinate resistance and brave defence of Shinas against the British in 1809; and it was under his superintendence that the fort received its present shape, and was surrounded by the ditch, now forming its most formidable line of defence.

Brymee has been generally held by the Wahabees to the date of the fall of their power and influence, when the Naeem tribes assumed possession in independence. Being from its position and advantages a place of considerable importance, its capture would be deemed essential by any force invading Oman.

## ROUTE FROM BRYMEE TO SOHAR,

TRAVERSED IN JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1840.

Names.	Hours.	Direction.	Remarks.
Brymee to Bir-ool-Humeeza.	6	E. by N. $\frac{1}{2}$ N.	Ambek, a place on the road in the hills, having wells, and abundance of good water. At Bir-ool-Humeeza (off the track) is a good well. The road all the way very good, and water in several places.
Wadi-ool-Tizzee.	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	NE.	The bed of a mountain torrent, near a fine date grove, called the Jruhl-ool-Heil, with a fine stream of water. Two hours further, another large date grove, the Nukhl bin Kuttub, with also a stream of good water, and two hours further Shigeeree.
Shigeeree.	4	NE.	A pass between two high peaks in the Wadi-ool-Tizzee. There is here a round tower (Heerinal Shigeeree), built by the Imaum of Muskat, but now belonging to Hamed bin Syf (Ool Bokhee Bancee), and a spring of good water. Two hours further an aqueduct upon arches, crossing a ravine called El Molana, belonging to the Kurnide Arabs, and two hours further Saleet.
Saleet.	4	NE.	A small town, with large date groves, and a fine stream of water. From Ool Humeeza to Saleet (eleven and a half hours) the road very good, winding through high mountains. Plenty of water all the way, but no forage, except





## CONCLUDING REMARKS.


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Names.	Hours.	Direction.	Remarks.
			for camels. Shortly after leaving Saleet the sea becomes visible towards the north-east, and the descent from the hills commences to the plain at the Kemaats, called Fel-ligh-ool-Goball, aqueducts, which extend from the hills to the date groves of Sohar.
Al Ohei Sohar.	4½	...	Al Ohei, a small town.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS.

The two tribes who reside in the part of Oman visited, are the Beni Kaab and Beni Kuttub; the latter a Bedouin Tribe, without any fixed place of residence, numbering about 600 men. The Beni Kaab inhabit that part of the country between Gibul Yiff and Hurmullioh; they are estimated at 600 men.

The road from Shargah to Brymee is difficult, while that from Sohar to Brymee may be considered good. Plenty of water the whole way; forage for camels abundant, but none for horses.







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# CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS

CONNECTED WITH

THE GOVERNMENT OF MUSKAT,  
FROM THE YEAR 1730 TO 1843;

WITH

THE JOASMEE TRIBE OF ARABS,  
FROM THE YEAR 1765 TO 1843;

WITH

THE UTTOOBEE TRIBE OF ARABS (BAHREIN),  
FROM THE YEAR 1716 TO 1844;

WITH

THE WAHABEE TRIBE OF ARABS,  
FROM THE YEAR 1795 TO 1844;

WITH

THE BENIYAS TRIBE OF ARABS,  
FROM THE YEAR 1793 TO 1843;

AND WITH

THE DEBAYE (BOO FELASA) TRIBE OF ARABS,  
FROM THE YEAR 1834 TO 1843.

THE WHOLE PREPARED, IN THE YEAR 1844, BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,  
ASSISTANT RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.



## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

## MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1730-35	The Persians are driven out of Oman by Ahmed bin Saeed, the Governor of Sohar, who is elected Imaum.
1769	The Muskatees boldly and peremptorily refuse the demand of Persia for tribute.
1770	A large fleet, with troops, sails against Bushire, but the ships, dispersing, return to Muskat.
1774	Efforts to negotiate a peace between the Imaum and Persia fail, the former considering the conditions proposed disgraceful.
1775	A Muskat fleet proceeds to relieve Bussora, besieged by the Persians. It defeats the Bushire boats, and becomes master of the river, but the town being compelled ultimately to surrender, returns to port.
1797	Syud Sultan, the second son of Syud Ahmed, succeeds to the Imaumship, usurping the authority of his elder brother, the rightful heir, and confining him to the city of Bombac, and its immediate vicinity, the usual residence of the Imaum.
12th Oct. 1798	An engagement is entered into by the Imaum with the British Government, to exclude the French and Dutch from having any factory within his territories, or at Gombroon; to prevent the ships of the former nation entering the cove; and to dismiss the French, who were at the time, and had been for many years, in his service.
28th Nov.	The Imaum, with a view the more effectually to prosecute his hostile intentions against Bussora, on account of some ancient claims on the Pasha of Bagdad, negotiates a peace with his formidable enemy the Joasmee Chief. Through





## MUSKAT.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	the mediation of the British Resident, the usual friendly intercourse between the Pasha and the Imaum is however restored.
A. D. 1799	The Imaum, sailing with a large fleet to attack the Uttoobees, and reduce Bahrein, seizes the only three vessels belonging to them. The Uttoobees apply for aid to Shaikh Nassir of Bushire, who proceeds to Bahrein, and receives the tribute for 1798. The Imaum, in return, by means of intrigues, obtains possession of the island of Karrack. He amicably adjusts matters with the Uttoobees, and the Shaikh of Bushire, and returns to Muskat.
1800	Colonel Malcolm, touching at Muskat on his embassy to Persia, enters into an agreement, in confirmation of that of 1798, with the Imaum, who was supposed to have favoured the intrigues of the French.
	The Imaum proceeds towards Ras-ool-Khyma, where he joins Shaikh Suggur, with a view to oppose the threatened invasion of Oman by the Wahabees, which is, however, averted by the conclusion of a peace.
1801	The Imaum accomplishes his favourite object of reducing Bahrein. The Uttoobees, however, retake it in a few months.
1803	The Wahabee influence and power having greatly increased, the Imaum, unable to check its progress, accedes to a truce of three years with them. The Wahabee ruler, returning from his victorious career on the western frontier of Arabia (to allow of his prosecuting which the truce had been formed), now, in violation of the same, prepares to attack Oman by land and sea. The conquest of the province was arrested by the murder of the Wahabee Shaikh, Abdool Azeez, early in the month of November.
14th Nov. 1804	Syud Sultan is killed in an engagement with the Uttoobees, joined by the Joasmeees, off the bar of Bussora river. Another account has it that he was killed by some Aza Arabs (a branch of the Joasmee Tribe), while going on shore at Kishm.
	The administration of affairs devolves upon his two sons, who being young and unprotected, their pretensions are disputed by their uncle, Shaikh Ghes, of Sohar, who aims at the usurpation of the government.



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## MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1804	The management of affairs is entrusted by the two sons to Syud Beder, their cousin, who, with the Wahabee Chief's assistance, defeats Ghes.
1805	Syud Beder recovers Bunder Abbas and Ormus, of which places the Shaikh of Kishm, availing himself of the troubles that had ensued on the death of the late Imaum, had possessed himself.
1807	Syud Saeed, the second son of the late Imaum, who had now succeeded Syud Beder, defeats an expedition against Mukran by the Joasmee pirates.
1808	An attack by the Imaum against Khore Fukaun fails, in consequence of the treacherous desertion of an auxiliary Chief of the Fajarah Tribe. The Imaum narrowly escapes to his ship, and Syud Ghes loses his life in the affray, and is succeeded by his son Azan. The Wahabees establish their influence at Muskat, and commence to propagate by violence the tenets of their particular sect. Some instances of oppression on their part, indeed the common danger, reunited the Shaikhs of Oman, who determine on a vigorous resistance to Saood.
1809	An expedition was despatched by the British Government, for the protection of Muskat against the Wahabees, in order that a well disposed ally might not be converted into a dangerous enemy, through their influence and compulsion; and for the suppression of the Joasmee pirates. (Vide Joasmees.)
1811	The Imaum's brother sails on an expedition against Bahrein and Zobara. The latter is taken, plundered, and levelled with the ground. The troops and battering train are landed on the former, where the brother of the governor, and the Duryah Beggee of the Wahabee fleet, with fifteen of their principal officers, are made prisoners.
1813	An expedition by the Imaum against Ras-ool-Khyma, for the purpose of reinstating Sultan bin Suggur, fails.
1814	A second expedition had started, when the chiefs and inhabitants send a mediator to him, to solicit peace, which the Imaum grants, and returns to the island of Ormus.
1815	The Imaum's fleet is beaten off by the Joasmee fleet, and his frigate, the <i>Caroline</i> , nearly taken. He returns to Muskat,





## MUSKAT.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	and, having refitted, again puts to sea after the Joasmees, whom he chases into Ras-ool-Khyma.
A. D. 1815	The Imaum, accompanied by boats from the coast of Persia, attacks Bahrein, but is signally defeated. He proceeds to Congoon for a Persian reinforcement, for the purpose of renewing the attack. Discovering the treachery of the Persian Government, who contemplate the seizure of himself and the different Arab Chiefs, he quits the coast, and the expedition is abandoned.
1816	The Imaum blockades Ras-ool-Khyma for four months, but is unable to effect anything against it.
1819	The Imaum co-operates with the British expedition, under Sir W. Grant Keir, against the piratical ports.
Nov. 1820	The Imaum, in concert with a British detachment from Kishm, under the political and military control of Captain Thompson, attacks the Beni Boo Ali Tribe of Jaalan. The combined force is defeated. The whole proceedings entirely disapproved by Government.
Mar. 1821	A large detachment is despatched from Bombay against the Beni Boo Ali Tribe, defeats them, killing five hundred of their number, and taking the rest prisoners, and blows up the works and defences of their town.
1823-24	The Beni Boo Ali prisoners (who were taken to Bombay) restored to their former seats and residences, and 25,000 German crowns advanced by Government, to enable them to repair and rebuild their dwellings.
1826	The Imaum intercepts the Shaikh of Bushire on his return from Mecca, and captures his two vessels, having previously captured the <i>Noosrut Shah</i> , also belonging to the Shaikh. The Imaum blockades Bussora, but shortly withdraws his fleet, on his claims being adjusted.
May 1827	Shaikh Abdool Russool, Governor of Bushire, restored to liberty, and his two vessels also given up to him, on his giving a bond for 80,000 German crowns.
July.	The Imaum marries the daughter of the Prince of Shiraz.
Nov. 1828	The Imaum, accompanied by Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabec, and a body of the Beniyas Tribe, attacks Bahrein, and is defeated, with considerable loss, being himself slightly wounded. The failure was attributable to the imprudence or treachery of the Beniyas' allies.



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## MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1829	A small vessel, belonging to Mr. Shipton, a British subject, is attacked and plundered on her way from the Red Sea by some dependents of the Imaum. His Highness obtains satisfaction from the pirates, and affords redress to the Government. The British merchant ship <i>Oscar</i> , having run ashore off the Coast of Jaalan, is plundered of her cargo by the Beni Boo Ali and Beni Boo Hussain Tribes, to the amount of eight lakhs of rupees. Five vessels proceed to that quarter, and partial redress is obtained.
Dec.	The Imaum invites Syud Hullal, the Governor of Soweik, to Muskat, and treacherously seizes and detains him a prisoner. He then sails for his African possessions.
1830	Syud Hullal's sister harasses the Imaum's territories, and Syud Humood bin Azan bin Ghes recovers from the Imaum his patrimony of Sohar. The safety of Muskat is compromised, and that town is saved by the intervention of the British Government. The Imaum returns to Muskat, and attacks Sohar, but fails to reduce it; is compelled to come to terms with Syud Humood, who agrees to pay tribute, retaining the districts of Khizza, Khaloorah, Markies, and Sohar. Shinas and Ghillal are restored to His Highness, who liberates Syud Hullal, and permits him to return to Soweik.
1831	The Imaum, accompanied by the Shaikh, and a force from Ejman, attacks Sohar: having rejected the alliance of the Beniyas, they join his opponents; and his allies, the Beni Naeem of Ejman, treacherously turning against him, he is defeated, and compelled to patch up a peace with the Sohar Chief, upon nearly the same terms as the former.
1832	The Imaum, having collected a force of Beloochees, quits Muskat for his African possessions, leaving his son, Syud Hullal bin Saeed, and nephew, Mahomed bin Salim, as his representatives at Muskat. Shortly after his departure, the persons left in charge of the Government, proceeding to Burka, are confined as prisoners there by its Chief, Saood bin Ali, who proceeds immediately against Musnaah, held by the mother of Mahomed bin Salim, but fails to reduce it. Humood bin Azan, of Sohar, and Hullal bin Imaum, of Soweik, taking advantage





## MUSKAT.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	of the disturbed state of affairs, prepare to attack Rastag, and other inland places in the Imaum's territory. Sultan bin Suggur seizes Khore Fukann, Khulla, and Dibbah, ports on the Batinah Coast. The British Government, determined upon upholding the Imaum's Government, and preserving the integrity of his dominions, despatch a naval force to Muskat, to support the local Government, and check the designs of their enemies, and the Resident addresses letters of remonstrance to the several invading chiefs.
A. D. 1832	The Imaum returns to restore order. The British Government declines to interfere to compel the Joasmee Chief to give up the towns of which he had taken possession during his absence.
1833	The Imaum, with the cognisance of the British authorities, enters into closer connection with the Wahabees; agrees to pay 5,000 German crowns as Zukat. A further engagement is formed, fixing the limits of the territories of each according as they then existed, and binding the parties reciprocally to assist in putting down any rebellions which might arise in their respective dominions. The execution of the last act the Imaum declared to the British Government should depend upon its views and wishes.
	A cruel piracy, committed on a Kutch Nowry off Zanzibar, is traced by His Highness to some Beni Hajir of Soor. He seizes and places the offenders at the disposal of the Resident, as also an individual who had been one of the chief actors in the piracy on a Dutch brig in 1829, who had hitherto evaded detection. The latter is sent to Bombay, but escapes punishment, from the absence of evidence to convict him.
1834-35	A further exertion of British influence becomes necessary, to check the designs of aggrandisement on the part of Humood bin Azan, who had taken possession of Rastag, and threatened other places. He is informed, that by committing further aggressions against the territories of the Imaum he would incur the penalty of being considered an enemy of the British Government. This has not the full effect. He attacks Sqweik, and partially gains possession of the town, but is shortly driven out, with some loss. The



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## MUSKAT.

Date.	Occurrences.
	Muskat authorities imprudently invite the Piratical Arab Tribes to their assistance.
A. D. 1836	The Imaum enters into engagements with Syud bin Mootluk, the Wahabee Agent, with a view to the expulsion of Humood bin Azan from the places of which he had illegally and forcibly obtained possession. The combined forces invest Sohar by land and sea, but the Imaum learning that, in the event of the place falling, the Wahabee Agent meditated retaining and garrisoning it in the name of his master, separates from his ally, and relinquishes the expedition. He shortly after proceeds to his African possessions.
1837	The Imaum, principally through the assistance and gallant behaviour of Esai bin Tarif, and his dependents, succeeds in reducing Mombassa, which had revolted from his authority.
1839	The Imaum returns from Africa in September, and is guided by the advice and views of the British Government in his intercourse and relations with the Egyptians. The letters of their Agents receive no attention. He exhorts and encourages the Brymee Shaikhs to unite and maintain their independence against the invaders. The Imaum threatens to send a force to attack Bushire, in consequence of the murder of his Agent, a Persian subject, in that town, on his return from Teheran, where he had been with a view to negotiate a marriage between His Highness and one of the Persian Princesses. A reconciliation is effected between the Imaum and Humood bin Azan, of Sohar, through the mediation of the British Resident.
1840	Captain Hamerton appointed British Agent at Muskat; is subsequently created a Consul by the Home Government, and directed to establish himself at Zanzibar. The blockade of the ports held by the Egyptians being contemplated, the Imaum places his vessels at the disposal of the British Government, whenever required. His Highness returns to Zanzibar. Humood bin Azan visits Bombay, and is received with all suitable respect and attention by the British Government.
1841	Shortly after his return from Bombay, Humood bin Azan furnishes proof of the sincerity of his friendship with the





## MUSKAT—JOASMEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	Imaum, by preparing cordially to aid the authorities of Muskat against a rebellious chief, who is in consequence induced to return to his allegiance.
A. D. 1842	A piracy, attended with murder, is committed by six Nujdees of Muskat, who had been lately dismissed from the service of the Imaum, upon a Kishm boat, in which they had taken passage. The pirates are discovered at Cheeroo, and handed over to the British authorities, who subsequently send them, agreeably to instructions from Government, to Muskat, with a desire that they might be made to suffer adequate punishment.
1843	The authorities of Muskat supply Esai bin Tarif and his colleagues with ammunition and military stores, but decline taking any active interference in their contest with Bahrein, without the sanction of His Highness, who refers them for the sentiments of the British Government on the subject. These were opposed to his taking part in the civil war.
	A force, sent by the Imaum against his rebellious subjects of Sevee, is defeated, with great slaughter.

## JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1765	The Joasmees, called in to aid the Governor of Ormus, Gombroon, and Minao, in resisting the unjust levy of tribute on the part of the Persian Government, take possession of the towns of Kishm, Luft, Lingah, and Shinas (on the Persian Coast). Kishm and Luft are subsequently recovered by the Persian Government.
1777	Shaikh Rashid, of Ras-ool-Khyma, resigns the Shaikhdом in favour of his son, Suggur.
1780	Shaikh Suggur, failing to negotiate a peace between the Persians and Uttoobees, who had taken and plundered Bahrein, joins Shaikh Nassir of Bushire in an expedition for the recovery of the island. These attempts for reducing Bahrein are repeatedly made, and not abandoned until 1785.



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## JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1797	The Joasmees seize the <i>Bassein Snow</i> , a British vessel, charged with public despatches, but release her two days after.
October.	The Joasmees, after having by professions of friendship, &c. procured ammunition from the <i>Viper</i> cruiser, treacherously attack that vessel in Bushire Roads, but are beaten off.
1803	Shaikh Suggur dying, is succeeded by his son, Sultan.
1805	Wahabee influence and authority lead to the vigorous renewal of piracy. The Joasmees capture two British vessels, the <i>Shannon</i> and <i>Trimmer</i> , and a fleet of forty sail surround and fire into the <i>Mornington</i> cruiser, but are compelled to sheer off.
	A Joasmee fleet is blockaded at Kishm by a combined British and Muskat force, and is reduced to such distress as to solicit a peace. The <i>Trimmer</i> was restored, the <i>Shannon</i> having been previously given up, completely stripped.
1806	An agreement is entered into between the British Government and the Joasmees, dated 6th February. It does not appear to have been negotiated with the consent, or even the knowledge, of the Wahabee Shaikh.
1807	The Joasmees join Syud Beder, the Imaum, against Syud Ghes, of Sohar.
1808	Precluded by the Treaty of 1806 to carry on their cruises in the Gulf, the Joasmees, urged and instigated by the Wahabees, extend them to India; and, rendered independent of their lawful Shaikh, Sultan, by the Wahabee ruler, send out their boats without his permission, and capture twenty country craft on the coast to the northward of Bombay.
20th Oct.	They commit a breach of the Treaty of 1806, and attack and capture the <i>Sylph</i> cruiser in the Gulf. She is immediately retaken by His Majesty's frigate <i>Nereid</i> , which heaves in sight.
1809	The Persians from Lar attack Lingah and Charrak, and compel the Joasmees to retire to Bassadore.
	The Joasmees defeat a fleet of Bushire boats, destined for the attack of Khor Hassan.
	The Wahabee Chief appoints Hussein bin Ali, a Joasmee, and Shaikh of Ramse, his vicegerent in the Seer principality, vesting him with authority over Ras-ool-Khyma, and nominates Wahabee officers throughout the Joasmee





## JOASMEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	country. Invites Shaikh Sultan to Deriah, and detains and imprisons him. Shaikh Sultan contrives to escape from prison, and, finding his way to Yemen, embarks at Mocha, and proceeds to Muskat. The Imaum takes him to Shargah, and places him over the Joasmee Tribe at that place, Shaikh Sultan occasionally living at Lingah.
A. D. 1809	The British Government, determining to relieve the Imaum from the power of the Wahabees, and to suppress their piracies, despatch an expedition to the Gulf.
13th Nov.	Ras-ool-Khyma, vigorously attacked by sea and land, is taken, after a bloody resistance. The town, with the vessels in port, amounting to upwards of fifty, with the English prize ship <i>Minerva</i> , burnt. The expedition then proceeds to Lingah, and destroys twenty Dows; thence, after passing Congoon, Bunder Mullim, and Homeram, to Luft. The town is soon occupied, but all attempts to carry the fort by storm fail. The bombardment continued.
	The fort is surrendered, together with property to the amount of two lakhs of rupees, belonging to the Imaum, which, with the fort, are handed over to His Highness.
1st Jan. 1810	Shinas attacked by the combined British and Imaum's forces. After an obstinate and sanguinary resistance, the fort surrenders, and is made over to His Highness; but now in so ruined a state that it cannot be occupied.
1812	The pirates reappear in the beginning of this year, and destroy several large Native craft, belonging to Bussora and Congoon. Boats carrying British colours do not escape, and others are detained at Porebunder, and prevented from prosecuting their mercantile pursuits.
1813	An expedition by the Imaum against Ras-ool-Khyma, with the view of reinstating Sultan bin Suggur, fails.
1814	A second expedition this year, for a similar purpose, terminates in a peace concluded between the Imaum of Muskat and the Joasmees, to which Shaikh Suggur is compelled to become a party.
1814-15	The Joasmees commit many depredations upon the Indian trade, and insult the British flag, by plundering and retaining a boat, despatched by the British Resident on the faith of an engagement entered into early in the year 1814.



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JOASMEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1815	The Joasmees engage and defeat the Imaum's fleet, and nearly take the <i>Caroline</i> frigate, of 32 guns (Imaum's). They capture also a British vessel from Bombay, put the greater portion of her crew to death, and exact ransom for the release of the remainder.
1816	The Joasmees attack the <i>Aurora</i> cruiser, and fire at the ship <i>Persia</i> , and <i>Cintra</i> schooner. They take three vessels belonging to Surat, and murder many of their crews: the loss of property by this capture estimated at ten lakhs of rupees. Many other captures made of British vessels, under circumstances of similar atrocity; and finally the British armed boat <i>Turrarow</i> .
1817	A small squadron of Joasmee boats proceeds to Busheab: the crew land, burn, and pillage the villages on the western part of the island, and carry off all the cattle, killing great numbers of the inhabitants.
1817-18	They enter the harbour of Aseeloo, and take five large laden Buggalows, valued at three lakhs of rupees, and murder their crews. They proceed to Congoon, but, finding the place prepared to receive them, weigh, and proceed to Daire, where they land, and destroy a number of date trees. They are repulsed, however, by the inhabitants, and compelled to take to their boats. The greatest consternation of the Joasmees inspired throughout the Gulf.
1819	Ras-ool-Khyma taken by the British troops, under Sir W. G. Keir, 9th December. Hussain bin Ramah and Guzeeb bin Ahmed, the chiefs, surrender at discretion. The other chiefs on the coast tender unqualified submission to the British General.
8th Jan. 1820	A general Treaty of peace concluded with the maritime chieftains, its object the suppression of piracy, and security to trade. A separate agreement is entered into with Hussain bin Ali, the former Wahabee vicegerent, for the surrender of all his vessels (excepting the fishing-boats), the release of all Indian captives, and the occupation of the towns of Ras-ool-Khyma and Moharra by the British troops. A similar agreement also with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, for the surrender of the towers, guns, and vessels of Shargah, Ejman, Amulgavine, and their dependencies, stipulating that British troops should not enter the towns or lay them waste.





## JOASMEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1820	Ras-ool-Khyma is garrisoned by a detachment of British troops, which is, however, removed to Kishm on 18th July, when the defences are dismantled, and destroyed.
1823	<p>Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur claims general supremacy over all the Joasmee ports. The British Government recognise the assumption of this authority on his part in as far only as it is acknowledged and obeyed by the several chiefs. Ejman in the first instance refuses, but subsequently tenders allegiance to him.</p> <p>The Shaikh of Ramse is deposed by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and succeeded by Mahomed Abdool Rahman, the son of a former Shaikh, who had been removed by Hussain bin Ali (the Wahabee vicegerent).</p> <p>Shaikh Guzeeb bin Ahmed, of Jazirat-ool-Hamrah, dies, and is succeeded by Shaikh Mahzem bin Abdool Rahman; who, dying, is succeeded by his son, Mahomed; who, giving umbrage to the Joasmee Chief, is removed by him, and Ahmed bin Abdoolla established in his room.</p>
1824	<p>A piracy, attended with cruelty, is committed by two Shargah boats upon a Buggalow belonging to Socotra. A strict watch being kept, in order to seize them on their return, one is abandoned by its crew at Charrak, and the other takes refuge at Muttra, where, having remained unmolested for several months, no further steps are taken regarding it.</p> <p>The Joasmee Chief opens a communication with the Wahabees, who had lately obtained considerable successes over the Turks, assigning self-preservation as his motive.</p>
1824-25	Owing to the intriguing and faithless conduct of the Joasmee Chief, hostilities arise between him and Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, and are the occasion of various irregularities. An amicable adjustment is effected in October, through the influence of the Imaum.
1827	Hostilities again break out between the Joasmees and Beni-yas, the latter having seized Debaye; but a peace is soon concluded.
1828	A most atrocious and cruel piracy is committed by a Joasmee boat, under one Mooslim bin Rashid, upon a Sohar boat, which, after plundering, he scuttles. The Resident remonstrates, and Mooslim, with the greater part of his crew, are made prisoners, after a sharp action, by a boat



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## JOASMEEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1829	<p>sent in pursuit by the Joasmee Chief, who subsequently puts Mooslim to death. The pirate vessel, with all the plundered cargo recovered, is given up to the Imaum.</p> <p>The British ship <i>Sunbury</i> visiting Shargah, her Captain and crew are ill-treated, in consequence of her meditating to visit Aboothabee, with which place the Joasmees are at war; an insult is further offered, in pulling down the flag. Sultan bin Suggur affords satisfaction, by burning the first boat that boarded the <i>Sunbury</i>, and flogging the individual who hauled down the flag.</p>
1831	<p>The Joasmee Chief, receiving a subsidy from the Imaum, promises him his aid against Sohar; but, with his usual want of faith, fails in performance. The Shaikh of Ejman, similarly subsidised, joins His Highness, but, on the defeat of the troops of the latter, declaring in favour of the people of Sohar, treacherously turns his arms against his late allies. His town and date groves are plundered and injured, during his absence, by a party of Beniyas, sent by Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee.</p> <p>Hostilities are in consequence declared between the Joasmees and Beniyas, but through the mediation of Mahomed bin Guzeeb, of Lingah, a peace is again concluded.</p> <p>Sultan bin Suggur intimates his intention of declaring war against the Imaum of Muskat, and of immediately commencing hostilities. Previous to the receipt of an answer from the Resident, and to the arrival of the British naval force at Muskat, to the assistance of the existing Government, he, by surprise or treachery, obtains possession of the ports of Khore Fukaun, Khulla, and Dibbah, on the Coast of Batinah. Rashid bin Humeed, of Ejman, commits daring depredations upon the trade of Sohar and Muskat.</p> <p>Some Joasmee boats take advantage of the defenceless state of many of the places near Bushire, in consequence of the plague, plunder the towns of Bunder Dillum and Bunder Reigh, and likewise a boat returning from Congoon to Bushire.</p>
1832	<p>Called upon to afford redress for the outrages committed by the dependents of the Shaikh of Ejman, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur distinctly disavows any authority over that chief.</p>





Date.	Occurrences.
	He had before by letter disclaimed the exercise of any control over the Shaikh of Amulgavine.
A. D. 1832	Shaikh Rashid, of Ejman, on a naval force appearing before his port, affords the required redress, on account of the plunder of Muskat and other vessels (not including those of Sohar, with which place he was at war).
Nov. Dec.	A large fleet of Joasmee vessels, under the command of Sultan bin Suggur in person, come to Bushire, with a view to assist Shaikh Nassir, the hereditary Governor of Bushire, who had been ejected by the Shiraz authorities, and had instituted a blockade of the port. According to previous agreement, the plunder of the place was to have been the reward of a successful attack.
	The Joasmees are prevented by the British authorities from carrying out their intention.
1833	A trifling act of piracy, but indicative of their disorderly and plundering spirit, is committed by a Joasmee boat, whose crew carries off from Corgoo some small portion of a tent belonging to the British Residency establishment, who had made that island the place of their sojourn during the plague. A vessel of war is despatched after the boat, and coming up with it at Mohumrah, demands and obtains the surrender of the delinquents, and plundered property, and brings them to Bushire, where, the object having been gained, they are immediately released.
1833-34	Sultan bin Suggur is defeated in his attack upon Aboothabee. He returns with his fleet, accompanied by the boats of Lingah, Ejman, and Debaye, and blockades the place, where parties of his dependents and allies cut off the supplies by land. Both sides, much distressed, and deprived of the benefits of the pearl fishery, are glad to conclude a peace, which is mediated by Syud bin Guzeeb, the Shaikh of Lingah.
	The influence of the Wahabees in favour of the Beniyas is insufficient to prevent these proceedings on the part of the Joasmees.
1835	Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur proceeds with a large fleet to his possessions on the Batinah Coast, ostensibly for the purpose of assisting the authorities of Muskat in their civil broils (agreeable to the desire of the Imaum, on his leaving for his



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JOASMEEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	<p>African possessions), but really to avail himself of the disturbed state of affairs to promote his own interests at the expense of either party. His fleet plunder not only the boats of Sohar and Muskat, but neutral vessels. For these last he is compelled by the British Government to make reparation; but the Muskat Government, fearing to incur his more decided enmity, and perhaps turn him over to the cause of their opponent, Humood bin Azan, of Sohar, overlook, and even sanction his proceedings.</p>
A. D. 1835	<p>The Shaikhs of Ras-ool-Khyma, Ejman, and Amulgavine, become parties to the Maritime Truce.</p>
1837	<p>Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur applies for permission to go to the aid of the Shaikh of Towarah, who was at feud with the Shaikh of Soweik, both places on the Persian Coast, which is, on the grounds of his engagements, and for other reasons, refused.</p>
	<p>The people of Heera, a Joasmee dependency, commit a piracy upon a Bunder Abbas boat. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur of his own accord compels full restitution of the property, and punishes the perpetrators.</p>
1838	<p>Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur supersedes his brother Saleh in the government of Shargah, and appoints his son, Suggur, in his room.</p>
	<p>Rashid bin Humeed, of Ejman, dies, and is succeeded by his son, Humeed.</p>
	<p>Two piracies are committed by two Joasmees, brothers, named Sultan and Mahomed bin Sohar; the one on a Karrack boat, having on board a Chaab subject, on his way to Mohumrah, with much property, the other on a Batinah boat. Sultan is discovered and seized at Lingah, and placed at the disposal of the Resident, who sends him to Shaikh Samur, the Chief of Chaab. Mahomed, and the Nakhoda of his boat, take refuge at Ejman, but are given up on demand. Having suffered much from confinement at Shargah, they are subsequently released, on furnishing a bond to pay 100 crowns.</p>
	<p>Alarmed at the threats of Shaikh Samur, in consequence of the piracy committed by Sultan bin Sohar, the boats of Lingah and Ras-ool-Khyma, annually visiting Bussora and Mohumrah for dates, sail in company, in order to repel</p>





Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1839	<p>force by force. The Resident addresses the Shaikh of Chaab, and the misunderstanding is settled.</p> <p>Shaikh Sultan, thwarted in his forcible endeavours by land, to reduce the Naeem Tribe of Kassaab, Koomza, and Ras Musseldom, who would not acknowledge his supremacy, resolves to send a naval force to blockade their ports; but, alarmed at the rapid successes of the Egyptians, and their tool Ameer Khalid, relinquishes his hostile intentions, and quickly makes peace.</p>
March.	<p>Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur receives the Egypto-Wahabee Agent, Syud bin Mootluk, into his territories, and is by him induced to summon the Beni Naeem of Brymee to surrender their fort into his hands: they boldly refuse, and prepare for resistance.</p> <p>Two Debaye men being killed by a party of six, of whom two are subjects of Amulgavine, the satisfaction offered by that chief, in the shape of blood money, is refused. The Shaikh of Debaye proceeds to foray the neighbourhood of Amulgavine, but is defeated, with the loss of six men made prisoners. The Shaikh of Shargah requiring the liberation of these, is refused, and joins the Shaikh of Debaye. Their united forces march against Amulgavine, whose inhabitants are decoyed to some distance by a pretended flight, and, suddenly attacked and overwhelmed, are compelled to retreat, with the loss of twenty men killed, and many wounded. A peace is then concluded, the Amulgavine Shaikh consenting to liberate the six prisoners, and to pay his share of the blood money for the two Debaye men.</p>
1840	<p>Captain Hamerton is despatched to Brymee, with a view to collect all the information in his power relative to that place and its inhabitants. Owing to the intrigues of the Joasmee Chiefs, and the Shaikh of Debaye, who offers every obstacle to the prosecution of the Mission, it is not without great difficulty and delay, nor until the principal Brymee Shaikh voluntarily offers to accompany him, that he is enabled to start for his destination.</p> <p>Previous to his departure, with a view to combine the power and resources of the inland tribes, the Resident invites their chieftains to a conference at Ejman. Small sums of</p>



Date.	Occurrences.
	<p>money are distributed, and, with the exception of a slight misunderstanding between the Zowahir and Beni Kuttub, their differences reconciled.</p>
A. D. 1840	<p>The Shaikh of Heerah, Humeed bin Obed bin Subt, with a body of the Beni Naeem, surprises and takes Ejman. Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan declines in the first instance to interfere, but considering that he would thereby give umbrage to the British Government, subsequently sends his son Suggur, with Muktoom of Debaye, who eject the Shaikh of Heerah, and burn his town, in retaliation for the injuries he had inflicted upon the people of Ejman.</p>
Apr. May	<p>Immediately on the termination of the Maritime Truce, before steps could be taken for its renewal, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, engaging the assistance of his son Suggur, of Shargah, and Muktoom of Debaye, attacks Amulgavine, which is reduced to the last extremity, when the Resident arriving, mediates between the parties, and effects a peace, a treaty being concluded, one article of which binds the Shaikh of Amulgavine not to build any new defences, or add to the old.</p>
	<p>Suggur bin Sultan, the Shaikh of Shargah, at the instigation of Muktoom of Debaye, rebels against his father, and refuses to acknowledge his authority.</p>
	<p>The latter, avoiding measures of violence, dissimulates, and agrees that his son, instead of being Governor of Shargah, and receiving a salary as before, should hold it as a permanent possession, and pay annually a stipulated sum.</p>
Dec.	<p>Saleh bin Suggur, and the principal men of Shargah, invite Shaikh Sultan to attempt the recovery of his lost authority, and, introducing him clandestinely into the fort, put him in possession of the person of his son. The latter is despatched under escort to Ras-ool-Khyma, but contrives to escape from his guards, and takes refuge at Debaye, whose Shaikh refuses to give him up.</p>
	<p>Shaikh Sultan effects a reconciliation with the Chiefs of Amulgavine and Aboothabee, who now willingly consent to aid him against Debaye, which place, it was agreed, should, when taken, be entirely destroyed. Shaikh Muktoom, thereon greatly alarmed, makes professions of unlimited obedience and submission, and offers a bribe of 1,000</p>





## JOASMEEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1840-41	<p>crowns, which Shaikh Sultan being unable to resist, he coolly breaks with his new allies, reconciles himself with Shaikh Muktoom, and replaces his son Suggur in the government of Shargah.</p> <p>A Joasmee boat of Ras-ool-Khyma is plundered by some lawless characters from Biddah, among whom is the old and notorious delinquent, Jassim bin Jabbur Rugragee. Salmin bin Nassir, governor of that place, having screened and protected the latter for some years, is held responsible for his acts. Two vessels of the squadron, accompanied by a steam-frigate, visit his port, for the purpose of demanding redress; but it is not until eleven shot have been fired into the place that he affords compliance with the requisition made upon him. (No lives are lost, nor injury done on shore.) Shaikh Abdool Azeez usurps authority over his brother, Humaid, and seizes the fort of Ejman.</p>
1842-43	<p>Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, of Amulgavine, persisting, contrary to treaty, in erecting and renewing the defences of his town, in opposition to the repeated remonstrances of the Resident, upon the representations of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and refusing positively to act up to his agreement, he is at length told, that unless he consents to destroy what has been built or added subsequent to the conclusion of the peace between him and the Joasmee Chief, he will be considered an enemy, and treated accordingly: this had the desired effect; but previous to the total demolition of the works, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur consenting to their remaining in existence, the demands of the British Government are foregone. Previous to this just exercise of power, both parties had been informed that on the Amulgavine Shaikh acting up to his engagement, he would be at liberty to raise what defences he pleased, and that the treaty would thenceforward be considered null and void.</p>
1843	<p>The Maritime Truce is established, for the extended period* of ten years.</p>

\* At the expiration of this Truce a Perpetual Treaty of Peace was entered into, on the 4th May 1853, by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, through the mediation of the Resident, Captain A. B. Kemball.—Vide pages 88 and 89 of this Selection.—*Editor*.



## UTTOOBEE TRIBE OF ARABS.—BAHREIN.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1716	The Beni Subah, Al Yalahimah and Al Khaleefa, considerable tribes of Arabs, the first under Shaikh Soleyman bin Ahmed, the second under Jaubir bin Uttoobee, and the third under Khaleefa bin Mahomed, enter into a compact, and take possession of Koweit, belonging to the Persians.
1766-75	Khaleefa bin Mahomed, with a portion of his tribe, passes over and settles at Zobara, where, after gradually drawing over the rest of his own tribe, completely separating himself from the other two, he establishes his independence. The Yalahimah, shortly after expelled from the port and town of Koweit by the Beni Subah, seek and obtain the protection of their kinsmen at Zobara. Quarrelling in a few years, they quit Zobara, and take up their residence at Kaveish, a barren spot, a short distance eastward of Zobara. A desperate feud arises between the tribes, which terminates in the almost total destruction of the Yalahimah.
1776	On the attack of Eussora by the Persians, some of the merchants of that place, and one of the Shaikhs of Koweit, with many of the principal people, retire to Zobara, and the power, wealth, and influence of the Beni Khaleefa rapidly increase.
1777	The fears and jealousy of Shaikh Nassir, the Persian Governor of Bushire and Bahrein, are thereby excited. His repeated attempts, however, to reduce Zobara, are ineffectual.
1782-83	On the death of Kureem Khan, and the warfare and confusion which ensue, the Zobara Arabs make a descent upon Bahrein, compel Shaikh Nassir to retire to the fort, and, having plundered and destroyed the town, return to Zobara. A military force, in a large fleet from the Persian Coast, blockade Zobara, and, after some fruitless and unsuccessful negotiations on the part of the Arabs, assisted by Shaikh Rashid, of Ras-ool-Khyma, land to storm the place; but, resolutely attacked by an unexpectedly large force, are





## UTTOOBEEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	compelled to throw down their arms, and escape to their boats. Several of the principal men are killed. A Koweit fleet arrives the same day at Bahrein, sets fire to, and plunders the town.
A. D. 1783	The Zobara Arabs, assisted by their kinsmen from Koweit, capture Bahrein from the Persians on 28th July. The four sons of Jaubir bin Uttoobee, dissatisfied on this occasion with the rewards and rank assigned to them, quit the island in disgust; and, after wandering for a few years, establish themselves at Khor Hassan, and commence a system of piracy.
1800	The Imaum of Muskat reduces the island of Bahrein, and sends all the head men, consisting of twenty-five families, to Muskat. The Uttoobees return to Zobara, and solicit the protection of the Wahabees, which is readily extended.
1801	Early this year the Uttoobees, with the assistance of the Wahabees, retake Bahrein.
1809	The Uttoobees deprecate the wrath of the British Government, urge exemption from the general chastisement of the pirates by the British forces, and solicit the countenance of the British Government in throwing off the Wahabee yoke, and quitting the main; also some trifling support to enable them to remain undisturbed at Bahrein. The British Government abstain from all interference.
1810	The Wahabee ruler assumes the government of Bahrein and Zobara, and appoints Abdoolla bin Oofeysan Vukeel over those places, and the Kateef and Guttur districts, to convert the Uttoobees to the Wahabee faith. The Uttoobees continue in administration, but pay tribute to the Vukeel.
1810-11	The Imaum, taking advantage of the attention and resources of the Wahabee ruler being engaged in checking the invasion of the Turkish troops under Ibrahim Pasha, attacks Zobara and Bahrein, burns the former, and lands on the latter. The Wahabee Vukeel, Oofeysan, is made prisoner, and the Uttoobees recover the island.
May, 1811	A desperate action was fought between Ramah's fleet, accompanied by a fleet of boats belonging to the Joasmeees of Ejman, and the Uttoobees of Bahrein, in which the latter are victorious.
1815-16	The Imaum attacks Bahrein. His troops land at Arad, and





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## UTTOOBEEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	are signally defeated, with great loss, two of his relations and principal Sirdars being killed.
A. D. Oct. 1816	The Wahabee Chief, incensed against Shaikh Ramah bin Jaubir, for having taken part with the Imaum of Muskat, directs his property and family to be seized and brought up to Deriah : he escapes with them, with great difficulty, to Bushire.
1818	Ramah bin Jaubir proceeds to, and lands with some guns at Kateef, which, in concert with Ibrahim Pasha, he batters, and commences to rebuild his old fort at Damaum, destroyed by the Wahabees in 1816.
1819	Seventeen Indian women, captured by the pirates of Ras-ool-Khyma, are restored to liberty, by the Bahrein Chiefs releasing a number of Joasmee prisoners in exchange, at the instance of Captain Lock, of His Majesty's vessel <i>Eden</i> , on that ship visiting the island, accompanied by five other vessels of war, for the purpose of inquiring into the report that several Indian women had been brought from Ras-ool-Khyma, and publicly sold in the bazar at Bahrein, which proved unfounded.
1819-20	Ramah bin Jaubir is informed by the British authority that his vessels would not be permitted to leave Kateef to cruise against the people of Bahrein, unless acting with an authorised State, in regular warfare.
Feb. 1820	He proceeds with his three vessels to Bushire, in order to co-operate in an expedition projected against Bahrein by the Prince of Shiraz. On his way down to Tauzee his large Buggalow is wrecked on the Berdistan Shoal, and he and his people escape with great difficulty with their lives.
April.	Ramah bin Jaubir refuses to become a member of the General Treaty, under the plea of his being the servant of the Persian Government. The Governor of Bushire engaging to be responsible for his future peaceable conduct, the excuse is admitted.
	After the capture of Ras-ool-Khyma by the British expedition, the Shaikh of Bahrein delivers up the vessels belonging to the piratical powers, which were in his harbour.
	The General Treaty is first signed at Ras-ool-Khyma by the Vukeel of the Uttoobee Shaikhs, and subsequently by themselves in Bahrein.






## UTTOOBES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1821-22	The Bahrein Chiefs agree to pay 30,000 German crowns tribute annually to the Imaum of Muskat, who, in return, engages to release some of the Uttoobee Shaikhs detained by him, and restore all the vessels and property belonging to Bahrein, which he had put under an embargo on their way up from India. Of the tribute, 12,000 crowns are subsequently remitted.
	Ramah bin Jaubir nevertheless (with reference to the security of the Bushire Shaikh for his future good conduct) continues his aggressions upon the trade of Bahrein. The Uttoobee Chief complains to the British authority. A remonstrance is made to the Shiraz Government, who order him to be called to account, and his son and family to be detained as hostages. Ramah in the mean time had quitted Bushire, and placed himself under the protection of the Imaum, but returns to Bushire in November; the Imaum disavowing him, and declaring that no reliance was to be placed upon his word.
1823	Ramah bin Jaubir takes up his residence at Damaum, with a view, although old and blind, of prosecuting his inveterate feud against the Bahrein Chiefs.
1824	A peace is concluded between the Bahrein Chiefs and Shaikh Ramah bin Jaubir of Khor Hassan and Damaum, through the Resident's mediation.
	Ramah blockades Kateef, with the view of recovering the tribute formerly paid him by that place, and is successful.
1825	He continues his aggressions against the trade of Kateef, plundering its boats, and murdering their crews. Remonstrances of the British authorities fail, and two vessels of war are stationed near Damaum for the protection of peaceable traders. It was directed, however, that no interference should be made as long as his hostilities were confined to the people of Kateef, and the cruisers are again withdrawn.
1825-26	Hostilities again break out between Ramah bin Jaubir and the Uttoobees. The parties apply to the British Resident to proclaim a truce; but Ramah, refusing to admit the people of Kateef to a participation of it, that functionary declines all interference, except such as would lead to a general pacification.
1826	Ramah proceeds to Bushire, and failing to induce the British






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## UTTOOBEEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	Resident to interfere in his behalf, receives on board a reinforcement of Beloochees, and returns to Damaum; on entering which place he fires a salute, as a mark of contempt. Ahmed bin Soleyman, a nephew of the reigning Shaikh, attacks him in his vessel. A desperate action takes place. Ramah sets fire to his own magazine, and blows himself and crew into the air.
A. D. 1826	Busheer, the son of Ramah, surrenders Damaum unconditionally. His life and liberty are granted him, and he proceeds to Muskat, where His Highness the Imaum presents him with a Buggalow, to enable him to gain a livelihood by trade. Through the influence of the Imaum, Busheer is permitted by the Wahabee Chief to build a fort at Darcen, a place on Tirhoot, an island opposite to Kateef, where he is joined by many of the Aboosemate tribe, bitter enemies of the Uttoobees. Suliman bin Ahmed, the colleague and elder brother of Shaikh Abdoolla, dies, and is succeeded in his property and political influence by his eldest son, Shaikh Khaleefa, who accordingly shares the net revenue of the island equally with his uncle, with whom the executive power and transaction of all public business still remain, the concurrence of the nephew being, however, considered necessary.
1827	A piracy is committed by Obed or Abdoolla bin Mohunnah, an inhabitant of Biddah, a Bahrein dependency, upon a Bushire boat, off Gonara.
1828	The Chief of Biddah, stabbing an individual of Bahrein, is placed in confinement by his feudal superior. The inhabitants thereon becoming refractory, are removed to Roweess and Fowarah, more immediately under his control, and their fort is destroyed by the same authority. Obed bin Mohunnah commits further piracies, but is himself, after a desperate resistance, taken prisoner on his landing at Zeerah, on the Persian Coast, to make inquiries regarding the destination of a Buggalow then at anchor. Being convicted by the British authorities, he is handed over to the Shaikh of Bushire, whose subjects had suffered from his late piracies, but contrives to escape. The crew of his





## UTTOOBEEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	boat, on their way to Aboothabee, plunder four Aseeloo boats. Full redress is, however, afforded for this act, by Shaikh Tahnoon.
A. D. 1828 Nov.	The Bahrein Chiefs signally defeat the Imaum's expedition against the island.
Mar. 1829	A Bahrein fleet, under the command of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, in person, set out on a cruise to harass the Imaum's trade and coasts. His Highness sends out two frigates to meet it, which, after an ineffectual attempt to capture the Uttoobee Buggalow, the <i>Syar</i> , with which they fall in, return to Muskat without doing anything.
	The Bahrein fleet fail to capture an Aseeloo Buggalow, which fairly beats them off. They commit a piracy, in seizing a Morebat (neutral) vessel, evade two Muskat vessels of war which they meet, and return to Bahrein in safety. Redress to a certain extent was obtained for the piracy upon the Morebat vessel.
2nd Dec.	A peace most favourable to the Uttoobees is concluded between them and the Imaum; the tribute they formerly paid to cease, and no interference whatever to take place in each other's concerns.
1830-31	Shaikh Abdoolla is called upon by the Wahabee Chief to pay the annual Zukat or tribute, besides 40,000 German crowns, as the alleged value of a number of horses left under his charge by the Wahabees many years previous. A demand is at the same time made for the surrender of the fort of Damaum to Busheer, the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir. The Shaikhs despatching a near relation to wait upon the Wahabee ruler at Riaz, an arrangement is made, that the supremacy of Ameer Toorkey bin Saood should be acknowledged at Bahrein, and the Zukat paid by the Uttoobees, in return for which he promises them his protection.
1831	The sincerity of the Wahabee ruler considered doubtful, from his establishing Busheer the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir at Dareen, with whom they had necessarily a most inveterate feud.
Jan. 1832	Busheer quarrels with the inhabitants of Kateef, destroys the fort he was building, and leaves with his dependents for Muskat.



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UTTOOBES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1832	A piracy, committed on a Congoon boat in Hallilah Bay, is traced to Hussoom of Fowarah, a dependency of Bahrein, and the captured boat recovered.
1833	The Shaikh of Bahrein refuses allegiance to the Wahabees, and resolves to retaliate all attempts at aggression. The Imaum pledges himself to him not to interfere in the quarrel. He instigates the Amayir Tribe, who, leaving the neighbourhood of Kateef, take up a position at Damaum, and establish a very close blockade of the former port.
1834	The British Agent is ill-treated and grossly insulted by the sons of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, whom the father does not exert himself to check. The appearance of a considerable naval force in his port induces him to afford ample satisfaction. On the death of Toorkey, and in the absence of his son from Kateef, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed succeeds by bribery in obtaining possession of the fort of Tirhoot, on the island of that name.
31st May	Khaleefa bin Suliman, the nephew and colleague of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, dies, and is succeeded by his son Mahomed, to whom, however, the power and share in government possessed by his father are not immediately accorded. A party of the Amayir, under the command of one Mushrif, make an attempt to recover their possessions at Lahsa and Kateef, but are defeated by the Wahabee General, Omr bin Oofeysan, and compelled to take refuge under the guns of Tirhoot.
1835	The Wahabees fail in an attack upon Tirhoot. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed resumes the strict blockade of Kateef and Ageer. The internal dissensions of Bahrein begin to wear a serious aspect. The Chiefs of Huailah, dependents of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, conspire against his authority, and enter into treasonable communications with the Imaum and the Wahabee Chief. They are moreover joined by one of his sons, who, securing the services of a body of Wahabees, sets his authority at defiance, and commits depredations on the trade of Bahrein. Capturing, also, some neutral vessels, he is compelled to make reparation by the British Resident. He proceeds to Muskat to solicit aid. His Highness the Imaum not only refuses to take any part in these civil broils, but sends his son Hullal, in one of his





## UTTOOBEEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1835	<p>frigates, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation; but his efforts are rendered unavailing, by the irregular and hostile conduct of the subordinates, which leads to the secession of two influential inhabitants of Bahrein, and their dependents, who take refuge at Aboothabee.</p> <p>Esai bin Tarif desires permission to carry on hostilities against the trade and territories of his late master, which is refused, he having established himself in a friendly, or at least neutral port.</p>
May June 1836	<p>Abdoolla bin Ahmed, alarmed at the threats of Persia, with whom the Imaum might co-operate, enters into terms with the Wahabees, he promising to pay the small annual tribute of 2,000 dollars, and the Wahabee Chief engaging to supply a contingent of troops to repel any invasion of Bahrein, and not to call for the vessels of that island in the event of his purposing to attack Muskat.</p>
1837	<p>The disturbances and confusion increase on the island, in consequence of the tyrannical and oppressive conduct of the subordinate members of the Chief's family.</p> <p>The Huwajir and Amayir, taking advantage of the disturbed state of affairs in Nujd, in consequence of the struggle for power between Ameer Fysul and the pretender Khalid, commence the systematic plunder of all boats belonging to Kateef, and occasionally those from Bahrein. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed punishes and brings them to order.</p>
1838	<p>Attempts are made to effect a reconciliation between the Chief of Bahrein and the Al Ali under Esai bin Tarif and Bin Salameh, but without effect. Hostilities are, however, postponed.</p>
1839	<p>On the fall of Ameer Fysul, his General, Omr bin Oofeysan, seeks and obtains asylum at Bahrein. Ameer Khalid demands his surrender, and that Damaum be given up to him. Tribute, and the surrender of Tirhoot, had been before demanded.</p> <p>The Bahrein Chief evades compliance, on the plea of connection with, and submission to, the Persian Government. Korshid Pasha, the Egyptian Commander, avows to the British authority his intention of attacking and reducing Bahrein. The latter remonstrates and protests, and</p>



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## UTTOOBEEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1839	<p>reminds him of the assurances of His Highness Mahomed Ali Pasha to Her Majesty's Government.</p> <p>One Hajee Kasim, formerly supercargo of a trading vessel, is sent from Bushire as envoy from the Government of Shiraz to Bahrein, having an escort of ten Sirbaz, to reside on the island as Persian Agent, and be the medium of receiving and transmitting the annual tribute, which the Persian authorities vainly flattered themselves the Bahrein Chief was disposed to pay for their countenance and protection. Hostilities are carried on between the Al Ali at Aboothabee and the people of Bahrein, which entail much distress upon the merchants of the latter. The Assistant Resident is despatched, to bring about a reconciliation. As no terms would be entered into that had not the guarantee of the British Government, his mission is of no avail.</p> <p>The friendship between Esai bin Tarif and the Chief of Aboothabee is interrupted: the latter, who was under friendly communication with the Chief of Bahrein, requires him to leave his country, or settle there permanently as a peaceable subject. He is therefore obliged to relinquish the prosecution of further aggressions.</p> <p>Abdoolla bin Ahmed becomes tributary to the Egyptians, notwithstanding his having promised to communicate with the Resident previous to placing himself under the protection of any other foreign power; being aware of the light in which Korshid Pasha's proceedings are viewed by the British Government, and the encouragement he had received from them to assert his rights and maintain his independence. He declares, however, that it has been expressly stipulated by him that no Agent of the Pasha should reside in Bahrein. The quarrels and dissensions among the members of the Uttoobee Chief's family grow more serious. He brings over a body of mercenary Bedouins from the main land. His own weak and vacillating conduct greatly disgusts the inhabitants.</p> <p>Esai bin Tarif and his dependents remove from Aboothabee, on the termination of the pearl fishery, and settle on the island of Kenn, whence, he is forewarned, he will be precluded from carrying on aggressive warfare against any part of the Arabian Coast.</p>





## UTTOOBEEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1840	Mahomed bin Khaleefa, the young Chief of Bahrein, is invited to assume authority over Lahsa and Kateef, but is opposed in doing so by the elder chief. An open collision between the two is with difficulty averted; a hollow reconciliation takes place. Mahomed bin Khaleefa addresses a letter to the British authorities, offering his services, and soliciting assistance against his grand-uncle. He then proceeds to the Guttur Coast, and commences a system of annoyance and opposition to his superior.
1841	A piracy, committed in the previous year upon a Koweit boat, is traced to a follower of Shaikh Moobaruk, the son of Abdoolla bin Ahmed. The father is compelled to make reparation, by the payment of the value of the property plundered.
1842	An open rupture takes place between the parties,—the immediate, but only ostensible, cause of contention being a girl sought in marriage by a dependent on either side. Mahomed bin Khaleefa is driven out of Munama (which town is given up to plunder by Abdoolla bin Ahmed to his victorious followers, and property belonging to British merchants shares the common fate), and flies to the main land. He proceeds to Lahsa and Riaz, to solicit the aid of the Wahabee ruler, Abdoolla bin Soneyan.
	Abdoolla bin Ahmed, finding that the son and dependents of Humood bin Omeree, a person most obnoxious to him, had taken refuge in the British Agent's house, demands and obtains their surrender by means of threats of violence, when they are immediately cut to peices. The Agent's conduct throughout the affair is so irregular and condemnable, that he is dismissed. The Uttoobee Shaikh is not without blame however. Abdoolla bin Ahmed proceeds to Khor Hassan, which he also gives up to plunder.
	Abdoolla bin Ahmed, not coming to terms with the Wahabee ruler, in consequence of his refusing to release his staunch adherent, Shafee, the head of the Huwajir Tribe, the latter favours the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa.
	Esai bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah solicit and obtain permission from the British Resident to espouse the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and due intimation is given of this coalition to Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed.



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## UTTOOBEE.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1842	Mahomed bin Khaleefa establishes himself on the Guttur Coast, whose inhabitants are well inclined towards him, and keeps open the communication with his colleagues. The Wahabee ruler endeavours to mediate between the parties, but without effect. He releases Shafee, who promises to use his influence towards a reconciliation. The Uttoobee Chief unwisely uses threatening language to the Wahabee ruler, to induce his observance of perfect neutrality.
1843	Mahomed bin Khaleefa prosecutes his successful operations on the main land. A piracy is committed upon a boat carrying British colours, in the harbour of Munama, by the immediate dependents of Abdoolla bin Ahmed. Mahomed bin Khaleefa lands with a force on the island, and shortly obtains possession of Munama, which offers no resistance. A Charrak boat is plundered in the harbour of Munama by some of the Huwajir and Suloota Tribes.
April.	The forces of the colleagues join from Kenn. They attack Muharag, defeat the troops of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and compel him to take refuge in a small fort, close to the town. Abdoolla bin Ahmed surrenders at discretion, and is allowed to leave the island, with his personal property and followers. His sons are permitted to remain. Abdoolla bin Ahmed proceeds to Damaum, the only place now left acknowledging his authority, held by his eldest son, Moobaruk.
June.	Abdoolla bin Ahmed annoys the trade of Bahrein. The colleagues in consequence blockade Damaum. Both parties make overtures to the Wahabee ruler. Shaikh Jaubir, of Koweit, proceeds with his fleet to Bahrein, with a view to mediate a peace between the contending chieftains, but fails in his object. Mahomed and Ali, the sons of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and Hajee Bushab his Vizier, are made prisoners by the Governor of Kateef, who places them at the disposal of the Wahabee ruler. Abdoolla bin Ahmed endeavours to engage the assistance of the Chiefs of Ras-ool-Khyma, Shargah, and Debaye, who refer him to the Resident for his permission. The ex-chief






UTTOOBEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	comes in person to Bushire with this object. The colleagues had made overtures with a view to secure the aid of the Shaikhs of Aboothabee and Amulgavine. The British authority declines on this account, and for obvious reasons, to give his sanction.
A. D. 1843 Oct.	Proffers of military aid are unauthorisedly made to the ex-chief by an individual of Bushire, one Shaikh Sulman, on the part of the Persian Government, which the former affects to believe. The ex-chief leaves Bushire, and proceeds to Nabend, on the Persian Coast.
Dec.	Esai bin Tarif and his dependents abandon Kenn, and settle at Biddah, a dependency of Bahrein. The ex-chief revisits Bushire, with the avowed object of having an interview with the Resident, but declines the latter's invitation to meet him on board a vessel of war. His real object appears to be to endeavour to procure the aid, so unauthorisedly promised by Shaikh Sulman. He earnestly urges his claims by letter to the Resident, to the interference and assistance of the British Government in his behalf, which are not admitted. A Bahrein boat, seized near Aseeloo by the dependents of the ex-chief, is, after much correspondence, restored in July 1844.
Jan. 1844	The ex-chief, still in Bushire Roads, again urges his claims to assistance, and is peremptorily refused. The long promised land forces under the Wahabee ruler arrive, and lay siege to Damaum, which is under blockade by the fleet of the coalesced chieftains. Two boats, despatched by the chief and people of Koweit, with supplies for Damaum, are captured at Khore Balbul, by some vessels detached from the blockading fleet. Although the seizure is perfectly legal and just, Mahomed bin Khaleefa is subsequently induced to restore the boats, rather than incur the risk of a war with the powerful Shaikh of Koweit. The ex-chief lands, is received with honours, and takes up his residence on shore, his hopes of military aid from the Persian Government increased; but after waiting three months without any signs of intention to join his cause being shown, determines upon taking his departure. He visits the Resident.



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## UTTOOBES—WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1844	He proceeds towards Damaum, and endeavours to throw supplies into the beleaguered fort, now driven to the last extremity for provisions; but fails, is himself chased, and takes refuge at Koweit.
April.	Damaum capitulates, and is garrisoned by Wahabee troops. The ex-chief revisits Bushire, and has an interview with the Resident on the sea shore, about three miles from the town, on the subject of certain overtures made to him by the Wahabee ruler. The British Resident declines interfering. The ex-chief proceeds to Nabend, on the Persian Coast. Mahomed bin Khaleefa, the <i>de facto</i> ruler, is required to pay the value of that portion of the property plundered from the Charrak boat, which had fallen to the share of the Suloota, who had abandoned the cause of his opponent, and become his adherents. He accedes without hesitation.

## WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1795-97	The Wahabees take Lahsa, and annihilate the power of the Beni Khalid Arabs; threaten Bussora, and excite the fears of the Turkish Governor of Bagdad, who despatches an Arab force against them, under the command of Shaikh Sweeney, Chief of the Montafig, who is killed, and the expedition fails.
1799	A Turkish force is sent from Bagdad against the Wahabees, and a battle on the eve of being fought, when Abdool Azeez, the commander of the latter, hearing of the death of his father, the Wahabee Chief, submits to proposals of peace. Abdool Azeez succeeds his father.
1800-02	The Wahabee influence established throughout the whole coast from Bussora river to Dibbah, the boundary between the Muskat and Joasmee territories.
1802	Kerbelah attacked and pillaged by the Wahabees, and many of the inhabitants cruelly massacred (21st April).
1803	The Wahabees take Mecca; occupy Taif, and convert that fertile region into an absolute desert; invest Jeddah, and





## WAHABEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	reduce it to great distress. Its Imaum buys it off for one lakh and forty thousand dollars. The Wahabees are now in possession of nearly the whole sea coast on the western frontier of Arabia.
A. D. 1803 Nov.	The Wahabee ruler, Abdool Azeez, murdered (as he was about to make the conquest of Oman) in his capital of Deriah, whilst at evening prayers in a public place of worship, by a religious fanatic, who is immediately killed by his adherents. Saood succeeds his father as Wahabee ruler.
1806	Saood takes the field with about 50,000 men; first plunders the Dufceh, and then the Aneeza Tribe; proceeds and attacks Meshid Ali, and afterwards Semowka, from both of which places he is repulsed. He then proceeds to Zobeer, a few miles from Bussora, upon which town local obstacles prevent his making any attempt, but which is nevertheless thrown into great consternation.
1808	The preponderance of the Wahabees completely established in Oman.
1811-12	Mecca and Jeddah taken, without opposition, by the Turkish troops of Mahomed Ali Pasha, also Taif; thus the Wahabee power in that part of Arabia is annihilated.
1814	Saood dies on the 10th April, and is succeeded by his eldest son, Abdoolla.
1817	Ibrahim Pasha defeats the Wahabees at Manwiah, seven stages from Deriah; and, following up his success, invests and reduces the city on the 10th September; destroys the fortifications, town, and plantations of date trees, and removes the inhabitants to Lahsa, the intended future seat of his government.
1818	Abdoolla bin Saood is taken prisoner, and sent off to Egypt. Kateef, the principal Wahabee seaport, next surrenders to the Turkish troops.
1824	Shaikh Toorkey, the son of Abdoolla bin Saood, collects a considerable force, and marches against the Turkish provinces to the westward, but is repulsed by Ahmed Pasha. He soon after makes another attempt, and is successful.
Mar. 1830	The Beni Khalid are outmanœuvred, and attacked at disadvantage by the Wahabee forces, under Toorkey bin Saood and his son Fysul, and are completely routed, their families,



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## WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	tents, baggage, camels, and cattle falling into the hands of the enemy.
A. D. 1830	The Wahabees occupy Lahsa without resistance. Kateef also surrenders. The Beni Khalid Shaikhs are thus expelled from their hereditary dominions. Toorkey had agreed and continued to pay a small annual tribute to Mahomed Ali Pasha, who approves of his proceedings. Toorkey establishes himself at Deriah, and governs with great prudence and moderation.
1831	The Imaum, in the hope of forwarding his views upon Bahrein, tenders submission to Fysul, and promises tribute. The Bahrein Chiefs, to counteract the Imaum's designs, are induced to adopt a similar course : thus the whole of the Arabian Coast from Ras-ool-Hud to Koweit, with the exception of Aboothabee, became tributary to the Wahabees. The Wahabee ruler intimates to the Governor of Bombay, through Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, his desire to be on the same friendly footing as that formerly existing between the British Government and his ancestor Saood. A friendly but general reply is returned, through the Resident in the Persian Gulf.
1831-32	Musharree, a relative of the Wahabee ruler, Toorkey bin Saood, rebels against his authority, and joins the Amayir and Beni Khalid Tribes, who had refused to acknowledge his supremacy. Hostilities continue between the Wahabees and Bahrein, the chief of which island blockades Kateef, Sohat, and Ajeer.
1833	The Wahabee ruler's influence established throughout the coast. He begins to levy tribute, but will not countenance lawless proceedings, and opposes the renewal of piracy, contrary to the expectation of the Joasmecs, who had in this idea hailed the re-establishment of his authority. The demand for redress upon the Joasmec Chief directly, by the British Government, on account of a piracy committed by his subjects, offends the Wahabee Agent in Oman, Abdool Azeez, who addresses an intemperate letter to the British Native Agent at Shargah, claiming for his master, as being the ruler of the country, whose authority had been acknow-





## WAHABEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1834	<p>ledged by all, or his delegate, the right of judging in all cases connected with the Maritime Arabs.</p> <p>The annoyance and distress created by the blockade of his seaports leads the Wahabee to call in the assistance of the Joasmees against Bahrein.</p> <p>The application for the Joasmees naval resources, and the discussion started by the Wahabee Agent, Abdool Azeez, in 1833, relinquished in consequence of the violent death of Toorkey bin Saood by the hand of his nephew, Musharee. The maritime tribes return to their former relative positions.</p> <p>Fysul, the son of Toorkey, puts Musharee and twenty others to the sword, and succeeds his father as Wahabee ruler.</p>
1835	<p>The Pasha of Mecca farms Kateef and the surrounding district to one Abdoolla bin Musharee, for 20,000 or 24,000 reals. This individual proceeds to, but precipitately quits the place, on the approach of troops despatched by the Wahabee ruler, who asserts his right over, and determination to keep it. Ahmed Pasha's design in this act supposed to be to engage Fysul in operations towards the north-east, whilst Mahomed Ali Pasha was prosecuting his conquests in the south-west quarter of the Arabian peninsula.</p>
1836	<p>Ameer Fysul summoned by the Egyptian Viceroy to meet either of his Generals, Ibrahim or Hussain Pasha, and afford his co-operation against the Asser Tribe, who had successfully opposed their advance. A large Egyptian force collected at Medina. Fysul excuses himself, but sends his brother with a present.</p> <p>Ameer Fysul glad to listen to overtures of peace on the part of the Bahrein Chief.</p>
1837	<p>Khalid, supported by an Egyptian military force, urges his pretensions to be Wahabee ruler.</p>
March.	<p>Fysul, but now too late, tenders submission to the Egyptians. The pretender captures Gusseem and Deriah, and defeats Fysul in a pitched battle near Riaz.</p>
Dec.	<p>Fysul, besieged in Dillum, surrenders himself, and is sent a prisoner to Egypt.</p> <p>The Egyptian General now throws off his disguise as the</p>




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## WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	<p>auxiliary of Khalid, and declares Nujd a possession of his master's, and avows his intention of improving and extending his conquests.</p>
A. D. 1839	<p>Synd bin Mootluk, formerly Naib or Deputy of Ameer Toorkey at Brymee, but removed by his son and successor Fysul, joins the Egyptian commander, and is by him despatched to Ras-ool-Khyma, to persuade the chiefs on the Coast of Oman to acknowledge in reality the authority of Mahomed Ali Pasha, but ostensibly that of his tool Khalid. The Joasmee Chief, at his instigation, summons the Beni Nacem, who had lately got possession of Brymee, to surrender it to the Nujdees. They nobly refuse, and apply to the Beniyas and Sohar Chiefs for aid to meet the common enemy. The latter sends 200 men, under his brother Ghes, to reinforce the garrison of Brymee.</p> <p>The Resident, with a view to re-assure the Arab Tribes, and check and counteract the increasing influence of the Egyptians, enters a solemn protest against the proceedings and intrigues of Korshid Pasha, as being in direct opposition to the assurances given by His Highness Mahomed Ali to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and invites the several Maritime Chieftains of Oman to certify in writing their determination to cultivate more sedulously their relations with the British Government, to abide by its wishes and instructions, and to resist to the last extremity all attempts of Korshid Pasha to subjugate them.</p> <p>Synd bin Mootluk, after repeated remonstrances, at length quits Oman, and, embarking at Shargah, proceeds to Ajeer. On his way he lands on the island of Kenn, on the Persian Coast, and forcibly carries off 400 sheep, and other property.</p>
	<p>The Shaikh of Kateef is informed that any expedition against Oman or the territories of the Imaum would be opposed by the British squadron in the Gulf.</p>
	<p>Mahomed Effendi, an Egyptian officer of rank, is murdered by some Arabs in the suburbs of Lahsa.</p>
Nov.	<p>A Ghooncha arrives at Kateef from Hodeida, in the Red Sea, with ammunition and military stores, for the use of the Egyptian forces in Nujd.</p>
1840	<p>Quarrels and dissensions arise among the Egyptian Agents</p>





## WAHABEES.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	<p>themselves. The jealousy of the Egyptian Viceroy excited against his General Korshid. The disaffected tribes, particularly that of Ejman, commence rising in open rebellion. Communication between the different ports is seriously interrupted; the supplies for the Egyptian forces need considerable escorts. Syud bin Mootluk is distrusted, and sent under surveillance to Riaz. The remonstrances of the British Government have effect.</p>
A. D. 1840 May	<p>The Egyptian forces evacuate Nujd. Korshid's last act was to put to death Burgeish, the Chief of the Ali Humeed, as a sacrifice to the memory of Mahomed Effendi, his deputy. Intrigues are commenced, to deprive the pretender Khalid of his usurped authority.</p>
1841	<p>The Sublime Porte advance claims to authority over Nujd, and, having received presents from Khalid, appoint him their Wullee over that province. Khalid threatening, notwithstanding his utter want of power, to send a force into Oman, an officer is deputed to wait upon him in his camp at Lahsa, with written and verbal communications, indicative of the disapproval of the British Government to such a measure. He disavows any intention to do so.</p>
Sept.	<p>Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, the son of Mahomed, a younger brother of Saood, father of Khalid, retiring to Koweit, rises in rebellion against Khalid, seizes Zoomah, Iyah, and Munfoohad, and threatens Riaz; is defeated in a skirmish before that place, but contrives to get possession of it by treachery. Khalid flies to Lahsa, but that town favouring the cause of his opponent, and tendering its allegiance to him, he is obliged to take refuge with Moobaruk, the son of the Bahrein Chief, at Damaum, whence he proceeds to Koweit, and thence to Gusseem, where he supposes himself to have some staunch adherents. He subsequently makes an abortive attempt, or rather feint, to recover his lost position.</p>
Feb. 1842	<p>Abdoolla bin Sooneyan acknowledged Wahabee ruler. Abdoolla bin Sooneyan addresses letters to the Chiefs of Oman, intimating his intention of sending Syud bin Mootluk as his deputy to them, and inviting them cordially to unite with, and afford him every aid and assistance, upon which he is addressed by the British authority, deprecating</p>



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## WAHABEES.

Date.	Occurrences.
	his present attempts to bring them again under Wahabee influence, &c. He, in reply, declares his intention of co-operating with the Government to check piracy; that he had promulgated the same to the people of Oman, whom he terms his subjects, &c. The Arab Chieftains are generally inclined to the restoration of Wahabee influence.
A.D. 1842 May June	Ameer Fysul is released, and returns to Nujd. His march attended with uniform success to Riaz. He invests the fort of that place, in which Abdoolla bin Sooneyan had taken refuge, and the latter is shortly compelled to surrender at discretion.
July.	Ameer Fysul makes the usual intimation to the Shaikhs of Oman of his intention shortly to send his deputy to them.
Nov.	The Chiefs of Brymee address the Resident, expressing their assurance of the earnestness of the Wahabee ruler, and requesting the aid and support of the British Government to repel the invaders, but are informed that no valid reasons now exist for interference. At this very time Ameer Fysul opens a correspondence with the Resident by a letter expressive of a desire for the renewal of the amicable relations which formerly existed between his father, Toorkey, and the British Government, sentiments of course fittingly responded to, the objects of the British Government in this quarter being at the same time explained.
Dec.	Ameer Fysul attempts to mediate a reconciliation between the contending Chieftains of Bahrein, but fails.
Mar. 1844	Ameer Fysul espouses the cause of the younger Chief, Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and aids him with a land force against Damaum, which the latter are blockading by sea. Damaum falls, and is taken possession of by Fysul, who maintains a garrison there, to the prejudice of Busheer bin Rahmah, one of the colleagues, whose patrimony it is.





## BENIYAS.

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## BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1793	Shaikh Zheab, the superior Chief of Aboothabee, murdered by his relative, Huza bin Zaed.
1795	Shaikh Shakboot, the son of the murdered chief, defeating and expelling the murderer, succeeds his father, and remains in authority until 1816, when his eldest son Mahomed deposes him, and usurps the chiefship.
1816	
1818	Shaikh Tahnoon, a younger son, succeeds, with the assistance of the Imaum and the good will of the majority of the tribe, in expelling the usurper, who escapes with difficulty, and takes refuge at Bahrein. Tahnoon gradually assumes the superior authority and executive power, to which the father quietly submits. The alliance and connection of the Imaum with the Beniyas is the cause of weakening the close intimacy and friendship hitherto existing between that tribe and the Joasmees.
1820	The Beniyas Chief is admitted a member of the General Treaty.
1822	Sooedan bin Zaal, an individual of some rank, secedes from Aboothabee, and takes refuge at Biddah (a Bahrein dependency). Shaikh Tahnoon prosecutes active measures against him, which, being calculated to lead to the renewal of piracy, he abandons, at the desire of the British authority.
1823	Mahomed bin Shakboot collects a force, and attacks and plunders Aboothabee. Shaikh Tahnoon marches to the relief of the town, and defeats his brother with some loss. Mahomed takes refuge at Shargah, but that place being threatened by Tahnoon, quits the protection of its chief, and proceeds to Huailah (a Bahrein dependency).
1824-25	A Treaty is formed between the Imaum, Beniyas, and Joasmees, through the influence of the British Resident. Sultan bin Suggur, the Chief of the last, violates it, and hostilities commence.
1825	No material advantage having been gained by either side, a peace is concluded at the end of the year, through the mediation of the Imaum.
1826	War between the Beniyas and Uttoobees, arising out of the



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BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
	predatory aggressions on the former by the followers of the seceder Soodean bin Zaal, who had taken asylum with the Uttoobees, is with difficulty averted, through the influence of the British authority.
A. D. 1827	The Imaum visits the coast with two vessels, and in support of one of the conditions of the Treaty which his protégé, Tahnoon, had failed to fulfil, destroys Derah. The Imaum supplies the Beniyas Chief with guns and ammunition. Shaikh Tahnoon, availing himself of the support thus afforded, makes a sudden and vigorous attack upon Debaye, which is successful. The Joasmee Chief declares war, but does not commence hostile operations.
1827-28	The Debaye Governor, Khaleefa bin Dumeeta, seizes several Shargah boats, and their cargoes, but is compelled by the British authorities to make restoration.
Oct. 1828	Shaikh Tahnoon joins the Imaum's expedition against Bahrein, but acts with great imprudence, if not treachery, and a signal failure is the result.
1828	The seceder, Soodean bin Zaal, and his followers, effect a reconciliation with Shaikh Tahnoon, and return to Aboothabee. Two Bahrein Buggarahs and a Koweit Buteel are seized by the Beniyas; the boats and property are recovered and restored, but the pirates escape.
Feb. 1829	Hostilities again break out between the Joasmees and Beniyas. Shaikh Sultan blockades Aboothabee, and reduces it to great distress. Both parties, anticipating the loss of the advantages to be obtained from the prosecution of the pearl fishery, accept the mediation of Shaikh Mahomed bin Guzeeb, Governor of Lingah, and a peace is concluded.
Dec.	Shaikh Tahnoon becomes a member of the Treaty of Peace concluded between the Imaum and the Uttoobees.
1831	The Beniyas Chief volunteers his aid to the Imaum on the occasion of his declaring war a second time against his relation Humood bin Azan, of Sohar, but his fidelity being suspected, it is declined, while that of the Joasmee Chief and the Shaikh of Ejman is accepted.
	Irritated at this rejection, and dreading any alliance between the Imaum and his rivals the Joasmees, Tahnoon throws himself into the opposite scale, and commences aggressions upon the territories of the latter, the accepted allies.





## BENIYAS.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	<p>Sultan bin Suggur declares war, and prepares to blockade Aboothabee, but hostilities during the pearl fishery at last creating great discontent in the minds of both Joasmee and Beniyas subjects, a peace is concluded, after a short negotiation, through the mediation of Syed bin Guzeeb of Lingah.</p>
<p>A. D. 1832-33</p>	<p>Shaikh Tahnoon gives refuge to three Joasmee pirates, inhabitants of Khan, and draws upon himself the responsibility of their acts, and the consequent obligation to afford redress, which he does by paying the sum of 1,500 German crowns. The Joasmee Chief is compelled to pay 2,000 German crowns for the part taken by the accomplices of the above.</p>
<p>Mar. Apr. 1833</p>	<p>Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot is murdered by the hands of his brothers Khaleefa and Sultan. The former of the two succeeds him in authority.</p> <p>Shaikh Khaleefa tenders allegiance and the annual payment of tribute to the Wahabee ruler, Toorkey bin Saood, who in return informs the Joasmee Chief that the Beniyas are under his protection, and that he will permit of no aggressions upon them.</p> <p>In consequence of the oppressive and arbitrary conduct of the usurper, a conspiracy is formed to put him to death. The plot is betrayed to Shaikh Khaleefa, who puts three of the conspirators to death, and severely punishes the others. The Boo Felasa and Rumshah tribes, to the number of about 800 persons, secede from the main Beniyas Tribe, and establish themselves at Debaye, a dependency of Aboothabee. The Joasmee Chief takes advantage of the division in the Beniyas Tribe, espouses the quarrel of the Boo Felasa, and proceeds with the whole of his disposable forces, increased by boats and men from Lingah, to the attack of Aboothabee, which he expects to find an easy conquest.</p> <p>The combined troops land at Khore Suffan ; are unexpectedly surrounded by a superior force, supported by horse and camel men, and completely defeated, and driven to their boats. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur narrowly escapes drowning. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur returns with a large fleet, and blockades Aboothabee.</p>



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## BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1833	Three Beniyas' vessels evade the blockading squadron, and proceed to Cape Bostinah; capture an Ejman Buggarah with a crew of eight men, seven of whom they put to death. They then attack a Muskat Buggalow, and plunder her to a considerable amount, and kill five of her crew. They escape from the Joasmee boats sent in pursuit, and return in safety to Aboothabee. The Muskat authorities receive the explanation offered by the Beniyas, and remove the necessity for any interference on the part of the Resident. The blockade is raised, and a peace effected, through the mediation of the Shaikh of Lingah.
1833-34	Mutual aggressions are committed by the Beniyas and Joasmees; their boats are in consequence withdrawn from the pearl banks. Shaikh Khaleefa, at the earnest solicitation of his tribe, sends his father Shakboot to conclude a peace; one of the conditions is that the Debaye people shall be henceforth under the authority of the Joasmees.
1834	Some of the Soodan of Aboothabee attack a Buteel belonging to Muttrah, and plunder her of property to the amount of 1,000 dollars. The appearance of a squadron before Aboothabee induces Shaikh Khaleefa to comply with the requisitions of the British authorities for reparation.
1835	The Beniyas break out into open and avowed piracy. They commit the most daring depredations, attended with the greatest cruelty. All the available vessels of war of the squadron are immediately despatched in quest of their boats. The <i>Elphinstone</i> falls in with the piratical fleet, which, confident in its own power, prepares for engagement, but is very shortly put to flight, with the loss of many killed. Full redress is demanded and obtained from the Shaikh of Aboothabee. The two chief pirates are surrendered, and sent to Bombay for trial. The one was convicted and transported for life, the other, against whom unfortunately no prosecution could be sustained, was returned, to be handed over to the Joasmee Chief, but effected his escape from the vessel off Shargah, and swam to the shore, four miles distant.
1836	The Gubeezat tribe, under Khadom bin Nahman, to avoid a participation in the consequences of their late piratical acts (the payment of the value of the property plundered or





## BENIYAS.

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Date.	Occurrences.
	<p>destroyed), secede from Aboothabee, and establish themselves at Adeed.</p> <p>A. D. 1836 Jassim bin Jubbur Rugragee, of that tribe, and two others, Soheel bin Ateesh and Ali Howly, each acting independently, and commanding each a small boat containing from twelve to eighteen men, commence a systematic course of plunder. A naval force visits the ports of Biddah, Wukra, and Adeed, whose chiefs bind themselves to do their utmost to seize the boats of the pirates, and are held responsible for their future acts. The latter is further required to afford security in money and property for the fulfilment of the engagement (which is subsequently restored). Three of Jassim bin Jubbur's gang are seized by the Chief of Aboothabee, and are detained in confinement four months, during which period one dies. Their boat is publicly burnt on the beach, in presence of the Resident.</p> <p>Shaikh Khaleefa solicits permission to espouse the cause of his guest, Esai bin Tarif, against Bahrein, but is refused, until the special sanction of Government can be obtained, on the grounds of the late serious misdemeanors of his tribe.</p> <p>Esai bin Tarif and his dependents leave Aboothabee, and join the expedition of the Imaum against Mombassa, where they render good service.</p>
May 1837	<p>Shaikh Khaleefa attacks the Gubeezat seceders at Adeed, surprises them, kills fifty, and completely destroys the place. His subsequent lenient and moderate conduct induces those who had fled and taken refuge at Debaye and elsewhere, to return and settle under his authority at Aboothabee.</p>
1838	<p>The whole of the Boo Eyneen tribe, numbering about three hundred families, inhabiting Wukra, vacate and destroy that place, and take up their residence at Aboothabee.</p>
May	<p>Khaleefa proceeds with a force to Debaye, while the inhabitants are absent in their vocation on the pearl banks, and obtains possession of the sea tower. The Debaye people return, and, with the assistance of the Shargah people, dislodge the Beniyas garrison, and destroy the tower. Hostilities take place at sea in consequence. All the</p>



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BENIYAS.

Date.	Occurrences.
	<p>pearl boats are recalled, but mutual restitution of the captured property being made, peace is restored, and the fishery resumed.</p>
A. D. 1839	<p>Contrary to his engagements and promises, Shaikh Khaleefa opens a friendly correspondence with the Egypto-Wahabee Agent in Oman, Syud bin Mootluk. He further, in direct opposition to all his pledges, and in pursuance of the policy of that functionary, proceeds in person to the attack of the Naeem tribes of Brymee (who had been encouraged by the British Government to maintain their independence against the invaders), but is repulsed. He is held responsible therefore by the British authority for the property plundered by them.</p>
1840	<p>A misunderstanding arises between Aboothabee and Debaye in consequence of some aggressions at sea, but is amicably adjusted through the interference of the British authority.</p>
1841	<p>A piracy is committed by some of the Monasir and Howamil tribes under the authority of Khaleefa bin Shakboot, upon a Bahrein boat. That chief, upon the circumstance being brought to his notice, adopts the most vigorous measures to punish the delinquents.</p>
1842	<p>It was proposed to Khaleefa bin Shakboot to become a party to a truce forbidding all aggressions and hostilities by land. He declines.</p> <p>Shaikh Khaleefa visits Debaye, and a peace is concluded between him and the chief of that place, an arrangement offensive to the Joasmees.</p>
1843	<p>Esai bin Tarif invites Shaikh Khaleefa to join the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa and his colleagues against Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein. He declines doing so without the permission of the British Government. Shakboot, the brother of Khaleefa, makes a foray into the territories of the Joasmees and their allies, and inflicts much injury.</p> <p>A hollow treaty of peace is entered into between the Beniayas and Joasmees, but is soon violated by Khaleefa, who, at the instigation probably of the Shaikh of Debaye, makes a foray upon the Bedouin allies of the Joasmees.</p>






DEBAYE—BOO FELASA.

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## DEBAYE—BOO FELASA.

Date.	Occurrences.
A. D. 1834-35	The Boo Felasa, shortly after their secession, commence depredations upon the general trade of the Gulf. Sultan bin Suggur disclaims any control or authority over Debaye. The Shaikh of that place is called upon to make reparation. It becomes necessary to resort to a demonstration of force, and threats of coercive measures, to enforce compliance with the requisitions.
1836	Obed bin Subt, principal Chief of Debaye, dies, and supreme and undivided authority devolves upon Muktoom bin Butye.
1838	The Beniyas Chief seizes the sea tower of Debaye, but is shortly compelled to abandon it.
1839	A Debaye boat commits a piracy upon one belonging to Khaboorah. The Shaikh is compelled to make redress.
1840-41	In consequence of some aggressions by his dependents upon some boats belonging to the Beniyas, the Shaikh of Debaye is called upon to pay a certain sum, and restore the captured Buggarahs. Two shells are fired over his town at a long interval, before he consents to accede to the demand. In consequence of an epidemic, which attacks his people and carries off a great number, the Shaikh of Debaye temporarily abandons his town, and, with the permission of the Joasmee Chief, builds a fort at Derah. Five hundred of the Boo Muhair tribe secede from Debaye to Shargah.
	The Beniyas Chief takes advantage of the absence of its inhabitants to attack Debaye, guarded only by a small garrison. He does much injury to the date groves, gains possession of the town and fort, plunders the market and houses, and burns all the stores of dates, &c. as also a Buteel belonging to Shaikh Muktoom. He quits before the combined Debaye and Shargah forces can march against him. He continues his depredations against them inland, greatly harassing them, and constraining them to keep incessantly on the alert.
1842-43	Shaikh Muktoom is victorious against the Beni Ghufflah Bedouin tribes, but receives eight wounds, one of which causes him the loss of an eye.







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HISTORICAL SKETCH  
OF THE  
RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE  
GOVERNMENT OF MUSKAT;  
COMMENCING WITH THE YEAR 1694-95, AND CONTINUED TO THE  
YEAR 1819.

BY  
MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,  
MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.

TO WHICH IS ADDED  
A NARRATIVE OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THAT  
GOVERNMENT,

FROM THE YEAR 1819 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL;

FROM THE YEAR 1832 TO JULY 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

AND FROM AUGUST 1844 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.



## MUSKAT.

MUSKAT is the chief seaport of one of the two grand principalities into which the Province of Oman is divided, of which Rastag is the capital. It is inhabited by the Beni Yemen, or Beni Hinavi Tribe of Arabs, of which the Imaum of Muskat is the head. The line of coast from Cape Ras-ool-Gate to Cape Musseldom belongs to the Imaum. The tribes dependent on Muskat are enumerated in the 2nd paragraph of my sketch of the Province of Oman.\*

2. The ascendancy of the Arabs of Muskat in the Gulf of Persia may be dated from the year 1694-95, when they became so powerful as to excite an alarm that they would obtain the command of the Persian Gulf. The navigation of the Gulf became more difficult in the following year, from the increase of their power, of which our Agent at Gombroon predicted that "they would prove as great a plague in India as the Algerines were in Europe."

3. Being superior to the Persians at sea, they carried on a successful warfare against the trade of that kingdom, insomuch that the King of Persia made an offer to our Agents that if the Company would co-operate in the reduction of Muskat, he would grant them the same privileges at that port as we enjoyed at Gombroon. No decided answer was returned, as we had neither ships nor troops to spare.

4. By the observance of this policy, the English trade was uninterruptedly prosecuted, while the conduct of the Muskat Arabs towards the Portuguese clearly proved that they would hold any aid given by Europeans to the Persians as an act of hostility against themselves; for as soon as they found that the Portuguese had assisted the former, they divided the Muskat fleet into two squadrons, one sailed along the Coast of Africa, and burnt the Portuguese settlement at Mombassa, and the other, stretching across the Indian Seas, destroyed one of their factories.

\* Vide page 42 of this Selection.





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5. The Muskat Arabs in 1705-06 were still infesting the coast, taking every ship they could overpower.  
A. D. 1705-06.
6. In the following year their attention was turned to a more regular system of naval warfare, for they obtained permission from the King of Pegu to build ships at the ports in his country, and spread their fleets over the seas which surround the peninsula of India. Some of their ships carried from thirty to fifty guns. They made descents on several towns on the Malabar Coast, both to obtain plunder and a fixed station, from which they might annoy the trade, or resist the Mogul or Muratha fleets, or even the more powerful vessels of the European nations.  
A. D. 1706-07.
7. These depredations led to the Murathas\* equipping a fleet of sixty vessels, not only to repel the Arabs, but to act also as pirates against all defenceless vessels.
8. The captures by the Arabs and Murathas became so numerous that the King of Persia contemplated the deputation of ambassadors to Bombay and Batavia, to solicit naval aid against the pirates. It having been considered politic to prevent the adoption of either of those measures, as the first would only have exposed the then weak state of Bombay, and the second, if complied with, might have obtained a preference to the Dutch in the Persian market, our Agent in Persia promised, as soon as the war in Europe should cease, that a naval force should be sent to destroy the pirates.
9. Without detailing the various depredations committed by the Arab cruisers, it may be stated that the imbecile state of the kingdom of Persia in the commencement of the last century was favourable to the growing power of Muskat, the ruler of which was at this period master of all the islands in the Gulf; and it is probable that it maintained its ascendancy in that quarter during the establishment of the Afghans in Persia, or until the year 1730.  
A. D. 1707-08 to 1717.
10. Bahrein was taken from the Arabs in the reign of Nadir Shah, by Mahomed Takee Khan, the Governor of Fars, and there can be no doubt of the influence of Persia having been completely restored by that prince in the Gulf, as even the Muskat Government was at this period obliged to pay tribute to Persia.
11. The Persians were driven out of Oman by Ahmed bin Saeed, the Governor of Sohar, for which act he was elected Imaum. He led an army by land towards Ras-ool-Khyma, and would have reduced the Seer principality to his allegiance had he not been abandoned by some

\* The piracies of the Muskat Arabs gave rise to another formidable pirate, Angria of Colaba, in the vicinity of Bombay.





of his allies, on whom he chiefly depended for his supplies, and forced to make a precipitate retreat.

12. We hear nothing of the Arabs of Muskat from 1736 to 1769, at the close of which latter year a dispute occurred between the Persians and Muskatees, in consequence of Kureem Khan demanding from the latter a Persian ship which had been a long time in the hands of the Muskat Arabs, and the arrears of tribute they formerly paid to Nadir Shah. With these demands the Muskat Government refused to comply, alleging that the ship was lawfully purchased from Shaikh Abdolla of Ormus; whilst with respect to the claim to tribute, they replied that Nadir Shah was too powerful a tyrant to contend with,—it was therefore paid to him, not as a matter of right but of policy: that Nadir Shah, however, and Kureem Khan, were characters widely different,—the one they dreaded, the other they rather despised; the one was the conqueror of all Persia, the other was merely a Vukeel of two or three of its provinces;—if, therefore, Kureem Khan thought proper to persist in his demand, they threatened to answer it by force.

13. At the commencement of the following year the Imaum's fleet, consisting of several ships and gallivats, made its appearance in the Gulf, with five thousand troops on board. It was intended to proceed to Bushire, to demand satisfaction from the Persians for some losses the Muskatees had suffered from them. The fleet having, however, dispersed, and not re-assembling at the appointed rendezvous, returned to Muskat.

14. Hostilities continued to prevail between the Persians and the Imaum of Muskat. Shaikh Nassir of Bushire, who had been appointed to command the Persian gallivats, was authorised by Kureem Khan either to prosecute the war or to make peace with the Imaum, who showed a disposition to accommodate matters, by surrendering some Persian property, which he had detained at Muskat on his rupture with the Khan. The efforts to negotiate a peace failed, as the Imaum would not listen to the conditions proposed by the Shaikh on the part of Kureem Khan, which were considered disgraceful. The Imaum professed a wish to be on amicable terms with the Persians, but disdained to purchase their friendship by the payment of an annual tribute on any consideration whatever. The Muskat Government was at this time in alliance with the Shaikh of Julfar, or Ras-ool-Khyma.

15. On the attack of Bussora by the Persians, the Imaum of Muskat detached a fleet to assist in its protection. It anchored at the entrance of the river early in the month of August, having dispersed the Persian gallivats, under





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Shaikh Nassir, and became masters of the river. Bussora was in consequence abundantly supplied. The town, however, having been ultimately compelled to surrender to the Persians, the Muskat fleet returned to port.

A. D. 1776.

16. Hostilities next ensued between the Imaum of Muskat and Shaikh Rashid of Ras-ool-Khyma, who had become very powerful, by land. He had taken some Bussora craft, on the plea of their having Muskat property on board.

A. D. 1778-79.

17. The Julfar fleet continued to cruise in the Gulf, rousing every petty Shaikh to fit out armed boats, which carried on a predatory system of warfare. The death of Kureem Khan, which led to the evacuation of Bussora by the Persians, and to its re-occupation by the Turks, having in a great degree dissolved the bonds which kept the various powers under control and subjection,

A. D. 1780-81.

the Gulf was involved in the greatest trouble, one power carrying on hostilities against another.

18. It was during this period of a general contest for independence, arising out of the decline of the Persian power

A. D. 1781-82.

in the Gulf, that the Uttoobee Arabs conquered Bahrein from the Persians. In the repeated attempts made by the Shaikh of Bushire, in conjunction with the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, to recover Bahrein, the Imaum of Muskat preserved a strict neutrality.

19. During the hostilities that were carried on in the subsequent years between the Turkish Government of Bussora, and the Montifik Arabs and their allies, the

A. D. 1783 to 1797.

Muskat Government also maintained a strict neutrality; nor did it interfere in the affairs of the Gulf until the Imaumship of Syud Sultan, or Sultan bin Ahmed, in the year 1797.

20. Syud Sultan was the second son of Syud Ahmed, the first Imaum, but being of a restless and enterprising genius, had unjustly deprived his elder brother, Saud Syud bin Ahmed, the rightful heir and his immediate sovereign, of power and authority, by confining him to the city of Bombac, and its immediate vicinity, the usual residence of the Imaums. Having obtained possession of Muskat, he made it the seat of his Government, and thence prosecuted his ambitious plans against his neighbours.

21. The turbulence of his disposition urged him into serious disputes with the Arabs in the Gulf, which involved him in hostilities with many of them, who had united against him. This rupture rendered the navigation of the Gulf extremely insecure. The *Viper* cruiser was attacked in the month of October 1797, whilst at anchor in the roads of Bushire, by some Dows, commanded by Shaikh Saleh, the nephew





of Shaikh Suggur, the Chief of the Beni Jansannee Arabs, who were at war with the Imaum, and supposed to be in the interest of his elder brother, the deposed Prince of Oman.

22. The King of Persia, Baba Khan, who had recently succeeded to the throne, reverting to the grounds of offence that subsisted against the Imaum of Muskat, issued orders to the Shaikh of Bushire, directing the immediate equipment of a considerable land force, to be embarked on a fleet at Bussora, which was to co-operate in an attack on Muskat.

23. Our policy being at this period actively directed to counteract the intrigues of Buonaparte, in Persia and in the Gulf, for the purpose of prosecuting his views on India, suspicions were entertained that the Government of Muskat was more disposed to an alliance with the French than with the British, a commercial intercourse which the Imaum carried on with the Mauritius bringing him in constant communication with the former power.

24. It being on these grounds deemed expedient to form a connection with Muskat, Mehedi Ali Khan, who was appointed Resident at Bushire, was ordered to touch at the former port on his way to his station, and, in pursuance of instructions for that purpose, concluded an agreement with the Imaum, dated the 12th October 1798, the object of which was to exclude the French and Dutch from having any factory within his territories, or at Gombroon, to prevent the ships of the former nation entering the cove, and to dismiss the French who at the time were in his service.

25. At the close of the year, we find the Imaum of Muskat threatening Bussora on account of some ancient claims on the Pasha of Bagdad, and in order to enable him the more effectually to prosecute his hostile intentions, the Imaum negotiated a peace with his formidable enemy the Joasmee Chief.

26. The Pasha remonstrated on this occasion against the conduct of the Imaum, observing that whilst the Beni

A. D. 1798.

Uttoobee Arabs were assisting him in an attack

they meditated on Kateef and the Wahabee power, the former should seize, at a period, moreover, when the French were invading Egypt, that opportunity to carry on hostilities against their allies and dependents the Uttoobees (between whom and the people of Muskat there existed some differences), a conduct on the part of the Imaum which counteracted the expedition, and deprived it of the assistance which would otherwise be received from the marine force of those Arabs. The Pasha expressed an anxious wish that two of the Company's cruisers might be ordered immediately to Bussora, for the purpose of acting in concert with his fleet.





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27. As a compliance with this application would have reduced the Government to an awkward dilemma with the Imaum of Muskat, whose good will we had so lately engaged, as manifested in the treaty recently concluded, we offered to contribute by our interference towards the satisfactory accommodation of such differences as might exist between the Pasha and the Oman Chief.

28. The Pasha of Bagdad having requested the intercession of the Resident at Bussora with the Imaum and the Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma to desist from their hostile intentions, Mr. Manesty complied with the request : the result led to a negotiation between the Mussaleem and the commandant of the Muskat annual coffee fleet, then lying at Bushire, and the usual friendly intercourse between the Pasha and the Imaum was restored.

29. The Imaum in the course of the following year, however, proceeded, in compliance with the application of the Beglerbeg of Fars, with four ships, and sixty Buggalows and armed gallivats, to attack the Uttoobees, and reduce Bahrein. The Uttoobees had only three ships, which were on a trading voyage in the Indian seas, which were all taken by the Imaum on their return.

30. The Uttoobees wrote on this occasion to Shaikh Nassir of Bushire, stating that the island of Bahrein was originally under the Turkish Government, the Kings of the Sofi race having for some time brought it under control, but that it was seventy years since they had been in possession of it ; that they were now desirous of becoming subject to the King of Persia, to whom they would pay tribute. Shaikh Nassir availed himself of this invitation, and privately proceeded to Bahrein, and received the tribute for 1798.

31. The Imaum, on hearing of the intelligence, expressed his displeasure at the Shaikh's conduct. He seized the opportunity of Shaikh Nassir's absence from Bushire to spread a report in Karrack that he had fled from the island, and Shaikh Ghanum, Shaikh Nassir's cousin, had been appointed Governor, recommending them to send all the Bushire people back from Karrack, as Shaikh Ghanum would consider them as rebels and confine their women, and to entrust the charge of the fort to him. The Karrackees, in consequence, gave up the fort to the Imaum, who immediately wrote to the Beglerbeg of Fars, that as there were very few people at Karrack, he had taken possession of it, to prevent the Uttoobees occupying it, and offered to give five years' revenue in advance if the island were given up to him. The result of this application is not known, but Syud Sultan, having amicably adjusted matters with the Uttoobees and the Shaikh of Bushire, returned to Muskat, an event which restored tranquillity to the Gulf.





32. The immunities granted to the Imaum of Muskat by the agreement of 1798 were suspended by the Government until that prince offered satisfactory explanations on several suspicious circumstances in his conduct which were supposed to favour the intrigues of the French. These were afforded to the satisfaction of General Malcolm, who had touched at Muskat on his embassy to Persia, and concluded a further\* agreement with the Imaum, in confirmation of that entered into in 1798.

A. D. 1800.

33. The Wahabees threatening to invade Oman, Syud Sultan proceeded towards Julfar, where he joined Shaikh Suggur, with the view of opposing the threatened attack, which was, however, averted by the peace concluded between the Wahabees and the Imaum.

34. In the following year Syud Sultan accomplished the favourite object of reducing the island of Bahrein; on the conquest of which he demanded of the Shaikh of Grane that he would personally pay him homage, which must have been complied with, as the Imaum shortly after dismissed all his troops. He retained possession of Bahrein for a few months only, the Uttoobees having re-taken it in 1801.

A. D. 1801.

35. The attention of the Imaum was next directed to the formation of an alliance with the Joasmee Arabs, in which he failed. The Wahabee troops were at this time in the vicinity of Oman, and had compelled the wild Arabs to join them. The Chiefs of Zaheera and Sohar, and Mahomed bin Nassir, three Shaikhs of Oman, had been rendered independent of Muskat. The Imaum received tenders of assistance from the Turkish and Persian Governments if he would attack the Wahabees. This combination became necessary, to check the Wahabees, who had reduced to nominal submission the whole coast from Bussora river to Debaye,† and who, if allowed to strengthen themselves in their acquisitions, would, it was feared, commence and prosecute those depredations by sea which they had carried on on shore. A conviction of this danger had united the mercantile powers in the Gulf against the Wahabees.

A. D. 1802.

36. Unable, however, to check their progress, the Imaum in 1803 acceded to a truce of three years with the Wahabees, who had succeeded in converting or rendering tributary to their power the Arabs who inhabited the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf. This truce left the Wahabee Chief at liberty to prosecute his ambitious designs on the western frontier of Arabia.

A. D. 1803.

\* Dated the 18th January 1800.

† The boundary between the Muskat and Joasmee territories.





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37. Returning from his victorious career on the western frontier of Arabia, the Wahabee, notwithstanding the truce so recently concluded, prepared for the invasion of Oman by land and sea. A party had already entered the province, and advanced within two days' journey of Burka (the summer residence of the Imaum). The Resident at Muskat observed on this occasion that "if the Wahabees reduced Oman, all Arabia must submit to their yoke, and the whole coast would become a nest of pirates, who would extend their depredations to India, of which there was some danger, as the Imaum had disgusted all his chiefs, and stood almost alone."

38. The conquest of Oman was arrested by the murder of the Wahabee Shaikh Abdool Azeez, early in the month of November; and in the same month of the following year Syud Sultan was killed in an engagement with the Uttoobees, joined by the Joasmees, off the bar of Bussora river.

39. The administration of affairs on the death of Syud Sultan devolved on his two sons. Being young and unprotected, their pretensions to the succession were disputed by their uncle Syud Gheif, of Sohar, who aimed at the usurpation of the government.

40. The death of Syud Sultan, who had maintained some degree of control over the petty powers in alliance with Muskat, left these latter without any check; the disturbances in consequence increased. The Joasmee pirates, who were principally the authors of them, captured two vessels (the *Shannon* and *Trimmer*), belonging to Mr. Manesty, proceeding to Bussora with public despatches, and treated the commanders with great severity and cruelty; and a fleet of forty sail surrounded the *Mornington* cruiser, and fired into her, but a few discharges from her great guns obliged them to sheer off.

41. The Government of Bombay determined, in consequence, to assist the Imaum of Muskat in chastising the Joasmees, by affording the co-operation of our cruisers in the Gulf.

42. The authorities in the Gulf were accordingly enjoined to use every effort to check the pirates, but to take especial care to avoid offence to any other tribes who might not be essentially engaged in piratical depredations.

43. The character of the Government of Muskat is so material a consideration connected with the security of the Gulf, that a review of the events that resulted from the death of Syud Sultan, having relation to the succession, is not unimportant.

44. After the death of Syud Sultan, his two sons retained possession of Muskat and the adjacent territory, but being opposed by their uncle,





Syud Gheif, of Sohar, who succeeded in seizing the forts of Kabara and Seher, they were reduced to the necessity of entrusting the management of affairs to Syud Beder, their cousin, who, being assisted by the Wahabees, succeeded in repulsing Syud Gheif.

45. Syud Beder was a man of ability and enterprise, and as his connection with or dependence on the Wahabees is also materially connected with these inquiries, it may not be improper briefly to advert to the circumstances which gave rise to that connection.

46. In 1803, Syud Beder, availing himself of the opportunity of the late Imaum's absence on a pilgrimage to Mecca, made an attempt to seize the fort of Muskat; but failing in that project, he fled to Zobara, and sought the protection of the Wahabee Chief, who ordered the Arab Tribes bordering on Oman to assist Syud Beder in his ambitious views on that country.

47. With the aid thus afforded, Syud Beder twice invaded Oman, but, being repulsed, fled to Deriah. At the period of the death of Syud Sultan, Beder was at Zobara, where a force was collecting to assist him. On hearing of that event, he set out, accompanied only by a few followers, for Ras-ool-Khyma, where he was in danger of being cut off; but effecting his escape in a fishing-boat, he reached Oman just at the time that his uncle Syud Gheif was besieging Muttra, and refusing to negotiate with the late Imaum's children upon any terms short of the surrender of all the forts into his possession.

48. In this conjuncture, the sons of the late Imaum resolved to resign the management of affairs to Syud Beder, who, by his influence with the Wahabees, caused a diversion to be made by the troops of that chief towards Sohar, which obliged Syud Gheif to retire, for the purpose of defending his own territory; an army of 4,000 Wahabees having subsequently approached by sea, and a maritime force of fifteen vessels, for the purpose of establishing Beder in the government, and of recovering what Syud Gheif had usurped from the late Imaum's children.

49. The Wahabee Chief, however, apprehending that the successful accomplishment of these measures would render Syud Beder independent of him, withdrew his aid, and at the same time required the rival chiefs to await his decision. The policy of Saood seemed to be to permit neither of those competitors establishing an ascendancy at Muskat, but, by allowing them to exhaust their strength in hostile efforts against each other, to ensure the more effectually their falling an easy prey, in due season, to himself.

50. Syud Beder at length concluded a peace with Syud Gheif, by the cession of Muttra, and proceeded with a land and sea force against Bunder Abbas, for the purpose of recovering it out of the hands of





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Moolla Hussain, the Shaikh of Kishm, who, availing himself of the troubles that ensued on the death of the late Imaum, possessed himself of that place and harbour, and of Ormus.

51. Syud Beder recovered Bunder Abbas, and also the island of Ormus, the possession of those places being an object of importance, as all the ports belonging to or connected with the Joasmee pirates drew from them their supplies of dates and grain. Syud Beder offered on this occasion to allow the Company to establish a factory at Bunder Abbas, on the same terms as those granted by Shah Abbas on the first settlement of the English at that place, or on any other terms we might choose to dictate; which could not, however, be accepted, without the concurrence of the Persian Government. This offer was made in consequence of Captain Seton having accompanied Syud Beder on this expedition with two of the Company's cruisers.

52. Affairs in the Gulf, however, were still far from assuming a settled appearance, as Syud Gheif, aided by Moolla Hussain, and other partisans, had recommenced hostilities with Syud Beder, and compelled the latter to call in a Wahabee force.

53. Operations were also at this period actively prosecuted by the Company against the Joasmee pirates, in conjunction with the Muskat Government, in consequence of the capture of the *Shannon* and *Trimmer*. The combined forces proceeded to the island of Kishm, where they blockaded a fleet of Joasmees, who, being reduced to distress, Captain Seton agreed to grant them a truce until the pleasure of the Government should be known; explaining on this occasion, as his reason for refraining from hostilities, the impossibility of prosecuting them with vigour or effect, without offending either the Persians or the Wahabees. This truce led to the conclusion of the treaty with the Joasmees dated the 6th February 1806.\*

54. The tranquillity of the Gulf was further promoted by the reduction, by Syud Beder, of the fort of Bidbid, which commands the entrance of Oman, and of Keriati, leaving Muttra and its fort alone to Syud Gheif, who engaged to surrender the possessions of the late Imaum, except Kabara, and left it optional with Syud Beder to assign to him the revenue of Muttra.

55. The Joasmees remained true to the engagement concluded with Captain Seton in every point that regarded the Company, but co-operated with Syud Beder in an attack on Syud Gheif, who refused to become a party to the peace, as he could not in honour do, until he had revenged the blood of Syud Sultan, his brother.

56. Nor would the Joasmees and the Government of Muskat appear

\* Vide page 75 of this Selection.





to have strictly observed the terms of that engagement. Moolla Hussain, the Chief of Kishm, was seized by surprise in 1806, and carried to Muskat. In the following year a force was despatched from the latter to receive possession of the former place, and of Ormus also, from Moolla Hussain's family, in ransom for his person. Shaikh Sultan, the Joasmee, had, however, thrown a force into Kishm, which refused to receive Moolla Hussain, or to restore the island.

57. In the mean time, Shaikh Sultan, taking advantage of the absence of the fleet from Muskat, proceeded with twenty-two Dows, two Buggalows, and a number of Botellas, towards Seer, near Ras-ool-Hud, and landing, attempted to surprise the fort, but they were repulsed, and driven to their boats with some loss. An expedition against the Coast of Mukran by the pirates was also defeated about this time. Syud Saeed, the second son of Syud Sultan, who had succeeded Syud Beder in the Government of Muskat, was prevented by his uncle Syud Gheif from following up those advantages.

58. The Government of Muskat was represented by Captain Seton, in a letter dated the 16th of January 1808, as very  
A. D. 1808. unstable and unpopular. Syud Saeed, young and inexperienced, had lost the influence his father had acquired, and, from the little consideration he manifested towards the Shaikhs who visited Muskat, was left almost friendless. Of Oman he possessed only the sea coast, the upper country having become tributary to the Wahabees, and it was only by a degrading submission that the Imaum protected the low country from their inroads. Mukran, with the exception of Gauden, had also become independent of the Imaum; and as most of the Arab families had removed from Muskat, it was expected that troubles would ensue.

59. In the month of May, however, the Imaum, assisted by Syud Gheif, reduced the fort of Khore Fukaun. Mahomed bin Muttur, the chief of a tribe inhabiting a part of the country between Muskat and Khore Fukaun, called Tajarah, also co-operated with the Imaum, according to previous agreement, on this expedition. That chief, however, seizing a favourable opportunity, treacherously deserted, and surprised the Muskat troops. The Imaum narrowly escaped to his ships, whilst Syud Gheif lost his life in the affray, and was succeeded by his son in the Government of Sohar.

60. The power of the Wahabees now reached its height. The Joasmees had, by a late order of the Wahabees, been declared independent of their lawful Shaikh, Sultun bin Suggur of Ras-ool-Khyma, and the whole rendered tributary to the Shaikh of that sect. It was even apprehended that the Government of Muskat would be obliged to join the general piracy which now pervaded the Gulf, unless the British Government





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adopted active measures to relieve that State from the pressure of all that side of Arabia employed by the Wahabees to reduce it. Agents sent from Muskat to Deriah, to claim the restitution of Shinas and other forts that had been taken from the valley of Sohar, were ill received by Saood, who informed them that they would be detained until the Imaum sent his vessels against Bussora, or gave a proof of his attachment to the Mussulman cause by equipping a predatory expedition to India, and threatened to visit Muskat in person.

61. Owing to the disaffection of the Chiefs of Oman, the Imaum felt himself unable to resist those demands. Six Wahabee teachers were in fact at Muskat, compelling the inhabitants by blows to pray in their manner, and forcing the merchants to repair to the mosques. They laid the foundation of a large fort at Joh, on the western frontier of Oman, as a place of strength which might command that province.

62. The Wahabees had also succeeded in establishing a new power, the Zahib Tribe, in the tract of country from Musseldom to Ramse, which was placed under the government of Hussain bin Ali, who was the Shaikh of Ramse, and of two strong forts called Fequera and Bithney, which Saood had taken from the Joasmees, and whom that chief had conciliated to his support. The Imaum, anxious not to break with the Wahabees, refrained from acting against this tribe, which it would have been for his interest to have done.

63. Notwithstanding, however, the complete influence which the Wahabees had established throughout Oman, and in the Persian Gulf, the Arab Tribes were represented as hostile to their ascendancy; the common danger had united the whole, and they were ready to join any attack that might be projected or made against the power of that sect.

64. Mahomed bin Nassir Ghafie, one of the Chiefs of Oman who had joined the Wahabees, dissatisfied with the Wahabees, made advances to the Imaum, who, drawing him into a snare, seized and imprisoned him, in consequence of having acknowledged the Wahabee power, but released him on his surrendering to His Highness Semayle and another strong place he possessed in the mountains.

65. The Chief of Zaheera, having been plundered and insulted by the Wahabees, offered to join the Imaum, who however distrusted him; whilst the ruler of Sohar, having been deprived of half of his territory, declared his resolution rather to die than longer to submit to the Wahabees. The common danger had also reunited the Shaikhs of Oman, and they were determined on a vigorous resistance to Saood, who had threatened them with a visit on his return from Mecca. They were, however, desirous of the assistance of the English to recover Shinas, and the places on the coast near Cape Musseldom, that had





been dismembered from Sohar, so as to reduce the defence of the country to one point, the passage across the isthmus.

66. The Wahabee Chief being absent on a pilgrimage to Mecca, the Imaum, in 1809, prepared an expedition on a large scale, which was to be joined by four thousand men from Bushire; their avowed object being to destroy Jillama, of Khor Hassan. A powerful party of Joasmees, adverse to the Wahabee influence, was to assist the armament, the true destination of which was supposed to be against Hussain bin Ali, the Wahabee vicegerent in Oman, under whose control piracy was prosecuted.

67. The Uttoobee Arabs also joined in this expedition.

68. It sailed under the personal command of Syud Saeed, on the 15th of April. The fleet having, however, dispersed in different directions, the situation of the Imaum became very critical: he had left his possessions liable to be attacked, without the power of defending them. He was importuned by the Wahabees to proceed to Bussora and Grane: the Joasmees were to co-operate in this expedition, but the Uttoobees had declined. Unable to resist, the Imaum declared that his fleet was ready. In some degree to assist the Imaum in this predicament, the *Cornwallis* frigate was stationed at the Quoins, which would prevent the enemy attacking the Imaum, and enable him at the same time to adopt the line of conduct he wished, by delaying to go to Grane till the Uttoobees were ready to join him.

69. General Malcolm concurred in the opinion expressed by Captain Seton on this occasion, that nothing but the early interference of the British Government could prevent the port of Muskat being altogether destroyed as a port of commerce, and its inhabitants and shipping being added to the pirates;—considerations which led the Supreme Government to equip an expedition for the protection of Muskat against the Wahabees, in order that a well disposed ally might not be converted into a dangerous enemy, and for the suppression of the Joasmees pirates.

70. Sultan bin Suggur, the hereditary Chief of the Joasmees, had also been rendered a cypher in his own country by the appointment of the Wahabee officers to the charge of districts, and had, in consequence, abandoned his territories, and sought the Imaum's protection.

71. The Uttoobees at Zobara had also suffered so much from the tyranny of the Wahabees that they had recently endeavoured to conciliate the Government of Muskat, frequented the port, and paid duties as other States; whilst the Imaum, with a judicious policy, showed a preference to them, in remitting such duties as might fall heavily on their trade. No obstacle, therefore, opposed the conclusion of a solid agreement between the Uttoobees and the Government of





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Muskat, but the want of a guarantee, who could secure the due performance of its stipulations.

72. An expedition against the pirates having been determined on, as well for the suppression of piracy as for the relief of Muskat, it proceeded to the Gulf. The armament, after destroying the boats at Ras-ool-Khyma, Lingah, and Luft, repaired to Muskat. The Imaum, who in the first instance considered the attack of the pirates with so small a force a desperate attempt, afforded the fullest assurances of the satisfaction he had derived from its success, and expressed considerable gratitude for the benefit derived to his own cause, particularly by the capture and surrender of Luft to him; and proposed to accompany the expedition with a large force to attack Shinas and Khore Fukaun.

73. They reached Shinas on the 31st of December. A summons to surrender being unattended to, it was immediately bombarded. The fort, however, being

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too distantly situated to be reduced by those means, the troops were landed, those of His Highness taking up their ground on the left of the British. A battery having been raised and completed on the evening of the 2nd of January, a breach was made on the morning of the 3rd. It having been determined to storm the place, in which a body of four hundred of the Imaum's troops was to co-operate, these, considering the movements made by our different detachments in taking up their stations as moving to the attack, or misunderstanding their orders, got before the British, and entered the breach first, but the moment we got up they readily yielded to us the remaining labour and honour of the day.

74. After a most determined, sanguinary, and heroic defence on the part of the Wahabee officer, the fort surrendered, and was given up to the Imaum's troops, but the fort was so much demolished that His Highness did not think it prudent to keep possession of it.

75. The Imaum having expressed some hesitation on the policy of attacking Khore Fukaun, from an apprehension of experiencing a similar obstinate resistance as was made at Shinas, which would render it untenable, the object was abandoned, as it had no British interest connected with it, there being no pirate vessels belonging to that port; nor was it deemed necessary to attack Khor Hassan, as the Uttoobees of that place had never molested the British trade; the armament accordingly returned to Bombay.

76. In the month of April in the following year, information was received of the Wahabee troops being in the

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vicinity of Muskat, attacking and plundering the possessions of the Imaum. They had maintained an obstinate conflict with His Highness' troops at Saood Moval, about forty miles from





Burka, and afterwards proceeded to the attack of Ismailee, in the defence of which it was acknowledged the Imaum had lost two hundred of his troops.

77. The Imaum represented on this occasion to the Bombay Government that his co-operation with his friends and allies, the English, in the late expedition, had involved him in a perpetual and implacable war with the Wahabees, with whom he was before at peace, and trusted that the British Government would not remain neutral during the struggle which he was making to defend his possessions and capital from the invasion of an ancient and inveterate enemy, whose resentment had thus been strongly re-excited against him.

78. The Supreme Government, considering the declaration of the Imaum, that he had refrained from taking advantage of the peaceable overtures of the Wahabees in consequence of his connection with the British, to proceed from a wish to promulgate a belief that we were united with him in his contest with the Wahabees, and that he might expect to derive advantage from the reputation of having the support of so powerful an ally, and thus lead to a rupture with the Wahabees, against whom various considerations rendered it inexpedient, and indeed impracticable, to afford the Imaum any assistance, it was deemed of some consequence that His Highness should be undeceived on this subject, or rather that he should have no room to propagate the belief of our being a party in the war with the Wahabees.

79. It was therefore intimated to the Imaum that it was unnecessary to regulate his reply to any overtures on the part of the Wahabees by reference to his connection with the British Government, which had always considered itself to be at peace with that tribe, the late co-operation with the Imaum not having been in prosecution of war against the Wahabees generally, but merely for the extirpation of the pirates, whose augmented power and audacity had endangered the security of his own dominions, as well as interrupted the commerce and navigation of the Gulf. That the British Government, therefore, was no further interested in the contest between him and the Wahabees than as it was solicitous for the welfare and prosperity of the Imaum. Under the influence of that solicitude, and a just sense of the benefits and blessings of a state of peace, it was recommended to the Imaum to grant the terms of pacification solicited by the Wahabees, if consistent with the honour and security of the State of Muskat.

80. Previously to the receipt of that communication, the Imaum's brother, Syud Willah bin Humeed, had sailed on an expedition against Bahrein and Zobara. Zobara was taken, plundered, and the town burnt and levelled to the ground. His troops and battering train were landed at Bahrein; the brother of the Governor, and Duryah Begee





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of the Wahabee fleet, with fifteen of their principal officers, were made prisoners. From Bahrein the armament proceeded to Khor Hassan.

81. The influence of the Wahabees had been introduced into Bahrein, which, however, continued in the possession of the Uttoobees, who were required to pay a tribute to Abdoolla Saood. The Imaum made this attack in consequence of the successes of Ibrahim Pasha having obliged the Wahabee Chief to withdraw his garrison from Zobara, for the purpose of concentrating his forces.

82. An Agent arrived at Bombay from the Imaum in the month of June, soliciting such an auxiliary force as we might be able to allot, for the protection of Oman, during the ensuing season, against the attempts of hostile associations of armed Arabs situated in the vicinity of his capital, and more particularly to overawe the Wahabees, by the presence of a British force of about two thousand men, from his projected measures against the Government of Muskat, a compliance with which was of course evaded.

83. Mr. Bruce having paid a visit to the Presidency in 1813, was directed, on his return to Bushire, to call at Muskat, for the purpose of making arrangements for the duties of that station, which was placed under his control. On his arrival at that port, he found the Imaum preparing an expedition against Ras-ool-Khyma, for the purpose of reinstating Shaikh Sultan, the Joasmee Chief, in his government.

84. The Imaum requested that Mr. Bruce would accompany him to witness the treaty which he should enter into with Sultan bin Suggur, and for the purpose, also, of negotiating a treaty with that chief on the part of the British Government, which would have more effect in keeping him to the performance of his engagements than anything else, as Sultan bin Suggur was now aware of our determination not to allow the slightest insult to pass unnoticed.

85. As the renewal of the treaty entered into by the Joasmee Chief with Captain Seton in 1806\* was deemed essential for restraining the piratical acts of his subjects, Mr. Bruce was instructed to adopt the necessary measures accordingly; and to contract similar engagements with the other chieftains in the Gulf, promulgating the determination of the Government to attack and destroy every vessel that might be met with, to whatever State she might belong, engaged in piracies, and that we should not relax in the prosecution of that object until we should obtain the most perfect security for the vessels and trade of our subjects visiting the Gulf.

86. Mr. Bruce accompanied the Imaum on that expedition: they proceeded over to the Arabian Coast to Boothabane, the principal port of

\* Vide page 75 of this Selection.





the Beni yas, situated to the westward of Ras-ool-Khyma. The Imaum had a conference with Shaikh Shakboot, the head of the tribe, who agreed to co-operate in the attack on Ras-ool-Khyma, with two thousand men. At this place the Imaum received a despatch from Sultan bin Suggur, stating that he had been joined by several Arab Chiefs on the Persian side, and that he had force enough to join in the expedition. The Shaikh of Bahrein also promised to co-operate with fifteen or twenty sail, and two thousand men, and proposed to join the Imaum at the port of the Hiza Arabs.

87. The Imaum acknowledged on this occasion that it was owing to our presence that the Arab Chiefs had so readily come in to his views, and had made so favourable an impression to his interests that he was almost certain of carrying his point against Ras-ool-Khyma. His Highness said that Sultan bin Suggur had expressed his gratitude very warmly to the British Government, and would consider himself as having been restored to his hereditary situation by its influence. Sultan bin Suggur having joined the Imaum at Debaye with a hundred and fifty sail of vessels, there was every prospect of accomplishing their object.

88. The expedition failed from an ineffectual co-operation on the part of the Beni yas Tribe, who do not appear to have voluntarily offered to aid in the undertaking. Another expedition was undertaken by the Imaum in the following year, for a similar purpose, His Highness apprising Mr. Bruce that the Shaikh of the Beni yas and Hera Tribes, and Sultan bin Suggur, were entreating him to join them, promising most faithfully to support him with all their strength, and to act contrary to what they did in the preceding year. Mr. Bruce stated on this occasion that a severe skirmish had taken place between the Beni yas and Ras-ool-Khyma Arabs, in which the former were victorious, having killed near three hundred Joasmees, and carried off about four hundred head of camels. Shaikh Sultan had, moreover, obtained possession of Shargah with his adherents. The famous Wahabee General, Mootluk, who defended Shinas with so much bravery, when attacked by Colonel Smith, and whose support of the Joasmees had caused the failure of the Imaum's armament, had died, and there was every prospect of success.

89. The Imaum having proceeded on the second expedition against Ras-ool-Khyma, the chief inhabitants sent a mediator to him, and solicited peace, which the

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Imaum granted, and returned to the island of Ormus. The terms were, that the ports on the line of coast from Congoon to the southward on the Persian side, and those on the coast from Bahrein to Cape Ras-ool-Gate on the Arabian side, should be at peace with each other. Bushire, Bus-





sora, and Grahe were not included in this pacification, to which Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaikh Shakboot of the Beni-yas were very adverse, and rendered those chiefs dissatisfied with the Imaum. His Highness was, however, obliged to conclude the treaty, owing to the backwardness of Shaikh Shakboot and the other tribes to act offensively, notwithstanding that they had invited and urged the Imaum to undertake that expedition. Those tribes were to march and attack Ras-ool-Khyrna by land, whilst the Imaum did so by sea; but finding them averse to it, and suspecting that they had made a private treaty with the Joasmees, the Imaum negotiated a hasty engagement with them also, and withdrew his forces. The double dealings of these tribes, observed Mr. Bruce on this occasion, is hardly to be accounted for; but he suspected it had been from fear that the Imaum would not succeed, that these tribes formed a secret article with the Joasmees.

90. It was reported on this occasion that the Imaum had compelled Shaikh Suggur to accede to the engagement he had made with the Joasmees, and to agree to a stipulation that Ras-ool-Khyrna should remain in His Highness' possession, and that Shaikh Sultan should be established at Shargah.

91. The reverses experienced by the Wahabees having led to overtures on their part to the Persian and British Governments, a Wahabee Agent was also deputed to Muskat. The negotiation broke off because Ras-ool-Khyrna, which was in subjection to the Wahabee, was an obstacle, and in consequence of his proposing as a secret article that His Highness should furnish that chieftain with vessels to enable him to embark a force for the purpose of making a sudden descent on some part of the Malabar Coast, which the Imaum rejected, as inconsistent with his engagements with the British Government.

92. The engagement concluded by Mr. Bruce with the Joasmees, and the circumstances attending its subsequent violation by them, are fully detailed in a subsequent sketch of that tribe. Their depredations recommenced. The Imaum wrote to the Governor, reporting that another Vukeel had arrived at Muskat from the Wahabee Chief; that the Vukeel was constantly seeking means to set up some new pretension, and made several demands, which were not only inadmissible, but foreign from a state of peace; that he had not, in consequence, entered into any agreement with the Wahabees, and that being disappointed in their views, they had recommenced hostilities with him; that the Imaum had no other alternative than to employ his utmost exertions and endeavours against Ras-ool-Khyrna, for whilst it was allowed to remain on its present footing they would never be inclined to peace, and requesting that we should afford him the co-operation of some of our vessels.

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93. The Joasmee fleet, consisting of a ship, and twenty-five Bug-galows and Buteels, being out on a cruise at the entrance of the Gulf, the Imaum, with his fleet, composed of the *Caroline* frigate and two other ships, with a number of smaller vessels, fell in with the Joasmees off Cape Keriati. A smart action ensued, in which the Joasmees attempted to board the Imaum's ship, and had actually got possession of the fore-castle, when they were dislodged by the guns from the poop being fired pointed forward, loaded with grape. The Imaum's other vessels having fallen astern, he was obliged to bear up and run in to Muskat. His Highness, who commanded in person on board the *Caroline*, was slightly wounded by a musket ball. In two days, after having refitted, the Imaum again put to sea after the Joasmees, fell in with them off Sohar, from which he chased them into Ras-ool-Khyma, and returned to Muskat.

94. His Highness renewed operations against the Joasmees in the commencement of the following year, but was  
A. D. 1816. unable to effect anything against them, notwithstanding that he blockaded the port of Ras-ool-Khyma for nearly four months; nor, in the opinion of Mr. Bruce, would the Imaum be able to do anything without our support, for which he was extremely anxious, and would, to obtain it, be glad to cede to us any of the ports or islands in the Gulf that are subject to him.

95. On the 15th of June 1816, Mr. Bruce reported that the Imaum had proceeded with a large force to reduce the Beni Uttoobee and Joasmee Arabs to his allegiance, having been joined by the Aseeloo and Congoon Arabs, and, with three boats from Bushire, despatched to his assistance by orders from Shiraz, the Imaum proceeded to Bahrein, and landed their troops on the island of Arad, which is separated from Bahrein by a narrow channel for boats, and commenced the attack with some prospect of success, but ultimately experienced a signal defeat, and with great loss. Two of the Imaum's principal Sirdars were killed on this occasion. Mr. Bruce, who had quitted Bahrein a few days before the Imaum attacked it, wrote to His Highness to dissuade him from it, as he knew that many of the Imaum's troops were secretly in the interests of the Uttoobees, and offering his mediation to settle his differences with that tribe. No reply was returned to that offer.

96. The Imaum, after this defeat, proceeded to Congoon with the whole of his fleet, for the purpose of taking on board a reinforcement of troops, consisting of one thousand musketeers, and four hundred irregular cavalry, which the Prince of Shiraz had engaged to furnish, on condition of the Imaum's defraying their expenses, and paying an annual Peshkush should the troops once embark, and the expedition be abandoned; but





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if they landed in Bahrein, and reduced it, the Imaum was to pay 10,000 Tomans annually to the Government of Shiraz.

97. The expedition against Bahrein was soon abandoned, the Imaum having discovered that the Government of Persia was actuated by motives of treachery, and contemplated his seizure, and that of some of his chiefs, and carrying them off to Shiraz.

98. In the month of May in the following year, Rahmah bin Jaubir proceeded to Muskat, with the view of prevailing on the Imaum to make another attack on Bahrein, but His Highness was too much occupied in his own territories to undertake it, having met with a repulse from a Joasmee force that marched against Khore Fukaun, which surrendered to those freebooters.

99. By late accounts (1818) the Imaum was meditating another expedition against Ras-ool-Khyma.

CONTINUATION OF THE FOREGOING SKETCH, TO  
THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT HENNEL, ASSISTANT RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF.

Mr. Warden's Sketches of the Arabian Tribes in the Gulf of Persia conclude the history of the Government of Muskat, in 1817, with the account of the Imaum's defeat in his attack on Bahrein, and the abandonment by His Highness of a second attempt upon that island (in which he was to have been joined by a body of Persian horse and foot), in consequence of his discovering that the Fars Government was actuated by motives of treachery. His Highness, however, appears to have been much hurt at the duplicity and double dealing of the Court of Shiraz, and certainly not without reason, for while the Persian authorities detained the Muskat vessels in the Gulf during many months, at a heavy expense, for the purpose of embarking the troops, which they pretended were collecting to co-operate against Bahrein, they sent over messengers to the chief of that island, and concluded a separate agreement, on receiving presents to a considerable amount. In consequence of this conduct, His Highness despatched a messenger in April 1818 to Bushire, for the purpose of proceeding to the Shah's presence, to lay before His Majesty all the documents relating to his negotiations with the Government of Fars, and to intimate that he should in future look to other sources than Persia for support in carrying into effect his views upon the Uttoobee territory. This person, on





arriving at Bushire, did not proceed himself to the interior, but sent on his letters and papers to Court by a courier. On His Highness' return to Muskat from his unfortunate expedition, he despatched two ships to cruise off Cape Ras-ool-Gate, in order to protect the vessels belonging to his subjects (returning from India) against the anticipated attacks of the Uttoobees, who were of course inclined to make reprisals for the hostile demonstrations so lately shown towards them. Soon afterwards the inhabitants of Ras-ool-Khyma, alarmed at the approach of the Turkish troops under Ibrahim Pasha, after the fall of Deriah, made proposals to His Highness to settle their differences, and to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance, which proposition was rejected.

About the end of 1819, an expedition was despatched from Bombay, under the command of Major General Sir William Grant Keir, for the purpose of punishing

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the insults offered to the British flag, as well as putting an end to the piracies daily committed upon English and other vessels, by the maritime inhabitants of the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf. General Keir touched at Muskat on his voyage; and, in the course of an interview held with the Imaum, communicated the instructions he had received to His Highness, who willingly entered into all the views of the British Government, and promised to furnish 4,000 troops by land, and to add three vessels of war to the naval part of the force. The expedition subsequently sailed for its destination, and by the destruction or capture of all the vessels, and the principal stronghold of the piratical chieftains, inspired a wholesome dread of the British power, and restored peace and safety to the Persian Gulf. Encouraged by the complete success of these operations against the piratical chieftains, His Highness determined to avail himself of the strong impression produced in the minds of the maritime inhabitants of the Persian Gulf, by his having co-operated with the British forces, to make another attempt to carry his designs against the island of Bahrein into execution. He however endeavoured to learn previously from Sir W. Keir the light in which this intention might be viewed by the authorities in India, but without success, as the General would give no opinion on the subject. On leaving the expedition, His Highness returned to Muskat in 1820, ostensibly for the purpose of commencing his preparations, but shortly after informed Sir W. Keir that, conceiving it was the wish of the British Government that he should not come to an open rupture with the Uttoobees, he had consented to make peace with them, on receiving an annual tribute of 30,000 German crowns; but that he required the guarantee of the Government for the regular payment of this sum. General Keir, in reply to His Highness' communication, stated that he had no authority to give any such





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pledge, but that His Highness' desire should be referred to India. The guarantee of course was never given.

Some irregular proceedings on the part of the Arabs\* of Al Ushkara having been brought to the notice of the Government, instructions were issued to the Political Agent at Kishm to proceed against them, in the event of the action reported appearing to be clearly piratical; at the same time, he was instructed to take every care to ascertain that what was represented as piracy, might not be lawful warfare. In conformity with these instructions, a cruiser was despatched to Al Ushkara, to convey a letter addressed to the Chiefs of the Beni Boo Ali Tribe from the British authority. On arriving off the place above alluded to, a man of some consequence (who had been previously procured from Muskat), was sent with the communication, but, on his landing, the boat was attacked by the Arabs, and the messenger cut in pieces. This proceeding appeared to the Political Agent sufficient to justify immediate hostilities, and accordingly, by his orders, six companies of sepoy, with eight pieces of artillery, were embarked from Kishm on board several vessels of war, which sailed forthwith for Muskat, where they arrived on the 11th October. A plan of operations was immediately concerted with the Imaum, and it was arranged, that as the landing at Al Ushkara was nearly impracticable, and could not be supported by such of His Highness' troops as were to co-operate, the detachment should proceed to Soor by sea, while His Highness marched with his forces by land to the same place. The Beni Boo Ali Tribe no sooner received information of the projected expedition than they set fire to Al Ushkara, and, after burning fourteen of their boats, retreated into the interior, to Bulad Beni Boo Ali. The detachment being joined by one thousand men from the Imaum, together with nine hundred head of draft cattle, marched from Soor on the 1st November, carrying with them two six-pounders, two howitzers, and two iron eighteen-pounders.

On the 8th November the combined forces arrived within three miles of Bulad Beni Boo Ali, the residence of the hostile tribe, and a demand was forthwith made for the surrender of their fortifications and arms, together with the persons who had murdered the messenger at Al Ushkara. The summons was sent by His Highness the Imaum, but conveyed an intimation from the Political Agent that the war on the part of the British was brought on by the Beni Boo Ali having committed piracies on the seas, and that this cause was quite distinct from the reasons which had induced His Highness to proceed against them. In

\* A small place on the sea coast near Ras-ool-Hud, belonging to the Beni Boo Ali Arabs, a fierce and turbulent tribe residing in Jaalan, a province belonging to the Imaum, whose authority they had lately thrown off (June 1820).





answer to this summons, the Beni Boo Ali stated they were ready to comply with the conditions proposed, except the one stipulating for the surrender of their arms. This modification, however, was not acceded to, and the heavy guns and stores being left in the entrenched camp, the combined forces, consisting of four guns, 380 sepoys, and 2,000 men belonging to the Imaum, moved the next morning towards the enemy's town, which was situated with its back to a deep date grove, round which it was necessary to defile in order to get at the assailable front, which looked towards the sandy plain, and was protected by ditches. On arriving within sight of the town, the light infantry of the 1st battalion 2nd regiment, which had headed the column in extended order, opened its fire, and began to fall back, and soon after the enemy appeared in motion on the top of some elevated ground, with the apparent design of turning the right flank. The officer commanding immediately directed the troops to form column of sections to the right, so as to present a new front, parallel to the enemy's attack, and then to charge bayonets. Some hesitation on the part of the sepoys is asserted to have been displayed at this moment in obeying the last order, and, as the only course left, they were directed to fire, which was done; but immediately after, on the enemy being within twenty yards of the line, they are alleged by the commanding officer to have turned about, and thrown themselves on the Imaum's troops in the rear. These soon gave way, and the whole took to flight, being pursued by the enemy in the direction of the entrenched camp at Beni Boo Hussain, within which the remnants of the force were collected. Nearly the whole of the British detachment actually engaged in the action was cut up, together with all their officers, with the exception of two, one of whom afterwards died of his wounds. The Imaum was shot through the hand in endeavouring to save an artilleryman, and seems to have displayed great coolness and courage throughout the affair. An attack of the enemy during the night upon the position at Beni Boo Hussain was repulsed, but the commanding officer, finding it could not be maintained, directed the remains of the detachment to retreat upon Muskat, where they arrived on the 17th November 1820.

The whole of the proceedings of the Political Agent in respect to this disastrous expedition were entirely disapproved of by the Government, but for the support of our national character, and the maintenance of our influence in the Gulf of Persia, it was considered necessary to send up a large force under the command of Major General Smith, in order to co-operate with His Highness the Imaum in punishing the Beni Boo Ali Tribe. This division arrived before the capital of the tribe in question on the 2nd March 1821, and after repulsing a very sharp attack of the enemy

A. D. 1821.





on the right brigade (consisting of 400 of H. M.'s 65th regiment, and 300 of the 1st battalion 7th regiment N. I., under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Warren), took possession of the whole fortified position the same evening. The sepoys on this occasion suffered severely, but the enemy lost upwards of 500 killed and wounded, while nearly all the remainder, together with their two chiefs, were taken prisoners. After blowing up the works and defences, the forces returned to Soor, and re-embarked for India, taking a number of prisoners with them. On this occasion His Highness the Imaum cut down the date groves, and turned the watercourses of Bulad Beni Boo Ali.

A discussion having arisen in 1822 between His Highness and the Uttoobees relative to the non-payment of their tribute, a reference was made to the British Government on the subject, and Mr. Bruce was ordered to mediate an adjustment between the two powers; but some delay taking place in carrying this arrangement into effect, it was resolved not to interfere further than by the Government addressing a letter to both parties, advising them strongly to settle their differences amicably, without going to war. It was likewise intimated to His Highness, that he must restrain Rahmah bin Jaubir and Shaikh Tahnoon from committing unjust depredations upon the property of others, and that unless he did so, they would be punished as disturbers of the general peace.

In 1823, the Court of Directors sent out instructions to the Bombay Government, to use its influence with His Highness the Imaum to procure the restoration of the remnants of the Beni Boo Ali Tribe to their native seats. This was done, and, after some hesitation and correspondence, His Highness permitted their return to their old residence. The next year Mahomed bin Ali having represented to the Resident in the Persian Gulf the distressed situation to which his tribe was reduced by the total destruction of their houses and watercourses, the sum of 2,500 German crowns was advanced by the Government to enable them to make the necessary repairs.

About the end of 1824, a correspondence took place between His Highness the Imaum and the Bombay Government, respecting the conduct of Captain Owen, of the royal navy, in having taken possession of Mombassa, on the African Coast, in the name of the King of Great Britain. On a strong remonstrance being preferred by His Highness against this proceeding, upon the grounds of his claim to the sovereignty of that island, Captain Owen's proceedings were disavowed by the Indian authorities, and a reference, transmitting a memorial from the Imaum, was made to His





Majesty's Ministers, who subsequently replied that it was determined to take no further steps in the affair.

A tribute which His Highness the Imaum laid claim to from Bussora having been withheld for several years, and no attention paid to repeated remonstrances, His

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Highness informed the Resident in the Persian Gulf that it was his intention to blockade the river, in order to enforce the payment of the arrears due. The Resident having offered his mediation to endeavour to adjust this dispute, it was accepted, and a communication was made to the Political Agent at Bagdad, in March 1825, requesting him to exert his influence with the Pasha to settle the affair quietly. The Bombay Government, however, directed that our interference should be confined solely to producing a disposition to an amicable adjustment, and that in the event of the blockade being established, British ships were to be subjected to its operation equally with others. Captain Taylor, having intimated the failure of his attempt to induce the Pasha of Bagdad to make concessions, the Imaum was informed that he was at liberty to carry on whatever measures he thought proper. His Highness, however, in consequence of the threats of Mahomed Ali Pasha, abandoned the idea of an expedition for that time.

In May 1825, the British Resident having received orders to take measures to remove the jealous feelings which had been excited in the mind of the Imaum, owing to our interference in behalf of the Beni Boo Ali Tribe, proceeded in person to Muskat, ostensibly with the view of endeavouring to bring the discussion between His Highness and Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, touching the towers of Brymee, to a favourable termination. The presence at Muskat of Mahomed bin Ali, the Chief of the Beni Boo Ali Tribe, afforded Colonel Stannus an opportunity of introducing the real object of his visit, and in the various conversations he held with His Highness touching the present and future condition of the Beni Boo Ali Tribe, succeeded, apparently, in satisfying His Highness that our interference in their behalf was prompted solely by the humane motive of relieving them from the distresses of the situation which our proceedings against them had been mainly instrumental in producing.

In the latter end of 1825 His Highness visited the Gulf of Persia, with his fleet, and having proffered his mediation to arrange the differences between the Chiefs of Ras-ool-Khyma and Aboothabee (Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot), his offer was accepted, and an amicable arrangement was finally made, in which, however, no mention whatever was made of the towers of Brymee, which had been so long a subject of dispute; an omission which leads to the conclusion that (notwithstanding the report of Goolab, the British Agent at Muskat, to the contrary) the delay in carrying into effect the part of the former





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treaty touching their demolition was occasioned more by the intrigues of His Highness than those of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur.

The people of Makullah having complained to the British Government that some aggressions had been committed upon them by the Imaum's subjects residing in Soor, the Resident was directed to inquire into the affair, which was subsequently settled by his Highness compelling the aggressors to pay 7,000 dollars to the Shaikh of Makullah, as a compensation for his losses.

In December 1825 the British authority in the Persian Gulf had an interview with the Imaum, on which occasion His Highness again complained of fresh aggressions having been committed on his African territories by English Agents. His Highness likewise intimated, on the same occasion, that he considered his connection with the British Government in the light of an offensive and defensive alliance; and, further, recommended that a stop should be put to all maritime warfare in the Persian Gulf, as the most effectual means of suppressing piracy.

In the reply to the despatches communicating the above particulars, the Government directed the Imaum should be informed, that with reference to Mombassa, His Majesty's Ministers had determined to drop all further proceedings in respect to that place. On the subject of the relations subsisting between His Highness and the British Government, it was shown, in a detail of considerable length, that although one of the articles of the Quolnamah or agreement, concluded by Mehedi Ali Khan, stated that the friends and enemies of the one party stood in a similar relation to the other; yet that this was merely intended to convey a general notion of strict friendship, and that it was so completely contradicted by the other stipulations, and the numerous communications bearing upon this point subsequently made to His Highness, as well as by the transactions which had taken place between the two States since its conclusion, as to make it perfectly evident that the same understanding of neutrality on both sides in each other's wars had been always avowed and acted upon. The plan of insisting on the maintenance of maritime peace was considered by the Government as impracticable, even if desirable, on account of the absence of any means to compel the inhabitants of the Persian Coast to accede to it, as well as its unequal operation, in increasing the power of the military, and diminishing that of the naval, tribes on the Arabian side of the Gulf. Shortly afterwards, the Resident reported that he had had an interview with His Highness, and succeeded in impressing on his mind the true nature of the amicable relations now subsisting between the two Governments, and that His Highness had fully acquiesced in the propriety of the views submitted to him.





The Imaum having long suspected that Shaikh Abdool Russool Khan, the Governor of Bushire, had, by his intrigues and misrepresentations, traduced him at the Court of Shiraz, and even attempted to supplant him in his proposed connexion with the sister of the Prince Royal of Fars, His Highness availed himself of the absence of his rival, on a pilgrimage to Mecca, to declare war, in May 1826, against his territories. On the 27th July 1826, His Highness' fleet appeared off Bushire, and excited considerable alarm in the minds of the inhabitants, which, however, was allayed on its being ascertained that it had come to Bushire solely for the purpose of landing the cargo of Shaikh Abdool Russool's ship the *Noosrut Shah*, which had been previously captured by the Imaum on her way from Bengal. No aggressions whatever were committed against the town or trade, and after some little discussion about the payment of duties, the cargo was landed, and the fleet proceeded to Bussora, in order to enforce some private and public claims advanced by His Highness against that place. On a report of these circumstances being made to India, the Government directed that the Imaum should be allowed to pursue his own course of policy towards Bushire and Bussora, in the event of our interference not procuring him ample satisfaction, and further directed that the strictest neutrality should be maintained by the British authorities on these occasions.

In May 1826, Commodore Christian, the officer commanding the naval force on the Cape of Good Hope station, addressed a letter to the Bombay Government, requesting, for certain reasons, that they would interfere to prevent the Imaum from attacking Mombassa, and, if possible, induce His Highness to acknowledge the independence of that island. In a reply, dated September 1826, to the Commodore's communication, the Honorable the Governor in Council declined compliance with His Excellency's request; stating at the same time his reasons, and recommending that, in the event of the Imaum being prevented from prosecuting his views upon the place in question by the Home Authorities, a proper compensation should be afforded. The Commodore was likewise informed that a request would be made to His Highness to defer all operations until the decision of His Majesty's Government should be made known. In a subsequent communication, Commodore Christian intimated the removal of the British establishment from Mombassa, and stated that he did not consider the inhabitants of that island to be entitled to British protection. The British authority in the Gulf of Persia was accordingly instructed to intercede with the Imaum in behalf of the population of the island in question.

In the month of September 1826 His Highness proceeded to cruise





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with his fleet off Kishm, for the purpose of intercepting the Shaikh of Bushire on his return from Mecca. This plan was attended with entire success, as he fell in with the Shaikh on the 13th September, and, after a short action, captured that personage, together with his two vessels.

On the 25th October the British Resident had an interview with His Highness, on which occasion he brought to His Highness' notice the contumacy of Shaikh Tahnoon, in persisting in his refusal to destroy the fort of Derah,\* and remove the Soodan Tribe, agreeably to the stipulations of the treaty entered into by him with the Joasmee Shaikh. In consequence of this representation, His Highness promised to send his vessels of war to blockade the place by sea, while Sultan bin Suggur, with the troops drawn from Shargah and Ras-ool-Khyma, attacked it by land.

The Imaum's claims upon the authorities of Bussora having been brought to an amicable arrangement, the blockade of that place was raised in November 1826, and His Highness' fleet returned to Muskat.

In the month of May 1827 Shaikh Abdool Russool was restored to liberty by the Imaum, and, on his giving a bond for 80,000 German crowns, his two vessels were likewise given up to him.

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About this time His Highness proceeded to Derah, and had that place destroyed, agreeably to his promise to the Resident; but in order to heal the wounded pride of Shaikh Tahnoon, he supplied that chief with warlike stores of every description, and called upon the people of Debaye† to submit themselves to the authority of the Beniyas Chief. There can be little doubt that His Highness' intrigues on this occasion fomented the causes of disagreement between Shaikh Sultan and his rival Tahnoon.

In July 1827, one of the daughters of the Prince of Shiraz (a sister of Reza Koolie Mirza) was betrothed to the Imaum, and shortly after, proceeding to Bunder Abbas, was met there by his Highness, and conveyed to Muskat.

His Highness having requested the opinion of the British Resident as to the propriety or otherwise of his acceding to a request made by the Chaub Shaikhs for assistance against Bussora, a reply, couched in general terms, but pacific language, was returned, in consequence of which His Highness declined interfering in their affairs.

\* A small fort, between Shargah and Debaye, erected by the Soodan Tribe, under Soliman bin Nasser, a dependent of Shaikh Tahnoon.

† A small independent town, near Shargah, under the Heera family.





In June 1828 a report became very prevalent in the Persian Gulf, that the Imaum had determined to make another attempt to reduce the island of Bahrein to his dominion, and that he was collecting troops and vessels for that purpose. In order to throw the Uttoobees off their guard, His Highness, with more prudence than good faith, sent up a messenger to Bahrein with presents for the Shaikhs, accompanied by letters couched in the most friendly terms, assuring them that the rumours current regarding his hostile views were entirely without foundation. The duplicity of this statement, however, speedily became apparent, and in the month of August a representation was made on the subject by the Shaikh of Bahrein to the British authority in the Gulf, who declined interfering in any way, beyond making an attempt to induce Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee to remain neutral in the contest, in order to avoid the chance of the Joasmees being brought in as allies of Bahrein, and to prevent the probable evil consequences resulting from the blood feud which was likely to arise between the Uttoobees and Beni-yas. The effort was, however, unsuccessful, as the Chief of Aboothabee subsequently joined His Highness with a considerable body of men. His Highness himself did not formally declare war until August 1828, when he addressed a letter to Shaikh Abdoola bin Ahmed, intimating his intention of attacking Bahrein one month from the date of the communication. In the beginning of September, His Highness, attended by a large fleet of ships, and Native vessels, sailed from Muskat, and arrived at Kishm on the 17th of that month. After remaining a few days he again set sail, for Aboothabee, for the purpose of being joined by Shaikh Tahnoon and his contingent.

About November 1828, His Highness arrived off Bahrein with his fleet, and, having landed a party of men, took possession of the fort outside without any opposition, and had fixed a day for the whole of his forces proceeding against the town of Munamah, when he was surprised to hear that Shaikh Tahnoon, with his troops, had landed without his orders. Hastily collecting a few of his immediate followers and Nubian slaves, His Highness hurried on shore, to endeavour to avert the consequence of this imprudent proceeding. He was, however, too late: a small body of the Uttoobee horse had been previously concealed in some date groves on the flank, which, issuing out while the Imaum's troops were eagerly pressing forward to engage, charged in the rear, and at the same time the Uttoobee infantry making a general advance, the assailants were thrown into great confusion, and at last fled, completely routed, to their boats, leaving a very considerable number of killed, wounded, and prisoners behind them. His Highness appears to





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have shown his usual personal courage, and was carried off with great difficulty by his faithful Nubians, after being slightly wounded. In the confusion attending this disastrous affair, a brig and Buggalow belonging to His Highness got on shore, and, having been abandoned, were taken possession of by the enemy, but the former was subsequently burnt by the Imaum's people during the night. Discouraged by this defeat, and the ravages committed among his followers by the cholera morbus, His Highness affected to consider that the hand of Providence was against him, and, after an ineffectual attempt to conclude a peace with the Shaikh of Bahrein, he sailed back with his fleet to Muskat on the 20th November. Various reasons were assigned for His Highness having abandoned an enterprise, the preparation of which had cost him so much labour and treasure; but it was generally thought, that he either suspected some of his immediate adherents of treachery, or that the unexpected intelligence of a dangerous and spreading rebellion having broken out in his possessions on the African Coast had induced him to forego any further attempt upon Bahrein, and hasten back to Muskat.

The town of Bushire having been taken in the latter part of 1828 by

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Prince Timor Mirza, that personage sent down an application to his brother-in-law, the Imaum, for

the assistance of one or two of his vessels, and at the same time strongly recommended him to make a capture of Shaikh Abdool Russool's ship, the *Harriet*. In pursuance of this request, His Highness sent up the *Muzuffa* frigate, which, having fallen in with the *Harriet* off Congoon, escorted her into Bushire harbour, without, however, attempting to molest her in any way. On her arrival in January 1829, the commander, Syud bin Khalfan, landed, and finding His Royal Highness the Prince of Shiraz present, and Shaikh Abdool Russool apparently in high favour, he remained a few days as the Wuzcer's guest, and sailed away for Muskat, without attempting any act of hostility.

Soon after this, the Imaum having received information that the Uttoobees had despatched a fleet under the command of Abdool Rahman, to cruise against the vessels of his subjects and allies, His Highness directed two of his ships of war to proceed in quest of them. On their way up they fell in with a large Bahrein Buggalow, called the *Syar*, on her way from India to Bahrein, and immediately attacked her. The Uttoobee vessel, however, defended herself with great gallantry, and, after a distant and ineffectual cannonade, the Imaum's frigates attempted to bear down, for the purpose of boarding, but, on approaching, perceived that a quantity of combustible materials had been prepared by the Uttoobees to throw on board them should they come





near. In consequence, they changed their intentions, and continued the action with their guns, till, night coming on, the Buggalow altered her course, and arrived soon after at Bahrein, very little injured herself, but with a considerable portion of the cargo damaged.

In May 1829 the British Government directed their Agent in the Persian Gulf to endeavour to compose the differences existing between His Highness and the Shaikh of Bahrein. The offer of mediation was accepted by His Highness with great alacrity, as the state of his affairs in Zanzibar imperiously called upon him to proceed in person to the African Coast, for the purpose of crushing, if possible, the rebellion of the people of Mombassa. After some correspondence, His Highness sent up one of his confidential men for the purpose of arranging terms, but the Bahrein Chief, notwithstanding the earnest advice and recommendation of the political authority, refused to listen to any conditions of peace, however favourable to himself, that had not the guarantee of the British Government to them. This, of course, was absolutely refused, although His Highness earnestly begged that the pledge might be given. Finding the Bahrein Chief firm in his determination, the British Resident, after a correspondence of several months, declared his mediation at an end. Whether the Uttoobee Shaikh conceived that our desire for peace was so strong that, sooner than fail in the mediation, we should have acceded to his wishes regarding the guarantee, or whether he really regarded our friendly interference with an eye of suspicion, is doubtful; but certain it is, that we had no sooner declined taking any further steps in the affair than peace was concluded betwixt the belligerents (through the agency of a dependent of the Imaum, who had proceeded to Bahrein), on terms perhaps even more favourable to the interests of His Highness than those offered to the Uttoobees through us; thus adding another to the many instances in which the offer of our mediation tended rather to protract than expedite a return to amicable relations.

A small vessel, belonging to Mr. Shipton, having been attacked and plundered on her way from the Red Sea by some dependents of the Imaum, His Highness took immediate steps to obtain satisfaction for this outrage, and remitted in the first instance about 6,000 dollars, which he had recovered from the pirates, and subsequently a further sum of 1,100 crowns, to the Bombay Government.

About this time a merchant ship, called the *Oscar*, having been run ashore off the Coast of Jaalan, on her way from Bombay to Bushire, she was boarded by the Arabs (principally of the Beni Boo Ali and Beni Boo Hussain Tribes), and plundered of all her cargo, amounting in value to eight lakhs of rupees, the greater portion of which, had it not been for the violence of the Natives, might perhaps have been saved.





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In consequence of this proceeding, a strong application was made to the Bombay Government by the underwriters in India, to take immediate measures to procure the restoration of the plundered property. Accordingly the Resident, having received the instructions of his Government, proceeded to Muskat on board the schooner *Fly*, accompanied by Commodore Collinson in the *Ternate*. These two vessels, added to the three cruisers which had previously assembled there, formed a disposable force of five sloops and brigs of war. After an interview with His Highness, an arrangement was made, by which a portion of the Kashmere shawls taken from the wreck, and purchased by people in Muskat, was recovered, on paying salvage. On the 19th October the Resident, accompanied by His Highness the Imaum, with two frigates, and the rest of the squadron, sailed for Soor and Iyah, but after a minute investigation no trace of any of the plundered cargo could be found. From these places the Resident, accompanied by Commodore Collinson, proceeded to Khore Gerany, where he had a long interview with Mahomed bin Ali, the Chief of the Beni Boo Ali Tribe; and after fully impressing him with the superior advantages he and his tribe would derive from preserving the cargo of any British vessel that might be wrecked, instead of plundering it, he succeeded in inducing him to give up a few shawls, and 1,200 dollars, which he solemnly swore was all that it was in his power to restore at this late period. Finding that this chief and tribe, in consequence of their residing in the interior, were wholly untangible by naval means alone, the British authority conceived it useless to attempt force, and therefore endeavoured to create such an impression on the minds of the inhabitants of this dangerous coast, as would be likely to prove highly beneficial to any British ship that might have the misfortune to suffer a similar accident to that which had befallen the *Oscar*. On leaving Khore Gerany the Resident touched at Muskat, and arrived at Bushire in November 1829.

The conclusion of the peace with Bahrein, which was finally ratified in Muskat in December 1829, left the Imaum at liberty to carry into effect his intention of proceeding to Zanzibar, for the purpose of quieting a dangerous rebellion which had broken out in the island of Mombassa. As this object, in all probability, would oblige him to be absent from Muskat a considerable period, His Highness made arrangements for the administration of the government of Muskat during his absence, by appointing his nephew Syud Salim his Vukeel, with full powers, and likewise subsidising the Joasmee and Beniyas Shaikhs for the better protection of his dominions. Dreading, however, the ambitious character of his relation, Syud Hillal,\* the Governor of Soweik, a young

\* Syud Hillal's father was a first cousin of the Imaum.





man of gallant behaviour and liberal disposition, and consequently much beloved by the Arabian Tribes on the Coast of Oman, His Highness induced him, under the guarantee of the most solemn oaths and protestations, to pay him a visit in Muskat previous to his departure, and soon after took an opportunity to have him seized and detained a prisoner in one of the forts. After the completion of this short-sighted and treacherous policy, the Imaum sailed on the 15th December for the African Coast, with the conviction of his having taken most effectual means for insuring the tranquillity of his Arabian possessions during his absence. The very measure, however, which he had so unjustifiably adopted, in the face of the most sacred obligations, was nearly the cause of his ruin. It appears, that on receiving the intelligence of her brother's unjust imprisonment, the sister of Syud Hillal assembled all the chief men of Soweik together, and having acquainted them with what had occurred, asked if they would support her. They unanimously replied they would shed the last drop of their blood in her service. Upon this assurance, she took possession of the strong fort of Soweik, and having, by means of presents and entreaties, been joined by a number of the Beni Ghafoor Tribe, she began to foray and harass the Imaum's territories. The success which attended these efforts awakened the hopes of Humood bin Azan,\* who had been dispossessed of a large town and district on the Coast of Batinah, called Sohar, when an infant, by his cousin the Imaum. Taking advantage of the confusion arising in consequence of the proceedings of the sister of Syud Hillal, he assembled fifty followers, and, aided by the good will of the inhabitants, surprised the garrison of Sohar by night, and succeeded in getting possession of this fortress. Once established in this stronghold, the other ports of Shinas, Lowa, and Khaboora soon fell into his hands; and thus, in the short space of one month, nearly the whole of the productive and populous Coast of Batinah was lost to the Imaum. The flame of rebellion daily spread, while the Vukeel left in Muskat displayed a miserable want of judgment and decision in this important crisis. At last, the progress of the insurgents became so formidable, that serious apprehensions were entertained for the safety of Muskat itself. A fast-sailing vessel was despatched after His Highness, to acquaint him with the state of affairs, and Syud Salim became so much alarmed at the hostile demonstrations made by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, that he directed a communication to be made to the Bombay Government, through the Imaum's Agent in that place, requesting that two cruisers might be sent up to his assistance. In consequence, instructions were issued to the British authority in the Gulf of Persia to prevent the ruin of His Highness by every means in

\* Humood bin Azan bin Ghes, a first cousin of the Imaum.





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his power; and although he was directed not to interfere on account of any partial disorders in His Highness' territories, yet he was desired not to permit any act to take place calculated to annihilate or seriously weaken the Imaum's power. In the event of an attack on Muskat being contemplated, he was to take measures to prevent it. Agreeably to this intimation, the political authority despatched a vessel of war to Muskat, with orders to assist in the defence of that place, and made arrangements for the remainder of the squadron to proceed to the same capital immediately certain information was received that the town was about to be attacked. At the same time, he took measures to prevent any of the Arabian Chiefs from acting against the territories of His Highness, and intimated to Humood bin Azan that any attempt upon Muskat would be viewed as an act of hostility by the British Government.

On the 8th May 1830 His Highness the Imaum returned to Muskat from Zanzibar, where all his plans for the reduction of the island of Mombassa had totally

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failed, probably in consequence of the hurried manner in which the disturbance in his Arabian territories had called him away. On his reaching his capital, he immediately sent away the cruiser which had been despatched for the protection of that place, and in his communication to the British authority, announcing his return, he affected to look upon the state of the Batinah Coast as a trifling matter, easily to be settled. Altogether His Highness did not appear by any means pleased at our having considered his affairs so desperate.

Previous to commencing more active operations, the Imaum in June 1830 offered Humood bin Azan the alternative of the possession of certain districts, provided he would give up Sohar and Khaboora, or immediate war. His proposal was refused, and an intimation given by the revolted chief that he was prepared to stand by the consequences. His Highness accordingly left Muskat on the 12th June, and proceeded to Burka, accompanied by two frigates. On his arrival there he commenced assembling an army, with the intention of proceeding to the attack of Sohar. In the meanwhile Syud Hillal was still detained a prisoner, and was told that the surrender of the fort of Soweik was the only condition on which his liberty would be granted.

After an unsuccessful attempt to bombard and blockade Sohar, as well as to collect forces, His Highness found that the Arabian Tribes in Oman were determined not to afford him their cordial support in his plan for bringing that place once more under his own dominion; he therefore concluded an agreement with Shaikh Humood, by which he ceded to that chief the districts of Khizza, Khaboora, Markies, and Sohar, for the payment of an annual tribute of 8,000 German crowns.





The towns of Shinas and Ghillal were restored to His Highness. On his return to Muskat, the Imaum liberated Syud Hillal from confinement, and allowed him to proceed to Soweik. The total failure of his attempt on Sohar, notwithstanding the powerful demonstrations made by the British Government in sending a vessel of war to Muskat to protect that place, and its declaration that it would not permit the interference of foreign tribes in his affairs, proved in a striking manner the state of weakness to which His Highness' ill-planned and worse-executed schemes within the last three years had reduced him.

In February 1831, the Imaum again declared war against Humood bin Azan of Sohar, and, in order to promote his views upon that place, subsidised Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur of Ras-ool-Khyma, and Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, by paying them each a sum of money down, with promises of a much larger amount immediately their troops joined him at Shinas. The former, as usual, took the money, and neglected to fulfil his agreement; but the latter kept his word, so far as to proceed to the place of rendezvous with a small body of troops. His Highness, after a slight opposition, succeeded in disembarking his force near Shinas, where, after some time, he collected about 2,000 men. Previous to adopting these measures, His Highness had taken steps to conciliate the Wahabee Chief, by sending large presents, and in some measure acknowledging his supremacy. On hearing of the preparations of the Imaum, Shaikh Tahnoon made his usual offers of assistance, which, however, were rejected by His Highness, who appears to have considered the conduct of the Beniyas Shaikh in the attack upon Bahrein to have been, to say the least, of a very suspicious complexion. The consequence was, that Shaikh Tahnoon united his interests with those of Humood bin Azan, and, by an extensive foray, made by his orders into the Joasmee territories, kept Shaikh Sultan in check, and otherwise greatly crippled the arrangements making by His Highness the Imaum for the siege of Sohar; into which place Shaikh Humood, after being defeated in the field, was forced to retreat. The town being closely invested, His Highness directed a number of heavy guns to be landed from his vessels, and batteries to be constructed, for the purpose of opening a breach; but all his plans were completely ruined by Shaikh Humood making a sudden and unexpected sally, by which the Imaum's troops, after a slight resistance, were entirely routed; while, to complete the ill fortune of His Highness, the men of the Beni Nacem Tribe, who had joined him under Rashid bin Humeed, turned their arms against their late allies, and joined the Sohar forces in plundering and cutting them up. The loss on the side of the Imaum was so severe (amounting to four or five





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hundred men) that he judged it advisable to drop all further proceedings, and having patched up a peace with his successful relation, upon nearly the same terms as the former one, he returned to Muskat with both his finances and reputation, already severely shaken, reduced to a still lower ebb by the last unfortunate attempt.

At the present date (December 1831) His Highness is collecting a large force from the Coast of Mukran and the northern ports of the Arabian Gulf. The object of these preparations is not exactly known, but it is generally supposed they are destined for Zanzibar, on the African Coast, whither, it is reported, His Highness intends to proceed in person to attack the island of Mombassa.

### FURTHER CONTINUATION (TO 1844) OF THE PRECEDING SKETCHES,

BY LIEUTENANT KEMBALL, ASSISTANT RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF.

Captain Hennell's Historical Sketches, up to 1831, being a continuation of those drawn up by Mr. Secretary Warden, up to the year 1817, left the Imaum, after a severe loss in finance and reputation, in consequence of the total defeat of his expedition against Shinas, collecting a large force of Beloochees, destined, it was supposed, for the attack of Mombassa, on the African Coast, to be commanded by himself in person.

Early in the year 1832 the Imaum left Muskat for his African possessions, confiding to his son, Syud Hillal bin Saeed, and nephew, Mahomed bin Salim, the direction of his affairs during his absence. Immediately subsequent to his departure, however, these were thrown into the greatest confusion, in consequence of the seizure and imprisonment of the authorities above mentioned, by Saood bin Ali, the Chief of Burka. It appeared that a misunderstanding had in the first instance arisen between the parties, but had been explained on the latter visiting Muskat at the invitation of the Imaum's aunt. Shortly subsequent to this accommodation, Syud Hillal, desiring to visit the district of Rastag and its dependencies, conferred upon him by His Highness's mother, proceeded, with Mahomed bin Salim, to Burka, with the intention of requesting Syud Saood bin Ali to accompany them. They were received with the greatest respect, and persuaded to enter the fort with a few attendants. Some discussion taking place at their morning repast, Saood bin Ali ordered the gates of the fort to be shut, and made them his prisoners. Their servants offering some resistance, three were





killed, and the rest secured. On the receipt of this intelligence, the inhabitants of Muskat were thrown into the greatest consternation: the shops and markets were closed; the Imaum's daughter distributed powder and shot to the guards of the fortresses and defences, and immediately addressed letters to the Imaum, and the British authorities at Bombay and in the Gulf, calling upon the latter for support and assistance. Syud Saood in the mean time proceeded against Musnaah, which was held by the mother of Mahomed bin Salim, and his offer to liberate her son, provided she would surrender the fort into his hands, having been rejected, invested the place.

It being then the policy of the British Government to preserve the integrity of His Highness' dominions, the Resident lost no time in despatching his Assistant, with a respectable naval force, to check the designs of His Highness' enemies, as well as to afford advice and support to the existing Government; and Sultan bin Suggur having by letter communicated his wish to commence hostilities against the Imaum's possessions, and it being also known that Humood bin Azan of Sohar, and Hillal bin Imaum, although not having apparently interfered, were secretly rejoiced at what had taken place, letters were addressed to those chiefs, as well as to the Shaikhs of Aboothabee, Soweik, and Burka, intimating that the British Government had determined to support their ally, and further informing the latter, that the continued detention of his prisoners would lead to a collision with the British Government. Before the naval force could reach Muskat, Sultan bin Suggur had seized Khore Fukaun, Khulla, and Dubba, ports on the Batinah Coast, belonging to the Imaum; and Humood bin Azan, Chief of Sohar, with Shaikh Hillal,\* had prepared to attack Rastag, one of the most important inland places in the Imaum's territory. The latter two had given assistance to the Burka Chief in his attack upon Musnaah; but the Imaum's daughter having succeeded in throwing reinforcements into the place, the siege had been raised. The prisoners had been released and permitted to return to Muskat, and on the Assistant Resident's arrival at Burka, Saood bin Ali disclaimed all intention of rebelling against the Imaum, and protested that he had adopted such strong measures with reference to his kinsmen solely with a view to self-preservation, his life having been threatened by Mahomed bin Salim. To provide against any further aggressions and annoyances, a vessel of war was, at the request of the local authorities, directed to remain at Muskat, until the arrival of His Highness the Imaum, who was expected from Zanzibar in the course of a fortnight, and these authorities were dissuaded from retaliatory measures in the mean time, and advised to turn their attention to the manage-

\* Chief of Soweik.





ment of their internal affairs, and to the security of their persons and possessions from foreign aggressions or treachery. The vessel of war was very shortly withdrawn, its presence being required to give additional force in the demonstration against Ejman. His Highness the Imaum did not, however, return to Muskat until the 10th September, when he addressed the Resident upon the subject of the loss of his towns of Dubba and Khore Fukaun, proposing to leave the matter in his hands; but was informed that British interference, under the circumstances, was not called for, and moreover advised, since his absence from Muskat had been attended with so many disadvantages, to consider the integrity and protection of his hereditary dominions paramount to every other object.

These serious occurrences, as above detailed, were attributable to the imprudent policy adopted by the Imaum, in placing the government of his Arabian possessions in the hands of three individuals whose views and sentiments were notoriously at variance. The superior influence enjoyed by the son and nephew of His Highness, from their position in the capital, appears to have excited the jealousy of the Burka Chief, who (it was asserted) had been led by the Imaum to believe that he was to be looked up to as the head of the Government, during the absence of His Highness on his expedition against Mombassa. The youth of the parties, together with their want of judgment and experience, seemed to have laid them open to the intrigues of several connexions of the Imaum's family, who, to further some secret purposes of their own, spared no pains to foment a misunderstanding among the members of the Government. The consequence was, that a high degree of irritation was excited, particularly in the mind of Saood bin Ali, towards Mahomed bin Salim; and although an apparent reconciliation had been effected through the influence of the Imaum's aunt, yet the unadvised and imprudent visit made by his colleagues to Burka offered too tempting an opportunity of gratifying both his revenge and ambition to be neglected by the chief of that place, and the result was their seizure and imprisonment, and an attempt to surprise the places belonging to the Imaum in its immediate neighbourhood.

The demonstration made in the Imaum's favour by the visit of the British vessels of war to the Coast of Batinah, and their appearance at Muskat, was undoubtedly attended with highly beneficial consequences to the interests of His Highness. The liberation by Saood bin Ali of his prisoners, for so trifling a consideration as 8,000 dollars, was to be attributed solely to the apprehensions excited by his knowledge that an application had been made for British interference. The support thus afforded by the British Government interrupted various intrigues carrying on against the authority of the Imaum, and inspired





a degree of confidence in the minds of His Highness' adherents which could not have been derived from any other source.

A review of the occurrences of the preceding few years, in connection with this repetition of embarrassment, led to the formation of a very unfavourable estimate of the situation of our ally, the Imaum, at this time. It could not, indeed, be concealed, that our influence alone prevented his immediate downfall; and if the policy of the Wahabees had been less peaceable than all accounts concurred in representing it, from their attention being doubtless drawn to their own embarrassments, we should probably have been forced into actual hostilities, for the defence even of his capital itself.

The menacing power of the Wahabees, and the march of their army into the province of Oman, at the invitation of most of the tribes, began now to excite the fears of the Imaum for the integrity of his dominions, and he deemed it his best policy to form a closer connection with them, under the cognisance of the British authorities, who were at the same time fully alive to the critical nature of his situation, and aware, that unless a rupture with this fanatical and restless sect could be averted by the conciliatory policy of the Imaum, British assistance, or a renewed success of the Egyptian arms to the north, could alone enable him effectually to resist their encroachments. It was even to be feared that little confidence could be accorded to their forbearance, if circumstances placed the town and shipping of Muskat within their reach. It was agreed that the Imaum should pay 5,000 German crowns per annum as Zukat to the Wahabee Chief; that each was to hold possession of his own coast according to the limits then existing, the former's extending to Jaalan, the latter's thence to Kateef; and further, an engagement was entered into, binding the parties reciprocally to assist in putting down any rebellions which might arise in their respective territories. The fulfilment of this last article the Imaum assured the Resident, when laying the matter before him by letter, and through his Agent Hajee Hossein Goolam, would depend upon the wishes of the British Government. The line of policy thus marked out and pursued by the Imaum coincided exactly with the views of the British Government, who considered it advisable that His Highness' relations with the Wahabees should remain friendly; but with reference to his being required to act in concert with them, under the terms of the engagement, that he should avoid being led into hostilities on this account. He was accordingly strongly urged against any participation in foreign war, and cautioned against committing himself on points of magnitude, particularly on that of the supremacy of Mahomed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, who might shortly, perhaps, be again at leisure to direct his attention





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to this quarter. The Imaum's assistance having at this time been solicited by either of the parties contending at Bushire (the Governor of Fars and the hereditary chief of that port), he referred the subject for the opinion and sentiments of the Resident, and was by him dissuaded from the exercise of any interference whatever.

A piracy, attended with cruel and aggravated circumstances, committed on a Kutch Nowry off the Coast of Zanzibar, was traced by the Imaum to some of the Beni Hajee Tribe, inhabitants of Soor, a place under his authority. He seized the principal offenders, and placed them at the disposal of the Resident, to be dealt with as he might direct, as also an individual who had been one of the chief actors in the piracy on a Dutch brig in 1829, and who had hitherto evaded detection. This last was sent to the Presidency for trial, but, owing to the absence of evidence to convict him, was returned to Muskat.

About the middle of the year 1834, a further exertion of our influence became necessary, to check the designs of aggrandisement entertained by the Imaum's

A. D. 1834.

relative and dependent Humood bin Azan of Sohar, who had lately taken possession of Rastag, on the death of the governor left in charge of it by His Highness; and Mahomed bin Nasir, another most confidential servant, likewise entrusted by him with the command of places of strength in the interior of Oman, having died, it was feared these might share the fate of Rastag, and that Humood bin Azan, thus in possession of the greater part of the surrounding territory, would become too powerful for the young and imbecile governors in authority at Muskat. The Resident, therefore, on visiting that place, informed him by letter, that if by further aggressions he placed himself in a position of actual hostilities against the dominions of His Highness, he would by so doing incur the penalty of being considered an enemy of the British Government.

Nevertheless, towards the end of the year, Humood bin Azan surprised, and partially gained possession of, the town and towers of Soweik, at a time when the governor and his people were absent on an incursion into the country. Great fears were entertained lest the fall of Soweik should entail that of Musnaah and Burka, and even Muskat itself: boats and troops being therefore immediately sent from Muskat to its relief, Humood bin Azan was compelled to retreat, with the loss of twenty-nine men, not, however, before he had plundered the bazar, and seized property belonging to the people of Muskat to a very large amount. The Muskat boats, in retaliation, plundered several Sohar vessels, and publicly sold their cargo. The popularity and influence of the Chief of Sohar now appeared to be continually increasing in the province of Oman, while the imbecile conduct and





want of energy on the part of the son and nephew of the Imaum daily diminished their authority. These were guilty of a great want of judgment, in attempting to avail themselves of the interested assistance of the Joasmee, Naeem, and Beni-yas Tribes, whereby they opened the door to great disorders in those quarters, likely to entail as much injury upon their own subjects as upon those of their opponents; for, fully aware of the weakness of the Government they were called upon to support, it was not to be expected that these allies would exercise much discrimination between the vessels of friends or foes,—anticipations which were too fully verified.

His Highness subsequently entered into engagements with the Wahabee Chief's Agent in Oman, with a view to the expulsion of Humood bin Azan from Sohar, Rastag, and the other dependencies of Muskat of which he had forcibly and illegally taken possession; and, under the hope that Synd bin Mootluk's support would enable him to accomplish this long desired object, was induced to disburse a large sum of money for the expenses of the expedition. According to previous arrangement, the Wahabee force, consisting of 2,000 men, collected by detachments from the different tribes, after plundering the Coast of Batinah, besieged Sohar by land, while His Highness blockaded it by sea.

The siege had not been long maintained before a misunderstanding arose, which led to its being abandoned, in consequence of His Highness having satisfied himself of the truth of the communication made by a deputation from the besieged, that, Sohar falling, the Wahabee Agent intended retaining possession of it in the name of his superior, Fysul.

Shortly after the above occurrences, His Highness proceeded to the personal superintendence of his African possessions, and, principally through the assistance and gallant behaviour of Esai bin Tarif and his dependents, succeeded, by the capture of Mombassa, which had revolted, in recovering his lost authority.

It having been asserted that His Highness the Imaum had agreed with the Pasha of Egypt to pay him an annual tribute, if placed in possession of the island of Bahrein, although his recent secret instructions from Zanzibar to the regency at Muskat were, apparently, to join cordially with Humood bin Azan in his opposition to the encroachments of Korshid Pasha, if certain that he was *bonâ fide* in the exhibition of hostility; and the establishment of the supremacy of the Egyptians over the province of Oman, and the Arabian shores of the Persian Gulf, being a contingency much to be regretted, it was considered advisable to make the Muskat authori-





ties aware of the line of policy adopted by the British Government, in order to insure their co-operation with the other chiefs and tribes, prepared to do their utmost to maintain their independence, or to secure at least their neutrality. A communication from Syud bin Mootluk, accompanied by a letter from Korshid Pasha to the authorities of Muskat, calling upon them to afford him every assistance, under penalty of being considered in the light of enemies, received no attention, and the bearer was summarily dismissed.

The Imaum's opportune return from Zanzibar, in September 1839, tended to check the disturbances and quarrels which had arisen among some of the tribes only partially acknowledging his authority, and his judicious measures completely restored tranquillity. His Highness, as well as Esai bin Tarif, and the Chief of the Boo Gowarah, who were now in attendance upon him, most earnestly urged upon the British Resident the advisability of his Government taking possession of the island of Bahrein,—a measure which, considering the direct opposition exhibited by its chief to the British policy, his daily drawing closer his connection with the Egyptians, and the universal feeling of disgust and hatred he had caused throughout Bahrein and its dependencies, by his oppressive conduct, and the exactions and tyranny he permitted to be practised by his kinsmen and sons, would, they contended, go greatly to confirm the supremacy of the British Government in the Gulf, and be hailed with delight by every well-disposed individual.

The Imaum lost no time in evincing proofs of his determination to coincide in, and to act up to the views and policy of the British Government, with reference to the Egyptian invasion. He exhorted the Brymee Shaikhs by letter to use every endeavour to maintain their independence, and resist to the utmost of their power the efforts of Bin Buttal, another Egyptian Agent, to obtain possession of their forts, and to rely upon his warmest support in the promotion of this object.

Esai bin Tarif, finding that the British Government was not disposed to guarantee any arrangements which might be entered into between himself and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, or to establish him at Biddah, on the Guttur Coast, under its protection; the possessions of His Highness the Imaum being also too distant from the pearl banks, to admit of his settling there; and most cogent reasons preventing an attack upon Bahrein, in which His Highness' co-operation had been promised, namely the unpleasant contingency of the chief of that island calling in the Egyptians to his assistance, and virtually placing it under their authority; and determining, under any circumstances, upon leaving Aboothabee, proposed to settle with his tribe (thenceforth relinquishing





hostilities against Bahrein, provided its chief maintained a like conduct towards him) on the ruins of Wukra, a town which had been a short time previously abandoned by the Al Boo Eymen, partly from their dread of the enmity of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed,—to whom they had never paid perfect allegiance, and with whom they had been generally on bad terms,—and partly from its possessing only an open roadstead, which afforded little shelter to their vessels.

Deprived, however, of the looked for support of the Imaum,—who, for reasons unknown, most unexpectedly declined acting upon his promises, and, moreover, refused to send his relative Hillal bin Mahomed to Aboothabee, to assist the Al Ali in quitting that place, as had been arranged,—he subsequently found himself under the necessity of leaving the Beniyas port, in opposition to the inclinations of its Chief, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, who, no longer restrained by the influence of His Highness, would most likely instigate the Chief of Bahrein to join in harassing, if not openly attacking, the Al Ali in their new location of Wukra. Under these circumstances, he determined to settle with his tribe upon the island of Ges or Kenn, off the Persian Coast, to which no objection was offered by the British Resident, that location having the advantage of being situated without the restrictive war limit, and therefore secure from attack or molestation by either the Chiefs of Bahrein or Aboothabee; it being, on the other hand, fully understood that himself and followers would be equally precluded from committing any aggressions upon the territories of those chiefs. He was furnished with a letter to the Beniyas Chief, and every proper influence was exerted, to obtain the departure of his tribe without hindrance.

The violent death, in December 1839, through the agency of Baukir Khan, the Tungistan Chief, of Aga Jumal, *de jure* Governor of Bushire, who (so His Highness asserted), after residing under his protection a long period, had proceeded to Tehran, and made the arrangements regarding the government of Bushire as his Agent, and under his guarantee; or rather (as it was subsequently ascertained) for the purpose of negotiating a marriage between him and one of the relatives of the king, was by His Highness looked upon as a personal insult and injury to himself. He therefore contemplated adopting one of two measures,—the first to send up his fleet to that port, and, landing some 5,000 Arabs, completely destroy it; the second, to make a reference to the Shah of Persia regarding the affair, and suspend any ulterior proceedings until it could be seen what punishment His Majesty inflicted upon the murderers. This latter course was, at the advice of the Resident, adopted, and His Persian Majesty, in reply, promised to exact severe retribution for the murder.





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With the view of better carrying out the policy of the British Government towards the Egyptians, and to unite as far as possible the power and resources of the various chieftains, the Resident now applied his mediation and influence to bring about a reconciliation between the Imaum and his kinsman, Humood bin Azan; and the parties having been brought together, a treaty of peace was, after much and violent discussion on the part of the latter, drawn out and signed. The emissaries of the Egyptian Agent were received by the Imaum apparently in the same manner as their predecessors, and the contents of their letters immediately communicated to the British authorities, except on the last occasion, when, no objection being offered by the Government in reply to his communication, he sent return presents to some value to Korshid Pasha, and, in a private interview with his Agent, is said to have made two verbal requests,—the first that the Egyptian commander should demand the surrender of Damaum from the Bahrein Chief; the second, that he should invite Shaikh Esai bin Tarif and his followers to settle at Kateef.

A British Resident was in April 1840 appointed to Muskat, to assume charge (under the general superintendence of the Resident in the Persian Gulf) of the conduct of the political relations in the province of Oman, and along such portions of the coast as could be more conveniently controlled from Muskat than from Karrack. This officer was subsequently created a Consul by the Home Government, and directed to establish his Consulate at Zanzibar, where the Imaum henceforth principally resided.

At the time the blockade of the ports held by the Egyptians was contemplated (May 1840), His Highness, on being called upon, did not hesitate to assure the Government that the whole, or any part of his fleet was at their service whenever required.

His Highness the Imaum, after visiting his possessions in the Persian Gulf,—Kishm, Bunder Abbas, &c.,—accompanied by Syud Humood bin Azan, the Sohar Chief, with a view, as stated by themselves, to prove that the sincere friendship, consequent upon the reconciliation which had been effected between them through the mediation of the Resident, had not been interrupted, proceeded to his African possessions at Zanzibar.

Humood proceeded on a visit to Bombay, where he was received by the Government with all suitable respect and attention, and on his return (in 1841) afforded proof of his sincerity in the lately established friendship with his relative, by the part he took in a case of rebellion which shortly occurred.





About two years previous, one of the Chiefs of Oman, Syf bin Soleyman by name, had been placed in charge of a strong fort, situated between Rastag and Soweik, called Honken, by Syud Hillal bin Mahomed, the Governor of Muskat. Having rendered himself obnoxious to the inhabitants and ryuts by his irregular proceedings, Syf bin Soleyman was removed from his post by Syud Hillal, and another person appointed in his room. Thus affairs remained until the middle of the year 1841, when, taking advantage of the absence of the governor, the deposed chief succeeded in surprising and obtaining possession of the fort of Honken. Upon the intelligence reaching Syud Soweeynee, then Governor of Muskat, he wrote to his kinsman Syud Humood bin Azan, requesting his aid in its recovery, which that chief readily promised. In the mean while, overtures were made to him by Syf bin Soleyman, which he at once rejected, informing him that there was only one course left him to pursue, namely to tender immediate submission to the Muskat Government. Accordingly, finding that all the chiefs of His Highness' family were now united, and that the support he had counted upon from the ruler of Sohar, based upon the enmity formerly subsisting between that personage and the Imaum, was not forthcoming, Syf bin Soleyman begged for quarter, which being granted, he delivered up the fort to the troops of Syud Soweeynee, and proceeded to Muskat, to make his submission to that chief.

Had Syud Humood bin Azan, consulting his own interests, accepted the tempting offer of the fort of Honken, little doubt existed but that the example of Syf bin Soleyman would speedily have been followed by the disaffected Chieftains of Oman; and as the delegated authority of Syud Soweeynee was altogether inadequate to the suppression of such outbreaks, the Arabian provinces of His Highness the Imaum would before long have returned to that state of anarchy and disorder into which they had on former occasions generally fallen during the periods of his protracted absence from Muskat.

The Naeem Tribes of Brymee, instigated doubtless by the Joasmee Chiefs, made a foray in October 1842 into the territories of the Sohar Chief, whose attempts at retaliation were defeated by them, with great loss. He therefore applied for assistance to the Governor of Muskat, and addressed a letter to the Resident, complaining of their ungrateful conduct, after the kindness and friendship he had shown in co-operating with and supporting them against Syud bin Mootluk, the Wahabee-Egyptian General, and intimating his intention to use his utmost endeavours to chastise them, and put an end to their annoyances.

A piracy of a novel and highly dangerous nature occurred about this





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time, of which the following is a detailed account. Six men, originally of Nujd, who had lately been dismissed the service of His Highness the Imaum, took their passage in a small Kishm Buggalow, bound with cargo from Muskat for Bunder Abbas and Kishm. In her, also, were passengers, a Hindee,\* with his three wives and one child. Observing, on embarking, that some valuable property was on board, and that the crew were without arms, the Nujd men determined to make her their prize, and accordingly, on reaching the Coast off Salameh, they rose up, murdered the Nakhoda and Hindee passenger, and wounded one of the crew, which so terrified the remainder that they offered no resistance, and the Nujdees, remaining masters of the vessel, steered a course for Bahrein, when a severe storm compelled them to put in for shelter to Cheroo, on the Persian Coast. The crew, whether from positive ignorance or designedly, declaring themselves incapable of navigating the vessel, they here sent one of their own number on shore to engage a Buggarah, into which, having transhipped the property, they released the Kishm vessel. The crew immediately took her to Kelat, and despatched a messenger overland to communicate the circumstances to Shaikh Khalfan† at Cheroo, who immediately seized and imprisoned the pirates, and, landing the property, gave information to Shaikh Abdool Rahman of Kishm. On the news reaching the Commodore at the naval station, Bassadore, that officer despatched one of the vessels of the squadron to Cheroo, with a letter to the address of the Shaikh of that place, who immediately handed over the six prisoners, and replied that he was only awaiting the arrival of boats from Kishm and Bunder Abbas, to the governors of which places he had written, to deliver over the property. The three women and child, being natives of Hyderabad (Deccan), expressed their wish to return to India. It was accordingly arranged that they should be sent to Bassadore by the boat which conveyed the Kishm property. They nevertheless, by some accident (or design), found their way to Kishm, nor was it until early in the year 1844, and after much strict inquiry and investigation, and some correspondence as to their fate with the Governor Shaikh Syf, who is supposed either to have himself illegally detained them, or exercised some undue influence in their detention, that intimation of their departure for Bombay was received at Bushire.

\* Kerbelah Hoosein, a native of Kirman, but who had for many years past resided in India.

† Shaikh Khalfan, Governor of Aseeloo, happened to be at this time at Cheroo, having temporarily fled his town, with his family and a few attendants, in consequence, probably, of the heavy exaction of the Shiraz or Lar authorities. The Buggarah engaged by the pirates belonged to him.





The six pirates were in January 1843 transferred to the custody of the Shaikh of Kishm, on the understanding that a reference having been made to Government for its decision as to their ultimate disposal, he should restore them, if called upon to do so. Orders having been received in March for their being sent to Muskat, to be dealt with as the Imaum should think proper, they were brought back to Bassadore, whence (one having died in the interim) the remaining five were despatched to the care of Syud Soweynnee, Governor of Muskat, by an opportunity which offered in June, with an intimation expressive of the expectation of Government that their crimes should be visited with adequate punishment.

The civil war at Bahrein was not viewed with indifference by the local authorities at Muskat. The total discomfiture of the chief, who had hitherto so resolutely and successfully frustrated every endeavour of the Imaum against Bahrein, and the disordered state of its affairs, afforded the prospect of carrying into effect His Highness' long cherished design of adding that fertile island to the list of his possessions. Esai bin Tarif, at heart quite as much the enemy of his present ally Mahomed bin Khaal-eefa, with whom his own interests only have led him to make common cause, as of his rival Abdoolla bin Ahmed, had (there existed good grounds for supposing) invited them to make the attempt, and was prepared to join their standard whenever they did so. These were responded to only, in the first instance, by supplies of ammunition and military stores, Syud Soweynnee being unwilling to enter upon so extensive an expedition without the instructions and authority of his father, who was still absent at his African possessions. The latter referred him to the British Government, for whose sentiments he desired that an application should be made. He subsequently wrote himself to the Resident, requesting that the reply might be returned in English, and was informed that the subject had been laid before Government.

The policy of the British Government, though never perfectly approving, had never hitherto interfered to interrupt the views of His Highness: but his own personal absence from the scene of action, and the incapacity and inexperience of his representative; the probability of his giving umbrage to the Wahabees, and thereby endangering the integrity and independence of his own territories in Oman; and the fair excuse that would be afforded to the Persian Government for espousing the cause of the deposed chief (who had already solicited its assistance), in the event of his pursuing an opposite line of policy; and, finally, the circumstance of the ex-chief having been debarred the aid of several of the maritime Shaikhs of Oman, were now important reasons for recommending the maintenance of a perfect neutrality on his part.





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Presents in money to a considerable amount have been sent up by His Highness the Imaum from Zanzibar to all the maritime chiefs, his object being to secure their assistance next year in an expedition he has in contemplation against his rebellious subjects of Seevee, who have lately defeated, with great slaughter, a force sent by him to reduce them to obedience.

A. D. 1844.

### CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT DISBROWE, ASSISTANT RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF.

We learn from the termination of Captain Kemball's Historical Sketches of the Muskat Government, that His Highness the Imaum was at this time meditating an expedition against his rebellious subjects of Seevee, and had been striving, by presents of money, to induce the maritime chiefs of the Arabian Coast to assist him in the undertaking.

A. D. 1844.

The plan was not lost sight of, nor did the Arab Chiefs fail to espouse His Highness' cause; for towards the latter end of December, we find that troops to the number of one thousand left for Zanzibar in the ship *Naseeree* and five Buggalows, the whole commanded by Humeed bin Ahmed. To these must be added the auxiliaries from the Arabian Coast, consisting of "the nephew of Abdoolla bin Rashid, Chief of Amulgavine, with fifty men; Ali bin Rashid bin Humeed, brother to the Ejman Shaikh, in his own Buteel, with sixty men; and Muktoom bin Butye, of Debaye, with three vessels." The result of the expedition we shall learn in the sequel.

About this period (November 1844) the Imaum concluded a Treaty with the King of the French. "A French squadron, commanded by Captain De Fosse, arrived at Zanzibar, armed with full powers to enter into a treaty with His Highness." The latter had already communicated with the British Ministry, in order to obtain their sentiments on the proposed measure; and an intimation having reached him, through Captain Hamerton, that no objections existed to his entering into relations with the French, the Treaty\* with that nation was at once concluded.

During the absence of His Highness at Zanzibar, whither he had proceeded on a visit to his African possessions, the Government of Muskat was left in the hands of his son Syud Soweeynee, a man of a temperament singularly weak and vacillating,—one totally unfit and

\* Copy of this Treaty is annexed.





unable either to uphold the dignity of his father, or to command the obedience of his subjects. Differences arose between the Beni Jaubir and the tribes of the Al Mualik and Al Humeed, residing within the district of Burka: hostilities commenced between Humeed bin Salim, Governor of Musnaah, and the Bedouins; and none of these feuds did His Excellency find himself in a position to compose. Difficulties succeeded difficulties. While harassed by the disaffection of his own people within, news reached of the approach of a Wahabee force from without, and that the troops would shortly arrive at Brymee: Syud Soweeynee was perplexed and embarrassed; the Brymee authorities were in trepidation, and at a loss how to act, "whether to deliver up their forts, or defend their territories." His Excellency had recourse to his usual mode of conduct: he flew for advice to the Resident, and was recommended by that officer to keep up, if possible, a good understanding with the Wahabee Ameer, and to accede to any terms he might proffer, provided such concession did not lower the dignity of his father: if, however, the demands made by Fysul, should prove to be of so imperious and extravagant a nature as virtually to nullify his own independence as Governor, then would he act wisely by representing to the Ameer that without the consent of the British Government, whose ally he was, he never could submit to the requirements that were sought at his hands. Meanwhile, Syud bin Mootluk, the Wahabee Agent, had reached Brymee with all his forces. The holders of the forts, overawed, or thinking resistance useless, handed them over to him without demur. The maritime chiefs, too, proceeded to wait upon him, and did all in their power to manifest good will and respect towards him. Demands were made upon His Excellency Syud Soweeynee, and Syud Humood bin Azan, the Sohar Chief, to the amount of 20,000 and 5,000 reals respectively. Notwithstanding the bitter enmity that originally existed between the Imaum and the Sohar Chief, the reconciliation effected between them, through the mediation of the Resident, appeared to be something more than nominal, as was at the time supposed, and bid fair to prove firm and lasting; for we now find His Excellency Syud Soweeynee and the Sohar Chief drawing more closely to each other, and endeavouring by a coalition to avert the impending danger. Syud Humood was ready to fight the Wahabees, but His Excellency at one time consenting to, at another shrinking back from, the idea of hostilities, it was at length agreed that Syud bin Mootluk should be informed that Syud Humood would at once pay the 5,000 reals required of him, but that His Excellency, ere satisfying the demands that were made upon him, would write to his father for instructions;—until these had arrived he could not pay one farthing of tribute. Such were the terms offered, and to such did Syud bin Mootluk pretend to agree.





The Wahabee influence, which, on first arrival of the Agent, was so great as to endanger the security of the Imaum's dominions, received a severe shock in the open defiance of the Beni Saeed. The people of this powerful tribe set at naught his authority, refused to disburse an iota of tribute, and inflicted chastisement upon his envoys. Syud bin Mootluk threatened to exterminate them, and called upon the chiefs of the coast to assist him. They however, either disgusted at his arbitrary proceedings, or for some other reason best known to themselves, begged to be excused from joining him.

About this time letters arrived from the Imaum to his son, "enjoining him to strengthen Burka, Semayle, and Nukkul, and, in the event of a rupture with the Wahabees, to confine himself to the defence of the forts, and on no account to leave Muskat."

His Highness also intimated the complete failure of the expedition against Sevee: his troops had been defeated with severe loss, and compelled to retire; many of note were slain;—amongst the number Humeed bin Ahmed, who went in command of the expedition, also Nassir bin Ali, late Envoy to England.

Syud bin Mootluk's forces now made a foray into the district of Burka, killed some two or three women, and carried off a number of the latter, as also a large quantity of sheep and camels; and when His Excellency remonstrated, and sought reparation for these aggressive acts, the only reply he received was one couched in terms most overbearing and tyrannical; indeed the Wahabee Lieutenant seemed bent on something more than the mere venting of empty words and threats, and notwithstanding the promise so lately made to Syud Soweynee, that he would await his reply from Zanzibar, appeared to have been meditating immediate mischief; for early in the month of June we find him summoning the Arab Tribes to assemble at a place called Ghoopee, and declaring to them his intention to march upon Muskat forthwith. They on their side were not slow to obey: a large force was speedily collected; from the Beni Kuttub alone did he muster auxiliaries to the amount of 300 horse and 1000 infantry, and from all the rest of the tribes considerable numbers flocked to his standard. Muskat was evidently in danger. So powerful an army could not be withstood with ease, and no hopes of clemency could be entertained at the hands of so determined and merciless an invader. There remained but one alternative, either to resist successfully, or to be humbled excessively. All, however, was disorder and confusion at Muskat: either no one perceived the danger he was in, or, if he did, he cared not whether he was doomed to stand or to fall. Troops there were none, at least deserving of the name of troops. The garrison not long since had been reinforced with an accession from the neighbouring





tribes: they however forsook the place, and returned to their homes. Such was the defenceless state of Muskat, such the lethargy of her inhabitants, when she was threatened by the Wahabees. Her fate seemed inevitable; when the Resident stretched forth a helping hand. On the 25th June 1845 he addressed a letter to the Wahabee Ameer, remonstrating against his proceedings in Oman, and begging him, if he valued the friendship of the British State, not to permit His Highness the Imaum's dominions to be thus invaded. He likewise wrote to Syud bin Mootluk, desiring him to suspend hostilities, pending the receipt of further instructions from his chief, the Ameer. Meanwhile, also, the ships of war were sent to cruise off the Coast of Batinah, and, by constantly showing themselves, manifested the interest felt by the British towards their ally, the Imaum. At this conjuncture, too, while affairs were in so critical a position, fresh advices reached Syud Soweeynee from his father, empowering him, if driven to extremities, to pay to the Wahabee an annual tribute of 6,000 crowns, and desiring him to keep on the best of terms with the Sohar Chief.

The intervention of the Resident, coupled with the opportune arrival of the above instructions, had, no doubt, a salutary effect upon the Wahabee, and inclined him to come to terms more moderate than he probably otherwise would have done; for we find the Ameer hastening to reply to the Resident's communication, and expressing the great feeling of friendship he bore to the British Government; and although he dilated somewhat largely upon his rights to exercise authority over the province of Oman, there can be no doubt he felt and knew that it would be wiser far to waive some portion of his asserted claims, and come to a modified settlement with His Highness the Imaum, than to attempt carrying out his intention to the full, and thereby incur the displeasure of the British power. Whatever his feelings may have been,—whatever his motives,—the matter ended more favourably for the Muskat authorities than they had any right to expect, or deserved. His Excellency Syud Soweeynee engaged in the name of his father to pay an annual tribute of 5,000 German crowns, besides a present on this occasion of 2,000 German crowns to Syud bin Mootluk, which made a total of 7,000 German crowns for the first year,—a sum exceeding by 1,000 the amount authorised by the Imaum. The Wahabee forces were withdrawn; Majees, a dependency of the Sohar Chief, that had been illegally seized upon, was restored, and peace was established.

Scarcely had the above settlement been effected, when disturbances arose in other quarters. The people of Khuthra (a branch of the Beni





Saeed), who, as already stated, had openly defied the Wahabee's authority, were now joined by two other tribes scarcely less powerful than themselves, the Al Saeed and Al Boo Rashid. These three banded together, and resolved to arrest the rising power of the invader: they busied themselves repairing their forts, taking in stores, and arming the population around. Not a messenger of Syud bin Mootluk's was permitted to pass through Batinah unmolested,—some were detained, others beaten. Presently, too, we see the Shaikh of the Nacem Tribe making overtures to the Sohar Chief, and inviting him to join in common cause with himself against the intruders. Syud Humood bin Azan gave a ready ear to the invitation. The Muttowas (a branch of the Beni Saeed) likewise coalesced, and into the hands of the latter did the Sohar Chief transfer his forts, conditioning their immediate surrender to him whensoever the Wahabees no longer stood in their way. Here, then, we have two separate confederacies—both composed of powerful and numerous followers—embarked in the same undertaking. The effect of these leagues must, no doubt, have been highly beneficial, and tended greatly to prevent the inordinate aggrandisement of the Wahabee power in the province of Oman; indeed, when we take into consideration the opposition Syud bin Mootluk met with from the above tribes, the general ill feeling borne towards him by the maritime chiefs and others, and the necessity he found himself under of coming to moderate terms with His Highness the Imaum, it can hardly be doubted that his name had of late somewhat fallen in the eyes of the people, and that he had signally failed in the execution of his proud pretensions.

The affairs of Muskat with the Wahabees having been thus arranged, let us turn and inquire what was doing in other quarters.

The occurrence most worthy of mention, at this period, was the conclusion of a Treaty\* with His Highness the Imaum by Captain Hamerton, Her Majesty's Consul at Zanzibar, in behalf of Her Britannic Majesty, for the suppression of the exportation of slaves from His Highness' African possessions.

The first advances that appear to have been made, towards obtaining the above agreement, were on the occasion of a visit of one of Her Majesty's vessels to Zanzibar, for the express purpose of urging upon His Highness the earnest desire that was felt by Her Britannic Majesty, and the British nation at large, that the traffic in slaves should entirely cease in his dominions. His Highness at the outset showed great reluctance to enter upon the discussion of the subject, and, at an interview with the commander of the vessel, pointed out that such a

\* A copy of this treaty will be found at the end of this Selection.





concession was more than could justly be expected of him. The traffic in slaves, he said, was a lucrative one, and without full compensation he could not dream of prohibiting it. He was informed in reply that Her Britannic Majesty was well aware of the sacrifice he would make by the adoption of Her Majesty's views, and was ready, in the event of His Highness' concurrence in the abolition, to afford him any pecuniary concession he might solicit in reason. This announcement had the desired effect. His Highness took up his position firmly, and at once declared his willingness to concede the point, should Her Majesty, by way of return, think fit to place in his possession the fertile island of Bahrein. This of course could not be done, and he was informed accordingly. I am not aware of the nature of the discussions that ensued; the treaty, however, was concluded on the 2nd of October 1845, and an Act of Parliament for giving effect to its provisions was passed on the 5th of September 1848.

Scarcely a year\* had passed, before news reached the Resident of a gross case of infraction of the engagement,—that, too, by the representative of His Highness at Muskat, his own son, Syud Soweeynee. The circumstances attending the case were these: in the month of November 1847 a vessel laden with slaves from Hodeidah reached Mirbat. At Mirbat the slaves, twelve in number, Abyssinians, were transferred from the ship into a Budun (small boat), and thence conveyed to Muskat, where, in the dead of night, to escape the observation of any British cruisers that might be in the vicinity, they were disembarked. On being landed, their owner openly exposed them for sale, and His Excellency Syud Soweeynee, notwithstanding the sacred engagement so lately entered into, became a purchaser of three of their number. The British Agent at that port very properly addressed His Excellency on the subject, and animadverted in his letter on the injustice of the proceeding. His Excellency absolved himself from all blame in the transaction by urging and insisting that "no prohibition to the purchase and sale of Abyssinian slaves existed in the treaty"; that it only referred to traffic in Negroes and Somalees. It was also ascertained that His Excellency was highly wroth with the British Agent for daring to interfere in the matter; and although he abstained from showing his anger to him personally, that the expressions he made use of when speaking of him to others were most abusive and violent. The case was represented to the Bombay Government, who, through Captain Hamerton, its Agent, desired that His Highness the Imaum would acquaint his son Syud Soweeynee that traffic in slaves of any description whatsoever,—be they Negroes,

\* Not quite a year, for the agreement commenced to take effect on January 1st, 1847, and the sale of slaves took place in November 1847.





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be they Somalees, or be they Abyssinians,—one and all are like prohibited.

The agreement for the suppression of the slave trade was shortly followed by another convention,\* wherein His Highness established certain rules, regulating the amount to be paid by vessels entering the port of Muskat, or any other of His Highness' ports. It was thereby enacted that in all the harbours pertaining to His Highness, a full duty of five per cent. should be exacted on all cargoes transhipped from one vessel into another; that no vessel of any nation should pay duty on cargo landed at any of his ports, should such vessel have either put in through stress of weather, or for purpose of refit, and should such cargo be re-embarked in her; and lastly, it was therein stipulated that on no occasion should duty be charged on stores belonging to the British Government that might be landed at any of His Highness' ports.

The above rules, it will be observed, affect vessels of every nation, and not exclusively those of the British State. I have thought them, however, worthy of a passing notice, believing, as I do, that they owe their origin to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who, on more than one occasion, found himself at a loss how to decide certain claims for immunity from charges on transhipment of cargoes in Muskat harbour, that were referred for his decision by the British Agent at that port. The want of defined regulations for the settlement of such like cases was represented by him (the Resident) to the Bombay Government, and on the 13th April 1846 His Highness was induced to establish the rules above mentioned.

Early in the summer of 1846 attention was called to the disturbed state of affairs that existed in the Imaum's rented possessions on the Persian Coast. The proceedings connected with this affair extending over a period of more than two years, and being well nigh productive of serious complications, it may not be amiss to enter somewhat fully into an account of the cause of the disagreement, and to watch its progress through all its phases.

The Imaum had two grounds of complaint; the first, though it gave rise to much irritation, being comparatively speaking of little importance, shall be told as briefly as possible, and at once disposed of:

In the year 1846 Mahomed Ali Bundera, an influential merchant of Muskat, visited the town of Bushire. Meerza Abbas, at that time governor, hearing that the new arrival was possessed of much wealth, and instigated, it was said, by the evil counsels of one Meer Bauker, a Bushire merchant of no repute, resolved by some means or another to extort from his visitor a large sum of money. Mahomed Ali Bundera

\* A copy of which will be found at page 259 of this Selection.





was called upon to pay over a portion of his riches, and obstinately refused. Recourse was had to harsh measures and ill-usage, but without effect: at last, however, driven to extremities, and finding that preparations were in course to inflict torture upon him, he agreed to pay the sum of 750 Tomans. Having given the above promise, he was released, and contrived to make good his escape from Bushire harbour before he had paid any portion of the money. Meer Bauker pretended that the sum of 750 Tomans was due to himself, for he said that, having guaranteed the payment thereof to Meerza Abbas, he was eventually compelled to disburse the whole amount from his own pocket.

During the preceding year (1845), some seven cases of indigo were sent to Bushire for sale by Syud Mahomed bin Salim of Muskat, nephew to His Highness the Imaum. Meer Bauker, ever seeking a pretext for revenge, and still incensed at the escape of his would be victim, now thought a fitting opportunity for the practice of a little more villany had arrived. He declared Syf bin Salim's indigo to be the property of Mahomed Ali Bundera, and, by means of bribes, and a representation of his claims upon the latter party, induced Meerza Hedayut, acting Governor of Bushire, to seize and confiscate the whole of the boxes. These were transmitted to Shiraz, and no appeals from the Resident either to Meerza Hedayut or to Shaikh Nassir, the *de facto* Governor of Bushire, could effect their relinquishment. The Muskat authorities retaliated, by the seizure of a quantity of silk, belonging to Persian merchants, that was intercepted on its way to the Presidency. Much discussion arose, and many letters were exchanged on the subject of the above "seizure and counter seizure," but it was not until after the lapse of close upon a year that matters were in any way settled or adjusted.

We now come to the second ground of complaint:

This consisted in the despatch of troops by Houssein Khan, the Governor of Fars, against Bunder Abbas, with a view to exacting a large sum of money from Shaikh Syf bin Nubhan, the governor, and the Imaum's deputy in that place.

The Imaum was determined to resent these injuries. He addressed himself to the Governor General of India, "intimating his desire to blockade the port of Bushire," and also wrote to Shaikh Nassir direct, remonstrating with him for the unfriendliness of his behaviour in the matter of the indigo, and telling him plainly that as he understood Persian troops were encroaching upon, and "destroying his possessions in Bunder Abbas, he would retaliate by destroying Bushire."

The chief fears entertained by Shaikh Nassir, on receipt of the above communication, were lest the Imaum, by means of his fleet, should take possession of Karrack.





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The Governor of Fars likewise seems to have had a wholesome dread of the Imaum's naval superiority; for although he did not actually deign to express such feeling, he besought the Resident to pacify and appease His Highness,—to assure him that in no way had Persian troops encroached upon or injured his rented territories,—they had merely been despatched for the purpose of settling affairs on the frontier. The Resident, in reply, refused to interpose, until the illegally confiscated indigo had been restored to its lawful owner. In this refusal, too, was he justified, for the Persian Ministers had both disavowed the military proceedings of Houssein Khan, and commanded the immediate restitution of the indigo. That they were not sincere, however, in their professions of disavowal, is plain, for two reasons,—the indigo was not restored until after much evasion, and troops were again marched into the vicinity of Bunder Abbas, Meenao being actually invested by Fuzl Ali Khan, the Governor of Kirman.

Syf bin Nubhan lost all patience, and was on the point of himself carrying into execution the threats made by His Highness of blockading the ports on the Persian Coast, when an intimation reached him from the Resident, "that he would not be permitted to carry on hostilities at sea in the name of his master, and thus disturb the peace of the Persian Gulf." His designs of retaliation were thus frustrated, and he had recourse to another line of conduct. He promised Fuzl Ali Khan, in the event of his raising the siege of Meenao, and withdrawing his troops, that he would disburse to him the sum of 12,000 E. I. Company's Rupees. Whether or not the money was paid, or whether Syf bin Nubhan merely guaranteed its payment, with a full intention to break his promise so soon as a favourable opportunity presented itself, I know not. Ruse or no ruse, however, it had the desired effect: hostilities against Meenao were suspended, and the districts were evacuated by the Kirman army.

His Highness had up to the present time behaved with much forbearance, and entirely abstained from acts of aggression; but in October 1848, perceiving that no amends were likely to be made for the insults offered to his dignity, and the wrongs done to his territories, he again wrote to the Resident, reiterating his request for sanction to proceed against the ports on the Persian Coast. The Resident had hitherto sent no direct reply, but confined himself to doing all in his power to dissuade the Imaum from entertaining the idea of a blockade; to assuring him that such an act would in the end prove detrimental to his own interests; and to holding out to him hopes that, through the exertions of the British Envoy at the capital in his behalf, justice would yet be done,—amends would still be made: but now the aspect





of affairs was greatly altered,—indeed it is difficult to say where matters might have ended, or what disturbances might not have arisen, had not His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghasee, then Prime Minister at the Court of Persia, withdrawn from office, consequent upon the death of Mahomed Shah, which occurred at this season, and been succeeded by a Minister more favourable to British views, and more inclined to give ear to justice; for instructions had been issued by the Supreme Government to the Resident, in reply to a reference he had made on the subject, that he was not to thwart or prevent His Highness from carrying into execution his threat to blockade the Persian ports, in the event of redress being refused him. These instructions had arrived, and the Imaum had become desperate. Meerza Aghasee's successor was appealed to. He promised redress; he fulfilled his promise: Fuzl Ali Khan was removed from his post, and matters were peaceably settled.

On taking a retrospective review of the whole course of events, we cannot but think that the Persian Ministers, previous to the demise of Mahomed Shah, however much they appeared to disapprove of the conduct of their subordinates, they did not do so in reality. On the other hand, the Imaum, although, perhaps, all things considered, he may be said to have acted with much forbearance and moderation, conducted himself, it must be admitted, with considerable hastiness in the outset. The opinion of the Resident at the time was that had His Highness, in lieu of threatening to take the law into his own hands, plainly and soberly laid his grievances before His Majesty the Shah, full redress would have been afforded for any amount of wrongs he had suffered at the hands of the Persian Government; but the precipitate line of conduct His Highness adopted, the objectionable tone of his written address to Shaikh Nassir, the proneness to take offence displayed by Shaik Syf bin Nubhan,—these all tended to provoke and exasperate the Persian Ministers, and, naturally enough, to shut out every hope of a peaceable settlement.

To speculate, however, on what might or might not have been the result of this matter, appears both idle and profitless; let us therefore retrace our steps, and ascertain what was going on in other quarters.

Towards the close of the year 1847, His Highness the Imaum espoused a grand-daughter of the late Fath Ali Shah. This marriage occasioned considerable surprise to many, for no one had in any way heard of the proposed match until the lady made her appearance at Muskat, on her way to join His Highness at Zanzibar. No political importance, it may be observed, was attached to this Persian connexion by the British Minister at the capital.





Before entering upon the subject which now commands our chief attention, and led to such grave results,—I mean the conflict between the Muskat and Sohar Chiefs,—it is necessary that I should briefly describe a case of murder and piracy that had caused much agitation for a period of two years, and also make a short notice of a fresh treaty entered into by the British nation, for the abolition of the slave trade.

First, then, the piracy. So far back as the latter end of the year 1846, news reached the British Agent at Muskat of the destruction by fire of a Bombay Buggalow, under British colours, off the island of Busheab, on the Persian Coast. Other rumours likewise were freely circulated, regarding the fate of the above vessel. I shall not recount the numerous steps that were taken to establish the facts of the case, nor how the pirate and murderer contrived for a considerable time to evade the hands of justice; but simply give an outline of what did really occur, and in what manner the criminal was eventually disposed of.

In the month of September 1846 a Buggalow, belonging to Nansee Thakersee, a Bombay merchant, set sail from Muskat for the Presidency. She was commanded by one Ahmed bin Dad Kureem, a Beloochee, Native of Muttra, subject to the Imaum of Muskat. Having arrived in the vicinity of the island of Busheab, Ahmed bin Dad Kureem formed the project of plundering, and possessing himself of all the treasure in the vessel. He seems in the first instance to have endeavoured to carry out his purpose by stealth, and quietly, for in the dead of night, whilst the supercargo, in whose charge the money was, was asleep, he repaired to the treasure chest, and was in the act of making off with its contents, when one Moorad, a sailor on board, remonstrated with him, and caused him to desist. The Nakhoda's plans being thus frustrated, he resolved to rid himself of his opponents, and to perform by force what he was unable to do by stealth. The following night, accordingly, at an advanced hour, whilst his unsuspecting victims were in a profound sleep, he, with a number of his followers, fell upon and savagely butchered both Moorad and the supercargo: he likewise put an end to the existence of an unfortunate slave, who happened to be standing by at the time. Some of the crew, affrighted, leaped into the sea; many took part in the bloody deed; and the rest, however well disposed in their hearts to resist, were too much overawed by the fierce brutality and fiendish threats of the Nakhoda and his accomplices, to dream of opposing them. Ahmed bin Dad Kureem vowed instantaneous death to any man of the party who would not take the oath of the Zun-tullak\* to keep inviolate secrecy. They then, one and all, nine-

\* The most solemn form of oath among Arabs—"By the divorce of the wife."





teen in number, embarked with the Nakhoda in the long boat, having previously set fire to the Buggalow, and collected the treasure in date jars. Six of the men, notwithstanding that they had taken the oath required of them, fell victims to the Nakhoda's suspicions, and were cruelly slaughtered; two others, fearful for their lives, let themselves down into the sea close to Shinas, and swam ashore, whence they proceeded to Lingah, and back to Muttra, their native city. Scarcely had they reached the latter place, before they were seized and conveyed to Muskat, as accomplices of Ahmed bin Dad Kureem's.

For a length of time they denied all knowledge of the matter, and assured both His Excellency Syud Soweeynee and the British Agent that, so soon as the vessel caught fire, they threw themselves into the sea, to save their lives; that they knew nothing further. Guilt, however, attached itself too strongly to these individuals to permit of their story being credited. Recourse was had to intimidation, and preparations were even made for inflicting torture upon them; when, on being promised full pardon and liberty, they turned informers, and related all that had occurred.

In March 1847, after endless search and trouble, Ahmed bin Dad Kureem was likewise apprehended, and conveyed to Muskat, where, on being examined, and told that there was evidence forthcoming to convict him of his dastardly act, he at once confessed his guilt, and threw himself upon the mercy of his accusers. The matter of his trial was referred to the Bombay Government, who desired he might be tried before the Native court in Muskat, and suffer such punishment as the judicial authorities in that town might think fit to award.

His Excellency Syud Soweeynee, strange to say, did not so much as consult the court of justice regarding the punishment to be inflicted, nor did he cause any form of trial whatsoever to be undergone by the prisoner, but simply and plainly pronounced sentence of death upon him. His execution took place on the 5th day of October 1848, in the presence of the whole concourse of the Muskat population.

We now come to the Treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade.

A. D. 1849. This engagement was one entered into by the Chief of Sohar with the British Government, to-

wards the latter end of the spring of 1849. The reins of the Sohar Government were at the time held by Syud Humood bin Azan's son, Syud Syf bin Humood, and not by himself, he having been compelled to resign his authority into the hands of the former some considerable time previous. It is needless entering into detail on this subject;





suffice it to say that the provisions of the treaty were similar in extent and purport to those contained in the convention concluded with His Highness the Imaum in 1845, and that they came into operation on the 22nd of June 1849.

To preserve the connection of the British relations with the Sohar and Muskat Governments, and for a right understanding of the subject before us, it is necessary that we should, ere plunging into the thick of the conflict that at this time occurred, step back a little, and watch the risings of jealousy that so shortly led to a rupture.

The reconciliation effected between His Highness the Imaum and Syud Humood bin Azan by the Resident, in 1839, promised for a length of time to keep firm and stable; but the imbecility of His Highness' representative, Syud Soweynce, the utter want of decision and courage displayed by him during his late struggle with the Wahabees, the little or no support he proffered when the Sohar Chief desired to withstand the invaders, and sought his assistance,—all these things contributed to alienate Syud Humood bin Azan, and drove him to disregard his should-be ally, and look for aid from others.

It is mentioned in the early part of this narrative, that on the occasion of the Sohar Chief entering into a confederacy with a number of tribes against the Wahabees, he transferred his inland fortresses to the charge and holding of the Muttowas. This measure gave much offence to His Excellency Syud Soweynce, and greatly excited his fears: he looked upon the proceeding as one full of danger to himself, and forming but the commencement of a series of frauds;—he thought his kinsman was aspiring to the Imaumship. The instalment of the Muttowas was shortly followed by the direct interference of Humood bin Azan with the affairs of His Highness. He wrote to a number of tribes, desiring them to associate themselves with his interests, and to forsake their allegiance to the Imaum. This increased the apprehensions of the Muskat Governor, and led him to pour forth his tale of grievances to the Resident. The Sohar Chief was called upon to afford explanation of his conduct, and received warning that any acts of aggression by him upon the Imaum's dominions would be viewed in a most serious light by the British Government. Syud Humood's reply was highly characteristic, and portrayed the feelings he held towards the Muskat authorities. He denied the accusation wherewith he was charged, and assured the Resident that Syud Soweynce's appeals should never be attended to, for he was weak and fanciful as a child, and incapable of discerning good from evil!

Presently, however, at the time when Syud Humood had been deprived of power by his son, we find the integrity of the Sohar





Government placed in jeopardy, by the impolitic measure of leaving the defence of its forts to a foreign and powerful tribe. The Muttowas, a warlike and ambitious race, took advantage of every opportunity to strengthen themselves in their present position, and by degrees succeeded in usurping all authority. They proclaimed themselves the lawful possessors of the Sohar forts, and contrived, by a combination of rare dexterity and force, to eject therefrom Syf bin Humood, then chief of the place; they also seized upon Syud Ghes, brother of Syud Humood, and to prevent all chance of either regaining his lost possessions, they cast them both into prison.

Syud Syf after a while effected his escape, and calling in Shaikh Kahtan bin Syf, the Shinas Governor, to his assistance, made a vigorous and sudden attack upon Sohar, expelled the Muttowas, and re-established himself in authority. This authority was not, however, to remain with him long. The father, ever jealous of the son, resolved to destroy him, and hired the confidential servant of his master to carry into execution his base and treacherous purpose: Syud Syf was assassinated in his bed, and the murderer resumed his position.

Such was the posture of affairs in Sohar when Syud Soweeynee appeared off Shinas in his frigate the *Fyz Allum*. The immediate object of his visit was to act in concert with Syud bin Tahnoon, the Aboothabee Chief (with whom His Excellency was now in close alliance), against Syud bin Mootluk, the Chief of the Wahabees. He also found his presence necessary in that quarter to counteract the plans of the Joasmees, who were mediating an attack upon His Highness' forts of Shinas, Khore Fukauun, and Ghulla.

On arrival, His Excellency expressed a desire to hold an interview with Syud Humood bin Azan, for the purpose of renewing his friendly relations with that chief, and restoring to their original footing the terms of the treaty concluded between Syud Saeed and himself. The Sohar Chief cheerfully responded to this apparently generous appeal, and hastened to wait upon His Excellency. Their first interview was held at a place called Mudwal, situate between Sohar and Shinas, and was shortly followed by another at Shinas itself, on which latter occasion, so little did Syud Humood suspect His Excellency of treachery, so convinced was he of the sincerity of his professed motives, that he alighted at Shinas unattended by escort, without retinue,—his only attendants consisted of one confidential servant, and other followers to the number of ten;—this, too, at a time when His Excellency had come in a ship equipped for war,—when a land force destined to co-operate with the Aboothabee Chief against Brymee had arrived on the spot.

Let us now proceed to relate the result of the meeting,—let us learn





with what generosity and faithfulness His Excellency was led to respond to the advances of his unsuspecting guest.

After receiving a visit from Syud Humood bin Azan, it was proposed that they should proceed inland on a pleasure excursion, whereby they could enjoy change of air and scene, and also freely discuss any matters that had to be arranged between them. They did so. Much cordiality was evinced on either side, and perfect concord had existed on every subject, until His Excellency expressed a hope that the Sohar Chief would join Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon and himself in the proposed expedition against Brymee. On this point, however, Syud Humood was not to be moved; no words, no arguments could induce him to waver: he had but one reply,—he could not, he would not, join His Excellency; he was in strict alliance with the Al Boo Khureyban, and they were averse to the project;—he could not, he would not, assist in the expedition.

This unexpected display of stubbornness on the part of his guest greatly incensed His Excellency, and led him to commit a breach of faith and hospitality rarely equalled, I believe, in Arab history. He determined to make his guest a captive; and at Shinas he caused him to be seized, bound, and conveyed to the frigate in chains. He then issued orders for the immediate march of the land forces upon Sohar, and himself proceeded thither by sea. On the arrival of the troops before the fort, Syud Ghes (brother of Syud Humood) was called upon to surrender: he sent for reply a charged salute from his batteries. The fort was invested both by land and by sea. Syud Ghes applied to Shaikh Sultan for succour, and engaged, in the event of being freed from his present difficulties, to pay him a yearly tribute not less in amount than that he had hitherto paid to the Wahabees. He also promised to co-operate with him against Shinas, and the other forts of His Highness on the Batinah Coast.

Such an appeal was not likely to be disregarded by the Joasmee, whose grasping and ever calculating spirit perceived at a glance what a golden harvest was in store; for not only did he feel that Syud Ghes was purchasing help by an acknowledgment of his own subserviency, but he also entertained rich ideas of personal aggrandisement in the direction of Batinah. The Sohar Chief's terms were speedily closed with, and troops were despatched to his immediate assistance. In the mean time Syud Soweeynee, as was his custom, had met with naught but reverses: his troops had been defeated by a handful of the Sohar garrison, who sallied forth from their defences; the Al Saeed and other tribes refused to espouse his cause; the Joasmee succours were daily expected;—in fact, there seemed no chance of success. His Excellency therefore raised the siege, and returned to





Muskat. Syud Ghes now hastened to join the force of Shaikh Sultan, and on his arrival, the combined armies laid siege to Shinas. The resistance offered by Shaikh Kahtan bin Syf was stout and obstinate,—he well sustained his reputation for courage and valour; and had Syud Soweynnee ably supported him, he might have been spared the pain of surrender. His munitions, however, ran out, ineffectual attempts were made to introduce fresh supplies, and on the 10th May 1850 Shinas was compelled to surrender. Khore Fukaun shared the same fate,

A. D. 1850. after a siege of two days; Ghulla had already fallen; and thus, in an incredibly short space of time, did the whole of the Batinah Coast, from Merya to Cape Musseldom, fall into the hands of the Joasmee Chief and Syud Ghes bin Azan.

The season of the pearl fishery was now at hand, and all parties became anxious for a temporary cessation of hostilities. The troops of Shaikh Sultan therefore returned to Ras-ool-Khyma, and through the mediation of the Al Saeed was a four months' truce effected between Syud Soweynnee and his kinsman Syud Ghes bin Azan.

Let us now revert to the prisoner, Syud Humood bin Azan, and inquire how he fared in his dungeon. The treatment he experienced at the hands of Syud Soweynnee was of a very severe character: he was loaded with chains, and confined in a place of heat unbearable; no liberty, no comforts, no freedom from restraint, was accorded him; health gave way, and nature quickly sank under such cruel usage.

When the news of his brother's death reached Syed Ghes, his fiery temper became inflamed with exceeding rage: he burned for revenge; and eagerly sought for a victim whereon to vent his fury. He sought not in vain: the brave and courageous Shaikh Kahtan bin Syf was caught intriguing, cast into prison, and doomed to perish.

Such were the scenes of bloodshed and murder that clouded the annals of Muskat history,—such the bitter fruit of Syud Soweynnee's policy: nor was there any prospect of better days to come.

The Resident had exhausted every argument, and done all in his power to effect a mediation between the furious rivals,—he had even proceeded to Muskat in person, and striven to reconcile them; but such rivals were not to be reconciled. What then should be done? Were the contending parties to be permitted to plunge anew into all the horrors of a fierce and bloody warfare? Was the British Government to remain a passive observer of injuries inflicted upon their old and steadfast ally the Imaum, at a time too when he was far away? To a certain extent they were. The British Government ever refrained from active interference with the inland affairs of the Arab Tribes, and much as they grieved at the present effusion of blood, they viewed with too much





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pain and sorrow the injustice and wrongs committed by Syud Soweynee, to dream of supporting his cause. They did not, however, forsake His Highness in the hour of distress: they counselled his immediate return to his disturbed possessions; they animadverted with the greatest delicacy upon the conduct of his son and representative; they pointed out the course that appeared most fitting for His Highness to pursue;—they offered, in fact, every moral support in their power. His Highness gave heed to the friendly warning, and repaired with haste to Muskat. The well known character of Syud Saeed for moderation and justice gave every room for hope that matters might once more be restored to peace and quietness.

Syud Ghes was however called upon to restore the forts he had lately seized with the assistance of his ally Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, on the Batinah Coast. He refused, and hostilities were at once commenced. His Highness proceeded to Khaboora, with two ships and a number of Soor boats, having previously despatched a force by land under the command of Syud Soweynee, to invest the place.

The campaign opened in September 1851, and began auspiciously

A. D. 1851.

enough for the cause of His Highness: Kasbeeah fell without a struggle; Khaboora was taken after a bombardment of two days' duration; and other preparations were in course, when His Highness effected a meeting with Sultan bin Suggur, and induced him to abandon the cause of the Sohar Chief.

Deserted by the Joasmees, opposed by the combined forces of Syud Saeed and the Shaikh of Debaye,\* Syud Ghes stood but little chance of success. He turned, however, to bay, with much display of fierceness, and strove to meet his opponents single-handed. They proved too strong for him: Shinas fell an easy prey to the allied armies, and Syud Ghes was compelled to surrender. Sohar was handed over to His Highness; Rastag and Hebee remained in possession of Syud Ghes, who also received from the Muskat Government a pension of 200 dollars per mensem,—a poor indemnity indeed for all the wrongs he had suffered.

In the month of May 1852 occurred the loss of the British ship

A. D. 1852.

*Centaur* off Ras-ool-Hud, in the country of the Beni Boo Ali. She ran ashore in a thick fog at the hour of midnight, close to a place called Al Khubba, and no efforts of the crew could succeed in getting her off.

At daylight on the following morning, the Arabs, perceiving the helpless condition she was in, poured down in shoals upon her, and plundered her of the whole of her valuable cargo, which consisted of 1,600 chests of indigo, besides rice, sugar, and other goods, valued in the

\* The British Agent at Shargah reports in one of his letters that "the Shaikh of Debaye proceeded to Muskat with 500 men, in nineteen vessels."





aggregate at ten or eleven lakhs of rupees. The crew, overpowered by numbers, left the vessel, and proceeded to Muskat in three Native boats that were hired for the purpose from the people of Soor. Every possible exertion was made by the Resident and other political officers to recover the plundered property, but so scattered had it become, and so far inland had it probably travelled, that there remained but little chance of success. The vessel was destroyed by the Arabs.

The disorders of the Muskat Government, that had been appeased by the arrival of His Highness Syud Saeed, and the measures he adopted, were merely suspended for a time. It was not likely, indeed, that the line of conduct pursued by His Highness, however well it succeeded in humbling the pride of the Sohar Chief, and wresting from him the possessions he had so lately acquired, should tend to restore order of a permanent character.

Towards the close of the year 1852, His Highness Syud Saeed left Muskat, and returned to Zanzibar, and his African possessions. His departure was the signal for revolt : fresh disturbances arose ; signs of disaffection were freely manifested by the tribes in Batinah, and the whole of His Highness' dominions was in a blaze with dissensions. At this conjuncture, too, the advancing steps of the Wahabee Chief were heard thundering once more in the distance. He came in the character of arbiter and redresser of wrongs suffered by his children (the Shaikhs) in Oman. He took up his position at Brymee, and summoned the chiefs to attend him. The force despatched on this occasion was so unusually large, and entrusted to the command of so influential a person,—that person being no less than a son of the great Ameer himself,—that all the tribes, struck with awe, hastened to meet its commander, and seemed to vie with each other in acts of submission and homage towards him. The maritime chiefs, too, repaired with haste to pay their addresses, and to relate their tales of woe.

Scarcely had Abdoolla bin Fysul arrived, ere he sent forth demands for the immediate cession of Sohar, and the payment of tribute so large in amount that it was plain he sought but a pretext, in the refusal that must of necessity follow, to attack and lay waste the districts of Batinah. The Sohar Chief, it cannot be doubted, added fuel to the flame, by recounting with fiery eloquence the wrongs he had suffered, the indignities that were heaped on his ill-fated brother. A blow, it was manifest, was about to be aimed at His Highness' dominions, that would imperil their safety, and endanger their integrity. The aspect of affairs was gloomy indeed, and had it not been for the opportune presence of the Resident on the Arabian Coast, and the steps he adopted to stay the storm, coupled with the noble stand of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon in support of His Highness, matters would have proved most





truly serious; for not only was His Highness threatened with ruin by the confederacy in league against him, but great fears also existed lest a renewal of the Maritime Truce, about to expire, should not be effected ere hostilities commenced. The Resident had proceeded to the coast for the express purpose of arranging a firm and lasting peace among the Arab Tribes, and now so engrossed was their attention with the designs of the Wahabees, that not one of their number found himself either able or willing to return to his post. It seemed highly probable, therefore, that unless the crisis had passed ere the coming month of June, either His Highness would fall a prey to his enemies, and maritime disorder in every shape and form arise, or else the British representative must act, on his own responsibility, with a degree of coercion entirely opposed to the rules of British policy.

Such was the position of affairs when the Resident reached the Coast of Arabia,—a position, it must be admitted, highly difficult and embarrassing. He at once addressed a letter of strong remonstrance to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, charging him in the name of the British Government to abstain from intriguing, and desiring him to return to his seat, to meet the British representative, who awaited his coming. Syud Soweeynee was likewise apprised of his presence, and his intention, if dangers thickened, to repair to Muskat in person, for the purpose of assisting him. To Abdoolla bin Fysul was conveyed the extreme surprise of the Resident that any circumstances whatsoever should induce him to prevent the Shaikhs from obeying his call. These measures, backed by the presence of a vessel of war sent to cruise on the Arabian Coast, together with the decided tone of opposition adopted by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, tended greatly to restrain the Wahabees. His Excellency hastened to Sohar, placed the fort in a state of defence, and assumed a hostile attitude.

After some display of hesitation, the plan of attacking Batinah was abandoned, and a series of negotiations entered upon, which ended in a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Syud Soweeynee and Abdoolla bin Fysul, whereby the Muskat Government agreed to pay to the Wahabee Ameer an annual tribute of 12,000 crowns, besides arrears to the extent of 60,000 crowns, and the usual supply of provisions and stores. The Wahabee likewise pledged himself to assist His Excellency in every hour of difficulty; and the boundaries of the dominions of either remained as heretofore.

Matters remained in this condition for a length of time, when fresh difficulties presented themselves. So strong was the ill-feeling of the tribes of Batinah towards Syud Soweeynee, that they nearly one and all refused to disburse one farthing of tribute. Disturbances raged on every side: the Wahabee

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commenced calling aloud for tribute, and threatened an invasion should it not be speedily paid to him. His Excellency referred Abdoolla bin Fysul to the terms of the treaty, and called upon him to bring back the rebels to allegiance. He did so, though with reluctance, and in the month of December 1853 the tribes became reconciled to His Excellency, and an amicable arrangement was concluded between himself and Abdoolla bin Fysul.





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BRIEF NOTES,  
CONTAINING  
INFORMATION ON VARIOUS POINTS CONNECTED WITH  
HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT;  
AND  
THE NATURE OF HIS RELATIONS WITH THE  
BRITISH GOVERNMENT, &c.

BY  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ATKINS HAMERTON,  
H. M.'S CONSUL, AND E. I. CO.'S AGENT, IN THE DOMINIONS OF H. H. THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT.

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*Submitted to Government on the 24th March 1855.*

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BRIEF NOTES,

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMERTON, *Her Majesty's Consul, and the Honorable East India Company's Agent, in the Dominions of His HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT, containing Information on the following points connected with His Highness, his Form of Government, &c:—*

- I.—Name, title, and age (in 1855) of the Imaum of Muskat.
- II.—Usual place of residence.
- III.—Names and ages of the legitimate male issue, and of the principal persons of the Court.
- IV.—Whether tributary or not.
- V.—Estimated gross annual revenue.
- VI.—Boundaries of territory, and estimated area in square miles.
- VII.—Prevailing nature of the soil, usual means of irrigation, and general features of the country.
- VIII.—Natural and industrial resources.
- IX.—Routes, approaches, and means of communication by land and water.
- X.—Climate, and average range of thermometer.
- XI.—Average annual fall of rain.
- XII.—Estimated population.
- XIII.—Religion, language, tribes, and castes.
- XIV.—Brief notice of the mode in which civil and criminal justice are administered.
- XV.—Nature of punishments awarded for criminal offences.
- XVI.—Educational measures.
- XVII.—Progress of vaccination.
- XVIII.—Prevalent diseases.
- XIX.—Nature of the relations of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat with the British Government.





## MUSKAT.

I.—THE present Ruler, or Sultan of the Kingdom of Oman, in Arabia, and its dependencies on the Coast of Africa, Syud bin Sultan, commonly called the Imaum of Muskat, is\* in the sixty-fifth year of his age.

Name and Title of the Imaum.

He succeeded to the government on the death of his uncle, Badr bin Halal, in the early part of the year of the Hijree 1222 (in the month of March A. D. 1807), date of the month unknown.

Usual Place of Residence.

II.—Either at Muskat or Zanzibar; but the Imaum mostly resides at the latter place.

Names and Ages of Legitimate Male Issue, and of the Principal Persons of the Court.

III.—The Imaum has ten sons living, all by concubines (legitimate amongst Arabs), whose names and ages are as follow :—

- 1, Syud Soweynee bin Saeed, aged thirty-four years.\*
- 2, Mahomed bin Saeed, aged twenty-nine years.
- 3, Turkee bin Saeed, aged twenty-three years.
- 4, Majed bin Saeed, aged twenty years.
- 5, Burgash bin Saeed, aged eighteen years.
- 6, Abdool Wahab bin Saeed, aged fifteen years.
- 7, Jamsheed bin Saeed, aged thirteen years.
- 8, Haurdan bin Saeed, aged twelve years.
- 9, Sawedan bin Saeed, aged ten years.
- 10, Abdool Azeez bin Saeed, aged five years.

Primogeniture amongst Arabs is not acknowledged as giving any *bonâ fide* right of succession.

There are but two men who can be fairly said to be principal men of the Court, who interfere in affairs of Government: one is at Muskat, Saeed Mahomed bin Saban, the Imaum's nephew, a clever man, of about forty years of age (he is a sort of adviser with the Imaum's son, Syud Soweynee, the Governor of Muskat); and the other at Zanzibar,

\* A. D. 1855.



Saeed Sulymaun bin Hamed, not related to the Imaum. He is not a clever man, but a kind, good sort of person: he is the adviser of the Imaum's son at Zanzibar, and was Regent during the minority of the Imaum's late son the Governor, the Prince Khalid, who died in November 1854. This man has much influence with the pagan chiefs on the Coast of Africa. All the respectable men at Muskat and Zanzibar generally attend daily at the Durbar, or when the Imaum holds his assembly, three times a day. They do not interfere in the Government; but if called on by the Imaum they would do as desired. There are many of these men highly respectable, and wealthy for men in these countries. The Imaum has not any regular Ministers, or Secretaries for different departments; he has two men who write his letters, and convey messages to Europeans. These men are ill paid. His Highness employs his Nakhodas (who all speak English) when transacting business with Europeans, and these men are supposed to be the Ministers by strangers. Some of the Nakhodas speak French.

IV.—The Imaum is not exactly tributary to any one, but he pays 12,000 dollars a year to the Wahabee Chief of Nujd, Fysul bin Abdoolla bin Saeed, on account of certain of the tribes in Oman, which it is said the Wahabee Chief has a right to.

Tributary or not; and, if so, to whom, and Annual Amount of Tribute.

Estimated Value of Gross Annual Revenue.

VI.—There are no means of ascertaining the boundaries of the Imaum's territories, or the estimated area in square miles. No maps exist of the Imaum's dominions, nor is there any person who could define the boundaries.

Boundaries of Territory, and Estimated Area in Square Miles.

VII.—In the Imaum's Arabian territories, the soil is generally sandy and poor, but black earth exists in some parts, in the Wadis or ravines. Irrigation is mostly from wells. The country is composed of sandy plains, with mountains, and intersected much with ravines or Wadis, in which the most part of the cultivation is carried on. It is a country fit for Arabs, and for no other people.

Nature of the Soil, Means of Irrigation, and general Features of the Country.

VIII.—The date is the chief article; barley the principal grain; some wheat; but little rice. Wheat is exported from Muskat, and called Muskat wheat, but it is brought from Persia. The animals are horses, camels, sheep, and goats, in great numbers. Fish of great variety, and quantity, of most excellent quality, are caught all along the coast, and salted, dried, and largely exported. There are also black cattle, but not numerous; of small species, but the flesh is excellent. The industrial resources are

Natural and Industrial Resources.





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almost nothing: woollen cloths, useful to Arabs only, for tents and cloaks; some cottons of a good quality, used only by Arabs; silks, also used by Arabs; leather, but of poor quality; iron, chiefly arms. Oman cannot be said to have an export trade in manufactures; most things now required are imported. Yet in Oman, formerly, there existed considerable manufactories of silks, and mines were also worked in various places. I have seen old mines in several places, but the Arabs had not even any tradition regarding them. I always got the constant answer of the Arab, touching anything of which he knows nothing (and indeed they do know but very little, and care to know but little),—Allah Acem hadha row shugne fil Aciom ul Kaffar! (God knows; it was some affair or business in the days of the unbelievers!)

IX.—As to routes, a man may take the one which pleases him,—at

Routes, and Means of  
Communication by Land  
and Water.

one time of the year one way, at another some other route, as he can find water. Oman can be approached in many places, and entered from the sea; from the interior, from the Hadlur al

Mant, the Hajaz, or from Nujd; and the Imaum's African dominions are all open to the sea. The natural resources are incalculable: the sugar grown in Zanzibar is as fine as any in the world, but with Arabs the natural resources of a country will never be developed. The cloves answer the Arab well, because they grow with so little care; the Arabs here are all growing rich from the sale of their cloves.

X.—The climate of Oman in the interior is said to be good, but the

Climate, and Average  
Range of the Thermo-  
meter.

coast is very unhealthy for four months in the year: the heat is truly terrible in April, May, June, and July. In and about Muskat is

supposed to be the greatest heat in the world.

In the Imaum's African possessions, the climate is certainly unhealthy for Europeans, on the coast, and in the adjacent islands. The highlands in the interior are supposed to be healthy, but they have not as yet been tried. The range of the thermometer in Oman I do not know, nor of the range of it in Africa, except at Zanzibar, where it is from 71° to 90°.

XI.—What it may be in Arabia I know not, but little rain falls. On

Average Annual Fall of  
Rain.

the Coast of Africa the fall of rain is very great, but we have no means of ascertaining it: at Zanzibar it is about from 84 to 100 inches.

XII.—I do not know; there is no means of estimating it, and I and

Estimated Population.

others have often tried to do so: we have not sufficient knowledge of the country, and to get

information from the Arabs is out of the question.





XIII.—In Oman the religion is Mahomedan, the language Arabic. Such a thing as caste, as known in India, does not exist amongst the Arabs. The tribes in Oman are various. In the African territories of the Imaum but little is known of the tribes; they are almost all pagans, except those immediately on the Coast, the Sawheelies, who are many of them Mahomedans, *yet Africans*.

Religion, Language,  
Tribes, and Castes.

The principal tribes in Oman are, east and south of Muskat, towards the Hadhrat Maut,—the Hurth, 2,000, the Chiefs Shaikhs Nassir bin Ali, and Salah bin Ali; the Massakeeah, 4,000, Chief Shaikh Saeed bin Ali al Mogeawee; the Beni Boo Hassan, 1,500 to 2,000, principal Shaikh Mahomed bin Massellim; the Hajrieen, 1,000, Chief Shaikh Mahomed bin Aamr; the Habbeas, 700, head Shaikh Aamr bin Rashid; the Beni Rawaheeyah, 500, Chief Shaikh I know not; the Beni Riam, 3,000 to 3,500, living in or about the Jibbae Kudhera (the Green Mountains), six days' distance from Muskat;—are on good terms with the Imaum, but say they have never been in subjection to any one. There are numerous branch tribes connected with these people: they do not mix much with the adjacent tribes, are a violent and unruly people, given to intoxication, and other vices not usual amongst Arabs. Their country produces great quantities of fine fruits,—grapes\* of most excellent quality; peaches; vegetables; violets and roses in profusion. These mountains are the Neilgherries of Arabia, but the people dislike strangers coming amongst them. The Beni Waheeba, 1,200, Chief Shaikh Nassir bin Ali bin Kadim. This is a fine tribe, and very trustworthy. The Hishm, 700, Shaikh Nassir bin Kadim; the Beni Boo Ali, 3,000 to 3,500, including those on the coast, the Chief Shaikh Mahomed bin Ali; the Jeneba, living between Masseera and Soor, said to be 10,000, the Chiefs Shaikhs Saeed bin Ali and Humood. This tribe is much divided, and they are at variance amongst themselves. The Beni Jaabe between Thewee and Khairat, number not well known (many of them living with other tribes), Chief Shaikh Mahomed bin Serhan. Many of this tribe stretch as far into the interior as the Wadi Samail. In the Wadi Aak live the small tribes called the Indabee, the Siabee, and the Rebbewee. These are a pastoral people, supposed to be very ancient tribes, formerly very numerous. They are quiet and good-natured, and very different in features and appearance from any other Arabs I have seen in Oman; and although they speak the Arabic, they have a language of their own, in which are many Hebrew words. Some time ago their Shaikh was Saeed Mashun. They say they are about 1,000 souls.

\* They have ripe grapes for eight months in the year, crop after crop, with which they make wine and distilled liquors; but they do not sell them.





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To the west of Muskat is the Huddabei Tribe,—who the Shaikh is now I do not know; they are 500; the Jenadie, 2,000,—who is the Shaikh at present I know not; the Beni Aamr, and the Hawasseena, 1,200, Shaikh Aamr bin Rashid; the Jeal-i-Saad (Children of Saad), 15,000, Shaikh Jemul-i-Saad. This is the great tribe of Oman, and by whom, and from whom, the Imaums were in the olden time selected.

In the Wadi Maaweel are many small tribes, with their Shaikhs, in all about 2,000; and in and near the district of the Ahil-i-Nachl are several small tribes, subject to the Ya Araba: the Shaikhs are many; their names I do not know.

In the Zahnah districts are the Beni Kelban, the Beni Ali, the Ahilee Younkei, the Beni Yakoot, the Beni Havill, the Boo Khuriban and the Shakul, the Maahyahee and the Beniyas, who, with their several Shaikhs, own the Imaum's authority, and consider him as their chief. These tribes\* are about 12,000 collectively.

These are the principal tribes of Oman; but I am not aware, nor have I ever heard, of any particular story or history of any of them. They know exceedingly little of their own history: Arabs are perhaps the least thinking people in the world. Of the tribes on the Coast of Africa, in the Imaum's territories, but very little is known: they are numerous, but as yet all savages, excepting those along the coast.

XIV.—Nothing like a court house or a court of justice exists in the Imaum's territories. The Koran is the code, administered, Civil and Criminal, and the Shaikhs, assisted by the Kazees and Moollas, at once decide all lawsuits, and administer justice,—in criminal cases on the instant; and certainly fair justice is generally done. If the Imaum were present, or near, anything of importance would be referred to him. At Muskat and Zanzibar, when cases are tried by the Kazees, the decisions are not so fair,—bribery is usual; but an appeal can always be made to the Governor, or the Imaum when he is present. The Imaum's Government is of a purely patriarchal character: there are no establishments of any kind similar to those existing in the States of Native Princes in India; all things are in the most primitive condition,—such as it may be assumed they have been in from a very remote period.

XV.—As directed in the Koran,—for murder, death; for theft, the hand cut off, or the ears, and sometimes the nose. Torture is not as a general thing resorted to; the floggings, when administered, are inflicted with a stick, and often cause the death of the culprit.

\* Dissensions are frequent amongst these tribes, and it is very difficult to get them united for a common cause.





XVI.—Nothing more than that, in most towns and villages, a few schools are kept by Moollas, and when a boy can read the Koran his education is considered complete. Those who intend to become Nakhodas are taught a little arithmetic, and navigation, at Bombay or at Calcutta.

XVII.—None whatever; the thing is unknown, except to a few people who are attached to Europeans, at Zanzibar and Muskat. Mr. Frost, the medical officer of the Consulate and Agency, finds the people rather averse to it.

XVIII.—Catarrhs, fevers, and, in Arabia, disease of the eyes; and at Zanzibar and on the Coast of Africa that terrible disease, elephantiasis, and a disease peculiar to this country, elephantiasis of the scrotum,—a frightful disease, and for which there is, I believe, no remedy. The yellow fever has been here: I have seen three Europeans die here of it; and Her Majesty's ships on the coast for the suppression of the slave trade have lost numbers of men from it.

It may be observed that there are no people in the world from whom it is so difficult to get information as from Arabs. They have a religious dislike to talk of the past, they care but little for the present, and for the future nothing at all.

#### XIX.—NATURE OF THE RELATIONS OF HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

His Highness the Imaum of Muskat is an independent Sultan. His ancestors have ruled the Kingdom of Oman for nearly three hundred years, in Southern Arabia, and most of them have been Imaums of Muskat, the capital of Oman, the seaport, in lat.  $23^{\circ} 37' N.$ , and long.  $58^{\circ} 35' E.$  The Imaum of Muskat has also possessions on the Coast of Beloochistan, and rents Bunder Abbas and its dependencies, on the Southern Coast of Persia, from the Persian Government.

His Highness has besides very extensive territory on the East Coast of Africa, extending from Mukdeesha (the Majadaxa of the Portuguese), in lat.  $2^{\circ} 2' S.$ , and long.  $45^{\circ} 26' E.$ , to the river Lindee, in lat.  $10^{\circ} S.$ , and long.  $39^{\circ} 45' E.$

The British Government have not any political relations of a separate nature with any of the Shaikhs or Chiefs in any part of the territories of the Imaum of Muskat, either in Arabia or Africa: all the engagements or treaties which have from time to time been entered into by the East India Company, and the Government of Great Britain, have been





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made with the Imaum of Muskat, and not with any of the Chiefs or Shaikhs.

Political relations, in a written form, have existed between the Honorable the East India Company and the Imaum of Muskat since the year 1798, when a Treaty\* or Kuolnamah was concluded on the 12th October in that year, between the Honorable Company and His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, through the intervention of the Nuwab Etmandood Duola Mirza Mehdy Ali Khan Bahadoor Hushmunt Jung.

In the year 1800 a further Treaty was concluded between the Imaum of Muskat and the East India Company, the late Sir John Malcolm being Envoy. In this Treaty, which is dated the 18th January 1800, it was agreed that the former Treaty or Kuolnamah of the 12th of October 1798, between the Imaum of Muskat and the Honorable East India Company, through the intervention of the Nuwab Etmandood Duola Mirza Mehdy Ali Khan Bahadoor Hushmunt Jung, should remain fixed and in full force, and further for the residence at Muskat of a respectable English gentleman, as Agent from the British Government, through whom all matters between the two States should be truly and fairly stated and represented.

On the 29th August 1822, a Treaty was proposed to the Imaum of Muskat, for the prevention of the slave trade, by Captain Fairfax Moresby, of His Britannic Majesty's ship *Menai*, and on the 7th September 1822 His Highness the Imaum concluded the engagement for the prevention of the slave trade from his dominions to all Christian countries, and the following stipulations were agreed to:—

The Imaum to prohibit the sale of slaves to every or any Christian nation, and to order his officers throughout his dominions, in case they found the owners of any Arab vessels taking slaves for sale to any Christian country, to seize such vessels, and to punish the commanders. The crews of all Arab vessels to be enjoined to report the transport of slaves to Christian countries, in order that the commanders of the vessels might be punished, and in default to be themselves punished; also for the settlement at Zanzibar and other places of British Agents, to watch and report the traffic in slaves with Christian nations; permission to seize vessels laden with slaves, bound to Christian countries; certificates to be furnished to all vessels departing on a voyage, stating from what port sailed, and to what port bound; vessels found without this certificate to be seized.

On the 10th September 1822 His Highness the Imaum further

\* A copy of this, and of all other treaties, with the exception of that connected with the suppression of the slave trade, existing between the Honorable the East India Company and His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, follow this narrative. The treaties connected with the abolition of the slave trade are given in a subsequent portion of this Selection.—*Editor*.





granted, on the requisition of Captain Moresby, permission for the ships of war of His Majesty the King of England to seize Arab vessels with slaves on board to the eastward of Cape Delgado, passing sixty miles to the eastward of Socotra, on to Diu Head, the western point of the Gulf of Cambay, unless driven by stress of weather. This permission granted to His Majesty's ships only, and not to the cruisers of the Honorable Company. On the 17th December 1839, the Imaum consented to three additional articles being added to the Treaty concluded by Captain Moresby on the 7th and 10th September 1822, in which the following stipulations were agreed to :—

In the event of the Government cruisers meeting the Imaum's vessels, or those of his subjects, in a line drawn from Cape Delgado, two degrees eastward of Socotra, ending at Pussem, suspected of being engaged in the slave trade, the cruisers to be permitted to detain and search them, and if found carrying on the slave trade beyond these limits, the cruisers to be allowed to seize and confiscate such vessels and their cargo, unless such vessels were driven by stress of weather beyond the line, in which case they were not to be seized; the sale of all Somalees (a free people) to be considered as piracy, and all persons convicted of selling Somalees to be punished as pirates.

These additional concessions were granted by the Imaum on the requisition of Lieutenant Colonel Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf.

On the 18th August 1845, in a letter to Captain Hamerton, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, and Honorable Company's Agent, His Highness the Imaum consented to rectify an omission in Article IV. of the Arabic version of the Treaty of the 7th September 1822, when His Highness declared it incumbent on himself, his heirs, &c. to assist to apprehend British subjects engaged in the slave trade, on a requisition from the accredited Agent of Government.

On the 31st May 1839, a Commercial Treaty was concluded at Zanzibar, between Her Britannic Majesty and His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, by Captain Robert Cogan, of the Honorable Company's naval service, in which is provided for as follows :—

Reciprocal liberty of intercourse, trade, and residence; commercial privileges of the most favoured nations; purchase, sale, or hire of houses in the Imaum's dominions; inviolability of houses and warehouses; search of ditto in certain cases; appointment and privileges of Consuls; protection of Natives, servants of British subjects; punishment of ditto; settlement of disputes between British subjects, and between them and other subjects; disposal of property of deceased persons, and of the property of British bankrupts; recovery of debts; duty on British goods; exemption of British ships entering to refit;






freedom of exportation and importation; prohibition of monopolies and exclusive privileges; exceptions, valuation, and sale of British goods; passage of merchandize in the event of war with a third party; vessels in distress, and shipwrecks; suppression of the slave trade; vessels of war of the East India Company allowed to give full force and effect to the stipulations of this treaty, in the same way as vessels of war of Her Britannic Majesty; commerce and navigation within the limits of the East India Company's Charter.

The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged by Lieutenant Colonel Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of Her Majesty, at Muskat, on the 22nd July 1840.

On the 2nd of October 1845, a further Treaty was concluded at Zanzibar, with His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, by Captain Atkins Hamerton, 15th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, and Honorable Company's Agent, on the part of Her Majesty, for the suppression of the exportation of slaves, from and after the 1st January 1847, from the African possessions of His Highness. By this treaty the Imaum engaged to prohibit the export of slaves from his African dominions, to prevent and suppress the trade, to prohibit the importation of slaves into his Arabian possessions from any part of Africa, and to use his influence with the Chiefs of the Red Sea, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf, to prohibit and prevent the importation of slaves from Africa into their respective territories; and also granted permission to the ships of Her Majesty's of the Honorable Company's Navy, to seize and confiscate all vessels, the property of His Highness, or of his subjects, carying on the slave trade, excepting such as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another in his own dominions in Africa, between certain limits provided for in the treaty.

On the 5th September 1848, an Act was passed by the Parliament of Great Britain, for giving effect to the provisions of this treaty.







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TREATIES, ENGAGEMENTS,\* &c.

CONCLUDED BETWEEN

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY,  
AND HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT;

AND BETWEEN

THE HONORABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY  
AND HIS HIGHNESS.

A. D. 1798 TO A. D. 1846.

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[\* The Engagements for the Abolition of the Slave Trade are given at the end of this Selection, under a distinct head.]



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## MUSKAT.

*Treaty concluded between the Honorable EAST INDIA COMPANY and His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, under date the 12th October 1798.*

Seal of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat.

Deed of Agreement from the State of Oman (Muskat), the place of shelter, under the approbation of the Imaum, the Director, Synd Sultan, (whose grandeur be eternal !) to the high and potent English Company, (whose greatness be perpetuated !) as comprehended in the following Articles :—

### ARTICLE I.

From the intervention of the Nuwab Etmandood Duola Mirza Mehdy Ali Khan Bahadoor Hushmunt Jung, never shall there be any deviation from this Kuolnamah.

### ARTICLE II.

From the recital of the said Nuwab, my heart has become disposed to an increase of the friendship with that State, and from this day forth, the friend of that Sirkar is the friend of this, and the friend of this Sirkar is to be the friend of that Sirkar ; and in the same way the enemy of this is to be the enemy of that.

### ARTICLE III.

Whereas frequent applications have been made, and are still making, by the French and Dutch people, for a factory, *i. e.* a place to seat themselves in, either at Muskat or Bunder Abbas, or at the other ports of this Sirkar, it is therefore written, that whilst warfare shall continue between the English Company and them, never shall, from respect to the Company's friendship, be given to them throughout all my territories a place to fix or seat themselves in, nor shall they get even ground to stand upon, within this State.





TREATIES WITH MUSKAT.

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ARTICLE IV.

As there is a person of the French nation who has been for these several years in my service, and who hath now gone in command of one of my vessels to the Mauritius, I shall, immediately on his return, dismiss him from my service, and expel him.

ARTICLE V.

In the event of any French vessel coming to water at Muskat, she shall not be allowed to enter the cove into which the English vessels are admitted, but remain outside the cove; and in case of hostilities ensuing here between the French and English ships, the army, and navy, and people of this Government shall take part in hostility with the English, but on the high seas I am not to interfere.

ARTICLE VI.

On the occurrence of any shipwreck of a vessel, or vessels, appertaining to the English, there shall certainly be aid and comfort afforded on the part of this Government, nor shall the property be seized on.

ARTICLE VII.

In the port of Bunder Abbas (Gombroon), whenever the English shall be disposed to establish a factory, making it as a fort, I have no objection to their fortifying the same, and mounting guns thereon, as many as they list, and to forty or fifty English gentlemen residing there, with seven or eight hundred English sepoys; and for the rest, the rate of duties on goods, on buying and selling, will be on the same footing as at Bussora and Abusheher.

*Dated 1st of Jumadee-ool-Awul 1213, Hijree (or the 12th of October 1798, A. D.).*

Seal of His  
Highness the  
Imaum of  
Muskat.

*Further Treaty between the Honorable EAST INDIA COMPANY and  
His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, concluded on the 18th  
January 1800.*

Seal of His High-  
ness the Imaum of  
Muskat.

Agreement entered into by the Imaum of the State of Oman, the



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TREATIES WITH MUSKAT.

place of shelter, with Captain JOHN MALCOLM, Bahadoor, Envoy from the Right Honorable the Governor General, dated the 21st of Shaban 1214, Hijree (or the 18th January 1800, A. D.).

ARTICLE I.

The Kuolnamah entered into on the 1st Jumadee-ool-Awul, Hijree 1213 (12th October 1798), by the Imaum Syud Sultan, through Nuwab Etmandood Duola Mehdy Ali Khan Bahadoor Hushmunt Jung, remains fixed and in full force.

ARTICLE II.

As improper reports, of a tendency to interrupt the existing harmony, and create misunderstanding between the two States, have gone abroad, and have been communicated to the Right Honorable the Governor General, the Earl of Mornington, K.P., with a view to prevent such evils in future, we, actuated by sentiments of reciprocal friendship, agree that an English gentleman of respectability, on the part of the Honorable Company, shall always reside at the port of Muskat, and be an Agent through whom all intercourse between the States shall be conducted, in order that the actions of each Government may be fairly and justly stated, and that no opportunity may be afforded to designing men, who are ever eager to promote dissensions; and that the friendship of the two States may remain unshaken till the end of time, and till the sun and moon have finished their revolving career.

Seal of His  
Highness  
the Imaum  
of Muskat.


Sealed in my presence, and delivered to me by the Imaum, on board the *Gunjava*, on the 18th January 1800.

(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM,  
Envoy.

*Treaty of Commerce between Her Majesty the QUEEN of the United Kingdom of GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, and His Highness Sultan SYUD SUEED bin SULTAN, Imaum of Muskat, dated the 31st May 1839.*

PREAMBLE.—Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Highness the Sultan of Muskat and its dependencies, being desirous to confirm and strengthen the good understanding which now subsists between them, and to promote, by means of a convention, the commercial intercourse between their respective





## TREATIES WITH MUSKAT.

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subjects; and His Highness the Sultan of Muskat being moreover desirous to record, in a more formal manner, the Engagements entered into by His Highness on the 10th September 1822, for the perpetual abolition of the Slave Trade between the dominions of His Highness and all Christian nations, they have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, ROBERT COGAN, Esquire, a Captain in the Naval Service of the East India Company, on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c. &c., and HUSUN bin IBRAHIM, and ALI bin NASIR, on behalf of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, &c. &c., who, having communicated their full powers, found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

## ARTICLE I.

The subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat shall be at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass, with their merchandize, through all parts of Her Britannic Majesty's dominions in Europe and in Asia, and shall enjoy in those dominions all the privileges and advantages, with respect to commerce or otherwise, which are or may be accorded therein to the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nations; and the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall, in like manner, have full liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass, with their merchandize, through all parts of the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, and shall in those dominions enjoy all the privileges and advantages, with respect to commerce or otherwise, which are or may be accorded therein to the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nations.


## ARTICLE II.

British subjects shall be at liberty to purchase, sell, or hire land or houses in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat. The houses, warehouses, or other premises of British subjects, or of persons actually in the service of British subjects, in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, shall not be forcibly entered, nor on any pretext searched, without the consent of the occupier, unless with the cognisance of the British Consul or Resident Agent. But such Consul or Resident Agent, on just cause being adduced by the authorities of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, shall send a competent person, who, in concert with the officers of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, shall conduct the search, and shall prevent the use of unnecessary violence, or of improper resistance.

## ARTICLE III.

The two high contracting parties acknowledge reciprocally to each other the right of appointing Consuls to reside in each other's dominions, wherever the interests of commerce may require the presence of





such officers; and such Consuls shall at all times be placed, in the country in which they reside, on the footing of the Consuls of the most favoured nations. Each of the high contracting parties further agrees to permit his own subjects to be appointed to Consular offices by the other contracting party: provided always that the persons so appointed shall not begin to act without the previous approbation of the Sovereign whose subjects they may be.

The public functionaries of either Government, residing in the dominions of the other, shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions, which are enjoyed within the same dominions by similar public functionaries of other countries.

ARTICLE IV.

Subjects of the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, actually in the service of British subjects in those dominions, shall enjoy the same protection which is granted to British subjects themselves; but if such subjects of the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat shall be convicted of any crime or infraction of the law, requiring punishment, they shall be discharged by the British subjects in whose service they may be, and shall be delivered over to the authorities of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat.

ARTICLE V.

The authorities of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat shall not interfere in disputes between British subjects, or between British subject and the subjects or citizens of other Christian nations. When differences arise between a subject of the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat and a British subject, if the former is the complainant, the cause shall be heard by the British Consul or Resident Agent, who shall administer justice thereupon; but if the British subject is the complainant against any of the subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, or the subjects of any other Mahomedan power, then the cause shall be decided by the highest authority of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, or by any person nominated by him; but in such case, the cause shall not be proceeded in, except in the presence of the British Consul, or Resident Agent, or of some person deputed by one or other of them, who shall attend at the court house where such matter shall be tried. In causes between a British subject and a native of the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, whether tried before the British Consul or Resident Agent, or before the abovementioned authority of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, the evidence of a man proved to have given false testimony on a former occasion shall not be received.





## TREATIES WITH MUSKAT.

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## ARTICLE VI.

The property of a British subject who may die in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, or of a subject of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat who may die in the British dominions, shall be delivered over to the heirs, or executors, or administrators of the deceased, or to the respective Consuls or Resident Agents of the contracting parties, in default of such heirs, or executors, or administrators.

## ARTICLE VII.

If a British subject shall become bankrupt in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, the British Consul or Resident Agent shall take possession of all the property of such bankrupt, and shall give it up to his creditors, to be divided among them. This having been done, the bankrupt shall be entitled to a full discharge from his creditors, and he shall not at any time afterwards be required to make up his deficiency, nor shall any property he may afterwards acquire be considered liable for that purpose. But the British Consul or Resident Agent shall use his endeavours to obtain, for the benefit of the creditors, any property of the bankrupt in another country, and to ascertain that everything possessed by the bankrupt, at the time when he became insolvent, has been given up without reserve.

## ARTICLE VIII.

If a subject of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat should resist or evade payment of his just debts to a British subject, the authorities of His Highness shall afford to the British subject every aid and facility in recovering the amount due; and in like manner the British Consul or Resident Agent shall afford every aid and facility to subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, in recovering debts justly due to them from a British subject.

## ARTICLE IX.

No duty exceeding five per cent. shall be levied at the place of entry in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, on any goods the growth, produce, or manufacture of the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty, imported by British vessels; and this duty shall be deemed to be a full payment of all import, and export, and tonnage duties, of license to trade, of pilotage and anchorage, and of any other charge by Government whatever, upon the vessels or upon the goods so imported or exported; nor shall any charge be made on that part of the cargo which may remain on board unsold; and no additional or higher duty shall be levied upon these goods when afterwards transported from one place to another in the dominions of His Highness, but the above-





mentioned duty having once been paid, the goods may be sold by whole-sale or retail without any further duty. No charge whatever shall be made on British vessels which may enter any of the ports of His Highness for the purpose of refitting, or for refreshments, or to inquire about the state of the market.

ARTICLE X.

No article whatever shall be prohibited from being imported into, or exported from, the territories of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat; but the trade between the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty and those of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat shall be perfectly free, subject to the abovementioned duty upon goods imported, and to no other. And His Highness the Sultan of Muskat hereby engages not to permit the establishment of any monopoly or exclusive privilege of sale within his dominions, except in the articles of ivory and gum copal, on that part of the East Coast of Africa from the port of Tangate, situated in about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  degrees of south latitude, to the port of Quiloa, laying in about 7 degrees south of the equator, both ports inclusive; but in all other ports and places in His Highness' dominions there shall be no monopoly whatever, but the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall be at liberty to buy and sell with perfect freedom from whomsoever and to whomsoever they choose, subject to no other duty by Government than that before mentioned.

ARTICLE XI.

If any dispute should arise in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat as to the value of goods which shall be imported by British merchants, and on which the duty of five per cent. is to be levied, the Custom-master, or other authorised officer acting on the part of the Government of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, shall be entitled to demand one-twentieth part of the goods in lieu of the payment of five per cent., and the merchant shall be bound to surrender the twentieth part so demanded, whenever, from the nature of the articles, it may be practicable to do so; but the merchant having done so, shall be subject to no further demand on account of customs on the other nineteen-twentieths of those goods in any part of the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat to which he may transport them; but if the Custom-master should object to levy the duty in the manner aforesaid, by taking one-twentieth part of the goods, or if the goods should not admit of being so divided, then the point in dispute shall be referred to two competent persons, one chosen by the Custom-master and the other by the importer, and a valuation of the goods shall be made; and if the referees shall differ in opinion, they shall appoint an arbitrator, whose decision shall be final, and the duty shall be levied according to the value thus established.





## TREATIES WITH MUSKAT.

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## ARTICLE XII.

It shall not be lawful for any British merchant to expose his goods for sale for the space of three days after the arrival of such goods, unless, before the expiration of such three days, the importer and Custom-master shall have agreed as to the value of such goods. If the Custom-master shall not, within three days, have accepted one of the two modes proposed for ascertaining the value of the goods, the authorities of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, on application being made to them to that effect, shall compel the Custom-master to choose one of the two modes by which the amount of the customs to be levied is to be determined.

## ARTICLE XIII.

If it shall happen that either the Queen of England or His Highness the Sultan of Muskat should be at war with another country, the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty and the subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat shall nevertheless be allowed to pass to such country, through the dominions of either power, with merchandize of every description except warlike stores, but they shall not be allowed to enter any port or place actually blockaded or besieged.


## ARTICLE XIV.

Should a vessel under the British flag enter a port in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, in distress, the local authorities at such port shall afford all necessary aid to enable the vessel to refit and to prosecute her voyage; and if any such vessel should be wrecked on the coast of the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, the authorities of His Highness shall give all the assistance in their power to recover and to deliver over to the owners all the property that can be saved from such vessel. The same assistance and protection shall be afforded to vessels of the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, and property saved therefrom, under similar circumstances, in the ports and on the coasts of the British dominions.

## ARTICLE XV.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat hereby renews and confirms the Engagements entered into by His Highness with Great Britain on the 10th\* September 1822, for the entire suppression of the slave trade between his dominions and all Christian countries; and His Highness further engages that the ships and vessels of war belonging to the East India Company shall be allowed to give full force and effect to the stipulations of the said Treaty, agreeably with the conditions prescribed

\* This should be the 7th and 10th September 1822.



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TREATIES WITH MUSKAT.

therein, and in the same manner as the ships and vessels of Her Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE XVI.



It is further acknowledged and declared by the high contracting parties, that nothing in this Convention is in any way intended to interfere with or rescind any of the rights or privileges now enjoyed by the subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, in respect to commerce and navigation, within the limits of the East India Company's Charter.

ARTICLE XVII.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged, at Muskat or Zanzibar, as soon as possible, and in any case within the space of fifteen months from the date hereof.

*Done on the Island and at the Town of Zanzibar, this thirty-first day of May, in the year of Christ eighteen hundred and thirty-nine (corresponding with the seventeenth of the month Rubec-ool-Awul, of the Hijree, twelve hundred and fifty-five).*

(Signed) R. COGAN.



(Signed) HUSUN bin IBRAHIM.


(Signed) ALI bin NASIR.

*Translation of a Note from His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT to Captain HENNELL, dated 22nd July 1840.*

A. C.

I have the honour to intimate to you, that I have now appointed my friend Syud Mahomed bin Syud Shuruf, my Vukeel, to wait upon you for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty. He is my Plenipotentiary in this affair.


(Signed) SYUD SUEED.



(True translation)

(Signed) S. HENNELL,  
Resident, Persian Gulf.





## TREATIES WITH MUSKAT.

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*Declaration made on the part of HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY, on the exchange of the Ratifications of the preceding Convention.*

The undersigned SAMUEL HENNELL, Esquire, a Captain in the Military Service of the East India Company, and Resident in the Persian Gulf, appointed on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to exchange Her Majesty's ratification of the Treaty of Commerce concluded at Zanzibar on the thirty-first May, eighteen hundred and thirty-nine, by ROBERT COGAN, Esquire, a Captain in the Naval Service of the East India Company, on the part of Her said Majesty, and by HUSUN bin IBRAHIM and MAHABUT ALI bin NASIR, on the part of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, against the ratification of the same Treaty by His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, is commanded by the Queen, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding as to the meaning of the words contained in Article IX. of the said Treaty, "any other charge by Government whatever," to declare to Syud Mahomed bin Syud Shuruf, appointed by His Highness the Sultan of Muskat to exchange His Highness' ratification, that the aforesaid words are by Her Majesty taken and understood to mean "any other charge whatever made by the Government, or by any local authority of the Government."

Muskat, this 22nd day of July 1840.

(Signed) SYUD MAHOMED bin SYUD SHURUF.

(Signed) S. HENNELL.

Seal of Syud  
Mahomed bin  
Syud Shuruf.

Seal of  
Captain  
Hennell.

*The following Counter-Declaration was at the same time made on the part of His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, by his appointed Agent, SYUD MAHOMED bin SYUD SHURUF.*

The undersigned, SYUD MAHOMED bin SYUD SHURUF, appointed by His Highness the Sultan of Muskat to exchange His Highness' ratification of the Treaty of Commerce concluded at Zanzibar, on the 31st of May 1839, by ROBERT COGAN, Esquire, a Captain of the Naval Service of the East India Company, on the part of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by HUSUN bin IBRAHIM, and MAHABUT ALI bin NASIR, on the part of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, against the ratification of the same Treaty by Her





Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having received from Samuel Hennell, Esquire, a Captain in the Military Service of the East India Company, and Resident in the Persian Gulf, appointed to act in this matter on behalf of Her said Majesty, a declaration stating that, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding as to the meaning of the words "any other charge by Government whatever," contained in the 9th Article of the said Treaty, the aforesaid words are by Her Majesty taken and understood to mean "any other charge whatever made by the Government, or by any local authority of the Government," the undersigned Syud Mahomed bin Syud Shuruf, being duly authorised by His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, hereby accepts and adopts the said declaration, in the name and on the behalf of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat.

*Muskat, this 22nd day of July 1840.*

(Signed) SYUD MAHOMED bin SYUD SHURUF.

Seal of Syud  
Mahomed bin  
Syud Shuruf.

The undersigned having met together for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of a Treaty of Commerce between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, concluded and signed at Zanzibar on the 31st day of May 1839, and the respective ratifications of the said Instrument having been carefully perused, the said exchange took place this day, in the usual form.

In witness whereof, they have signed the present certificate of exchanges, and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

*Done at Muskat, the twenty-second day of July 1840.*

(Signed) S. HENNELL. (Signed) SYUD MAHOMED bin SYUD SHURUF.

Seal of  
Captain  
Hennell.

Seal of Syud Maho-  
med bin Syud Shuruf.

*Translation of the Ratification of His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT to the foregoing Treaty of Commerce.*

We, having duly considered the Treaty above drawn out, have approved, accepted, and confirmed the several Articles and Clauses therein set forth, and by this document do hereby approve, accept, and





## TREATIES WITH MUSKAT.

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confirm the same, for ourselves, our heirs and successors. Accordingly, we do, by our word, promise and engage, sincerely and faithfully, to perform all and everything set forth and contained in the aforesaid Treaty; and further, that to the utmost of our power we will allow no one to violate or infringe this Engagement in any way whatsoever. In witness whereof, we have directed our seal to be affixed to this document, which we have signed with our own hand, in this our Port of Muskat, this 22nd day of Jumadee-ool-Awul, A. H. 1256 (according to 22nd July 1840 of the Christian era).

(Signed) SYUD SUEED.

Seal of His  
Highness  
the Imaum  
of Muskat.

(True translation)

(Signed) S. HENNELL,  
Resident in the Persian Gulf.


*Rules established by His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, in April 1846, in regard to the Duties to be hereafter charged on the Cargoes of Vessels putting into His Highness' Ports.*

In a letter dated the 13th April 1846, Captain ATKINS HAMERTON, Her Majesty's Consul, and Honorable Company's Agent, in the dominions of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, reported that His Highness the Imaum of Muskat had ordered the following Rules to be henceforth observed in regard to the landing or transhipment of the cargoes of vessels putting into Muskat, or into any of His Highness' other ports:—


1st.—That the full duty of five per cent. shall be levied on all articles transhipped from one vessel into another in all the ports and harbours belonging to His Highness the Imaum.

2nd.—That a vessel of any nation being obliged to put into any of His Highness' ports through stress of weather, or for the purpose of refit, shall not be required to pay duty on any part of her cargo which may be landed and stored during the repair of the vessel, provided it be re-embarked in her.

3rd.—That no duty shall, under any circumstances whatever, be levied on stores, the property of the British Government, when landed at any of His Highness' ports.







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# TREATY

(CONCLUDED ON THE 21ST SEPTEMBER 1833)

BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

AND

HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT.



## MUSKAT.

### TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

*Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and His Majesty SYUD SUEED bin SULTAN, of Muskat, and his Dependencies.*

#### ARTICLE I.

There shall be a perpetual peace between the United States of America and His Majesty Syud Sued bin Sultan, of Muskat, and his dependencies.


#### ARTICLE II.

The citizens of the United States shall have free liberty to enter all the ports of His Majesty Syud Sued bin Sultan, with their cargoes, of whatever kind the said cargoes may consist, and they shall have liberty to sell the same to any of the subjects of the Sultan, or others who may wish to purchase the same, or to barter the same for any produce or manufactures of the kingdom, or other articles that may be found there. No price shall be fixed by the Sultan or his officers on the articles to be sold by the merchants of the United States, or the merchandize they may wish to buy, but the trade shall be free on both sides, to sell, or buy, or exchange, on the terms and for the prices the owners may think fit; and whenever the said citizens of the United States may think fit to depart, they shall be at liberty to do so; and if any officer of the Sultan shall contravene this Article, he shall be severely punished. It is understood and agreed, however, that the articles of muskets, powder, and ball, can only be sold to the Government in the island of Zanzibar, but in all other ports of the Sultan the said munitions of war may be freely sold, without any restriction whatever, to the highest bidder.

#### ARTICLE III.

Vessels of the United States, entering any port within the Sultan's dominions, shall pay no more than five per cent. duties on the cargo landed, and this shall be in full consideration of all import and export duties, tonnage, license to trade, pilotage, anchorage, or any other charge whatever. Nor shall any charge be paid on that part of the cargo





TREATY BETWEEN MUSKAT AND AMERICA.

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which shall remain on board unsold, and re-exported. Nor shall any charge whatever be paid on any vessel of the United States which may enter any of the ports of His Majesty, for the purpose of refitting or for refreshments, or to inquire the state of the market.

ARTICLE IV.

That American citizens shall pay no other duties on export or import, tonnage, license to trade, or other charge whatsoever, than the nation the most favoured shall pay.

ARTICLE V.

If any vessel of the United States shall suffer shipwreck on any part of the Sultan's dominions, the persons escaping from the wreck shall be taken care of, and hospitably entertained, at the expense of the Sultan, until they shall find an opportunity to be returned to their country,—for the Sultan can never receive any remuneration whatever for rendering succour to the distressed,—and the property saved from such wreck shall be carefully preserved, and delivered to the owner, or the Consul of the United States, or to any authorised Agent.

ARTICLE VI.

The citizens of the United States resorting to the ports of the Sultan, for the purpose of trade, shall have leave to land and reside in the said ports, without paying any tax on importation whatever, for such liberty, other than the general duties on imports which the most favoured nation shall pay.

ARTICLE VII.

If any citizens of the United States, or their vessels, or other property, shall be taken by pirates, and brought within the dominions of the Sultan, the persons shall be set at liberty, and the property restored to the owner, if he be present, or to the American Consul, or to any authorised Agent.

ARTICLE VIII.

Vessels belonging to the subjects of the Sultan, which may resort to any port in the United States, shall pay no other or higher rate of duties or other charges than the nation the most favoured shall pay.

ARTICLE IX.

The President of the United States may appoint Consuls to reside in the ports of the Sultan where the principal commerce shall be carried on, which Consuls shall be the exclusive judges of all disputes or suits wherein American citizens shall be engaged with each other. They shall have power to receive the property of any American citizen dying within the kingdom, and to send the same to his heirs, first paying all his debts due to the subjects of the Sultan. The said Consuls shall not





be arrested, nor shall their property be seized, nor shall any of their household be arrested, but their persons, and their property, and their houses, shall be inviolate. Should any Consul, however, commit any offence against the laws of the kingdom, complaint shall be made to the President, who will immediately displace him.

*Concluded, signed, and sealed, at the Royal Palace, in the City of Muskat, in the Kingdom of Oman, the 21st day of September, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three of the Christian Era, and the fifty-seventh year of the Independence of the United States of America (corresponding to the sixth day of the Moon called Jumadee-ool-Awul, in the year of the Hijree one thousand two hundred and forty-nine).*

(Signed) EDMUND ROBERTS,

(True copy)

(Signed) HENRY HART, Captain, R. N.

Whereas the undersigned EDMUND ROBERTS, a citizen of the United States of America, and a resident of Portsmouth, in the State of New Hampshire, being duly appointed a special Agent, by Letters Patent under the signature of the President, and seal of the United States of America, bearing date at the city of Washington, the twenty-sixth day of January, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, for negotiating and concluding a Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States of America and His Majesty Syud Sued bin Sultan, of Muskat: Now know ye, that I, Edmund Roberts, special Agent as aforesaid, do conclude the foregoing Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and every Article and Clause therein contained, reserving the same, nevertheless, for the final ratification of the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States.

*Done at the Royal Palace, in the City of Muskat, in the Kingdom of Oman, on the 21st day of September, in the year of our Lord 1833, and of the Independence of the United States of America the fifty-seventh (corresponding to the 6th day of the Moon called Jumadee-ool-Awul, in the year Alhijra [Hijree] 1249).*

(Signed) EDMUND ROBERTS,

(True copy)

(Signed) HENRY HART, Captain, R. N.





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# TREATY

(CONCLUDED ON THE 17TH NOVEMBER 1844)

BETWEEN

THE KING OF THE FRENCH,

AND

HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT.

*Finally ratified on the 4th February 1846.*



## MUSKAT.

### TREATY WITH THE KING OF THE FRENCH.

*Treaty of Commerce, concluded on the 17th November 1844, between His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT and the KING OF THE FRENCH, and finally ratified on the 4th February 1846.*

PREAMBLE.—The King of the French and His Highness Syud Sued bin Sultan, the Sultan of Muskat and other places, being desirous to confirm and strengthen the good understanding which subsists between them, and to promote the commercial intercourse between their respective countries, and having come to the determination of entering into a Treaty of Commerce and Amity, the former has appointed as his Plenipotentiary, Monsieur ROMAIN DESFOSSES, Captain in the Navy, and Chief of Bourbon and Madagascar, and the latter has resolved personally to carry on negotiation with the said Plenipotentiary. The Plenipotentiary of the King of the French having represented to His Highness the Imaum and Sultan of Muskat that he was vested with the requisite powers, has concluded the following Articles with His Highness Syud Sued bin Sultan:—

#### ARTICLE I.

There shall always be good understanding and friendship between the King of the French, his heirs and successors, and His Highness Syud Sued bin Sultan, the Sultan of Muskat, his heirs and successors, as also between their respective subjects.

#### ARTICLE II.

The subjects of Syud Sued bin Sultan, the Sultan of Muskat, shall be at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass with their merchandize through France; and the French shall, in like manner, have similar liberty with regard to the territories of Syud Sued bin Sultan, the Sultan of Muskat. The subjects of both the Governments shall have all the privileges which are or may be conceded by the respective Governments to the subjects of the most favoured nations.

#### ARTICLE III.

The French shall be at liberty to purchase, sell, or rent land, houses,





## TREATY BETWEEN MUSKAT AND FRANCE.

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or warehouses, in the dominions of Syud Sued bin Sultan, the Sultan of Muskat. The houses, warehouses, or other premises occupied by the French, or by persons in their service, shall not be forcibly entered without the permission of the French Consul. They shall not be prevented from leaving the dominions of Syud Sued bin Sultan whenever they wish to do so.

## ARTICLE IV.

The subjects of Syud Sued bin Sultan, the Sultan of Muskat, actually in the service of the French, shall enjoy the same privileges which are granted to the French themselves; but if such subjects of His Highness shall be convicted of any crime or infraction of the law, they shall be discharged by the French, and delivered over to the authorities of the place.

## ARTICLE V.

The two high contracting parties acknowledge reciprocally the right of appointing Consuls to reside in each other's dominions, wherever the interests of commerce may require the presence of such officers; and such Consuls shall at all times be placed, in the country in which they reside, on the footing of the Consuls of the most favoured nations. Each of the high contracting parties further agrees to permit his own subjects to be appointed to Consular offices by the other contracting party, provided always that the persons so appointed shall not begin to act without the previous approbation of the Sovereign whose subjects they may be. The public functionaries of either Government, residing in the dominions of the other, shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions which are enjoyed within the same dominions by similar public functionaries of other countries. The French Consul shall be at liberty to hoist the French flag over his house.

## ARTICLE VI.

The authorities of the Sultan of Muskat shall not interfere in disputes between the French, or between the French and the subjects of other Christian nations. When differences arise between a subject of the Sultan of Muskat and a Frenchman, if the former be the complainant, the cause shall be heard by the French Consul; but if a Frenchman be the complainant against any of the subjects of the Sultan at Muskat, or against any Mahomedans, then the cause shall be decided by the authorities of the Sultan of Muskat, or by his deputy; but in such case the cause shall not be decided, except in the presence of the French Consul, or his deputy, who shall attend at the Court. In causes between a Frenchman and a subject of the Sultan of Muskat, the evidence of a man proved to have given false testimony on a former occasion shall not be received. A cause to be decided by the French Consul shall be tried in the presence of the Sultan of Muskat, or a person acting for him.





ARTICLE VII.

The property of a French subject who may die in any part of the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat, or of a subject of the Sultan of Muskat who may die in any part of the French dominions, shall be delivered over to the executor or administrator of the deceased, or, in default of such executor or administrator, to the respective Consuls of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE VIII.

If a Frenchman shall become bankrupt in the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat, the French Consul shall take possession of all the property of such bankrupt, and shall give it up to the creditors of the bankrupt, to be divided among them. This having been done, the bankrupt shall be entitled to a full discharge from his creditors, and he shall not at any time afterwards be required to make up the deficiency, nor shall any property he may afterwards acquire be considered liable for that purpose. But the French Consul shall use his endeavours to obtain for the benefit of the creditors all the property of the bankrupt. It shall also be incumbent upon the Consul to ascertain that everything possessed by the bankrupt at the time when he became insolvent has been given up.

ARTICLE IX.

If a subject of the Sultan of Muskat owes a debt to a Frenchman, the Sultan or his deputies shall urge the former to pay the claim of the latter. In like manner, the French Consul shall enjoin a Frenchman to pay a debt due by him to a subject of the Sultan of Muskat.

ARTICLE X.

No duty exceeding five per cent. shall be levied on goods imported by French vessels into the dominions of Syud Sued bin Sultan, the Sultan of Muskat. If a vessel of other nations imports any goods into the territories of the Sultan of Muskat, and pays less duty than five per cent., the same duty only shall be levied on similar goods imported by a French vessel into the said territories. A French vessel, after she has paid the duty of five per cent., shall not be subject to any other charges, such as anchorage, pilotage, &c.; nor shall any charge be made on that part of the cargo which may remain on board a French vessel; but if the vessel shall go to another part of the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat, duty shall be levied at five per cent. The abovementioned duty having once been paid, the goods may be sold, by wholesale or retail, without paying any further duty. No charge whatever shall be made on French vessels which may enter any of the ports of the Sultan of Muskat for the purpose of refitting, or for refreshments, or to inquire





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about the state of the market; and they shall enjoy the same privileges which are enjoyed (by the vessels) of the most favoured nations.

## ARTICLE XI.

No vessel shall be prohibited from importing into or exporting from the territories of the Sultan of Muskat any kind of merchandize. The trade shall be perfectly free in the said territories, subject to the above-mentioned duty, and to no other. The French shall be at liberty to buy and sell from whomsoever and to whomsoever they choose; but they shall not trade in the articles of ivory and gum copal on that part of the East Coast of Africa from the port of Tangate, situated in  $5\frac{1}{2}$  degrees of south latitude, to the port of Culva, lying in 9 degrees south of the equator, both ports inclusive. But if the English or Americans, or any other Christian nation, should carry on this trade, the French shall, in like manner, be at liberty to do so.

## ARTICLE XII.

If any disputes should arise in the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat as to the value of goods which shall be imported by French merchants, and on which the duty of five per cent. is to be levied, the Custom-master, or other person acting on the part of the Sultan of Muskat, shall, when practicable, receive one-twentieth part of the goods, and the merchant shall then be subject to no further demand on account of customs on the remaining goods, in any part of the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat to which he may transport them. But if the Custom-master should object to levy the duty in the manner aforesaid, by taking one-twentieth part of the goods, or if the goods should not admit of being so divided, then the point in dispute shall be referred to two competent persons, one chosen by the Custom-master, and the other by the merchant, who shall make a valuation of the goods; and if they shall differ in opinion, they shall appoint an arbitrator, whose decision shall be final, and the duty shall be levied according to the value thus established.

## ARTICLE XIII.

It shall not be lawful for any French merchant to expose his goods for sale for the space of three days after the arrival of such goods, unless the Custom-master and the merchant shall have agreed as to the value of such goods. If the Custom-master shall not within three days have accepted one of the two modes proposed for ascertaining the value of the goods, the authorities on the part of the Sultan of Muskat, on an intimation being made to them on the subject, shall compel the Custom-master to choose one of the two modes for the levy of the duty.

## ARTICLE XIV.

If it shall happen that either the King of the French or the Sultan of





Muskat should be at war with another country, the subjects of the King of the French and the subjects of the Sultan of Muskat shall nevertheless be allowed to trade with, and to take to such country, merchandize of every description, except warlike stores, but they shall not be allowed to enter any port or place actually blockaded or besieged.

ARTICLE XV.

Should a vessel under the French flag enter a port in the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat in distress, the local authorities at such port shall afford all necessary aid to enable the vessel to refit, and to prosecute her voyage; and if any such vessel should be wrecked on the coasts of the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat, the authorities on the part of the Sultan of Muskat shall render all the assistance in their power to recover and deliver over to the owner, or the Consul, the property that may be saved from such wreck. The same assistance and protection shall be afforded to vessels of the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat, and property saved therefrom under similar circumstances, in the ports and on the coasts of the French dominions.

ARTICLE XVI.

If any person not belonging to the Christian nations shall steal any article from a French vessel, and take it to the dominions of the Sultan of Muskat, it shall be recovered from the robber, and delivered over to the Consul.

ARTICLE XVII.

The French shall be at liberty to hire or erect houses and warehouses, at Zanzibar, or anywhere else.

ARTICLE XVIII.

Any Engagements which may have been entered into previously to this are null and void, and are not to be acted upon or attended to.

ARTICLE XIX.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged, at Muskat or Zanzibar, as soon as possible, and within the space of fifteen months from the date hereof.

*Dated the 6th Zilkad, Hijree 1260 (corresponding with the 17th November 1844, A. D.).*

(True translation)

(Signed) W. ESCOMBE,  
Secretary to Government.

MEMORANDUM.—On the 4th February 1846, the ratifications of the foregoing Treaty were exchanged between His Highness the Imaum of Muskat and Commodore Monsieur Romain Desfossés, on the part of the





TREATY BETWEEN MUSKAT AND FRANCE.

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King of the French. Previous to the exchange of the ratifications, His Highness requested from Commodore Monsieur Desfossés\* an explanation of the precise meaning of Article XVII. of the Treaty, who replied that the said Article was considered as having reference to matters simply and purely of a commercial nature. The exchange of ratifications then took place, His Highness the Imaum previously affixing thereto the following declaration:—

*Declaration written by His Highness the Imaum on the foregoing Treaty.*

That is correct, that whatsoever is written in Arabic letters (in the Arabic language) in the Agreement, is binding on us.


The writing of the humble Fakeer with his own hand.

(Signed) SYED bin SULTAN.

(True translation)

(Signed) ATKINS HAMERTON.

\* Vide letter from Captain Hamerton to the Bombay Government, dated the 13th February 1846.







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EXTRACTS FROM BRIEF NOTES  
OF A  
VISIT TO ZANZIBAR,  
(BELONGING TO H. H. THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT,)  
IN H. M.'S SHIP *IMOGENE*, IN THE MONTHS OF JANUARY  
AND FEBRUARY 1834.

BY  
CAPTAIN H. HART,  
ROYAL NAVY.

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*Submitted to Government on the 11th April 1834.*

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## NOTES OF A VISIT TO ZANZIBAR.

I LEFT Bombay on the 15th January 1834, in H. M.'s ship *Imogene*, and arrived at Zanzibar, after a passage of fifteen days, on the evening of the 30th of the same month.

We came to anchor off the Imaum's palace, alongside of the *Liverpool*, seventy-four guns, His Highness' flag-ship, carrying a red flag at the main. This is not the usual place of anchorage, and only made use of by the Imaum's men-of-war, in consequence of its being immediately opposite the palace, which stands on the beach, about a quarter of a mile from the ship. We found at this anchorage, besides the *Liverpool*, two frigates, two corvettes, and a brig. Information relative to the number, force, tonnage, state, age, and condition of His Highness' squadron is given in an annexed statement.

At the anchorage off the town of Zanzibar, which is about five miles from this, there were laying one English merchant brig, one American merchant ship and two brigs, with several small craft of the country. Before we had anchored, His Highness sent off a Captain of one of his frigates to welcome us on our arrival, and to express His Highness' great pleasure on seeing an English man-of-war. I thanked him for his attention, and said I was sorry it was after sunset, as I could not salute His Highness until early the next morning, when I would do so with twenty-one guns. He said they knew our custom very well, and that the flag-ship was ready to return our salute whenever we began. He now went on shore, and I begged him to state to His Highness that I was sent to pay respects to him, and to inquire after his health; and that I had also despatches, which I would deliver at any time His Highness would do me the honour to receive me. The next morning, at daylight, we fired a royal salute, which was taken up by the flag-ship immediately after our last gun, and in the same time, so that it appeared a continuation of the same salute; and this exactness of returning a salute they observed in all subsequent firing, taking it up at our last gun. At 9 o'clock the Captain returned, bringing with him a present, which he said His Highness had sent for the Captain, consist-





ing of two bullocks and vegetables, with a quantity of fruit, sufficient for a dessert for the whole crew after they had devoured one of the bullocks for dinner. He also brought a message to say that His Highness would receive me whenever most convenient to myself. I mentioned 10 o'clock, and at that hour went on shore. His Highness, with his officers, received me at the steps of the veranda in the most courteous and kind manner, coming up to shake hands, and, pointing out the way I was to go, followed me to a long room, at the head of which he placed me on his right. We conversed through his interpreter, Captain Hassan, of His Highness' Navy, who, though an Arab, was educated at Bombay, reads and writes English well, and is His Highness' confidential servant. Captain Hassan is a very pleasant, mild, gentlemanly man, and very partial to the English; has been much at Calcutta, Bombay, and various parts of India, and is appointed by His Highness as Agent to the English; and it is through him alone that anything can be done. After many inquiries after my health, and hopes that I had not suffered by the voyage, he commenced by saying how pleased he was to see an English ship, and when he heard her fire a gun he was delighted, as he was sure she must be a man-of-war. He always considers the English as his best friends, and was happy to see them at all times, and, whenever in his power, to show them every possible attention. I told him the friendship was mutual; that the English had a great regard for him and his subjects, and we were glad to show our sincerity whenever we had an opportunity, and that in saying this I was only speaking the sentiments of my country towards him. We played at compliments for some time in a very pleasant, good-humoured manner, when the interpreter said "that His Highness was more pleased than ever from the beginning to the end, and requested I would ask for everything I wanted." This was a good opportunity to change the subject, and I then stated that the ship required to be supplied with beef, vegetables, wood, and water, &c. His Highness ordered the boats off immediately, and they brought off a quantity of water in the course of the afternoon. As this was our first interview, I could not very well introduce what I wished: we therefore spoke about the ships of his squadron. I admired the *Liverpool*, a very fine ship of seventy-four guns, and told him she was very like the *Melville*. He said she was English, and all they said or did was good. I told him we had on board the *Imogene* guns on a new construction, and if he would do me the honour of visiting the ship, I should be glad to show them. This he was quite ready to do, and Monday was fixed to be the day. Having gone through the ceremony of drinking coffee and sherbet, I took my leave, and went on board. The next day I went to introduce the officers to His Highness, who was happy to see them,





receiving us at the door; and we were shown into the same room as yesterday, and served with coffee and sherbet, His Highness and the young princes (his two sons) shaking hands in the most good-humoured manner with all who offered to do so. When this was over, he told the interpreter to take a chair near him. \* \* \* \* \*

The *Imogene*, in compliment to His Highness, had been dressed in colours since eight in the morning; and at the appointed time all the boats attended to escort His Highness on board, he coming off in the barge, which hoisted his red flag, the other boats attending, and forming in two lines. He was received with a royal salute, and the officers in full uniform, and was attended on board by two of his sons, the governor (who is his uncle), and several officers. From the quarter deck we went to the cabin, when they all took seats, and sat for some time. Refreshments were offered, but it being their great fast of Ramzan, none were accepted. His Highness began by thanking me for my great kindness and attention,—that he could not sufficiently express all he felt, but that it came from his “inside, and from the bottom of his heart.” As the *Liverpool* was laying close under our stern, our attention was called to her. I admired her very much, and repeated that I was struck with her great likeness to the *Melville*. He said she was a very fine ship, and built by the English, and that nothing would please him so much as for the English to have her,—that if they would accept of her he should be very happy. I thanked him, and told him I would faithfully report his munificent offer to my Admiral. He said,—“That is what I wish; and to the Admiralty, and to the King. She is in very good condition, but is too large for the service of Muskat; and if the King of England will accept of her, it will make me very happy. I will send\* her to Bombay, or, if you like, will give her to you here.” We then went round the ship, and returned to the cabin for a short time, when he took his leave, apparently highly pleased, and left with every expression of thanks and gratitude. He proceeded to the shore under a royal salute, the boats attending in the same manner as they brought him off. \*

The next day I went on shore to see the Imaum. \* \* \* \*

As I was going away, he said he wished above all things to have an English person always with him: there was a house quite ready, and he wished some one would come and live in it, and he would be guided by him. I now took leave, and went on board. The next day I went to receive my despatches, and take my leave. This was our last interview. \* \* \* \*

I now received His Highness' despatches, and after many expressions

\* This vessel was subsequently sent by His Highness as a present to His late Majesty King William IV. Out of compliment to His Highness, her name has been changed to *The Imaum*, and she now belongs to the British Navy.—*Editor*.





of the pleasure he had experienced in having an English man-of-war with him, and his great attachment to the English nation, he shook my hand in the most friendly manner, wishing me every success and happiness. He then attended me to the steps on the beach, where I bowed and took my leave, and sailed the next morning.

The Imaum is said by his interpreter to be at the present period (February 1834) forty-four years of age, but he appears to be more. He is a tall, stout, and noble-looking man, with a benevolent countenance, clear, intelligent, sharp-eyed, and remarkably pleasant and agreeable in conversation. He is greatly attached to the English, and everything that is English, and appeared to have a pride in telling me "all his saddles were made in England." He was wounded some years since when in a joint expedition with the English; and appears to wish to be considered as an Englishman in everything. The English, he says, he looks upon as his brothers, and will willingly give them his country. He married the grand-daughter of the king of Persia, but in consequence of a quarrel between His Highness and the King of Persia about the English, he lost his wife, and she is now detained in Persia. He has three sons: the eldest, twenty-one years of age, is now in charge of Muskat, and the other two are with him at Zanzibar. When His Highness visited this island last year, the eldest son was then left at Muskat, but some disturbance taking place, His Highness was obliged to return. He has now been here about two months, and it is understood that if things remain quiet at Muskat he will remain here for a year or two longer.

His Highness has lately been endeavouring to form an alliance with the Queen of Madagascar, by offering his hand, and sent an Ambassador to the Court of Tananareiro for that purpose. This Ambassador returned last December, and met the Imaum at Samoo, on his way down from Muskat. His Highness had long been expecting these tender documents, and, cruel as love-letters always are, he found, contrary to all expectation, that they were written in English,—not only the letter from the Queen, but also those from her Ministers. His Highness had no one who could translate these letters, for although his Ambassador could speak English, yet he could not read it, and His Highness was obliged to have recourse to an English brig laying in the roads, the Master of which, as good luck would have it, being able to read. This Master was therefore employed to read the royal Queen's tender letter to the Ambassador, whilst he translated it to the anxious ear of his royal master. And thus it was that His Highness became acquainted with the reply to his royal love from the Madagascar Queen. The solemnity observed upon the occasion can better be imagined than I describe: fortunately for the nautical reader, there was no love or state secret imposed, or the good-natured man might have





had to lament his learning, by finding himself doomed to have had his head severed from his body, that he might tell no tales.

The Queen said she had been made happy by hearing from one who had long been in friendship with her father, and she hoped always to hear of his welfare, and wished he could pay a visit to Tananareiro: in case he did not do so, she should be very much obliged if he would have the kindness to send her a coral necklace of a thousand dollars, and she would order the money to be paid whenever it was landed. She hoped their friendship would increase, and that opportunities would offer for their becoming better acquainted.

The Ministers were also glad to hear of His Highness, and wished much that he would come and show himself, or send some of his men-of-war, which should have every attention paid them. They could not offer the Queen, because by their law it was contrary for her to marry, but there was a young princess which he might have. As for the men, he might have as many as he pleased, and he had only to give them a musket. This was the substance of the two letters. His Highness was disappointed that there was not more said about love in the Queen's letter; but the Master of the brig consoled him by saying "she had said as much as she could say in a first letter." The people of Madagascar appear to be his great allies, and have been some time in correspondence with him respecting a force of two thousand men, which His Highness is to have to go against the people of Mombassa, who are now in a state of revolt. The Imaum told me that the Mombassa people were in this state of rebellion, and asked, if he were to send to Madagascar and get troops, whether the English would like it? I told him the English would not interfere between him and his subjects, and that he could act as he pleased to subdue a rebellion in his own dominions; but he repeated, "Will they like it?" That I could not tell. I asked him why he did not send one of his ships, which would blow them out of the water. He said he had done so, but they all ran away, and returned in his absence; it was no use, unless he had troops to follow them. It appears he did some time since go to Mombassa with four or five thousand Arabs, who got fever and sickly, and most of them died; besides an Arab will not fight; whilst these Malambo people from Madagascar are said to be good soldiers, and desperate fellows. His Highness' frigate *Piedmontese* is going to Madagascar in about a month.

Tananareiro, the capital of the island of Madagascar, where the Queen resides, and where she has lately had built, by English architects, two beautiful palaces, is said to be very populous, and there are established in it fifty English schools, chiefly by the Missionaries. They have about five or six thousand troops, which are trained and





exercised after the military tactics of England, and are dressed in the English manner, and many of their officers are English. They always keep this number in training, but they can double or treble the number whenever they please. They are said to be good and excellent fighting soldiers. A Frenchman has established a manufactory there for making muskets, and has written to offer his services to the Imaum (who has declined, saying he can buy muskets cheaper than he could make them); and there is an Englishman who has established a powder manufactory.

One of the principal ports is Majunga, in Bambatooka Bay, in the north-western part of the island, where a whole fleet may lay in six or seven fathoms, sheltered from all winds. Bullocks are plentiful at this place, and very cheap. About eight years since the Americans carried on a most lucrative trade from this port, in buying bullocks at two dollars a head, which they killed on the spot, and salted the meat, and also the hides, and took the hoofs and horns, and, the latter selling for the original price of the bullocks, left the meat for clear profit, which they sold for an enormous price at the Havannah, when they had lost their supplies from South America.

His Highness the Imaum's whole revenue is stated to be about 250,000 dollars a year; that is 150,000 from Zanzibar, and 100,000 from Muskat. This revenue appears very small when compared to his fleet and establishment. However, he is said to be very rich, arising from trade, and by property coming to him at the death of his servants, who are expected to leave him their riches.

He has a squadron of one line-of-battle ship, three frigates, two corvettes, and a brig, which appears to constitute his great pleasure and amusement; and he has now given an order to the English brig to bring out naval stores to the amount of 30,000 dollars. When on board, he conducts everything himself; gets her under weigh, shifts her berth, or brings her to anchor, by giving every word of command.

He is said to have twenty merchant ships of different kinds, but I could not learn where or how they were employed: there was only one of that description at Zanzibar, and she was going to the Mauritius, to endeavour to get an engineer for the steam-engine she brought thence last year.

The island of Zanzibar is in lat.  $6^{\circ} 6' S.$ , and long.  $39^{\circ} 9' E.$

Its climate is said by the Americans, who have been here two years, not to be unhealthy or disagreeable, except for a week or two at the change of the monsoon, when there are rains and heavy squalls, but after that, the weather is settled, and water smooth; it is now, from the northerly winds occasionally, for part of the day rough for boats, which renders it bad for landing on the open beach.





His Highness the Imaum possesses absolute power, and his word is law. He has lately built a palace at Zanzibar, and is giving every encouragement to trade, and improving the island, by planting clove trees and sugarcane, which thrive in a remarkable manner. It has been supposed that His Highness will, on some future day, make this his chief residence, in preference to Muskat. The only places on the coast of any consequence, subject to his power, are Mombassa and Samoo; the former is at present in a state of revolt, and he has a frigate blockading the port.

It produces little more than a few cloves, and a small quantity of sugar, but both these plantations are in their infancy. The interior is said to be well cultivated, and extremely populous. Bullocks do not appear to be plentiful, but there are abundance on Pamba, the neighbouring island, which also produces a great quantity of rice, and has a good harbour; but the cattle of the latter will not live at Zanzibar. Fruit and vegetables were in great quantities.

It has within itself little or no trade. That to Bombay consists in the export of a little gum and ivory, brought from the main, with a few cloves, the only produce of the island; and the import trade is chiefly dates, and cloth from Muskat to make turbans. These things are sent in small country vessels, which make only one voyage a year; the trade is consequently very trifling. The revenue is chiefly received from ships, which come here to trade upon the coast, and which are mostly Americans. These ships have great difficulty in collecting a cargo, and their plan is to touch upon different parts of the coast, and leave one or two of their crew behind, with an interpreter, whilst they visit some other parts, or come to Zanzibar, which is the great mart and rendezvous. Out of thirteen ships which touched here last year (between January 1833 and January 1834) only four were English, all the rest Americans. The two American brigs now here are trading on the coast, but it is very common for the South Sea whalers to come for refreshments, of which description the ship now here is one. I was surprised to hear this, and could scarcely believe that a South Sea whaler came here for refreshments, and that to be her only object. However I found it truly so, and that he had actually caught between two and three hundred barrels of oil almost between Zanzibar and the next island of Pamba, and this the day after he had spoken an English whaler, who had been on the ground some time, and, after speaking the American, bore away to the Seychelles for refreshments. Of the two American brigs and their trade, one belongs to Old Salem, and other to New York, and both on their second voyage. The former has both voyages brought dollars to purchase a cargo; the latter, the first voyage, brought out goods which did not answer, and made a bad trip; he has now dollars, and





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does not appear to have met with much better success, expecting to be here two or three months collecting a freight. Their return cargoes consist almost totally of copal and gum; but since the Englishman has been here, and they have seen him buying ivory, they have commenced doing the same. The English brig is a great annoyance to them: it is her first voyage to this coast, and she brought out a cargo of goods, the whole of which she has disposed of, and is now about to return with a full cargo of copal, gum, ivory, and drugs, with a little gold dust and tortoiseshell. The latter, the Master gave me to understand, the Americans knew nothing about, and that he expected to clear for his owners 170 per cent. The Americans and this man (who is a clever, industrious, active, close-handed fellow, and understands perfectly what he is about) are upon perfect good terms with each other, though it is evident they are very jealous of him, and it is only his extreme good humour that prevents their quarrelling. Copal, gum, and ivory are the only return cargoes; they are therefore all looking out for the same thing.

This trade has been known only to one or two houses in America: the Americans now here said there were not ten people in their country who knew where Zanzibar was, or ever heard of it. Last year the Imaum sent a letter by one of these American Captains, to be published in America, inviting the citizens of the United States to come and trade; but the owners said—"No, Mr. Waters (the Master of the Old Salem brig); if we allow this to be published, everybody will hear of the place, and we shall lose our trade."

The Englishman is certainly a great favourite with the Imaum, and he has already given him orders to the amount of 30,000 dollars, chiefly for naval stores, to be brought out next year, and has been endeavouring to persuade this man to bring out his family, and live at Zanzibar.

There was no possibility of ascertaining any actual account of the number of the inhabitants at Zanzibar; some said there were 50,000, and others 200,000: a gentleman who had been there some time told me he always found the same unsatisfactory answer, but there was no doubt that the island was full of inhabitants. There is no European settled here, nor in any part of His Highness' dominions.

The revenue of the island of Zanzibar is said to be 150,000 dollars yearly. Previous to His Highness' visit last year, he only received about 30,000 or 40,000 dollars.

The Imaum has only about two or three hundred troops, which he brought from Muskat, but there appear to be a great number of police, armed with spears.

The only place on the island of Zanzibar where there are any guns





is at the foot of a white round tower, which stands near the custom house, on the point of the town,—it cannot well be called a castle. It consists of a square fort or prison, with four walls, and a small tower in each corner; the guns, eight or nine in number, are out of condition, and outside of the tower close to the beach: a jolly boat would take it, or knock it down. It is said His Highness intends to build a new fort.

In concluding this statement of my proceedings, I feel it my duty to state that His Highness the Imaum, during our stay at Zanzibar, continued to send off daily a bullock, with vegetables, and fruit sufficient for the officers and ship's company, and completed us with wood and water, for which His Highness would not receive any payment. The morning before our departure, his interpreter came to say that His Highness had 8,000 dollars, which he wished to send to Bombay, and he would pay me the freight. After the generous manner in which we had been treated, and the munificent offer of a seventy-four to His Majesty, I thought I should ill represent my king, or the generosity of my country, by receiving freight on so small a sum; I therefore, in return, declined payment, and received the 8,000 dollars, without freight, to be landed at Bombay.

*List of the Ships of War belonging to His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, with their Force, Tonnage, Age, State, and Condition, laying at Zanzibar.*

Names.	Quality.	Guns.	Built.		Tons.	State.	Remarks, &c.
			When.	Where.			
<i>Liverpool....</i>	Ship.	74	1826	Bombay.	1800	Good.	Hull in good condition. Her masts are struck and stripped, except the lower masts, and her yards are fore and aft on the booms. She has about 150 Natives on board.
<i>Shah Allum...</i>	Frigate.	50	1820	Bombay.	1100	Good.	She was docked last year at Bombay, was new coppered, and had a thorough repair. She is now at anchor off the town of Zanzibar, as a guard-ship. Her masts are struck, and stripped, except the lower masts, and her yards are fore and aft on the booms. She has about 50 men on board.
<i>Piedmontese..</i>	Frigate.	36	1829	Cochin.	761	Good.	In good condition, and going to Madagascar. Is at present in the same state as the others: masts struck, and yards fore and aft on the booms. She has 18 or 20 men on board.





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Names.	Quality.	Guns.	Built.		Tons.	State.	Remarks, &c.
			When.	Where.			
<i>Mustapha</i> ....	Ship.	26	Not known.	Muskat.	450	Indifferent.	She was built at Muskat out of plank taken from Rangoon, and timber of Muskat. This plan did not answer. She is, I understand, the most indifferent of the squadron. She is now blockading the port of Mombassa, and is the only one of the squadron not here.
<i>Rahmeany</i> ...	Corvette.	24	1833	Cochin.	725	Excellent.	A very fine and beautiful corvette, with great beam, drawing only 14 feet water, and is said to beat everything. His Highness the Imaum came down from Muskat in this ship about two months since. She is at present in the same state as the others, having struck her masts and yards, and unrigged them, since we have been here. She has about 30 men on board.
<i>Sultana</i> ....	Barque.	10	1833	Bombay.	300	Quite new.	She is a very handsome, strong, and well built vessel; only arrived from Bombay a few days ago, and is in the same state as the others, with masts and yards down. She has about 10 or 15 men on board.
<i>Targe</i> .....	Schooner.	None.	1829	Cochin.	125	Good.	She is a pretty little vessel, and is intended as a yacht. She was built at Cochin at the same time as <i>Piedmontese</i> , and is in the same state as the others. Has 6 or 8 men on board.

NOTE.—It will be seen that the squadron has but few men; they might, by taking nearly the whole of the men now here, be able to send one ship to sea. Their plan is to keep but few men on board, and when the squadron is wanted for service to send to Muskat for crews, which generally consist of half Arabs and half Lascars. His Highness finding the *Liverpool*, of seventy-four guns (a very fine ship, and in good condition), too large for the service of Muskat, has offered her as a present to His Majesty.







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STATISTICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

CONNECTED WITH THE

POSSESSIONS, REVENUES, FAMILIES, &c.

OF

HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT;

OF

THE RULER OF BAHREIN;

AND OF THE

CHIEFS OF THE MARITIME ARAB STATES IN THE  
PERSIAN GULF.

BY

CAPTAIN A. B. KEMBALL,

RESIDENT AT BUSHIRE.

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*Submitted to Government on the 1st July 1854.*

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## PERSIAN GULF.

I HAVE the honour to submit the information called for by Government on the 17th February 1854, regarding the principal estates within my political control. No mention is therein made of the ports on the Persian Coast between Bushire and Bunder Abbas given below, because, being situated within the territorial limits of Persia, their inhabitants acknowledge a direct allegiance to the Shah, and, contributing to the general revenue of the country, are more or less influenced in their condition, and in the condition of their chiefs, by the administration of the provincial functionaries within whose districts they are included.

Ports.	Tribes.	Names of Chiefs.
Congoon (with dependencies).	Nussoor .....	Shaikh Hussan bin Shaikh Jabnah.
Asceloo .....	Haram .....	Two brothers, Shaikh Abdool bin Khulfan and Shaikh Ahmed bin Khulfan.
Nabend .....	Ali Boo Khaleef .....	Shaikh Yoosoof bin Mubarak.
Nakheeloo (with dependency).	.....	Ruled at present by a lady chief.
Cheroo .....	Obeydalee .....	Abdool Russool.
Kelat .....	Beni Humeed .....	Shaikh Mahomed bin Ahmed.
Charrak (with dependencies).	.....	Shaikh Hussein bin Abdool.
Mogoo .....	Marazeek .....	Sultan bin Hoossein.
Lingah .....	.....	Khaleefa bin Guzeeb.

It should be observed, however, that beyond the exaction of an annual tribute, the control really exercised over them by the latter is of a very limited character; and being, as they are, at least east of Congoon, composed of Arab Tribes, cognate with those on the opposite shores of the Gulf, whence they originally migrated, the general remarks apply equally to them as to the latter. Their means of existence are derived from fishing, a participation in the coasting and





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carrying trade of the Gulf, and the cultivation of the date tree, and of grain, to the scanty extent to which the barren nature of their soil admits. A few of their boats proceed annually to Zanzibar, and they engage more or less extensively in the pearl fishery.

Of these Arab settlements on the Persian Coast, Lingah is by far the most thriving and important. The advantages it possesses as a free port, and the mild and equitable rule of its chief, lately deceased, have attracted thither, during the past fifteen years, a large accession of population, including many wealthy merchants, principally natives of Bahrein, who have been driven from their homes by domestic troubles; but its increasing magnitude and prosperity have of late attracted the attention of the Persian authorities, and the measures taken by them to extort additional tribute, if persisted in, may soon cause it to relapse into its former insignificance.

## MUSKAT.

I.—Syud Sued bin Sultan bin Ahmed, Imaum of Muskat, succeeded Name, Title, and Age of as Political Chief in 1807-08. His title of Chief. Imaum, in its religious signification, not generally recognised by Arabs; age sixty-seven years. (A. D. 1854.)

Usual Place of Residence. II.—Zanzibar, in his African possessions; has lately come to Muskat.

III. (A.)—Surviving sons :—Syud Soweeynee; of an Abyssinian mother; age thirty-three years; vicegerent of the Imaum in his Arabian possessions.

Syud Mahomed; of an Abyssinian mother; age twenty-six years; residing at Muskat; Governor of the district of Sumail.

Syud Khalid; of a Georgian mother; age not known; residing at Zanzibar.

Syud Burghash; of an Abyssinian mother; age nine years; has accompanied his father to Muskat.

Syud Toorkee; of an Abyssinian mother; age eleven years; ditto.

Syud Soweeynee has Salim, age fifteen years; and issue up to this date another son, six years of age.

Fysul bin Hillal, grandson of the Imaum, age twenty-four years.

III. (B.)—Syud Mahomed bin Salim bin Sultan, nephew of the Imaum, age fifty-three years; associated with Relatives, and Principal Persons of the Court. Syud Soweeynee in the government of the Imaum's Arabian possessions, and enjoys a considerable share of power.





Syud Humeed bin Salim, brother of preceding, age thirty-six years; Governor of Musnaah, from which he derives an income of 800 crowns annually.

Syud Humeed bin Suede bin Khulfan bin Ahmed, cousin of the Imaum, and confidant of Syud Soweeynee; age thirty-five years.

Syud Ali bin Syf bin Khulfan bin Ahmed, ditto ditto; age thirty years.

Syud Hillal bin Ahmed, ditto ditto; age forty-five years.

Syud Hillal bin Mahomed bin Ahmed, ditto ditto; Governor of Soweik; age fifty-one years.

Syud Mahomed bin Salmin, maternal uncle of the Imaum; age eighty years; Warden of Muskat.

Syud Ahmed, son of preceding, age eighteen years.

Syud Soweeynee, ditto ditto, age sixteen years.

Syud Azan bin Syf bin Ali, cousin of Imaum; age seventy-five years.

Sons of preceding,—Ali, age twenty-two years; Budran, age thirty years.

Shaikh Saleh bin Suede bin Humeed, formerly in the service of Humood bin Azan, now much trusted by the Imaum; age fifty years.

Ahmed bin Humad, son of the late commander of the Imaum's forces, who was killed at the taking of Sevee, on the African Coast; much esteemed by the Imaum: age thirty-three years.

III. (C.)—Syud Hillal bin Humood bin Azan bin Ahmed; age fourteen years. Uncle of the above, Syud Ghes bin Azan, age forty-one years;—Governor of Rastag, from which he derives an annual income of 3,000 crowns. This chief is believed to be biding his time, and would certainly contest the succession to the Imaumship in the event of the death of His Highness, or at least strike a blow for the recovery of the territory lately wrested from his brother.

IV.—The Imaum of Muskat is independent, but pays Zukat, or religious tithe, to the Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul, at the rate of 20,000 crowns per annum; this amount being 12,000 crowns for Muskat, and 8,000 crowns for Sohar.

The Imaum has hitherto farmed Bunder Abbas and its dependencies from the Persian Government. These districts have lately been resumed by the Shah, but, if not recovered by force, will probably be restored on the payment of an increased rent.

V.—One hundred and seventy thousand crowns, derived from customs and land taxes. Revenue of possessions on the African Coast not known, but believed to be much more considerable.

Estimated Gross Annual Revenue.





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VI.—On the Coast of Oman, the Imaum's territory extends from Ras-ool-Hud to Sohar. In addition to his hereditary dominions on the Arabian and African Coasts, the Imaum holds in possession the islands of Ormus and Kishm, and the tribes on the Mukran Coast between Fask and Pussem acknowledge him as their feudal lord. No correct estimate can be formed of the area of the Imaum's possessions.

Boundaries of Territory, and estimated Area in Square Miles.

VII.—The Imaum's territory in Oman is for the most part barren and mountainous, but contains many extensive and fertile valleys, in which water is generally found good and abundant, and is raised to the surface by means of the Persian wheel. The islands of Kishm and Ormus are barren and unproductive.

Prevailing Nature of the Soil, Usual Mode of Irrigation, and general Features of the Country.

VIII. and IX.—Muskat, as a general commercial entrepôt, possesses considerable trade. Its manufacture of coarse stuffs, in use amongst Arabs, is insignificant. The principal article of export is dried fish; from the Mukran Coast hides and wool are brought in small quantities for exportation. The harbour of the town, though small, is good and safe. The coast elsewhere is generally open, and more or less accessible from the sea. Little or nothing is known of the interior of Oman.

Natural and Industrial Resources; Routes, Approaches, and Means of Communication by Land and Water.

X.—The climate is generally considered unhealthy. In summer, the heat in the valleys and on the coast is excessive.

Climate, and average Range of Thermometer.

XI.—The Imaum could probably muster for the defence of his Arabian dominions from twelve to fifteen thousand fighting men. No other data can be supplied for estimating the population.

Estimated Population.

BAHREIN.

I.—Predominant tribe, a branch of the Uttoobees, originally from Koweit. Patronymic of the ruling family, Al Khaleefa.

Name, Title, and Age of Chief.

Mahomed bin Khaleefa bin Sulman bin Ahmed bin Khaleefa, Chief of Bahrein; age forty-one years. This chief and his immediate relatives or clan are commonly designated Al Sulman, from their common grandfather, to distinguish them from the rival branch of the family, now called Al Abdoolla.



II.—Chief's sons :—Khaleefa bin Mahomed, age eighteen years ;  
Names and Ages of Legitimate Male Issue. Abdoolla, age thirteen years ; Ahmed, age eleven years.

III. (A.)—Ali bin Khaleefa, brother of Chief, age forty years ;  
Principal Persons of the Court. exercises a considerable share of the government of the island.

Sons of preceding :—Abdoolla bin Ali, age fourteen years ; Ibrahim, age eleven years.

Rashid bin Khaleefa, uterine brother of chief, age forty-seven years ; of inferior capacity and influence ; holds a subordinate position.

Mahomed bin Sulman, uncle of chief, age forty-five years.

Humood bin Sulman, brother of preceding, age thirty-five years.

Influential and trusted Dependents of Chief. III. (B.)—Mubaruk bin Khaleefa Al Fazil, age sixty-five years.

Humood bin Mahomed, age forty years.

Abdool Wahab bin Abdoolla Al Khaleefa, age fifty years ; Khaleefa bin Mahomed bin Abdoolla, age forty-five years ; Khaleefa bin Mahomed bin Ali, age fifty-five years ; Ahmed, brother of preceding, age fifty years. These dependents reside in Guttur.

III. (C.)—Hassan bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed Al Khaleefa, son of the Rival Branch, Al Khaleefa Al Abdoolla. late ex-Chief of Bahrein, age forty-nine years ; Rashid, brother of preceding, age twenty years ; Humeed, ditto, age sixteen years. These three individuals reside at Bahrein, subsisting upon a pittance allowed them by the *de facto* Chief.

Mahomed bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed Al Khaleefa, son of the late ex-chief, age thirty-seven years ; eldest son Khaleefa, age sixteen years. Has two other sons, respectively twelve and eleven years of age.

Ahmed, brother of preceding, age thirty-eight years ; eldest son, Sulman, age eighteen years.

Ali, ditto ditto, of inferior birth on mother's side, age fifty-three years ; eldest son, Hussein, age fifteen years.

Sulman bin Ahmed bin Sulman, seceder from the party of the *de facto* chief ; age thirty-five years.

Khaleefa bin Humeed bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed Al Khaleefa, age thirty-four years.

Esai, brother of preceding, age thirty-two years.

Ali bin Nassir bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed, grandson of ex-chief, age twenty-seven years.

Hussein, brother of preceding, age twenty-five years.

Mahomed bin Mubaruk bin Abdoolla bin Ahmed, grandson of ex-chief, age sixteen years.

The above, with their followers, hold possession of Damaum, on





the main land opposite to Bahrein, under the protection of the Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul, from whom they receive a sum of money annually for their maintenance.

During the past fifteen years, a severe contest has been sustained, with occasional intermissions, between these competitors for the chiefship of Bahrein, to the almost complete ruin of the trade, and prosperity of the island.

IV.—The Chief of Bahrein is independent, but pays Zukat, or Whether Tributary or religious tithe, to the Wahabee ruler, at the rate of 4,000 crowns per annum.  
not; if so, to whom, and Annual Amount of Tribute.

V.—One hundred thousand crowns, derived from the produce of the extensive landed property in the possession of the ruling family, and the taxes on land, and on boats engaged in the pearl fishery. No customs or duties on exports or imports are levied at Bahrein.  
Estimated Gross Annual Revenue.

VI.—The territory of Bahrein consists of the two islands known by that name, and the line of coast extending from the bottom of the bight in which they are situated to Khore-al-Adeed, on the other side of the promontory of Ras Tanoorah.  
Boundaries of Territory, and estimated Area in Square Miles.

VII.—The larger island, which is thirty miles long, and of an average width of six miles, is generally low, though at its centre a range of small hills may be distinguished. The soil is fertile, and plentifully watered by numerous springs, rising to the surface of the ground. The smaller island, with the exception of one or two date plantations, admits of no cultivation. The Coast of Guttur partakes of the general character of the eastern shores of Arabia, and is barren and unproductive.  
Prevailing Nature of the Soil, Mode of Irrigation, and general Features of the Country.

VIII.—Although Bahrein, owing to constant internal dissensions, has of late years greatly fallen off in population, and the wealth of its inhabitants, it still maintains a thriving trade, of which the exports and imports may be roughly estimated each at five or six lakhs of crowns, and sends from 1,000 to 1,200 boats to the pearl fishery.  
Natural and Industrial Resources.

IX.—Its harbour, though in some degree difficult of access, is good, and well sheltered, and will admit vessels drawing not more than sixteen or seventeen feet of water.  
Means of Communication.

Climate. X.—The climate is bad.

Prevalent Diseases. XI.—Fevers prevail, and strangers sleeping on shore are liable to suffer from its deadly effects.





XII.—The heat in summer is excessive; no idea can be formed of the average range of the thermometer, or of the average fall of rain.

XIII.—Fifty thousand inhabitants on the island. No correct estimate can be formed, without further inquiry, of the population of the dependencies of Bahrein on the Guttur Coast.

#### MARITIME ARAB STATES.

These States are independent, but acknowledge the feudal supremacy of the Wahabee ruler whenever his own power, or their dissensions, may place him in a position to exercise it. Their chiefs are expected to afford military aid in his expeditions, and to furnish supplies to his troops when present, as in the case of the garrison at Brymee in Oman.

The territorial possessions of the Maritime States are confined to the inhabited spots on the sea coast, and may be said to be bounded by the walls of their towns, and by the date groves in their immediate vicinity. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, the Joasmee Chief, holds also some territory on the Batinah Coast, such as Khore Fukann and Dubba, which he wrested from the Imaum during the contest between His Highness and the Sohar branch of his family, when he supported the cause of the latter. The maritime tribes are each of them closely related to nomade tribes in the interior, over whom the chiefs of the former exercise a limited control.

The character of the Coast of Arabia, from the mouths of the Euphrates to the range of mountains in Oman which joins the sea a little below Ras-ool-Khyma, is low, sandy, and barren. Water is everywhere more or less brackish. The Desert passes close up to the walls of the towns, and, beyond the scanty date plantations, the produce of which is altogether inadequate to the supply of the inhabitants, precludes cultivation.

The maritime tribes are dependent for their subsistence upon the pearl and common fisheries. They engage, also, extensively in the coasting trade of the Gulf, and in the carrying trade to India and Zanzibar. Nothing is known of the interior of the country, with the exception of Koweit, and the bay of Kateef, sheltered by reefs. This coast possesses no harbours, and forms a lee-shore to the prevailing north-west winds. The towns are all built on the banks of deep creeks or backwaters, into which the larger boats can enter only when unladen. The heat during summer is excessive.

From the lowness of the country, the average fall of rain is small, and probably does not exceed from four to six inches in the year.





NAMES OF THE SHAIKHS OF OMAN;  
THEIR TERRITORIES, POPULATION, AND REVENUES;

AS EXISTING IN THE YEAR 1854.

*(Furnished to the Resident in the Persian Gulf by the Native Agent at Shargah.)*

ABOOTHABEE.

Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, Chief of Aboothabee, age twenty-nine years; Shaikh Humdan bin Tahnoon, his elder brother, age twenty-five years; Sukkur bin Tahnoon, younger brother, age twenty-one years.

Fighting men of Aboothabee 5,000. Revenue derived from pearl fishery, &c. amounts yearly to 6,000 reals. The inhabitants engage in the pearl fishery, and belong to the Malikee sect.

DEBAYE.

Shaikh Syud bin Butye, Chief of Debaye, age thirty-five years; Shaikh Butye bin Butye, his brother, age twenty-six years. Relatives, Juman bin Syud, age forty years; Syud bin Elian, age forty-two years.

Fighting men 1,000. Revenue that accrues to the chief 1,500 reals, besides 2,000 derived from traffic in pearls. The inhabitants generally engage in the pearl fishery, and belong to the sect of Malikees.

JOASMEES.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Kawasim (Joasmces), age eighty-five years, has sons,—Majid bin Sultan, age thirty-three years; Ibrahim bin Sultan, age thirty-one years; Abdoolla, age thirty years; Khalid, age twenty-one years; Salim, age ten years; Jassim, age eight years, and Ahmed, age eight years.

Grandsons, sons of Majid bin Sultan,—Humeed bin Majid, age ten years; and Saeed bin Majid, age eight years.

Son of Abdoolla bin Sultan,—Humeed bin Abdoolla, age eight years.

Sons of Ibrahim bin Sultan,—Musharee, age fifteen years; and Rashid, age eight years.

Saleh bin Suggur, brother to the ruling chief, age fifty-four years.

Territories owned by the chief, Mumzur, Khan, Leia, Shargah, Fasht, Heera, Himreeah, the island of Hamrah, Ras-ool-Khyma, Ramse, Shaan, Burka, Dubba, Roole, Zidna, Buddeeya, Rooban, Khore Fukaun, Kateef, Kureeyan, Sikumkum, Fujeera, Soor-ool-Muknood, Ghulla, and Khore Kalba.



Of these, Dubba, and the island of Hamrah, are governed by the chief's son Ibrahim bin Sultan, who derives therefrom a revenue of 1,800 reals, and Mumzur, Khan, Leia, Shargah, Fasht, Heera, and Himreeah are ruled by another of his sons, Abdoola bin Sultan, and the revenue he derives from them amounts to 2,000 reals.

Majid bin Sultan receives from his father an annual allowance of 100 Tomans, and the yearly revenue that accrues to Shaikh Sultan amounts in all to 5,000 reals. The Joasmees belong to the sect of the Wahabees. The fighting men of Shargah number 2,000 souls; of Ras-ool-Khyma, 1,000; the island of Zuab, 700; Khan, 400; Mumzur, 200; Leia, 100; Fasht, 100; Heera, 150; and Himreeah, 1,000. The remainder range, in the number of their fighting men, from 50 to 200 respectively. From Mumzur to the island of Zuab, the people generally engage in the pearl fishery.

The inhabitants of Ras-ool-Khyma go trading voyages in their vessels, and those of the rest of the places occupy themselves in the common fishery, the cultivation of the date tree, and the practice of agriculture.

Heera and Himreeah, whose people are of the Naeem Tribe, are not only exempt from the payment of tribute, but are wont to receive an annual allowance from the Chief of the Joasmees.

EJMAN.

Humeed bin Rashid, Chief of Ejman, age thirty-eight years, has sons,—Rashid bin Humeed, age thirteen years; Mahomed bin Humeed, age seven years; and Obed bin Humeed, age five years.

The chief's brother, Ali bin Rashid, age sixty years, has sons,—Sultan bin Ali, age thirty-one years; Mahomed bin Ali, age twenty-nine years; Salim bin Ali, age twenty-seven years; Majid bin Ali, age twenty-three years; and Rashid bin Ali, age nineteen years.

Son of the chief's late brother (Abdool Azeez\*), Rashid bin Abdool Azeez, age twenty years.

Fighting men of Ejman, 600 souls; sect of the people, Wahabee; gross annual revenue, 600 dollars.

Shaikh Humeed bin Rashid allows his brother, Ali bin Rashid, a yearly sum of 100 Tomans, and to Rashid bin Abdool Azeez in like manner the sum of 20 Tomans. The inhabitants generally employed in the pearl fishery.

\* Abdool Azeez, formerly Chief of Ejman, was slain in action, whilst engaging the people of Himreeah, in 1848.





AMULGAVINE.

Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, Chief of Amulgavine, age sixty years, has sons,—Mahomed bin Abdoolla, age thirty-three years; Ali bin Abdoolla, age thirty years; Rashid bin Abdoolla, age twenty-four years; Ahmed bin Abdoolla, age twenty-two years; Majid bin Abdoolla, age thirteen years; and Ibrahim bin Abdoolla, age five years.

Grandsons,—Nasir bin Mahomed, age seven years; and Suood bin Ali, age two years.

Brother of the Shaikh, Syud bin Rashid, age fifty-five years, has sons,—Esai bin Syud, age thirty-five years; Abdoolla bin Syud, age twenty-seven years; Mahomed bin Syud, age twenty-five years; and Ali bin Syud, age twenty-three years.

Grandsons,—Ibrahim bin Esai, age five years; Khalid bin Esai, age two years; and Ahmed bin Abdoolla, age four years.

Sons of Esai (deceased), a second brother of the chief's,—Abdoolla Azeez bin Esai, age forty-five years; and Mahomed bin Esai, age thirty-four years.

Grandsons of Esai aforesaid,—Esai bin Abdool Azeez bin Esai, age four years; Esai bin Mahomed bin Esai, age fourteen years; Rashid bin Mahomed bin Esai, age thirteen years; Ibrahim bin Mahomed, age ten years; and Suif bin Mahomed, age one year.

Revenue that accrues to Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid 2,000 reals, besides 1,000 additional derived from traffic in pearls.

Amulgavine vessels go trading voyages, and the general occupation of the people is the pearl fishery.

In Batinah, the date tree is cultivated.

The Amulgavines adhere to the Wahabee tenets, and can muster fighting men to the number of 1,000.

KOWEIT OR GRANE.

Ruling family, Al Subah; Shaikh Jaubir bin Abdoolla bin Subah,—the name of this last progenitor being assumed as the patronymic of the family,—age one hundred and two years, titular chief; his son, Shaikh Subah bin Jaubir, age seventy years, virtual chief.

Sons of preceding,—Abdoolla bin Subah, age forty years; Mahomed bin Subah, age fifteen years; Ahmed bin Subah, age twelve years; Mubarak bin Subah, age nine years; Jurrah bin Subah, age six years; Adhbee bin Subah, age four years; and Ghumlar bin Subah, age two years.





Daij bin Jaubir, son of the chief, age forty years.

Sons of preceding,—Ali bin Daij, age eighteen years; and Fazil, age twelve years.

Abdoolla bin Mahomed bin Subah, cousin of chief, age twenty years.

Mahomed bin Saood bin Mahomed bin Subah, cousin of chief, second degree, age twenty years.

Brothers of preceding,—Subah bin Saood, age eighteen years; Mubarak, age seventeen years; and Abdoolla, age fourteen years.

Khaleefa bin Eusoof bin Mahomed bin Subah, cousin of chief, second degree, age twenty-one years.

Mahomed bin Sultan bin Mahomed Al Subah, nephew of chief, age eighty years.

Sons of preceding,—Sulman bin Mahomed, age fifty years; and Humood bin Mahomed, age seventeen years.

Sulman bin Subah bin Daij bin Subah, cousin of chief, second degree, age fourteen years.

Mubarak bin Subah, brother of preceding, age ten years.

Ali bin Humood bin Sultan bin Subah, grand-nephew of chief, age sixty-five years.

Mahomed bin Mubarak bin Jaubir, grandson of chief, age twelve years.

Jurrah bin Salim bin Mubarak bin Subah, grand-nephew of chief, age fifty years.

Salim bin Jurrah, son of preceding, age twenty years.

There has been no contested succession to the chiefship of the tribe inhabiting Koweit (a branch of the Uttoobees) for upwards of a century. The members of the ruling family are thrifty and inoffensive, and engage themselves principally in trade, and in the navigation of their vessels.

The political condition of Koweit varies from that of the other Maritime States, in that the inhabitants acknowledge the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte, and use the Turkish flag, though their allegiance to the Sultan is merely nominal. Their Shaikh, on the contrary, receives an annual allowance of dates, stated at 200 karrahs (small), value about 4,000 crowns, from the Pasha of Bussora, as the condition of protecting that port from foreign aggression whenever his aid may be required.

Koweit possesses a safe and capacious harbour. The number of men capable of bearing arms is said to amount to 6,000; the population of the town to 22,000.

The estimated gross annual revenue amounts to 22,000 crowns, derived from contributions, and a small tax levied at the gate, on goods carried into the country, or brought into the town.





## CONCLUDING REMARKS.

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## CONCLUDING REMARKS.

The prevailing religion of the tribes alluded to in the foregoing paper is that of the Soonee branch of Mahomedans, comprehending, however, some sects differing more or less in their tenets, such as the Wahabees in the interior, and on the Coast of Nujd; the Byazee at Muskat; Malikees at Koweit and Bahrein. At Bahrein, and in smaller numbers at Muskat, where Sheeas compose a part of the population, they live in a state of comparative degradation; at the former place the treatment of them is frequently oppressive. The language throughout is Arabic.

The government of the Arab Tribes being patriarchal, justice is administered by the chiefs, whose decisions are much influenced by public opinion,—more especially in capital or aggravated offences. Sentence is passed by the Kazee, or principal ecclesiastical authority, whose decrees are founded on the Koran, and the traditions of the Prophet and his companions. The election of the Kazee is seldom formal or arbitrary, but rests upon the general recognition of the individual's superior learning, sanctity, and knowledge of the law.


Fine, imprisonment, and, less commonly, castigation, are the punishments awarded for minor offences, at the discretion of the chiefs.

Adultery, which is extremely rare; manslaughter, and other serious crimes, are specially provided for by the Koran, of which the injunctions are usually enforced.

Education is confined to reading and writing, as taught by Moollas in the mosques, or at their own houses, and even to this extent by no means general.

Unless immediately on the coast, vaccination and its benefits are unknown, and probably unheard of. One or two instances have come to my knowledge of applications being made to the surgeons of our vessels of war, when lying off the Arabian ports, for vaccine lymph. So great is the dread of small-pox, and so extensive are its ravages in the region referred to, that, were the means afforded, there can be no doubt that vaccination would be speedily universally adopted.

Fevers prevail more or less throughout the Arabian Coast, and at Bahrein and Muskat, especially, are of a deadly character. At these places, also, when cholera is present, the disease assumes its most virulent type. Small-pox, as above remarked, is everywhere generally prevalent.







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HISTORICAL SKETCH  
OF THE  
JOASMEE TRIBE OF ARABS;  
FROM THE YEAR 1747 TO THE YEAR 1819.  
PREPARED BY  
MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,  
MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.  
WITH  
CONTINUATIONS OF THE SAME,  
FROM THE YEAR 1819 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,  
BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL;  
FROM 1832 TO JULY 1844,  
BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;  
AND FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,  
BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;  
SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.



## JOASMEES.

THE Joasmees are a race of Arabs descended from the inhabitants of Nujd, and named Beni Nasir, as being on the left hand side of the Caaba; and called also Beni Gafree. They have possessed the principality of Seer, in Oman, and been an independent tribe, from the earliest ages. Their territory on the line of coast of that province extends from Musseldom to Zobara, or the island of Shargah, to the northward. That part of Oman contains many tribes,—the Shahee, Zoheree, Joasmee, Beni Kuttub, and Beni Naeem, &c. The Beni Naeem was for many years the head tribe, but the disturbances that followed the death of Nadir Shah having compelled

A. D. 1747. Moolla Ali Shah,\* the Governor of Ormus, Gombroon, and Minao, to call to his assistance some Arab Tribes for the purpose of resisting the unjust demand of tribute which every competitor for the throne of Persia preferred, without any consideration to its having been collected by his predecessor, he fixed on Rashid bin Muttur bin Kasim, with whom he formed alliances by marriage, and was enabled, from the vessels under his command, to avail himself of their services whenever required.

2. The Kasimees, or, as we shall hereafter call them, the Joasmees, retained the vessels occasionally sent for them, and being well paid for their assistance, and having opportunities of procuring arms, they soon acquired an ascendancy among their own tribes, and were enabled to take possession of the town of Kishm, and of Luft, and of Lingah and

A. D. 1765. Shinas on the Persian main, and were extending their conquests over all Moolla Ali's possessions, when their career was checked by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Moien,† who retook Ormus and Bunder Abbas from Moolla Hussein, and Kishm and Luft from the Joasmees. The Joasmees remained passive within their ports whilst Abdoolla lived, but on his death, his sons disagreeing, and their government becoming imbecile, the Joasmees reappeared in the Gulf, plundering the weaker tribes.

\* That monarch's Duryah Beg (or Admiral) in the Persian Gulf.

† Appointed by Kureem Khan Governor of Ormus, Kishm, and Bunder Abbas.





3. In 1772 we find Shaikh Rashid, of Ras-ool-Khyma, who had succeeded his father Shaikh Muttur, in alliance with the Imaum of Muskat, and co-operating with Shaikh Khulfan, the governor of that port, against the Persians. They destroyed two Persian gallivats off Gombroon, and a magazine which the Persian troops had formed at Lingah.

A. D. 1772.

4. In 1775 the Imaum of Muskat was at war with Shaikh Rashid, who had become very powerful by land; the Shaikh captured some Bushire craft, under the plea that their cargo belonged to Muskat.

A. D. 1775.

5. Shaikh Rashid retiring from public life, resigned the Shaikhdом to his son Shaikh Suggur, who, marrying one of Shaikh Abdoolla's daughters, all differences between them were settled.

6. The Joasmees now appeared as traders, and, in a very few years, by their activity, carried on a most profitable concern; but, adds Captain Seton, their rash and treacherous disposition was constantly showing itself, and leading to petty wars and quarrels, both among themselves and their neighbours.

7. The Ras-ool-Khyma fleet, in consequence of the decline of the Persian ascendancy in the Gulf, being constantly on the cruise, roused almost every petty chief to fit out armed boats, manned by lawless crews, under no control, but who depended solely on plunder for their maintenance, which they indiscriminately practised. This state of affairs arose out of the war between Ras-ool-Khyma and Muskat.

A. D. 1778-79.

8. The internal state of Persia being unsettled, the war with Ras-ool-Khyma continued; Shaikh Abdoolla of Ormus was at variance with Karrack; the Shaikh of Al Haram with the Jamia people; and the Uttoobees of Zobara and Grane with the Chaab.

9. Shaikh Suggur next appears endeavouring to negotiate a peace between the Persians and Uttoobees, who had plundered and taken Bahrein; but failing in his efforts, he joined Shaikh Nassir of Bushire in an expedition for the recovery of the island, the Joasmee Shaikh having taken part against the Uttoobees, in consequence of their having captured a boat of his, and murdered eighteen of her crew. These attempts for reducing Bahrein were repeatedly made, and not abandoned until 1785.

10. The Joasmees appear not to have taken any part in the disputes which occurred between the Montific Arabs and the Turkish Government, nor is any mention made of the Joasmees for a number of years. The Gulf enjoyed, also, every degree of tranquillity in 1793, 1794, 1795, and 1796.

A. D. 1785 to 1796.





11. In 1797 the first capture was made by the Joasmees of a British vessel. The *Bassein Snow*, under British colours, and charged with public despatches, was taken on the 18th of May, off Ramse, by a fleet of Dows belonging to Ras-ool-Khyma : she was, however, released by the Shaikh two days after.

A. D. 1797.  
12. In October following, the *Viper* cruiser was attacked by the Joasmees, whilst at anchor in Bushire Roads. A. D. 1797-98. The Joasmee Dows had arrived about six days before the *Viper*, under the command of Shaikh Saleh, Chief of the Beni Joasmee Arabs, and nephew to the Joasmee Shaikh, who were at war with the Imaum of Muskat. Their object was to intercept the Sooree Arabs, who were at Bussora. On the day the *Viper* arrived, Shaikh Saleh had an interview with the Resident at Bushire, when, after the strongest professions of friendship, he stated what his views were, and begged that we would not protect the Sooree Dows, nor ship any British property on board ; but if we did, he promised that it should be held sacred. After these professions, Shaikh Saleh requested a supply of balls and powder from the *Viper*, which having been furnished, he treacherously attacked the cruiser, but was beaten off.

13. The Resident at Bussora remonstrated against both these acts : they were met on the part of Shaikh Suggur by professions of regard for the English, contending, in respect to the attack of the *Viper*, that the cruiser had fired first on the Dows. He stated that Shaikh Saleh left Ras-ool-Khyma, separated himself from the tribe, had proceeded to the Persian shore, and there established himself among the Beni Khalid Arabs, marrying a woman of that tribe, which was one of a villanous nature and character ; that since the commencement of hostilities between the Joasmees and people of Oman, Shaikh Saleh had acted independently of Ras-ool-Khyma, committing depredations according to his inclination ; that the Joasmees had no disputes with the English, and considered the people of Oman alone as their enemies.

14. These disputes arose in consequence of the unsettled state of the Muskat Government on the death of Syud Ahmed, and the usurpations of Syud Sultan. He had involved himself in serious disputes with the Arabs of the Gulf, which brought on a war with many of them, who had united against him ; and the Bombay Government conceived that these acts of aggression experienced by British vessels had been from Arabs in the interest of the deposed Prince of Oman.

15. At the close of the year 1798, the Imaum of Muskat was threatening Bussora, on account of some ancient claims he possessed against the Pasha of Bagdad. In order to enable him the more effectually to execute his hostile intentions, Syud Saced negotiated a peace





## JOASMEES.

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with his formidable enemies the Joasmees. They desisted from these hostile intentions through the interposition of the Resident at Bussora.

16. The Joasmees do not appear to have co-operated with the Imaum in his attack on Bahrein; nor do we hear anything more of them until 1802, when the

A. D. 1802-03.

attention of the Imaum was directed to the formation of an alliance with the Joasmees, which failed;—its object probably was to assist in the attack on Zobara and Bahrein. Shaikh Suggur dying in 1803, was succeeded by his son, Shaikh Sultan.

17. The Joasmees must have been kept in check by the progress of the Wahabees, who had by the month of May 1802 reduced to nominal submission the whole coast from Bussora to Dubba, which included their territory. They appear, however, towards the close of 1804, to have been in alliance with the Uttoobees, since it was in an engagement with these two tribes that Syud Sultan, the Imaum, lost his life.

18. We may now date the period when the Joasmees may be said to have engaged in piratical depredations. Up to the close of 1804, they committed no act of piracy; but, with the exception of the attack on the *Bassein Snow*, and *Viper* cruiser, manifested every respect to the British flag.

19. The influence of the Wahabees having been introduced over the principality of Seer, and the Government of

A. D. 1805.

Muskat having, on the death of Syud Sultan, also fallen under the control of that power, the characters of the different tribes in the Gulf underwent a material change, and the attention of the British Government was directed to check the spirit of piracy which at this period began to display itself.

20. The contentions for the succession, between the members of the Muskat family, threw the Gulf into a state of great confusion: the Joasmees captured two vessels (the *Shannon* and *Trimmer*), belonging to Mr. Manisty, with public despatches, and treated the commanders with great severity and cruelty; and a fleet of forty sail surrounded and fired into the *Mornington* cruiser, but a broadside or two compelled them to sheer off. They were co-operating, also, with Moolla Hussein of Kishm, with whom they were allied, against Bunder Abbas and Minao; whilst Beder, the successful competitor for the Imaumship, was projecting a plan (notwithstanding the support he was receiving from the Wahabees) with the Uttoobees, to destroy the Joasmees, who were at this time in subjection to Abdool Azeez.

21. Syud Beder, on the adjustment of the disputes with Syud Ghes of Sohar, proceeded with a land and sea force for the recovery of Bunder Abbas, Minao, and Ormus, which he effected. Operations were at this time actively prosecuted by the British against the





Joasmees, in conjunction with the Government of Muskat. The combined forces proceeded to Kishm, where they blockaded a Joasmees fleet, which were reduced to such distress as to solicit a peace. Captain Seton agreed to grant them a truce until the pleasure of Government should be known; explaining, as his reason for not prosecuting hostilities with vigour, the impossibility of doing it without offending either the Persians or the Wahabees.

22. The Joasmees, according to their engagements, restored the *Trimmer*, the *Shannon* having been previously given up, after having been completely stripped.

23. In the month of October an Agent arrived at Muskat from Moolla Hussein, deputed by the Joasmees to negotiate a peace for them. The instructions of the Bombay Government having been applied for, Captain Seton was informed, that in the event of its becoming a party to the peace, it should not be of a limited nature, but extend generally to the whole Gulf, and every other place and situation, and he was to require full indemnification for the losses we had sustained.

24. Captain Seton, finding it impracticable to obey the orders of the Government to obtain the required indemnification, without having recourse to hostilities, which would have involved us in a general warfare with the whole Gulf, judged it advisable to enter into the agreement with the Joasmees dated the 6th of February 1806, the whole bulk of whom he represented as desirous of returning to their former mercantile pursuits. This agreement\* does not appear to have been negotiated with the consent, or even with the knowledge, of the Wahabee Shaikh.

25. The Joasmees continued true to their engagements in every point that regarded the British; but they co-operated in the following year with Syud Beder, the Imaum, in an attack on Syud Ghes, who had refused to become a party to the peace, which he could not in honour do until he had revenged the blood of Syud Sultan.

A. D. 1807.

26. Precluded by the Treaty of 1806 from carrying on their cruises in the Gulf, and urged by the Wahabees, the Joasmees extended them to India. In the month

A. D. 1808.

of April 1808 they made their first appearance as pirates in the Indian Seas, on the coast to the northward of Bombay. The Wahabee Shaikh had long contemplated the extension of piratical cruises to India. The Joasmees had by a late order of the Wahabee been rendered independent of their lawful Shaikh, Sultan, who had at this period nothing left but Ras-ool-Khyma. Ramse, Shargah, and other places sent out their boats without his permission. Gadeef, an

\* A copy of which will be found at page 75 of this Selection.





Arab Chieftain of the Joasmee Tribe, on the Persian main, was also averse to piracy; but his subjects, cut off from trade on account of the general disrepute of their tribe, sought a livelihood in the vessels of

A. D. 1808-09.

others. These piracies (as stated by Captain Seton) "can only be considered as a general one at the instigation of the Wahabees." In one cruise in this year they captured twenty country boats, which so elated them that they determined on sending a fleet of fifty towards Sind and Kutch.

27. On the 20th of October they committed a breach of the Treaty of 1806, by attacking and capturing the *Sylph* cruiser, in the Gulf of Persia. She was re-taken by H. M.'s frigate *Nereid*, which was in sight when the Joasmees boarded the cruiser.

28. In the following year, the Wahabees directed the Joasmees and the Uttoobees to proceed against Grane. The latter excused themselves, but the former offered

A. D. 1809.

to go if they were supported by ships.

29. The Persians from Lar attacked the Joasmees at Lingah, and the town of Karrack, and compelled them to retire to Basside, in the island of Kishm. The Joasmees were however successful against a fleet fitted out by Mahomed Nubhee Khan against Khor Hassan, which twenty-two Joasmee boats encountered, beat, and took six of the Bushire vessels.

30. The Wahabee Chief having appointed Hussein bin Ali, a Joasmee, and who was the Shaikh of Ramse, his vicegerent in the Seer principality, vested him with authority over Ras-ool-Khyma, and nominated Wahabee officers throughout the Joasmee country. Shaikh Sultan, the Joasmee Chief, having been invited to Deriah, proceeded to that capital, and was detained and imprisoned by the Wahabee Chief. He contrived to escape from prison, and finding his way to Yemen, embarked at Mocha, and, proceeding to Muskat, made overtures to the Imaum, besought His Highness' protection, disclaiming all countenance to, or concurrence in, the attack of the *Sylph*, and professing on this occasion a desire to conform to the Treaty of 1806. The Imaum took him to Shargah, and placed him over the Joasmee Tribes at that place, Shaikh Sultan occasionally living at Lingah.

31. The British Government, determining to relieve the Imaum from the power of the Wahabees, and to suppress these piracies, an expedition proceeded to the Gulf under the instructions dated the 7th of September 1809. Their first operations were directed against Ras-ool-Khyma. The attack commenced by a bombardment during the 12th of November. On the following day, the Joasmees were vigorously attacked by sea and land: after a bloody but ineffectual resistance, they were driven into the interior of the country. The town, with the





vessels in port, amounting to upwards of fifty, with the English prize ship the *Minerva*, were burnt.

32. The Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma, in the most insulting manner, had the audacity to demand a tribute from the Government to allow British ships to navigate the Persian Gulf in safety.

33. From Ras-ool-Khyma the armament proceeded to Lingah, where twenty Dows were destroyed, the inhabitants abandoning the town on the approach of our ships. Finding no vessels in the ports of Congoon, Bunder Mullim, and Homeram, the armament proceeded to Luft, situated on the north side of the island of Kishm. The town was soon taken possession of by our troops, but the unexpected strength of the fort, and the desperation with which it was defended, frustrated every attempt to carry it by storm. All the essential objects of the attack were however fully attained; their boats and Dows were completely destroyed. The bombardment having continued, Moolla Hussein surrendered the place, together with property to the amount of two lakhs of rupees, belonging to the Imaum, which, with the fort, were delivered in trust for the Imaum to Shaikh Dervish, the head of the Beni Naeem, a tribe of Arabs who have always been firmly attached to His Highness.

34. On the reduction of Luft, the armament proceeded to Muskat. The commanders of the expedition expressed their readiness to co-operate with His Highness in the recovery of any other of his ports. He proposed to accompany the armament with a considerable force to the attack of Shinas and Khore Fukaun.

35. The joint forces arrived at Shinas on the 31st of December, which was summoned on the following day.

A. D. 1810.

As this had no effect, it was bombarded. The situation of the fort, however, being too distant to be reduced by these means, the troops were landed. Shinas was defended with the most determined and heroic bravery. After an obstinate and sanguinary resistance, the fort was surrendered, and made over to the Oman troops, but was so much demolished that the Imaum did not think it prudent to keep possession of it.

36. The Imaum having expressed some hesitation on the policy of attacking Khore Fukaun, from apprehending a similar obstinate resistance to that made at Shinas, which would render it untenable by His Highness' troops, the object was abandoned, there being no British interest connected with it, as there were no pirate vessels belonging to the port.

37. The commanders were unable to form a treaty with Ras-ool-Khyma, Shaikh Sultan, their chief, having been seized by the Wahabees, and their Government completely overthrown; independently of which, no treaty could be binding on the Joasmees without the direct authority





and participation of Saood, on which tribe they were entirely dependent; but the commanders observed,—such had been the impression of our operations against the principal pirate ports, that they succeeded in their demand to destroy all the Dows and large boats of the petty chieftains from Ramse to Abookeyle, on the Arabian side, as well as Mogoo, on the Coast of Persia. The Chief of Charrak, not having any Dows or large boats, was admonished to refrain from giving encouragement or protection to future pirates. A similar message was sent to the Chief of Nakheeloo, with a demand, at the request of the Inaum, for the release of Shaikh Jubara of Congoon, the friend of the English. It was not deemed material to insist on the destruction of Tromkeys and small boats,—a measure that would have been hard on the poorest of the inhabitants, and created an odium against the British name which did not generally exist, many of the small villages on both sides of the Gulf having been compelled to join in piratical pursuits.

38. As the Uttoobees had never committed any depredations against our trade, even at times when the Joasmees were enriching themselves by their frequent captures of British vessels, the commanders determined on not attacking Khor Hassan.

39. It was the prevalent opinion in the Gulf, founded on the result of this expedition, that the Joasmees had been rendered quite incapable of committing any further depredations by sea. The Resident at Bussora confirmed this opinion; but added,—“such was the revengeful and vindictive spirit of the Wahabee Tribe, and of the inhabitants on the Arabian side of the Gulf under the jurisdiction and authority of Shaikh Saood, that they will attempt to wreak their vengeance on any defenceless British vessels which they may meet. At all events, such people are not to be trusted, and Mr. Manisty recommended a prohibition being imposed on the exportation of timber from the ports of India either to those of the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf, even including Muskat; from which place the pirates will by some means or other contrive to procure it. Their countries do not produce any kind of timber proper for ship or boat-building; if therefore the pirates be deprived by the regulations of the British Government of their ordinary supply of teak, they cannot long possess a naval force of any importance.”

40. The pirates reappeared in the beginning of 1812, and in the following year destroyed several large Dows and Buggalows belonging to the ports of Bussora and Congoon. Boats navigating under British colours did not escape depredations, whilst others were detained at Porebunder, and prevented from prosecuting their mercantile pursuits.

A. D. 1812.





41. In the following year the Imaum prepared an expedition against the port of Ras-ool-Khyma, for the purpose of reinstating the Joasmee Chief in his government, A. D. 1813. Shaikh Sultan promising that if His Highness would restore him to his hereditary possessions and consequence he would ever consider himself as a vassal of the Imaum and his allies, and would never again, or his tribe, commit piracies. The Imaum requested that Mr. Bruce, who was at Muskat, would accompany him to witness the treaty which he should enter into with Sultan bin Suggur, and for the purpose also of negotiating a treaty with the Joasmee Chief on the part of the British Government, which, as observed by the Imaum, would have more effect in keeping him to the performance of his engagements than anything else, as Sultan bin Suggur was now aware of our determination not to allow the slightest insult to pass unnoticed.

42. As the renewal of the treaty entered into by the Joasmee Chief with Captain Seton in 1806 was deemed essential for restraining the piratical acts of his subjects, Mr. Bruce was instructed to adopt the necessary measures accordingly, and to contract similar engagements with the other chieftains in the Gulf.

43. This expedition failed, and a second one, equipped in 1814, for a similar purpose, terminated in a peace, concluded between the Imaum of Muskat and the Joasmees, to which Shaikh Suggur was compelled to become a party. He agreed, it is said, to His Highness possessing Ras-ool-Khyma, and to his being established at Shargah. A. D. 1814.

44. Mr. Bruce, on the 7th of August, forwarded a letter from Shaikh Suggur, communicating the capture of the ship *Ahmed Shah* by the Shaikh of Charrak, and requested good offices in favour of an Agent he was deputing to the Prince at Shiraz, on business of importance. In transmitting that letter, Mr. Bruce remarked that the Joasmee Chief, who was residing at Lingah, was much attached to the British Government. The only further account we have of this mission is contained in a letter from the Broker at Muskat, dated the 7th of November, stating that the King of Persia had sent an honorary dress for Sultan bin Suggur, to obtain his co-operation with Persia in the reduction of Bahrein.

45. In consequence of some depredations committed on the trade, remonstrances were transmitted to the Chiefs of the Wahabees and the Joasmees, on the impropriety of their proceedings. A reply was returned from Hussein bin Rahmah, the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, stating that he was not aware that any vessels bearing the British pass and colours had been captured by the Joasmees, but that if it should prove to be the case, such property as might be forthcoming would be restored, but that





in future he would issue instructions to his tribe not to molest or come near any ship or vessel under British colours; nor did they wish to interrupt the British trade in any way. As he was proceeding to Deriah, Hussein bin Rahmah took Mr. Bruce's messenger with him, to obtain a reply to the letter to the Wahabee Chief.

46. The messenger returned with another letter from Shaikh Hussein bin Rahmah, in which, though he acknowledges that his cruisers had visited the northern ports of India, yet denied that they had knowingly molested any vessels navigating under British pass and colours, and repeating his assurances of a desire not to molest the British trade. At the suggestion of Mr. Bruce, the passes were ordered to be written in the Arabic language also, to prevent the Joasmees pleading ignorance of any pass being on board.

47. On the 2nd of October a Vukeel, named Hussein bin Mahomed bin Gaith, arrived at Bushire, with letters from the Wahabee Chief, and Hussein bin Rahmah; the former disapproving of the conduct of that chief, and of his tribe, and binding himself to compel the latter to deliver up such property as we could prove them to have captured; who, on the other hand, denied having captured any British property, expressing a hope that we would not be too severe in scrutinizing the past. The Vukeel was authorised to enter into an engagement with Mr. Bruce. He stated that the Joasmees were anxious to be on the best terms with the British Government, whose good will they would study hereafter to merit; that they would respect our flag and subjects; but that they hoped we would not insist on their leaving off cruising against those States who were at enmity with them; as, according to the law of nations among the Arabs, blood could only be repaid by blood; that if they did not follow this kind of warfare, they would lose their rank amongst the Arab States, and that their enemies would come to their very homes to attack them; that they were, moreover, compelled by the Wahabee Chief to wage war against the Mahomedan States of the Gulf, to bring them under the yoke and religion of the Wahabees; and only to respect the British flag and subjects, to whom they were directed to be attentive, and to cultivate their alliance; that if we would guarantee, on their leaving off this mode of proceeding, that none of the Arab States would molest them or their vessels, and would guarantee also their safety against the vengeance of the Wahabee Chief for not obeying his commands, they would then abandon the course of life they were pursuing; but otherwise their natural situation in the Gulf was such that they were compelled to be enemies to the greater portion of it.

48. Mr. Bruce confirmed the truth of Hussein bin Gaith's statement regarding their peculiar situation, and the system among the





Arabs; as also in respect to the tenets of their religion, so different from the other Mahomedan sects, which rendered them the enemies of all other Islam sects, and these to be their enemies; and deemed it advisable to enter into a few preliminary articles of agreement with Hussein bin Gaith, renouncing all claims, and passing an act of oblivion on the past, on the conditions specified in the engagement. The Joasmee Chief having resolved to depute an Agent to Bombay, Mr. Bruce was induced to conclude the preliminary agreement in question.

49. Some boats bearing the British pass and colours having been taken off Porebunder in the month of August  
A. D. 1815. 1814, Mr. Bruce, conformably to orders to remonstrate against that act, despatched a boat to Ras-ool-Khyma, with letters to Hussein bin Rahmah and to his Vukeel, who had entered into the preliminary engagement above specified, of a friendly tenor, and with a letter also to Sultan bin Suggur of Lingah.

50. To Mr. Bruce's astonishment, the Nakhoda returned in a few days after his departure in a most wretched plight, and almost starved to death. The Chief of Lingah, to which island the boat first proceeded, took 80 frazils of dates out of her, and seemed disposed to keep the boat itself; but on anchoring off the town of Ras-ool-Khyma, a boat put off the shore, came alongside, and inquired what vessel it was. On being informed, they greeted them on their arrival, and recommended them to get under weigh, and stand in for their greater security, and offered to pilot Mr. Bruce's boat in; on which the Nakhoda weighed, being towed in by the Joasmee boats. Shortly after, about twenty armed men came out of the latter, drew their sabres, and immediately drove the Nakhoda and part of the crew, who were in the leading boat, overboard. Those in the other, seeing this, cut the tow rope, and pulled away, taking up those who had jumped over, and reached Bushire.

51. The capture of this boat, which had been despatched on the faith of engagements so very recently made, and which had actually arrived at the very door of their dwellings, proved the little reliance that could be placed in any treaty with such lawless banditti. The act was at variance, also, with the conduct which so strongly characterises the Arabs, who fulfil the obligations of hospitality even towards an enemy seeking their protection, and reposing in their confidence. This flagrant breach of faith sufficiently proved a determination on the part of the Joasmees of attacking all vessels, of whatever description they might be, or under any colours.

52. This attack was followed by the capture by the Joasmees of a Buggalow belonging to the Imaum of Muskat, whilst at anchor in the





roads of Mogoo.\* She was laden with horses for the remount of the 17th dragoons, and with sulphur on account of the British. Six boats were moreover captured off the coasts of Kurachee and Sind.

53. The success that attended the subsequent cruises undertaken by the Joasmees added so much to their strength, that it induced most of the other ports on the coast, from Cape Nabend to the southward, to follow the same system. The Shaikh of Charrak in particular was encouraged to form a connection with Ras-ool-Khyma, and Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein openly avowed his determination of prosecuting piracy, as the surest mode of acquiring wealth and strength.

54. The Joasmees engaged and defeated the Imaum's fleet, and had very nearly taken the *Caroline* frigate, of thirty-two guns.

55. A vessel belonging to Bombay, sailing under a British pass and colours, was this year captured off Muskat, the greater part of her crew put to death, and a ransom exacted for the release of the remainder.

56. The audacity of the pirates increased to such a degree that they attacked the *Aurora* cruiser, and chased and fired at the American ship *Persia*, and *Cintra* schooner; and so great was the dread entertained of the Joasmees that Lieutenant Bruce could not obtain a boat to despatch to Ras-ool-Khyma, to convey a letter of remonstrance to the chief in regard to these depredations.

A. D. 1816.

57. Three vessels belonging to the port of Surat were taken in the Arabian Gulf, sailing under British pass and colours, and many of their crew murdered. The loss of property by this capture was estimated at ten lakhs of rupees.

58. Many other captures were made of vessels sailing under our protection, attended by similar acts of atrocity; and at length most indisputable proof was afforded of the faithlessness of their promises to respect the British flag and pass, by the capture of the Company's armed boat the *Turrarow*.

59. The measures of the Government were limited to remonstrances, and to the disposal of the cruisers for the protection of the trade, until the exigencies of the public service in other quarters should admit of an expedition being detached against the pirates.

60. A deputation was sent to Ras-ool-Khyma to obtain redress for the capture of the vessels in the Arabian Gulf, which failed. The Joasmees explicitly and boldly declared "that they would respect the sect of Christians, and their property, but none other; they did not consider any part of Western India as ours besides Bombay and Mangalore; that if we interfered in favour of the Hindoos and other

\* The people of Mogoo were privy to this depredation, and had, in fact, given information of the Buggalow being there.





unbelievers of India, we might take all India, and Muskat also, when nothing would be left for them to plunder."

61. A small squadron of Joasmee boats landed in the month of October in Busheab, and burnt and plundered the villages at the western part of the island, carrying off all the cattle, and killing great numbers of the inhabitants.

A. D. 1817.

62. At the close of the year we find them in the harbour of Aseeloo, whicht they had entered, and taken five large laden Buggalows, valued at three lakhs of rupees, and had murdered their crews. The inhabitants of Bushire were thrown into the greatest consternation from the Joasmees contemplating an attack on that place.

A. D. 1818.

The Governor of Bushire with great difficulty restrained the inhabitants from leaving it, and retiring further into the interior.

63. The Joasmee fleet remained twelve days at Aseeloo, and thence proceeded to Congoon, but finding the place prepared to receive them, they weighed, and, standing to the northward, anchored off Daire, where they landed and destroyed a number of date trees. They were repulsed, however, in an action with the inhabitants, and obliged to take to their boats.

64. Apprehending an attack by the Turkish troops, the Joasmee Chief sent a number of people from Ras-ool-Khyrna to build a fort at Bassadore, on the west

A. D. 1819.

end of the island of Kishm, which they intended to garrison, as a place of security for their property, should they not succeed in repelling the Turkish troops. Bassadore has a harbour well secured for vessels, and cannot be approached but by boats of light draught. It was formerly in possession of the Portuguese, who built several large reservoirs for water, and a large town with fortifications all round, now nearly destroyed, and a fine pier jutting into the sea, which, with the reservoirs, are in very good repair. This port, if possessed by the Joasmees, would from its situation be a source of greater annoyance to the trade going up and down the Gulf than Ras-ool-Khyrna has proved.

A letter has lately been received from Hussein bin Rahmah, referring to a treaty of peace concluded between "his Imaum" and us, and professing a desire of continuing on terms of friendship with the English Government; which of course has been positively declined; and by the last accounts from the Gulf it would appear that the Imaum of Muskat was preparing an expedition against Ras-ool-Khyrna, in conjunction with Shaikh Sultan and the Beniyas Tribe of Arabs.





JOASMEES.

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CONTINUATION OF THE FOREGOING SKETCH, TO  
THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL.

Mr. Warden's notices of the Joasmee Tribe are brought down to the year 1819; and conclude by stating that, alarmed at the rapid success of Ibrahim Pasha over the

A. D. 1819.

Wahabee power, and apprehending that after the reduction of Kateef the next operations of the Turkish General would be directed against Ras-ool-Khyma, the Joasmees contemplated forsaking that town, and forming a settlement and building a fort on Bassadore (the western extremity of the island of Kishm). Information of this intention having been received in India, orders were given to the commander of the British naval squadron in the Persian Gulf to prevent their carrying it into effect. It appears, also, that Hussein bin Rahmah, the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, probably alarmed by the reports of an expedition preparing in Bombay for the Gulf of Persia, made a proposal, about the commencement of the year, to continue on terms of friendship with the British Government, which was declined without hesitation. Mr. Warden likewise alludes to the Imaum having in contemplation an expedition against the Joasmee capital, in conjunction with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot.

In the month of October 1819 an expedition, which had been contemplated for some time, but which various causes had operated to delay, was prepared in Bombay, for the purpose of completely crushing the lawless and sanguinary proceedings of the Joasmees. This force consisted of 3,069 men under arms, viz. 1 company of artillery; H. M.'s 47th regiment; H. M.'s 65th regiment; 1st battalion 2nd regiment Native infantry; the flank companies of the 1st battalion 3rd regiment Native infantry; and those of the Marine Battalion; together with half a company of pioneers; making a total of 1,645 European, and 1,424 Native soldiers, under the command of Major General Sir William Grant Keir. The naval part of the expedition (which was composed of H. M.'s ships *Liverpool*, *Eden*, *Curlew*, and the vessels of the Honorable Company's Marine) was placed under the orders of Captain Collier, C.B. A short time previous to the sailing of the expedition, a communication was made by the Governor of Bombay to His Royal Highness the Prince of Shiraz, explanatory of the objects in equipping so large a military and naval force; and after intimating that no course of proceeding would be adopted inconsistent with the friendly relations so long established between the two Governments, expressed an earnest wish





that His Royal Highness would co-operate in the measures to be carried on against Lingah, Mogoo, Tawoonie, and Charrak, as those places had completely identified themselves with the Joasmees. A letter was likewise addressed to His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, nearly to the same purport as the above, and intimating that Dr. Jukes and a commissariat officer had been sent on in advance to make arrangements for the co-operation of His Highness, and the provisioning troops after their arrival at Kishm, where they were to rendezvous.

The expedition at last sailed from Bombay on the 4th November, the commanding officer proceeding on board the *Liverpool* to Muskat, which place he reached on the 13th, while the remainder of the convoy proceeded on to Kishm. His Highness the Imaum on this occasion agreed to furnish 4,000 men to act by land against Ras-ool-Khyma, and three vessels of war to join the naval force.

After the troops had been refreshed at Kishm, the expedition proceeded over to Ras-ool-Khyma, which was immediately invested, and battered in breach. After an active resistance of six days, the town was taken possession of by the British force on the 9th December, the enemy evacuating it on one side as the troops entered on the other. Hussein bin Rahmah and Guzeeb bin Ahmed, the Chiefs, together with their followers, who composed the garrison, surrendered at discretion. The effect of this success was soon shown by many of the most powerful and independent chieftains on the coast sending an unqualified offer of submission to the British General.

On the 8th January 1820 a General Treaty\* of Peace was concluded, in Ras-ool-Khyma, between Major General Keir, on the part of the British Government, and nearly all the Chiefs of the Maritime Arabs in the Gulf of Persia, by whom it was subsequently signed at different times and places. The sole purpose and scope of this treaty was the entire suppression of piracy, and the adoption of such measures of precaution and general co-operation as seemed best adapted to attain the object in view.

A separate Treaty† was concluded with Hussein bin Ali the same day, stipulating for the surrender of all his vessels (excepting the fishing-boats), the release of all Indian prisoners, and the occupation of the towns of Ras-ool-Khyma and Maharra by the British Government.

A similar Treaty‡ was likewise entered into with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, of Shargah, for the surrender of the towers, guns, and vessels of Shargah, Ejman, Amulgavine, and their dependencies; stipulating, however, that the British troops were not to enter the towns, or lay them waste.


A short time after these arrangements had been made, General Keir

\* Vide pages 76 to 80 of this Selection.

† Vide pages 81 and 82 of ditto.

‡ Vide pages 80 and 81 of ditto.





returned to Bombay, leaving a garrison in Ras-ool-Khyma, consisting of twenty artillerymen, and the 1st battalion 2nd regiment Native infantry, under the command of Captain Thomson, of H. M.'s 17th dragoons. In April of the same year, the Government resolved to remove the detachment from Ras-ool-Khyma to Kishm, and orders were accordingly transmitted to Captain Thomson to evacuate the former place, after dismantling the sea defences, and giving up the town to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. On a communication, however, being made to this chief, he positively refused to take possession, if the works were destroyed. A reference was consequently made to India, when final orders were issued for the defences to be destroyed, and the town abandoned, which directions were carried into effect on the 18th July 1820.

In the commencement of 1823 Shaikh Sultan began the erection of a fort at Shargah, but was informed that he must suspend the work until the instructions of the

A. D. 1823.

Government respecting it could be received. An application from the inhabitants of Ras-ool-Khyma to be allowed to erect a wall across the isthmus was likewise referred to the Government, which intimated, in its reply, that it was not intended to prevent the erection of forts or buildings on the Arabian Coast, as the treaty concluded by Sir W. G. Keir did not appear to authorise any such interference. About this time the Shaikh of Ramse (one of the Joasmee ports) was deposed, through the influence of Sultan bin Suggur, and succeeded by Mahomed Abdool Rahman, the son of a former Shaikh, who had been removed by Hussein bin Ali. Shaikh Guzeeb bin Ahmed, of Jazirat-ool-Hamrah (another of the Joasmee ports), having died the same year, was succeeded by Shaikh Mahzem bin Abdool Rahman. All the Joasmee ports, with the exception of Ejman, appear to have acknowledged the general supremacy of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, but Rashid bin Humeed, the chief of that place, complained very earnestly to the Resident at Bushire of the aggressions committed upon him by Shaikh Sultan, and declared he would never submit to his authority.

In February 1823, on the occasion of Captain Macleod paying a visit to the Joasmee Shaikh, he produced a paper, signed by the chiefs in the vicinity of Ras-ool-Khyma, admitting their dependence upon him, and he expressed himself very anxious that his rights as a feudal superior should be recognised by the British Government. In reply, he was informed the Government had nothing to do with his disputes for supremacy, and must look to every individual chief to answer for those immediately subject to him. Captain Macleod, in reporting upon this tribe, stated as follows:—"The Joasmees procure all their materials for building, as well as their warlike stores, from Muskat, Bahrein, and the Persian ports in the lower part of the Gulf. In the construction of their vessels, they use no other wood than Indian teak,





and, in respect to arms, those principally of Persian manufacture. They possess no articles of export, since their pearls are generally purchased by merchants on the spot, and the produce of their country is not even sufficient for their maintenance. Their only employment is fishing, diving for pearls, and importing dates, grain, and other necessities of life, which they purchase with the price of their pearls. Their dates are chiefly brought from Bahrein and Bussora; grain and cloth from Muskat and the Persian ports. They are very poor, and perhaps can never find much employment in commerce, unless in carrying for others; although it is said they at one time pursued a very extensive trade."

About the end of 1823, an inhabitant of Shargah, named Hassoom, armed a boat, and sent her to cruise in the neighbourhood of Cape Jask. She however returned without making any prizes, and was immediately seized by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who, after instituting an inquiry into the affair, liberated the owner, on the plea of want of evidence.

The first undoubted instance of piracy committed by the Joasmees, subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty, appears to have taken place in the beginning of

A. D. 1824. 1824, when two boats from Shargah fell in with and captured a Bug-galow belonging to the Mehra Tribe, near Socotra, on which occasion they are said to have put every one on board to the sword, and then sailed for Zanzibar. That Sultan bin Suggur was fully acquainted with the purpose of the boats in question is evident, from his making a communication soon after their departure to the senior officer of the marine, intimating their having sailed on a piratical expedition, and regretting his want of means to pursue them. In June 1824, these two boats returned to the Gulf, one of them having the audacity to touch at Muskat on her way up, and only escaped being detained by producing a passport from the Captain of H. M.'s ship *Minerva*. Finding, however, that orders had been issued for their seizure whenever they made their appearance in the Persian Gulf, they did not venture to return to Shargah, but one of the vessels in question was subsequently found abandoned at Charrak, and having been taken possession of by a cruiser, was to have been sent over to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, to be identified, but owing to its dilapidated state, was obliged to be broken up. The other boat took refuge at Muttra, where it remained unmolested for several months; and under the particular circumstances of the case no further steps were taken by the Government regarding it.

The Wahabees having about this time obtained considerable success over the Turks, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, in concert with Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed (who had lately acknowledged his supremacy), opened a negotiation with that sect. This measure he did not attempt





to conceal, but assigned self-preservation as his only motive for adopting it. The Shaikh of Al Hamra, Mahomed bin Mahzem, having given umbrage to the Joasmee Chief, was removed by him from the government of that place, and Ahmed bin Abdoolla bin Ooseyah established in his room.

A dispute having arisen between His Highness the Imaum and Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, on the subject of the occupation of the towers of a place on the frontiers of His Highness' territory, called Brymee, which had by a solemn treaty been previously declared neutral, His Highness' cause was taken up by his dependent, Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee. Independently of this chief threatening Shargah, some aggressions were committed on the boats of that place by the Soodean Tribe, under Salmin bin Nassir, which had separated itself from the Joasmees, and taken refuge in Debaye, between which place and Shargah they were erecting a fort, called Derah, a proceeding which drew down strong remonstrances from Sultan bin Suggur. The general peace and tranquillity of the Gulf appearing likely to be endangered if this dispute remained unsettled, the Resident (having previously had an interview with His Highness the Imaum upon the subject), proceeded to Shargah in December 1824, and there, by his mediation, a reconciliation was effected, upon the conditions that on the side of the Joasmee Chief the towers of Brymee should be destroyed, while a similar measure should be carried into effect in respect to the fort of Derah on the part of Shaikh Tahnoon, who was to assign some other part of his dominions for the residence of the Soodean Tribe.

Shaikh Sultan, however, took no steps to fulfil his part of the agreement, and in February 1825 the Resident was under the necessity of addressing a very strong remonstrance upon the extraordinary hesitation shown by him in carrying into effect the very first article of the treaty. Shaikh Sultan, however, in reply, threw all the blame of the delay which had taken place upon the Imaum's Agent at Brymee, who had persuaded his (Sultan's) man to disobey his orders; and further, in proof of his sincerity, offered to send a person in company with a messenger from Syud Saeed, and one from the Resident, to execute the conditions of the engagement entered into. A short time before the Huzah, the Governor of Debaye, and a kind of Agent of the Muskat Government, died, and was succeeded by his young son Mahomed, whose sister Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur had obtained in marriage. By means of this connexion, the Joasmee Chief acquired a very considerable degree of influence in Debaye, and was secretly intriguing to get possession of it, as its position and vicinity to Shargah rendered the place, when under the authority of an enemy, peculiarly obnoxious to him.

A. D. 1825.





In May 1825, the Resident having occasion to proceed to Muskat, availed himself of the opportunity to endeavour to effect the fulfilment of the article in the treaty mediated by him between Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaikh Tahnoon, relative to the demolition of the towers at Brymee. Accordingly, having obtained full authority from Shaikh Sultan for their destruction, he determined to send Goolab, the British Agent at Muskat, along with His Highness the Imaum's troops, to see the above stipulation executed. Before, however, the result of his mission could be known, Shaikh Sultan violated the truce, by suddenly attacking Derah. Reinforcements were immediately sent by Tahnoon to the relief of that place, but being intercepted by the Joasmee Chief, they were compelled to retreat, with the loss of a hundred and fifty men. This proceeding of course put an end to any further attempt at mediation on the part of the British authority, who, however, considered it necessary to take every precaution to prevent the war from degenerating into indiscriminate plunder; and for this purpose he directed two vessels of war to be kept constantly cruising on the pearl banks. On the return of Goolab Anundas from the mission mentioned above, he represented that all Sultan bin Suggur's representations relative to the obstacles thrown in the way of the demolition of the towers of Brymee by the Imaum's Agent were totally false, and that the delay which had taken place had been produced solely by his own intrigues.

The irregularities which were apprehended as likely to arise from the naval warfare between the two most powerful Arab Chiefs of the Gulf made their appearance shortly after the commencement of hostilities. A boat from Bahrein was attacked by some Shargah cruising vessels near the island of Anjar, without any provocation, and dollars to a considerable amount forcibly carried off, besides three or four of the crew being put to death. In consequence of this piracy, it was deemed necessary by the British authorities to adopt active measures, in order to check the piratical disposition thus manifesting itself, as well as to give confidence to the neutral tribes, who had become greatly alarmed at the lawless spirit which had appeared. Accordingly, instructions were issued, in August 1825, to the Commodore of the Marine, to proceed over to Shargah, and demand full satisfaction for the loss of both life and property from Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and in the event of this not being acceded to, to remove the British Agent from Shargah, and capture all vessels belonging to that place. This decisive proceeding was attended by the most favourable results: the Joasmee Chief, terrified at the firm line of conduct adopted by the British authority, lost no time in affording every redress to the Chief of Bahrein, who, in a letter to the Resident, expressed himself entirely satisfied with the arrangement made. The successful termination of





this business created a sensation throughout the Gulf highly creditable to our Government, and tended greatly to establish a favourable impression of the efficacy of the general treaty.


Exhausted by continual and fruitless warfare, and their exclusion from the pearl fishery in consequence, both Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaikh Tahnoon gladly availed themselves of the conciliatory offers made by the Imaum of Muskat, and a speedy adjustment of all differences took place under his mediation in October 1825, upon the conditions of the demolition of Derah, the removal of the Sooodan Tribe,\* and the reception of a small body of the Imaum's troops into Debaye. Not a word was said on this occasion about Brymee, and this singular omission, notwithstanding its being in the power of the Imaum to dictate his own terms, would seem to remove the blame of the non-fulfilment of the stipulation in the former treaty regarding this place from Shaikh Sultan to His Highness.

In the course of an interview held with the British authority in the Gulf of Persia, in November 1825, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur expressed great alarm at the increasing power and intrigues of the Wahabees, and professed himself very anxious to learn whether he might look to the English for assistance in the event of his endeavouring to maintain his independence. In reply, he was informed, in general terms, that he was the best judge of his own interests; but that no connection or authority would be received by the British Government as an excuse for any proceedings bearing a predatory character. The Shaikh then adverted to the very difficult dilemma into which he would be cast in the event of the Wahabees attacking the territories of the Imaum, and calling on him for his support against that prince. To this he was answered, that his forming any connection prejudicial to His Highness would be considered unfriendly by us, and it was in every point of view advisable that he should not adopt that line of conduct. The language held on this occasion was confirmed by the Governor in Council, with a further intimation, that however improbable it might be that we should act against the Wahabees so long as they confined their conquests to the shore, it was still not desirable that we should bind ourselves to abstain from interposition, or hold out so great an encouragement to the invasion of the Imaum's territories as our avowed indifference would be likely to afford.

A boat belonging to Amulgavine having been taken by the followers of the notorious Sooodan bin Zaal (who had settled at Biddah, in the territories of the Shaikh of Bahrein, on fleeing from Aboothabee), the Joasmee Chief affected to consider this act as more than balancing the piracy committed on the Bahrein boat captured by his subjects in 1825,

\* A body of Arabs, under Salmin bin Nassir, inhabiting Derah.





and therefore displayed a determination not to pay the remuneration money, which he had promised through the influence of the British on that occasion. This pretence, however, was not admitted by the authorities in the Gulf.

In an interview held with the British Resident in October 1826,

A. D. 1826.

Shaikh Sultan complained of the injury his subjects were exposed to, in consequence of the proceedings of the Soodean Tribe under Salmin bin Nassir (who still held possession of Derah, notwithstanding Shaikh Tahnoon having formerly agreed to its demolition), and therefore requested permission to expel the occupants by force of arms. As this measure would have led to an immediate rupture with Shaikh Tahnoon, and involved the Gulf once more in hostilities, he was requested to defer taking any steps of this nature until it was seen whether the Beni-yas Chief could be prevailed upon to withdraw his countenance from Salmin bin Nassir. Shaikh Tahnoon, however, obstinately refusing to attend to any recommendation having for its object the demolition of Derah, a representation was in consequence made to the Imaum, who, indignant at the continued contumacy of the Aboothabee Shaikh, promised to send two vessels of war to co-operate with Sultan bin Suggur's troops against the place above alluded to.

Having observed the marked disinclination with which the occurrence of maritime war among the tribes of the Persian Gulf was viewed by the British Government, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, with his usual acuteness, in a letter to the Government, dated December 1826, revived a number of dormant and unfounded claims against the people of Congoon, for the seizure of a Buggalow several years before, and also against Bussora, for the imprisonment and detention of the Nakhodas of some of his vessels. At the same time he intimated, that unless the Government made good his losses on this occasion, he required their permission to go to war.

The Government, in their reply, dated February 1827, intimated that

A. D. 1827.

the Resident in the Persian Gulf would be required to report on the subjects of his complaint, but that if he did not consider that justice had been done him, he was at liberty to commence hostilities, provided that it did not degenerate into piracy. The report was soon after made, showing that real facts had been grossly misrepresented by the Shaikh, who, failing in his object of inducing the Government to interfere actively in behalf of his unfounded claims, prudently remained quiet.

About March 1827, His Highness the Imaum appeared off Derah with his fleet, and redeemed his pledge to the British Government, by directing that fort to be demolished. The presence of the Imaum,





however, so far from tending to promote the general tranquillity, appears to have occasioned a speedy rupture of the good understanding which had been lately established between Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Tahnoon, in an interview they had held at Shargah only a few days before. The Joasmee Shaikh, after informing the British authority of the conclusion of peace between himself and the Beniyas Chief on the 17th March, wrote again, on the 22nd of the same month, stating that he found it quite impossible to maintain any engagement with a person of so faithless a character as his late enemy. Certain it is that, whether as an offering to the offended dignity of Shaikh Tahnoon, which had been sorely touched by the demolition of Derah, or in order to sow dissension between him and the Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma, the Imam presented the former with artillery and warlike stores, and likewise endeavoured to induce the inhabitants of Debaye to acknowledge his (Tahnoon's) jurisdiction. Encouraged by this support, Shaikh Tahnoon seized the ruler of Debaye by treachery, and afterwards attacked and carried that place by storm.


Anxious to avert the great and general distress so invariably occasioned by the breaking out of hostilities during the pearl fishing season, the British Resident proceeded to the Arabian Coast in June, but on his arrival found that peace had been again concluded between the contending chieftains. In an interview held with Shaikh Sultan, the latter endeavoured in vain to obtain the guarantee of the English to the treaty between himself and Tahnoon, and likewise entered into a long discussion upon Article IV. of the General Treaty,\* which, he maintained, bound the British Government to prevent the Arabs from fighting with each other. A written explanation of the real tenor of this article having been given him by the Resident, he did not touch again upon the subject.

About this time some acts of a piratical nature having been committed by a person named Udwee (a subject of Rashid bin Humeed), upon two Debaye boats, a remonstrance was made to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur by the British authority, in consequence of which the above individual, together with one or two of his followers, was placed in confinement, and detained there for a considerable period.

As might have been expected, the amicable relations, mentioned above as having been entered into by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur with the Chief of Aboothabee, were very soon interrupted by their mutual jealousy, and the collisions of their Bedouin dependents. In a letter dated November 1827, the Joasmee Shaikh declared war against Tahnoon, and detailed his reasons for so doing to the British authority. Notwithstanding this declaration, Shaikh Sultan appears to have given up his intention, and affairs remained in their former situation.

\* Vide pages 76 to 78 of this Selection.





In April 1828, Ras-ool-Khyma was visited by the British authority in the Gulf of Persia, who thus speaks of its state at that time :—"A square tower, of no great strength, has been built on the mound raised by the ruins of the strong outwork destroyed after the siege in 1819. A straight stone wall nearly connects one side of the town with the backwater or harbour, but as yet there are no defences towards the sea, excepting two old guns. The ruins of the old walls and towers serve as stone quarries, and the town of Ras-ool-Khyma is rapidly increasing. The houses are of stone and chunam, and, although small, are carefully built, and remarkably neat, even with some finish. Building is yet very cheap, from the old materials being so close at hand; and Shaikh Sultan is said to encourage it."

About this time, when a profound peace had happily extended itself over every part of the Persian Gulf, the commercial inhabitants were thrown into considerable alarm, in consequence of a very daring and atrocious piracy being committed by a man named Mooslim bin Rashid (an inhabitant of Ras-ool-Khyma), upon a boat from Sohar, on the Coast of Batinah. This vessel, after being plundered of cargo to the value of three or four thousand rupees, and the whole of her crew, fourteen in number, being tied to a grapnell, and thrown overboard, was scuttled, and sunk. The pirate Buteel, after selling portions of the plunder, was met off Lingah by a Buggalow which Shaikh Sultan (alarmed at the probable consequences of this infamous proceeding, and the strong remonstrance addressed to him) had sent in pursuit. A sharp action ensued, which terminated by the Buteel being run on shore at Lingah, and Mooslim bin Rashid, together with the greater part of his crew, made prisoners, and carried off to Ras-ool-Khyma. Shortly afterwards, Shaikh Sultan having assembled the heads of tribes, laid the affair before them, and at the same time mentioned his fears of being brought to a severe reckoning by the British Government. In consequence, it was unanimously resolved that Mooslim bin Rashid should be put to death: he was accordingly taken out of his prison during the night by four of Shaikh Sultan's slaves, and, having been conveyed to the sea beach, was there strangled, and buried; declaring, however, with his dying breath, that the piracy had been committed under the knowledge and approbation of the Joasmee Shaikh, who, he further stated, had even given him a document in writing to that effect, which he had lost when his Buteel was captured.

The rest of the crew were kept in close confinement for several months; but were subsequently set at liberty with the consent of His Highness the Imaum, to whom the pirate vessel, together with all the plundered cargo recovered, had been given up.





The peace between the Joasmee Chief and Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, although frequently shaken, was never wholly ruptured, until the commencement of 1829, when Shaikh Sultan again declared war against the latter. Whether really irritated against the Imaum for the secret and open assistance which he alleged was furnished by His Highness to Shaikh Tahnoon, or whether he was desirous of taking advantage of the unfortunate position in which Syud Saeed was placed, in consequence of his failure at Bahrein, the Ras-ool-Khyma Shaikh, in a letter to the British authority in the Gulf, intimated an intention of likewise commencing hostilities against His Highness. He did not, however, think proper to proceed to any overt acts of warfare, and his relations with the Muskat Government gradually resumed their old footing.

It being considered by the British Government that the cruising of the ships of war on the pearl banks, as usual during the fishing season, was not unlikely (with reference to the very general state of warfare in which all the tribes on the Arabian Coast were engaged) to involve us as principals, or at all events to produce an impression that we did not act up to our declaration touching our non-interference in lawful war, while carried on after the manner of civilized nations, it was resolved to discontinue the practice for that time, and to trust to the monthly visits of our cruisers for the protection of neutral vessels.

About the end of May 1829, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur represented to the British authority in the Persian Gulf, that although he had given due intimation of his intention of blockading Aboothabee, yet he had been given to understand that a vessel carrying an English pass and colours had been hired, by some of the people of Muskat, to convey provisions and warlike stores to the Beniyas capital (Aboothabee), which was suffering in consequence of the scarcity of food. On the arrival of the vessel in question (the merchant ship *Sunbury*) off Shargab, she landed a portion of her cargo, destined for that place, and was about to proceed on her voyage to Aboothabee, in spite of Shaikh Sultan's earnest remonstrances, when an arrangement was made by the agent of the owner, without the knowledge of the Captain, to sell all her cargo to the Joasmee Shaikh. Boats were accordingly sent off, the crews of which boarded the ship in a very insolent manner, and an attempt was made to haul down the British colours, which the Mate resisting, he was struck with some violence by one of the Arabs. Shaikh Sultan, however, on the Captain protesting against such conduct, disavowed the whole of the proceedings, and the opportune arrival of the *Amherst* sloop-of-war removed all apprehensions of any further violence. The Joasmee Chief, to prove the truth of





his statement that the insult to the vessel had been offered without his knowledge, directed the first boat that had boarded the *Sunbury* to be burnt, and the individual who had hauled down the colours to be tied up and flogged.

In June 1829, a peace was concluded between Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot, through the mediation of the Chief of Lingah, the principal condition of which was that neither party should interfere in any way with the subjects or dependents of the other.


The Imaum of Muskat being on the point of proceeding to his dominions on the African Coast, deemed it prudent to provide for the tranquillity of his Arabian territories by paying an annual sum to each of the Joasmee Chiefs;—2,000 German crowns a year was the amount fixed for Shaikh Sultan. Notwithstanding this arrangement, the Shaikh was on the point of sending 400 men to assist the sister of Synd Hillal, the Governor of Soweik, in the war which she was carrying on against the Imaum (in consequence of the unjust imprisonment of her brother); but the chief men of his tribe, having assembled together, represented the disgraceful nature of such a proceeding so strongly as to induce him to desist for the time. Soon afterwards, he received a communication from the British authority in the Gulf, acquainting him that any hostile steps against His Highness' territories would be viewed as a declaration of war by his Government.

In May 1830, the minds of the inhabitants of the Arabian Coast were much agitated, in consequence of the great and unexpected success of Toorkey bin Saood, the

A. D. 1830.

Wahabee Chief, over the Beni Khalid Tribe, and the gradual advance of that sect to the southward. To the bulk of the Joasmees, and particularly to Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, and Mahomed bin Rashid of Amulgavine, the prospect of the re-ascendancy of the Wahabee power appears to have given unmixed satisfaction,—the lower orders anticipating a return to their former piratical habits, and the above two chiefs expecting to emancipate themselves from their dependence upon Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. This latter personage, however, viewed the successes of Shaikh Toorkey in a very different light, and plainly saw that he could expect nothing but a diminution of influence and revenue in consequence. These sentiments he however carefully concealed, and professed himself outwardly as hearty as any one in the cause of Wahabeeism; but in a letter addressed to the British authority in the Gulf, in July 1830, he expressed his earnest desire to co-operate with the British Government in checking their further progress, and went so far as to declare that he was determined to oppose






them, even in the event of his not receiving any support. In reply, it was intimated to him that the views of the British Government in these quarters were confined solely to the suppression of piracy, without interfering in the internal affairs of the Arabian States.

The fear, however, of any material or immediate alteration in his situation, appears to have been removed soon after from the mind of Shaikh Sultan, in consequence of the Wahabee Chief having refused to furnish Rashid bin Humeed with a body of troops to enable him to obtain the ascendancy in the Joasmee territories, at the same time intimating to him that he should always continue to look upon the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma and the Imaum as the heads of all the Arabian Tribes in Oman.

In the latter part of 1830 and beginning of 1831 Shaikh Sultan was busily engaged in negotiating with the Imaum of Muskat, regarding the terms on which he should lend his support against Sohar, as, notwithstanding his having already received half the amount of subsidy, he now refused to move unless either Dubba or Khore Fukaun (places on the Coast of Batinah) were given up to him. This proposal the Imaum rejected at once, and in consequence Shaikh Sultan desisted from the preparations he had begun for the assistance of His Highness. His dependent, Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, however, proceeded to join the Imaum, but on the defeat of the troops of the latter before Sohar, Rashid and his tribe turned their arms against their late allies. On their return to their own country, they found that their flocks had been carried off, and Ejman plundered, by a party of the Beniyyas and Monasir, sent by Shaikh Tahnoon. In consequence, both Shaikh Sultan and himself declared war against Aboothabee, and extensive arrangements were made by the former for the blockade of that place; but finding that their subjects were entirely disinclined to carry on hostilities during the season of the pearl fishing, both parties requested the mediation of Shaikh Mahomed bin Guzeeb of Lingah, and peace was once more concluded between these unquiet and turbulent spirits.

These amicable relations were however soon disturbed by the lawless conduct of Shaikh Sultan's subjects, who, in the month of September, committed a piracy upon two Beniyyas pearl boats near Bahrein. On the intelligence of this proceeding reaching Shaikh Tahnoon, he laid an embargo upon fourteen Joasmee vessels which chanced to touch at Aboothabee for provisions. Alarmed at this decisive measure, the Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma immediately disavowed the conduct of his people, and after punishing the person who had committed the piracy, he restored the captured boats, with their crews and cargoes, to the



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JOASMEEES.


owners. Upon this satisfaction being afforded, Shaikh Tahnoon liberated the Joasmee vessels, but detained the slaves and pearls belonging to Shargah, as a pledge for the settlement of debts due to one of his subjects by a former inhabitant of Debaye, but now residing under the protection of Shaikh Sultan, in Shargah. At the present time (December 1831) a correspondence is still carrying on touching the pearls (the slaves having effected their escape to their old masters), but little if any probability appears to exist of the affair being brought to a final and peaceable termination.

*Statement*



STATEMENT of the Number of Inhabitants, Vessels, Houses, and Date Trees of the Joazeiro Ports in 1826, contrasted with the same in 1831.

Most of the fishing and trading boats are Ekman anchored in the model fishery.



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ports in 1826, contrasted with the s

	In 1826.			In 1831.		
	No. of Stone Houses.	No. of Huts.	Total.	No. of Stone Houses.	No. of Huts.	
Sh ..	250	250	250	..	250	..
Ra ..	250	250	250	..	300	..
Ra 200	1,000	1,200	300	1,300	1,000	1,000
Jaz 100	300	400	300	600	300	300
An 15	400	415	27	600	..	..
Ej 10	650	660	10	800	..	..
He ..	150	150	..	250	..	..
Sh 175	2,000	2,175	450	2,600	3,000	3,000
Kb ..	..	..	..	150	..	..
	500	5,000	5,500	1,087	6,850	7,900

as come in from the interior, and remain four  
the





JOASMEEES.

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FURTHER CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING, TO  
THE YEAR 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL.

In the latter end of December 1831, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and his dependent (the Chief of Ejman) declared war against the Beni-yas, in consequence of the injury they had received at the hands of the latter while the Ejman Shaikh was engaged in the assistance of the Imaum's forces against Shinas; or rather, on the contrary, while acting the part of a traitor towards His Highness, and accelerating and completing the defeat of his troops. The good offices and mediation of the Lingah Chief had succeeded in delaying the threatened hostilities, but depredations having nevertheless been mutually committed at sea by the subjects on either side, negotiations were being carried on for the settlement of the claims arising therefrom, and of others of ancient date, from which most unsatisfactory results were anticipated.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur having intimated to the Resident his intention of declaring war against the Imaum of Muskat, and of immediately commencing hostilities upon his possessions, had, previous to the arrival of the naval force at Muskat, destined for the assistance of the existing Government against the Chiefs of Burka and others, and to the receipt of the Resident's communication, taken advantage of the very disturbed state of the affairs of the Imaum, consequent upon the imprisonment of his son and nephew by the Chief of Burka, to proceed with a strong force against Khore Fukaun, Khulla, and Dubba, and succeeded, either by surprise or treachery, in obtaining possession of these places, with their surrounding country; and had been only deterred from attacking Shinas, a place of considerable strength, by the opportune arrival there of two of the Imaum's frigates, with a reinforcement of men and warlike stores. In the meanwhile his dependent, Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, in direct opposition to the orders of the Joasmee Chief,—as it would appear from the latter complaining of his proceedings to the Resident, and recommending the despatch of ships to bring him to order,—committed the most daring and open depredations\* upon the trade, not only of Sohar, but of Muskat.

\* Upwards of twelve boats, with their cargoes, fell into his hands. The origin of these lawless proceedings of the Shaikh of Ejman is to be traced to his conduct on the occasion of the siege of Sohar. Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, Chief of the Beni-yas Tribe, the great rival of the Joasmee Shaikh, Sultan bin Suggur, having been suspected of treachery while acting as the ally of the Imaum of Muskat, on his expedition against Bahrein, found his





The defenceless state into which many of the places in the neighbourhood of Bushire had been thrown, by the ravages of the plague, tended to encourage a return to habits of plunder and piracy, and was taken advantage of by some Joasmees, who, on their return from Bussora, finding that the towns of Bunder Dillum and Bunder Reig had been deserted, plundered them, as likewise a boat returning from Congoon to Bushire.

When called upon to afford satisfaction for the outrages committed by the dependents of Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur distinctly stated, (as he had before done by letter, which referred also to the Shaikh of Amulgavine,) that he no longer possessed any authority over him, nor could either control or be answerable for his proceedings, any participation in which he most positively disavowed. Upon this explicit avowal, therefore, of the virtual independence of Shaikh Rashid, the British authority turned for redress to that chief himself, and a formal demand, backed by the presence of two vessels of war, was accordingly made upon him, for the restoration of such vessels and property, belonging to Muskat, as had been captured and plundered by his subjects, and twenty-four hours were allowed him to consider the same, or abide by the consequences.

The Shaikh at first attempted evasions, upon various grounds:—his counter claims upon the people of Bussora, Grane, Amulgavine, Aboothabee, and Sohar; the discontinuance of late of the payment of the annual allowance, and the non-fulfilment of the promise of a Buggalow made to him by the Imaum; his being now a subject of the Wahabee Chief, and the necessity, therefore, for a reference to that personage; the people of Muskat having taken possession of an Ejman Buteel with her cargo, worth 1,500 dollars, &c.; but was informed, in reply, that being in his own person a member of the General Treaty, he must be held responsible for the acts of his subjects. His assertion, however, regarding the seizure of his Buteel, having been confirmed (with the

assistance declined when he again offered it to His Highness, for the reduction of his revolted dependent Humood bin Azan, and in consequence threw himself into the opposite scale. Accordingly, when Rashid bin Humeed, who, subsidised by His Highness, had joined his enemies, declaring in their favour, returned to his territory, he learnt that Ejman had been plundered, and several of his people killed and carried away by a party of the Beni yas during his absence. Immediate retaliation and hostilities between these parties were the result, and because the Sohar people refused to admit the Ejman boats into their ports, while those of Aboothabee were permitted to trade and export provisions as formerly, Rashid bin Humeed commenced aggressions against them, and now, in opposition to all that had of late occurred, setting up the plea that they were subjects of His Highness the Imaum, proceeded without further notice to an attack upon the trade of Muskat.





exception of that portion referring to its value), it was admitted as a set-off against the cargoes of the Muttra and Mukran boats, and their restitution was foregone; but with this modification entire compliance was yielded, after some little delay and hesitation to the demand, by the delivery of the boats, money, jewels, &c. in lieu of the missing cargo, the property of the passengers, &c. As his hostilities against the Chief of Sohar had been proclaimed and acknowledged, no notice was taken of his proceedings in capturing the boats of that place, nor, for the same reasons, of the seizures of Dubba and Khore Fukauun by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who now, anticipating with apprehension the chances of reprisals on the part of the Imaum for the loss of those towns, or a declaration of war at his instigation by the Beniyas Chief, to whom he was known to have furnished military stores, despatched a Vukeel to the Resident, to learn from him the sentiments and intentions of the British Government in the event of such taking place; and was, in reply, informed that the British Government had determined, in case of exigency, to afford the Imaum every assistance in their power to preserve his independence, but would not interfere in quarrels involving a minor stake, which His Highness might see fit to prosecute; and consequently that Shaikh Sultan, if unable to effect a reconciliation, and measures of hostility were pursued against him, would be at liberty to use his own means of defending himself, provided the above reservations with reference to those means and their ends were duly attended to.

In the latter end of November a large fleet of Joasmee boats, containing from one thousand to fifteen hundred of the tribe, under the command of Sultan bin Suggur in person, appeared at the head of the Gulf, with a view to affording assistance to Shaikh Nassir, the hereditary Governor of Bushire, who, giving umbrage to the Persian authorities, had been ejected from the town, and had taken to his boats, and commenced a blockade of the port, according to a previous engagement with that person, by which, in addition to certain other considerations, the plunder of the place was to be the reward of a successful attack. Previous to their arrival, however, the blockade had been raised, and it was evident, from late events, that Shaikh Nassir had no longer any expectation of regaining his inheritance, but was now merely intent upon inflicting injury upon the town and its inhabitants, which must have involved the destruction of a large amount of British property. Under these circumstances, and, moreover, the cause of humanity, and the protection of those connected with the British Government, calling for the exertion of every endeavour to ward off so great a calamity as that of a band of infuriate plunderers like the Joasmees being let loose in the midst of a peaceable and mercantile community, the Resident,





Mr. Blane, adopted the strongest arguments with the Joasmee Chief,—indeed threatened to resort to actual force, if he did not abstain from a measure which, as had been explained to the Vukeel above alluded to, on his mentioning the subject, would be contrary to the wishes of the British Government. The fleet accordingly withdrew.

One very trifling case only of a piratical nature occurred this year, indicative of the innate spirit of the Joasmees for plunder,—a spirit which they found it difficult to restrain even where British property was concerned, and the immediate infliction of punishment must certainly ensue.

A. D. 1833.

One of their boats putting into Korgoo for water, its crew seized and carried off some portion of a tent, lining the building which had been erected on that island for the accommodation of the Resident's establishment, during the prevalence of the plague at Bushire and in its neighbourhood, notwithstanding that they were warned that the same was the property of the British Government. Trifling as was the value of the articles taken, the more wanton and insulting appeared the conduct of the plunderers, and the more urgent the reason for its not being permitted to pass unnoticed. A vessel of war was therefore despatched in quest of the boat, and to demand the surrender of the delinquents. These were found at Mohumrah, and brought to Bushire, together with the stolen property; but the object having been gained, were immediately freed, in consideration of the Shaikh of that port having begged their forgiveness.

After his signal defeat at Khore Suffan (near Aboothabee\*), the Joasmee Chief commenced making great preparations for the attack and blockade of the Beniyas capital, and having secured the support of the Shaikh of Lingah, and Rashid bin Humced of Ejman, the combined fleets sailed from Debaye on the 9th of November. The two Chiefs of Aboothabee had however collected a large force of Bedouins and citizens, and moored with iron chains to the shore six or seven of their largest vessels, well manned, for the protection of their shipping. After a cannonade of three days, which was promptly and effectually answered by the besieged, Shaikh Sultan's Buggalow having received two shots in her hull, his whole fleet weighed out of range of the guns on shore, and anchoring, confined itself to the maintenance of a close blockade. The besieged were shortly reduced to the greatest distress from the want of provisions, and the departure of His Highness the Imaum for his African possessions removed all prospect of relief from foreign assistance. Their difficulties were further greatly increased by the capture of thirty of their boats in Khyran Beniyas, and the loss of ten men killed by the people of Debaye (of the seceded

\* Vide Sketch of the Beniyas, in a subsequent part of this Selection.





tribe), who, also acting on the offensive by land, intercepted and carried off a caravan of fifty camels, laden with dates from Brymee.

Pressed by famine, they fitted out three boats,\* manned with five hundred men, and secretly despatched them to sea by night. Twenty vessels of the blockading squadron went in pursuit, but unable to come up with them, returned after three days to resume their position off Aboothabee, reinforced by some additional vessels from Bussora. The blockading squadron was not without its difficulties and privations: provisions and water had to be brought from Ras-ool-Khyma and Lingah, and each individual being required to send for his own food, great suffering was experienced.

Both parties, therefore, tiring of these protracted hostilities, and disposed to come to an arrangement, a peace was

A. D. 1834.

easily effected, though the mediation of Mahomed bin Guzeeb, the Lingah Chief, on the condition that Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot should give up all the boats and property his people had captured since the commencement of the war; and the blockading fleets were withdrawn.

The Wahabees were desirous of befriending the Beniyas in this quarrel, but the threats of their representatives at Brymee proved insufficient to overawe the Joasmee Chief (whereby a decrease of the power of the sect at that time may be argued), and had the effect only of restraining the Bedouins from affording any assistance to Hussein bin Rahmah, who had been despatched into the interior to raise troops for the purpose of cutting off the communication with Aboothabee by land.

At the period of the disturbances in the Imaum's dominions, owing

A. D. 1835.

to the aggressions of his relative Humood bin Azan, Sultan bin Suggur proceeded with a large fleet to his possessions of Khore Fukaun and Dubba. Although formerly requested by the Imaum to assist his representatives in Muskat in any quarrels with their neighbours, it was evident that, far from any intention to exert his power and influence in favour of His Highness' relatives, his sole object was to avail himself of the state of affairs to benefit and promote his own interests, at the expense of either party.

The proceedings of his fleet, however, were not confined to depredations upon the boats belonging to Sohar and its dependencies, as the enemies of the Imaum, whose interests he pretended to serve, as also upon the property of the subjects of the Muskat Government, his ally, but were extended to acts of a decidedly piratical nature, upon the vessels of individuals having no concern or connection whatever with the contending parties. For these of course he was compelled by the

\* For the proceedings of these vessels, vide Sketch of the Beniyas.





British Government to afford redress; but with reference to the seizures of vessels belonging to Muskat, the acting governors of that place, fearing to incur his more decided enmity, so far from remonstrating, tacitly, and in some cases openly, sanctioned them.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur applied for permission to grant assistance to the Shaikh of Towanah against him of Charrak, both Persian subjects, who were preparing to decide their quarrel by the sword,—a request with which his engagement connected with the establishment of the restrictive line of course afforded one just plea, among others, to the Resident, for refusing compliance.

A. D. 1837.

The people of Heera, under the authority of Sultan bin Suggur, committing a piracy upon a boat belonging to Bunder Abbas, that chief of his own accord compelled restitution of the property plundered, and adopted measures to prevent a recurrence of the offence.

The Joasmee Chief superseded his brother Saleh in the government of Shargah, and appointed in his place his son, Suggur bin Sultan; a change which was viewed with some dissatisfaction by the British authorities, the former being by them considered one of the most enlightened and intelligent Arabs on the coast, who had ever laboured to check the predatory spirit of his countrymen, and maintained a continued cordial understanding with the British Agent, Moolla Hussein, residing at this port.

A. D. 1838.

Two piracies were this year committed, by two Joasmee subjects, named Sultan bin Sohar and his brother Mahomed; the former attended with the murder of several persons, and the plunder of much property, to the north of the Gulf, upon a boat belonging to Karrack, having on board a wealthy subject of Chaab, who had fled Mohumrah on its attack and capture by Ali Pasha of Bagdad, and was now on his return; the other on a Batinah boat off Ras-ool-Hud. Sultan bin Sohar was after some time discovered and seized at Lingah, and placed at the disposal of the Resident, who sent him to Shaikh Samur, the Chaab Chief, to be dealt with as he might think proper; the other, Mahomed, took refuge at Ejman, but, as a subject of Sultan bin Suggur, was upon demand subsequently given up by that chief, together with the Nakhoda of the pirate vessel. As the first of these had suffered severely from his confinement in chains at Shargah, he was released, together with his fellow-prisoner, on their furnishing a bond to pay the sum of 100 crowns.

Alarmed at the threats held out against them by Shaikh Samur, the Governor of Chaab, in consequence of the piracy committed on the Karrack boat, having on board one of his most wealthy subjects and firmest adherents, by Sultan bin Sohar, the Joasmee Chiefs of Lingah





and Ras-ool-Khyma despatched their boats in a body, forming unitedly a fleet of twenty-two sail, in order that, in paying their annual visit to Bussora, they might be prepared to repel force by force. On their arrival at Bushire, the Resident addressed a letter to the Shaikh of Chaab, deprecating any interference or molestation on his part towards the Joasmee boats, on the grounds that neither Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur nor his subjects had the slightest concern in the piracy on the Karrack boat, and that Shaikh Syud bin Guzeeb had done all in his power to forward justice, inasmuch as he had, at great trouble and expense, seized and given over the perpetrators. The misunderstanding was thereby amicably arranged, to the satisfaction of both parties.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, after various unsuccessful attempts by land against the Shehaheen tribe, residing at Casaab, Koomza, and Ras Musseldom, resolved to despatch a naval force to blockade their ports, and thus bring them under control. Although the Shehaheen were completely enclosed on the land side by the territories of the Joasmee Chief, whose alleged authority over them was admitted by His Highness the Imaum to the British authorities in the Gulf in 1836, yet that tribe had long continued to maintain a sort of independence, and, keeping up a friendly intercourse with Muskat, to exhibit little disposition to submit to the claim of supremacy advanced by the Joasmee Chief.

The immediate cause of the present quarrel arose from the treacherous surrender of one of the Shahaheen forts to the Naib of Shaikh Sultan, residing at Dubba, who immediately dismantled it. Skirmishes and predatory inroads on either side were the consequence, until the Joasmee Chief, finding that he could make no impression by land, meditated the adoption of the measures before alluded to.

Alarmed, however, at the rapid successes of the Egyptians, and their tool Ameer Khalid, he relinquished his hostile intentions against the Shehaheen, and both parties being thus equally averse to war, amicable arrangements were quickly concluded, through the means of an envoy from himself.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who had previously applied to the British authorities in the Gulf, to be informed whether he might look to the British Government for support in the event of his subjugation being contemplated by the Pasha of Egypt, was now (March 1839) compelled to receive his Agent, Syud bin Mootluk,\* and by him induced to summon the Beni Naeem to surrender their fort of Brymee into his hands. The only effect of his summons was to lead that tribe to make the most active preparations for self-defence,—a measure of bold determination, which did not fail to give him secret pleasure.

\* Vide Sketch of the Wahabees, in a subsequent part of this Selection.





He nevertheless hesitated to expel Syud bin Mootluk and his party (which had been destined to form a garrison for Brymee) from his territory, fearing lest the Aboothabee Chief, or some other neighbouring enemy, might receive them into his country and alliance; but at a general meeting of the maritime chieftains, convened in the presence and through the influence of the Assistant Resident, on board a British vessel, Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot having pledged himself, on oath, to Shaikh Sultan, neither to admit this party nor any others sent by the Egyptian commander, nor to ally himself in any way with him, the latter sent to Syud bin Mootluk to desire him to quit his country, and return to Nujd; but on that person's producing letters from the Egyptian commander to the several Shaikhs of Oman, to the effect that he was his envoy, and that, therefore, whoever opposed him would be considered inimical to the Egyptian cause, finally withdrew his demand, and acquiesced in his remaining, pending the return of the messenger he had despatched for instructions.

Shaikh Sultan, deceived in his expectation that the Chiefs of Brymee would place themselves under his authority, in order to secure his support in their contest with the Beniyas Chief, with a view to which he had directed all the tribes under his control to abstain from affording them (the Naeem) the assistance they had hitherto done, now that the Brymee Shaikhs made peace with Shaikh Khaleefa,\* had cause deeply to regret his short-sighted policy, which had the very opposite effect to that anticipated and desired, his ill-timed neutrality not even saving his own districts from aggression; for two of Shaikh Khaleefa's inland tribes foraying his territories, that chief, in reply to his remonstrances, excused himself from returning any of the plundered property, by falsely alleging that the tribes in question were not under his orders, but those of the Egyptian authorities at Lahsa.

Two Debaye men having been killed in the desert, owing to their having been mistaken for men of the Monasir Tribe, by a party of six individuals of different tribes, of whom two belonged to that of Abdoola bin Rashid, Shaikh of Amulgavine (who had long since thrown off any real allegiance to the Joasmee Chief), that chief, on discovering the error, lost no time in proceeding to Shargah, in order to settle the affair, by paying his share of the Deeah, or price of blood, on the behalf of his two followers. The *amende* was not accepted, and the attempts of the Resident shortly after to effect a reconciliation also failing, the parties were left to adopt their own means by land, precluded from hostilities by sea by the terms of the Maritime Truce, of which a period of two months remained yet unexpired.

\* Vide Sketch of the Beniyas.





In the mean while, however, Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye (having been informed by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, in reply to his demand for the surrender of those concerned in the death of his two subjects, that he was at liberty to take his own measures for redress) had left his town for the purpose of foraying the neighbourhood of Amulgavine; but, finding the inhabitants upon their guard, had been obliged to retreat, leaving six of his people in the hands of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, who placed them in confinement. Suggur bin Sultan, Shaikh of Shargah, now took part with Shaikh Muktoom, and demanded the liberation of the six prisoners, which being refused, he joined his forces to those of Debaye, making a total of 2,500 men, and marched against Amulgavine. The inhabitants, to the number of 400, coming out to meet them, were decoyed to some distance by a pretended flight of the attacking force, and, suddenly overwhelmed, were compelled to retreat, with the loss of twenty men killed, besides many wounded. A peace was shortly after temporarily adjusted, through the mediation of three influential Moollas, upon the conditions that the six Debaye men should be set at liberty by Abdoolla bin Rashid, and proportionable compensation afforded by him for the share the two men of his tribe had taken in the death of the two dependents of Shaikh Muktoom.

It was considered of great importance that every information should be obtained relative to Brymce and its inhabitants. An officer (Captain Hamerton) of the Karrack field force was therefore despatched there with this object; but it was not without the greatest difficulty, nor until the principal Naeem Shaikh, Humoód bin Saroor, himself voluntarily offered to accompany him, that he reached his destination, owing to the intrigues and obstacles offered by the Joasmee and Debaye Chiefs.

Immediately previous to this officer's departure, with a view to combine the power and resources of the inland tribes, who were disposed to resist to the utmost any aggressions of the Egyptian Agent, their chiefs were invited to an assembly, convened at Ejman by the Resident: small presents of money were distributed, and their differences reconciled, through his mediation and influence; with the exception of a misunderstanding between the Chiefs of the Zowahir and Beni Kuttub Tribes, regarding some mares belonging to the latter, which had been stolen, and sold to the former, and which he would not upon any consideration consent to restore.

They were informed, that although they could not be received under the immediate protection of the British Government, yet that their efforts in the maintenance of their independence were viewed with satisfaction, and would insure its good will and countenance,—indeed





assistance, in the shape of a moderate supply of military stores and provisions.

Some of the Bedouin Naeem Tribes, under Humeed bin Obed bin Subt, the Chief of Heera, under the pretence of prior right over the then ruler, Rashid bin Humeed, to authority over Ejman, surprised the town at night, and gained possession of the fort. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur in the first instance declined to interfere in favour of the lawful governor, but considering, without any grounds, that he would thereby give umbrage to the British Government, subsequently directed his son Suggur, and Muktoom bin Butye, to proceed and eject the Shaikh of Heera, which they did, and moreover burnt his town, in retaliation for the injuries he had inflicted upon the people of Ejman.

As anticipated, the Joasmee Chief, having lulled his opponent into supposed security, by declaring himself satisfied with the extent of punishment he had already inflicted by means of his son and the Shaikh of Debaye, was only awaiting the lapse of the term of the annual Maritime Truce, whose conditions were guaranteed by the British Government, to commence an attack upon Amulgavine by sea and land. He then despatched a fleet, composed of three Buggalows and sixty Buggarabs, conveying 1,500 men, under the orders of Suggur, his son, and Muktoom bin Butye of Debaye, to blockade the place by sea, while he assumed the personal command of a force of 700 Bedouins, to invest it by land.

The only operations which had been carried into effect previous to the Resident's arrival on the coast, for the purpose of establishing the Maritime Truce for another year, were directed against a tower commanding the entrance to the backwater, which it was necessary to take or destroy before the blockading boats could pass. An entrenchment, erected in advance of this tower, had been carried by the Joasmee force, who, however, in attempting to improve their success, by advancing upon the fort, had been received so warmly as to be obliged to retire, with the loss of eight men killed and forty wounded. An attempt by Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot to create a diversion in favour of Amulgavine, by surprising Debaye, had failed. Affairs had reached thus far when the timely mediation of the Resident effected an arrangement of the quarrel, and the siege was raised.

It was agreed that Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur should withdraw the demand he had made for the destruction of the tower commanding the wells of fresh water, while Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid on his part should make good the losses sustained by the Joasmee Chief in the several skirmishes which had taken place prior to the siege. Upon this basis, a formal treaty of alliance and friendship was completed, with the additional stipulations, that Shaikh Abdoolla should erect no new





fortifications, and that he should pay the value in coin of what he could not restore in kind.

These proceedings, as above detailed, were the result of the intrigues of the Joasmee Chief to bring under his immediate authority and subjection the Chiefs of Ejman, Amulgavine, and Debaye,—a design which, in the records of the Residency, he is repeatedly mentioned as having entertained for some time previous; but the settlement of the serious disturbance they had caused happily removed all further obstacle to the renewal of the Maritime Truce.

Suggur bin Sultan, the son of the Joasmee Chief, at the instigation of that intriguing and restless character Muktoom bin Butye of Debaye, now attempted to cast off the authority of his father. He commenced by ingratiating himself with the people, inducing many to join him, by persuading them that if he were chief he would deal more leniently with them, and greatly reduce the tax upon the pearl divers (levied by all the chiefs at a rate ranging from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 7 crowns,—the latter being the amount recovered by Sultan bin Suggur upon each at the last season).

The father, Shaikh Sultan, at first resolved upon a recourse to arms, but was at length persuaded to negotiate; and an arrangement was agreed to, by which the son, instead of being Governor of Shargah, and receiving a salary, as before, was to hold it as a permanent possession, paying annually a stipulated sum. To these terms he (Sultan bin Suggur) was compelled by circumstances to yield, but with a reluctance which indicated that he only did so in the hope of being sooner or later able to avail himself of some favourable opportunity to overthrow the illegally acquired authority of the son. The loss of the most productive and populous of his seaports appears to have been to him a source of great distress, and to have had a material effect upon his health and person. Affairs remained in this state until December, when the Shaikh's brother, Saleh bin Suggur (the former Governor of Shargah), and some of the principal residents in the place, disgusted at the influence Muktoom of Debaye had acquired over the mind of Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan, and foreseeing the injurious results to the best interests of the Joasmee Tribe likely to accrue from the division the irregular proceedings of the latter had introduced among them, determined, by a vigorous and well arranged effort, to restore the legitimate authority of their chief. Accordingly they informed Shaikh Sultan, that if he would contrive to be clandestinely in the neighbourhood of Shargah on a certain night, they would introduce him into the town, and, partly by the aid of their own adherents, assisted by the moral effect of his actual presence, put him in possession of the person of his son Suggur.





This plot seems to have been attended with complete success. Shaikh Suggur, surprised while asleep, found himself deserted by all his followers, and a prisoner in the hands of his justly offended father, who forthwith commanded him to make immediate preparation for his removal to Ras-ool-Khyma. Prior, however, to his departure, some of his adherents found means to communicate with him secretly, and intimating their intention of seeking refuge with Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, advised him to take an opportunity, while on the road to Ras-ool-Khyma, to slip away and join them. This scheme was carried into execution; and the only reply made by the Debaye Chief to Shaikh Sultan's indignant remonstrances and demands for the fugitives was that he could not, as an Arab, violate the rights of hospitality, by giving up, against their own wish, those who had sought his protection. The Joasmee Shaikh being now convinced that his son had been counselled and encouraged in his undutiful conduct by Shaikh Muktoom, determined to keep terms with the latter no longer; and accordingly, summoning all his own adherents, he effected a reconciliation with his former enemies the Chiefs of Amulgavine and Aboothabee, and forming an offensive and defensive alliance with them, required their aid in the siege of Debaye. Rejoiced at the prospect of indulging his long cherished hatred against Shaikh Muktoom, the Beniyas Chief willingly engaged to meet Shaikh Sultan's wishes, upon condition that, when captured, Debaye should be entirely demolished, and the inhabitants permitted to locate themselves either at Shargah or Aboothabee, agreeably to their own inclinations.

These vigorous measures, and the extensive arrangements in progress for the attack of Debaye, greatly alarmed Shaikh Muktoom and his people, and they lost no time in endeavouring to avert the storm which threatened, by making professions of unlimited obedience and submission, and employing the cogent argument of a bribe of 1,000 crowns. Unable to resist this offer, Shaikh Sultan added another to the many proofs already afforded of his faithless and insincere character, by coolly breaking all his engagements with the Beniyas and Amulgavine Chiefs, reconciling himself with Shaikh Muktoom, and, what is more extraordinary than all, replacing his son Suggur in the government of Shargah; thus leaving his brother Saleh, and the faithful adherents who had supported him so well, to all the bitter effects of the hatred and revenge of the now reinstated and triumphant governor, without the slightest attempt to shield them from him.

Shaikh Khaleefa was of course highly indignant at this unexpected breach of formal and written engagements, which he would naturally take the first opportunity that might offer to resent. Neither Shaikh Muktoom nor Suggur bin Sultan were likely soon to forget or overlook





the proceedings of Shaikh Sultan in respect to themselves; and as the faithless conduct of the latter towards his own adherents and allies would necessarily deprive him of all internal or external aid for the future, full scope was given to the ambitious projects of his son.

On the conclusion of the pearl fishery of this year, a Ras-ool-Khyma boat, with money and cargo on board, arriving at Biddah, excited the cupidity of some lawless characters residing there, who, on her quitting again, went in pursuit, and overtaking her off Khore-al-Jullaya, captured her, and after stripping the crew, and putting them on shore, proceeded with their prize to Khore Shugeer, a backwater between Aboothabec and Adeed.

Shaikh Salmin bin Nassir, of Biddah, on gaining the intelligence, despatched two Buggarahs in pursuit; but these arrived in time only to find the Ras-ool-Khyma boat abandoned, and quite stripped. Among the pirates was the old delinquent and notorious character, Jassim bin Jabbur Rugragee,\* who had in the course of the last five years been guilty of two or three similar acts, and who, as he had invariably proceeded into the interior with his plunder, nor returned until the following fishing season, had always escaped detection.

Strong suspicions existed—indeed little doubt was entertained—that were it not for the protection afforded by the Biddah Shaikh, who, it was believed, actually shared the booty, he could not thus have found the means and opportunity for these almost yearly acts of piracy. Further, one thing was certain, that Jassim had resided at Biddah during the whole of the last pearl fishery. With reference, therefore, to the warning personally given by the Resident, in September 1836, regarding this notorious character, and the chief having on that occasion actually asked for and received a written authority from that functionary for his seizure, he could not be looked upon as other than a direct or indirect accomplice, and therefore deserving of being held responsible for his acts. His sending out two boats in pursuit was evidently a mere blind, for he acknowledged that his people, fifty in number, fell in with the pirates, consisting only of twelve men, whereas these brought back to Biddah the Ras-ool-Khyma and pirate vessels mere shells, stripped of sails, and every moveable article in them. Accordingly the Indian Naval squadron then in the Gulf, consisting of the *Auckland*, steam-frigate, the *Coote*, sloop, and the *Tigris*, brig, under the command of Commodore Brucks, proceeded to Biddah, to demand the surrender of the pirate boat and its prize, and the payment of 300 dollars, with an additional 40 dollars as the value of the property subsequently plundered by Rugragee, together with the boat which on that occasion fell into his hands.

\* Vide Sketch of the Beniayas, in a subsequent part of this Selection.





The affair was most judiciously arranged; but it was not, however, till eleven shots had been fired, one into the curtain of the fort, two into the fort itself, and one into a house hard by, that Shaikh Salmin bin Nassir was induced to afford compliance. The remaining shots either fell short of their mark, or were intentionally directed, to avoid the infliction of injury; and it was a matter of gratification that the object desired was fully attained, without any loss of life on shore. Rugragee's boat was publicly burnt previous to the squadron's sailing from Biddah. These proceedings were attended with decidedly good effects: Salmin bin Nassir lost no time in seizing the slaves and effects of Jassim bin Jabbur Rugragee at Biddah, and the Chief of Bahrein issued the strictest orders to all the places on the sea coast, belonging to himself, not to afford shelter to suspicious characters, under pain of severe punishment. It was subsequently ascertained that Rugragee and some of his people were actually in Biddah when the squadron arrived off that port, but had been sent off with all haste by Salmin bin Nassir, who had, on finding matters so serious, and that he was held fully to account, despatched a party to bring back the pirates; but it was then too late,—they had got beyond his reach.

Shaikh Sultan, on receiving information (false and unfounded) that Ameer Khalid contemplated sending Syud bin Mootluk and Bin Buteel with a force against Brymee, opened a communication with them, with a view to promote the ruin of the Brymee Shaikhs. His letters by some means fell into the hands of the latter themselves. The character, however, of the old Joasmee Shaikh, for faithlessness and intrigue, was so well established throughout these quarters, and he was so entirely distrusted by all parties, that his machinations seldom produced, comparatively speaking, any evil consequences.

Abdoolla bin Rashid, the Shaikh of Amulgavine, desirous of taking advantage of the divisions existing in the family of the Joasmee Chief, to complete the building on the sea side, commenced previous to the attack upon his tower, but to which he was precluded from adding by one of the conditions of the treaty entered into on that occasion with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, through the mediation of the British Resident, expressed his wish to this effect in an interview with that functionary. He admitted that Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur had as yet displayed no signs of enmity; that he had, indeed, carefully adhered to the terms of the treaty; but remarked, that he considered it hard that he alone of all the chiefs should be restrained from altering or improving his defences as he thought proper, the more so as the incomplete state of his towers left him exposed to the attack of his enemies by sea. Such a proceeding was deprecated by the Resident, as involving a





breach of the treaty negotiated at his mediation, at a time when, but for the timely exertion of his influence, he would have been placed in a situation of great difficulty and peril, and as inevitably leading to a renewal of hostilities with the Joasmee Chief.

The only occurrences of notice during this season were some petty misunderstandings between the Shargah and Aboothabee people, in consequence of the arrest of a person in the latter port for debt, and the seizure of a mast from a Shargah boat. This spar had originally been lost from a wrecked vessel belonging to Sultan, the brother of the Beniyas Chief, and, having been picked up at sea, had been sold to its present possessor. An accidental collision between a Shargah and Aboothabee Buggarah on the pearl banks led to blows with sticks between the crews; but the quarrel was made up, and the Nakhoda of the former craft severely taken to task by his chief for his irregular conduct.

Subsequent to the visit of the Resident to the Arabian Coast, as before mentioned, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, the Chief of Amulgavine, notwithstanding the

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remonstrances he had received, and the disapprobation with which his designs had been viewed, commenced the building of the proscribed towers, and the construction of another for the defence of the back-water. The Joasmee Chief's repeated representations, calling upon the Resident, as mediator, to compel fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty entered into through his mediation, now thus openly violated, induced that functionary to depute his Assistant to the Arabian Coast in November of this year, with a view to the settlement of the misunderstanding between them.

The charge made by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur was found to be correct. It was, indeed, admitted by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid; nor could he adduce any palliatory plea for his conduct in the commission of any, the slightest breach of the compact, on the part of the former; but urged merely, in excuse of his faithless act, the necessity of every precaution in self-defence against so intriguing and treacherous a person as the Joasmee Chief. He further expressed his determination, on the same grounds, not only to complete the tower in question, but to build others; and on being reminded of the circumstances under which the Resident's timely mediation had been afforded, by which he had been saved from inevitable ruin, and pressed to consider the necessity of fulfilling strictly the conditions by which he was bound, under pain of the severe displeasure of Government, and the probable chance of its coercing him in the event of hesitation or refusal, he stated positively that he would not destroy the buildings he had lately erected, but that his tower, and all that belonged to him, being at the disposal of the Government, it might act





as it saw fit. The Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma, on the other hand, refused to listen to any compromise; and, with reference to a proposition to afford him assistance in enforcing compliance, declared that he had washed his hands of the business, and that he looked entirely to the British Government to hold both parties to their agreement, as entered into through the mediation of its representative. The Amulgavine Shaikh being called upon to suspend the further addition to the old or the construction of any new works, the case was now referred for the decision of Government.

In accordance with the instructions thereon received, the Assistant Resident, then in charge, proceeded in May 1843

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to Amulgavine, and finding the Shaikh as little disposed as ever to make the requisite *amende*, by destroying such towers as had been built or added to, in contravention of the treaty, was constrained, after the failure of every other argument, to have recourse to threats of coercion, before that chief would be induced to concede and pledge himself to a compliance with his just demands.

The establishment of the Maritime Truce for the extended period of ten years, which took place at this time, overturned in a great measure the arguments of the Amulgavine Shaikh for the non-destruction of the proscribed towers, particularly that erected as a defence towards the sea, and in like manner removed the objections of the Joasmee Chief to their existence. It was therefore agreed, that on the former's acting fully up to his engagements, he would be at liberty to rebuild or erect what towers or defences he pleased, and that the British Government would thenceforth be relieved of all further responsibility arising from its guarantee,—in short, that the treaty should be considered null and void.

The British Agent was directed to remain a month or a month and a half at Amulgavine, for the purpose of reporting every ten days the progress that should have been made.

Before the expiration of the period thus allotted, when one of the towers had been levelled with the ground, Muktoom bin Butye becoming mediator, and the Amulgavine Shaikh threatening to withhold his adherents from the pearl fishery, for the purpose of foraying the territories of his opponent,—a proceeding which would have subjected the latter to great injury, either by debarring his dependents from the profits to be derived from the fishery, inasmuch as he would have been compelled to retain them in a similar manner at home in self-defence, or by exposing them to such losses, during their absence on the banks, as the former had it in his power to inflict,—Sultan bin Suggur formally intimated his consent to forego the further destruction of the proscribed towers, if it were any longer permitted him to do so.





Such consent was evidently quite sufficient grounds for relinquishing the demand made on the part of Government, the office and duty of a guarantee being to prevent one party from neglecting, while the other fulfils, the obligations imposed by the compact, and not to interfere should they mutually determine to annul the same; and the object of impressing the Maritime Arab Chiefs with the conviction that the breach of an engagement, entered into through the mediation of the British Government, would never be passed over, having been fully gained, it was a matter of the greatest satisfaction that this long pending dispute was now fully terminated, to the apparent satisfaction of both parties, without the exercise or even demonstration of actual force, and without any loss of credit on the part of the British Government.

A Debaye Kafila having in November 1843 been plundered by some of the Beni Ghufflah, Shaikh Muktoom, in retaliation, made a sudden foray into the lands belonging to that tribe, and to the Chiefs of Brymee, and carried off a large number of camels and other cattle, whereby he gave great umbrage to the Joasmee Chief, Sultan bin Suggur, who at the time determined to come to an open rupture with the Debaye Chief, and compel him to restore the plunder. Wiser councils, however, prevailed (the fear of Muktoom's attaching himself more closely to the Beniyas Chief, which would have thrown the balance of power into the hands of the latter, and have proved highly prejudicial to his interests, having its due weight); and in disgust at Shaikh Sultan's change of determination, which deprived them of their revenge, the Chiefs of Brymee (Beni Ghufflah) threatened on their side to submit to Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot of Aboothabee, and actually commenced aggressions upon their former ally. The death of an inhabitant of Shargah by the hand of the brother of Shaikh Muktoom, notwithstanding that the payment of the Deeah or price of blood was immediately tendered by the latter, had nearly brought things to a crisis. The Joasmee Chief's conduct at least embittered the feud between his uncontrollable but in a measure dependent allies. A smart action took place, inland, between the Beni Ghufflah and Muktoom, in which the former were worsted, with the loss of several men killed on both sides. The Debaye Chief paid somewhat dearly for the victory, having himself received several wounds, one of which caused him the loss of an eye.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur now (July 1844) exerted himself to effect a reconciliation with the inland Bedouins; but his attempts having been unsuccessful, he was about to despatch a person to Aboothabee to sound Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, the Beniyas Chief, touching his inclination to receive proposals for a treaty of peace. In the event of a favourable reply, the

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Joasmee Chief will probably despatch his brother Saleh bin Suggur to open negotiations.

Some cases of irregularities on the pearl banks have occurred during the present season, in which the Joasmee subjects are the principal aggressors, and the proper remedies have been, or are in the course of being applied, with every prospect of a speedy settlement.

### CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

We are told by Captain Kemball, at the close of his Sketch of the Joasmee Tribe, that a few irregularities had occurred on the pearl banks during the present season, "in which the Joasmee subjects were the principal aggressors," and for which "the necessary remedies were being applied, with every prospect of a speedy settlement."

It would appear that five vessels pertaining to the Boo Mahir Tribe, which then resided at Shargah, and was consequently subject to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, attacked, in June 1844, two boats of Debaye, and took from them a quantity of pearls and arms, on the pretext of the people on board the latter owing them a sum of money, which they refused to disburse.

Another case occurred about the same period. It consisted in an "aggression committed by one of Shaikh Sultan's subjects, called Mahomed bin Majid, in taking a native of Chaab from a Debaye boat, while on the pearl banks."

These being the first instances of an open violation of the Maritime Truce, so lately entered into with the Arab Chiefs, it was highly necessary that prompt and immediate steps should be adopted to bring to an account the parties who had been guilty of infringing it. Colonel Hennell therefore addressed a letter to the Joasmee Chief, calling upon him to summon his refractory subjects from the pearl banks, and demanding the instant return of the five boats to Shargah, where they must be made to surrender to the injured parties of Debaye all the property they had plundered. In the second case, Mahomed bin Majid was to be likewise summoned to Shargah, and be compelled to deliver up the man he had captured; and in either case was an additional security for future good behaviour in the shape of 50 German crowns to be demanded from the chief parties implicated (the Nakhoda of each boat, and Mahomed bin Majid), until payment of





which, and the fulfilment of the other requirements, not one of the boats, or of the people belonging to them, were to be permitted to go back to the fishery. A vessel of war was despatched with the above communication, and she had not been long away ere she returned, to inform the Resident that the Joasmee Chief had shown the greatest "zeal and alacrity in taking measures for the execution of the requisitions made upon him"; that the property and captive had been given up to the people of Debaye, and the money demanded as security for the peaceable bearing of the delinquents had been paid, and deposited in the hands of the British Agent.

This was all satisfactory enough; but, unfortunately, the very vessel that was the bearer of such welcome tidings was also charged with other intelligence, of a less satisfactory nature. She brought news of a fresh violation of the Maritime Truce in September 1844.

The Joasmeees were again the offenders: one, Esai bin Jassim, a native of Shargah, quarrelled with the master of an Ejman boat; high words ensued, and these were shortly succeeded by blows. Esai bin Jassim boarded and attacked the Ejman craft, and severely wounded one of the crew on board with a spear. This case, though more grave in its character than any preceding it, was likewise brought to a settlement without any difficulty. Shaikh Abdool Azeez having begged the Resident to obtain reparation for the wrongs his people had suffered, that officer called upon Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur to make Esai bin Jassim disburse the sum of 200 crowns, "by way of punishment for his irregular conduct."

The Joasmee Chief, on his part, did not hesitate to comply with the requisitions preferred against him, but hastened, in December 1844, to furnish an order for the 200 dollars demanded. The money was lodged in the hands of Moolla Hussein, the British Agent at Shargah, and subsequently made over by him to the Chief of Ejman, as compensation for the wounds inflicted on his subject.

In the early part of the ensuing year (1846),\* hostilities commenced between the Joasmee Tribe and the Chief of Debaye. Shaikh Sultan, it would seem, with a view to extend his authority over the minor ports of Ejman and Amulgavine, determined, as a preparatory measure, to erect a number of towers at a place called Khan,† which, although in his own dominions, bordered also upon those of Debaye, the growing influence of whose chief it was his particular interest to keep in check and restrain. Shaikh Muktoom was by no means inclined to permit the plan to be carried

\* Nothing worthy of notice occurred in 1845.

† The actual site of the fort was at a place called Aboo Heyle, within gunshot range of Khan, and distant from Debaye three miles.





into execution. He at once resolved to oppose the erection of the fortifications with all the means in his power, and the better to enable him to cope with his powerful enemy, he entered into a close alliance with the chiefs of the two ports (Ejman and Amulgavine) whose subjection was eventually contemplated.

The Joasmee was equally determined and obstinate,—the fort should be built, and no one should prevent it. He opened negotiations with the Chief of Aboothabee, and, strange to say, notwithstanding the feud so long existing between the Joasmee and Beniyas Tribes, he contrived to persuade Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon to forsake the side of Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, and come over to that of himself. Preparations were set on foot for active operations, and hostilities were on the eve of commencing,—nay, a trifling case of aggression had already occurred, in the seizure\* of two Ejman boats by the people of Ramse and Himreeah,—when the opportune arrival of Her Majesty's and the Honorable Company's vessels of war off the port of Shargah induced the belligerents to refrain for a while, and attend to the voice of a mediator.

Commodore Sir H. Blackwood, R. N., desired the chiefs to await the result of a reference that should be made to the Resident, on the subject of the fortifications in course of erection. His proposition was readily agreed to, and Shaikh Sultan gave a solemn assurance to the British Commodore, that until the Resident's reply had been received not a hand should be laid to the building. This was well; but, unfortunately, it was not in the nature of the Joasmee to adhere to a promise. He proceeded, in direct violation of the pledge he had given, to erect and complete the structure at Khan. Hostilities were renewed, and conflicts were daily occurring between the forces of the hostile chiefs, when Captain Kemball, who had been deputed to strive and bring matters to a peaceable settlement, arrived in March 1846 off the Arabian Coast. That officer did all in his power to effect a reconciliation between the contending chiefs. He remonstrated with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur for breaking his promise; he pointed out, that although the British Government had it not in their mind to interfere with the inland affairs of the Arabs, yet they viewed with extreme displeasure his present line of behaviour, both as being opposed to the general peace and tranquillity of the tribes in the Gulf, and as showing a "spirit of ill-will and defiance."

Shaikh Sultan, after urging, in defence of his conduct, a host of excuses, as lame in their nature as they were false in reality, began to assure the Resident how much he was grieved to think that any act he

\* Seized from the shore, and not by boats at sea.





had committed should have been distasteful to the British Government; but that, as he himself must admit, every chief has a right to erect in his own territories structures of whatsoever description he chooses, so he was puzzled to imagine how, by the construction of the fortifications at Khan, he could possibly have given just cause for offence.

He at first denied, but subsequently granted, that he had pledged himself to the Commodore not to complete the towers until he had learned the Resident's opinion regarding them. That promise, however, was furnished, he said, on a distinct understanding that the Chief of Debaye was on his part to keep the peace; and as the latter proved a constant thorn in his side, and was for ever annoying him, he had no alternative left but to continue the building.

Captain Kemball plainly perceiving that further discussion would be unattended with success, proceeded on the 14th and 15th March 1846 to hold interviews with the Shaikh of Debaye, and his allies of Ejman and Amulgavine.

These three chiefs expressed a great desire for peace, but at the same time most justly observed, that so long as Shaikh Sultan acted the part of an aggressor, which he most undoubtedly had hitherto done, it was but right and proper that they, weak individually, though strong collectively, should combine to repel his attacks;—in short, that as they were well aware he was anxious to reduce them from a state of independence to one of subjection, they had resolved to stand by each other to the last extremity. Should the British Government, however, guarantee that no inland aggressions would be permitted against their territories, they would at once withdraw their forces, and abstain from the prosecution of warfare. This proposition, being one that could not be entertained for an instant, was at once rejected; and the inveterate obstinacy of Shaikh Sultan, coupled with the determined opposition of Shaikh Muktoom and his allies, leaving no room for hope that affairs could be peaceably arranged without compromising the British Government, Captain Kemball quitted the coast, and returned to his post at Bushire.

He had scarcely been gone a day and a night ere an event took place that paved the way for the re-opening of negotiations.

Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan, the Chief of Shargah, together with Abdoolla bin Howeylim, the head of the Beni Kuttub, having made a foray into the neighbourhood of Amulgavine, were suddenly attacked by a large body of troops, under the personal command of Abdoolla bin Rashid (Chief of Amulgavine). A fierce struggle ensued, neither party yielding an inch, until Shaikh Suggur fell from his horse, mortally wounded; on perceiving which the Shargah party took to their heels, and hastened back to their homes.





Shaikh Suggur had all along been looked upon as "the prime mover and instigator of the aggressive proceedings of Shaikh Sultan," his father; and this supposition was now confirmed, for Shaikh Sultan, although he expressed himself anxious to avenge the death of his son, showed a greater anxiety for the cessation of hostilities. He on the 2nd and 3rd April 1846 addressed the Resident, "expressing his regret at not having followed the advice of the Assistant Resident" when he was lately on the coast; he told the British Agent in the plainest terms that he had been blinded by the counsels of his son, Shaikh Suggur, now no more; that he was for ever wishing disorders might cease, but the evil instigations of others would not permit him to act as he wished. "What he now hoped was that the Resident would again depute some person, on his part, in a British Government vessel, to quiet affairs," and reconcile all who were at feud with each other. Here was a golden opportunity for putting an end to disorder,—here was a time for mediation;—nor was it lost sight of. Commodore Hawkins succeeded in bringing hostilities to a close, and through his intervention was a temporary peace concluded between the contending parties, whereby it was agreed that all the chiefs should withdraw with their troops to their respective territories, and, until the ensuing 12th of November, a period of more than six months, one and all should be at peace with each other. A satisfactory arrangement this,—one highly beneficial to the interests of all parties. The pearl season was now at hand, and the people of every tribe would be able to flock to the banks, and pursue their vocation. There would be no fear of molestation either, for the treaty had been signed in the presence of a British Commodore, and that alone would insure its being kept inviolate.

Such, we may readily suppose, were the feelings generally uppermost in the minds of both chiefs and subjects; such the assurances of peace and quiet that reigned in their breasts;—and such, we are convinced, would have been the state of the case, had the wily Joasmee not been one of the members affected. He unfortunately was one of the number. It was he, too, that had promised to fulfil beyond the mere abstaining from warfare: he had engaged to demolish the towers he had lately erected; he had promised to permit the people of other tribes to come and go among those of his own tribe, whensoever and wheresoever they listed. These, besides many others, were the engagements entered into by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. Let us inquire with how much faithfulness he adhered to his promises.

He forbade the people of Debaye admittance into Shargah; he commenced building, in lieu of demolishing; he strove to instigate Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, but late his ally, to offend and annoy





Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye; he seduced a party of the Al Huza from their allegiance to the Amulgavine Chief;—in short, we may safely say that he put his hand to the treaty with every intention to infringe it.

To give a description of all the intrigues he stooped to engage in were both idle and useless. I shall therefore confine myself to the mention of one so inconceivably glaring that his character for deceit will stand naked before us.

To describe the case I refer to, I cannot do better, I think, than furnish an extract from a letter, detailing the affair, that was addressed to the Resident at the time it occurred by Moolla Hussein, the British Agent at Shargah. It is thus that he writes:—

“I have understood that Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, when visiting Syud bin Tahnoon at Aboothabee, from a deficiency of sense, entered into engagements for the due execution of their designs,—that Syud bin Tahnoon should get ready a force of horsemen and camel riders to plunder the territories of the Bedouin Tribes, such as the Ghufilah and the Khuaiter, and those connected with them, viz. the Al Ali of the Tribe of Abdoola bin Rashid, and others; and with a view solely to inflict loss and injury upon Abdoola bin Rashid, Chief of Amulgavine. On the 2nd December, accordingly, did a force set out, and at daylight of the 15th attacked a position of the Ghufilah, containing about thirty men, resting in fancied security, who were taken by surprise. I understand that the Beniwas killed of the above all but five, who escaped by flight, carried away all the property from the dwellings, and captured five hundred camels, and a number of sheep. It is reported that of the Beniwas one man was killed, the son of Rashid bin Fazil. Most people possessed of the slightest reason and sense lament and condemn these proceedings on the part of the Beniwas, who were, however, prompted and instigated by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur himself to the slaughter of his dependents and subjects, because those Bedouins, such as the Ghufilah, the Khuaiter, the Naeem, &c. were all of them formerly connected with the Joasmees—particularly the Ghufilah. This senseless conduct of Shaikh Sultan will ruin and depopulate those districts. The Bedouins, on this event, were thrown into the utmost consternation, and the elders of Shargah despatched a messenger with the intelligence to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who affected to disapprove of the proceedings of the Beniwas against the Ghufilah, and yet it was he himself drew them on them. On the arrival of the messenger on the 7th of December, Shaikh Sultan came to Shargah, and immediately despatched a boat to Aboothabee, to intimate to Shaikh Syud that the act of his people against the Ghufilah had caused no change in his sentiments or feelings,





and in their friendly relations, but requesting that if, among the camels plundered from the Ghufalah, there should be found any belonging to the people of Shargah or Ras-ool-Khyma, they might be restored. I hear that Shaikh Syud returned an answer which satisfied him on every point."

Let us go on to consider the result of this chief's single-minded and upright behaviour.

At the close of the year 1846, when the pearl season was over, and the land truce at an end, Shaikh Sultan began to revolve in his mind plans of revenge upon the Chief of Amulgavine, for the slaughter of his son, Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan. He resolved to fall with all his power upon Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and, after the reduction of that chief, to fulfil his designs against Abdoolla bin Rashid, who, when unaided by others, would fall an easy prey to the wrath of his more powerful opponent. Shaikh Syud was once more summoned to assist in the undertaking. He cheerfully responded to the call, and hastened to join the Joasmees, with all his available forces. The plan of attacking Debaye in the outset was precisely the thing: nothing could be more consonant to the wishes of the Beniyas Chief than to aid in the reduction of Debaye, and by no other means would the Joasmees be able to wreak his vengeance on Abdoolla bin Rashid. Such was the language held by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon. Shaikh Sultan, however, was not to be duped: rather than see Debaye fall into the hands of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, he would forego his revenge,—he would change his plan of attack: he would proceed against the town of Amulgavine, and not against that of Debaye. To this Shaikh Syud would not for a moment agree: a difference of opinion arose, which quickly led to a quarrel, and either chief veering round, and suddenly shifting his policy, made overtures to Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, who humoured the one and rejected the other.

With Shaikh Syud he refused to treat on the terms that were offered. With Shaikh Sultan he in February or March 1847 entered into a treaty, in consequence of the latter faithfully promising to destroy the towers he had erected at Aboo Heyle, within a period of three months,—a promise, it is scarcely necessary to add, he never intended to fulfil.

Nothing worthy of notice occurred from this date until the commencement of the year 1848, when, "after friendly negotiations had been for some time carried on between Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur and the Chiefs of Debaye and Amulgavine, the people of Ejman," (who were now once again on the side of the latter,) "fancying themselves secure, re-opened their intercourse with the people of Shargah." Abdoolla bin Sultan, son of the





Joasmee, who was chief of the place, and on a par with his father for uprightness in dealing and single-mindedness of purpose, made a treacherous attempt to surprise and capture the fort of Ejman on the 12th January 1848. His plot, deeply laid though it was, signally failed, and led to all the maritime chiefs once more uniting and breaking off relations with the sons of Shaikh Sultan.\*

With regard to Shaikh Sultan himself, Moolla Hussein tells us, in a letter dated February 1st, 1848,—“When he (Shaikh Sultan) heard of the proceedings of his sons, and the failure of their stratagem to capture Ejman, which had led to an alliance between the minor chiefs and Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon of Aboothabee, he was much grieved, since detriment and injury could not fail to accrue therefrom to his interests; and he immediately wrote to the several Shaikhs, denouncing and disavowing their act: but this communication was dictated by the result,—had the attempt been successful he would have approved of their conduct.” We entirely concur with the Agent in the opinion he has above expressed, and are moved to pity for the Joasmee Chief, who was doomed to witness so many of his gigantic and disinterested plans both foiled and frustrated.

About this period, hostilities commenced between the Nujdee Lieutenant and the Chief of Aboothabee. The course pursued by Shaikh Sultan throughout the war was of a piece with the rest of his conduct. The following extracts from letters addressed to the Resident by Moolla Hussein, British Agent at Shargah, will sufficiently illustrate Shaikh Sultan's character; and laid down, as they are, in regular order, they furnish a clear though diminutive outline of the part he played in the struggle.

The first passage selected is one from a letter of the 29th of May 1848, wherein he writes:—“Great animosity before existed on the part of Shaikh Sultan against Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and he was exciting Shaikh Syud bin Tabnoon to attack the latter; but when he observed Syud bin Tahnoon had joined the coalition against Mahomed bin Syf, he secretly sent to Muktoom to propose an alliance.”

Again, in a letter of the 14th of June 1848, he says:—“On the 10th of June, Shaikh Sultan returned to Shargah, and wrote to Syud bin Tabnoon, that he had at first determined to come for the purpose of arranging matters between the parties, but when he learned that he did not desire it, he had given up the intention; and at the same time I have heard privately he wrote to Mahomed bin Syf that he had prepared to go to his assistance, but could find none of the chiefs of the coast to

\* Ibrahim is the second party referred to. He too took part in the plot against Ejman.





support him; encouraging him, however, to hold out bravely, and, please God, reinforcements would shortly arrive from Nujd."

Again, at the close of the same month, when talking of Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, he writes on the 25th June 1848:—"He has no confidence in Syud bin Tahnoon. With regard to his relations with Shaikh Sultan, outwardly a constant intercourse is kept up between them, but inwardly God knows! A constant correspondence is also going on between Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Syud. I cannot distinguish the false from the true men, as the chiefs of these parts are all endeavouring each to deceive his neighbour."

In a further letter he writes:—"On the 6th Shaban (8th July 1848) Shaikh Syud despatched from Brymee a special courier to Rasool-Khyma, with a letter to Shaikh Sultan, to the effect, I understand, that if he desired the continuance of their alliance on its present footing, he must at once commence hostilities against the people of Debaye, and prohibit and cut off their intercourse with his (the Joasmee's) territories. Shaikh Sultan was greatly perplexed, and knew not what reply to give. He resolved therefore to return an evasive answer, in terms of acquiescence,—to the effect that their engagements remained unaltered, and that he had prohibited all commerce and intercourse between his territories and those of Debaye. On the night of the 9th Shaban (11th July), after the above answer had been sent, Soleyman, one of Shaikh Sultan's followers, secretly took his departure from Shargah for Debaye, without the knowledge of the inhabitants, apprehensive lest it should reach the ears of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon. On meeting Shaikh Muktoom and his elders, he informed them that at heart Shaikh Sultan desired the closest alliance and friendship with them, but that he begged them for the present to forbid their tribe from continuing their intercourse with Shargah, and he purposed proclaiming publicly in Shargah that none should communicate with Debaye, in order that the rumour might spread abroad in the country. Shaikh Muktoom and his elders replied that they would not oppose the views of Shaikh Sultan."

Some three or four months later in the year, after Shaikh Sultan's territories had been forayed by the troops of the Aboothabee Chief, and after he had complained of the said foray in the bitterest terms to the Resident, reproaching Shaikh Syud with breaches of faith, and all manner of treachery, but omitting, of course, to mention how he, by his own conduct, had brought the attack upon himself,—after all this, he committed himself to a most extraordinary piece of duplicity. On one and the same day (30th October 1848) did he make overtures of peace to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, and issue an order to the people of Shargah, forbidding them "to proceed on their voyages,"





his object being, it was supposed, to march with his forces in aid of the Wahabees; and on the 4th of December we learn from another communication that the combined forces of Shaikh Sultan, Muktoom bin Butye, and Humeed bin Rashid, set out from Shargah with Syud bin Mootluk, and the remnant of the Nujdees, to attack Shaikh Syud at Brymee. The Joasmee had now therefore plainly identified himself with the cause of the Wahabees, and was at open war with the Chief of the Beni-yas. How matters would have ended, or what would have been the next step of the Joasmees, had hostilities continued, it is difficult to say. No general engagement, however, took place between the contending armies.

Peace was concluded in February 1849, and the Brymee forts restored to the Wahabee commander,—all things to all parties reverting to the condition they were in before the strife commenced.

A. D. 1849.

Shaikh Sultan had for some time past been planning an expedition against Khore Fukaun, a port on the Batinah Coast, now in the possession of His Excellency Syud Soweeynee; but, owing to the strong terms in which both Syud bin Mootluk and Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye expressed their aversion to the proposed measure, he abandoned the plan.

In the early part of the ensuing year, however, when the Sohar Chief sought his assistance against the Muskat authorities, who had seized upon his brother, and invaded his territories, Shaikh Sultan gave ear to the request, and finding that Syud Ghes promised, in the event of being freed from his obnoxious opponent, to aid and support the Joasmee in recovering his lost possessions upon the Batinah Coast, as also to pay tribute, the same in amount as he had hitherto paid the Wahabee, assistance was speedily proffered.

A. D. 1850.

The Joasmee troops were yet on the way, when they were met by Syud Ghes, who, having successfully resisted the convulsive efforts of the Muskat Governor to take the fort of Sohar, had driven His Excellency Syud Soweeynee to retreat from the neighbourhood, and return to Muskat. The combined chiefs now proceeded at once against the fort of Shinas, and, after a stout resistance had been offered, compelled the place to capitulate on the 10th May 1850. They were equally successful in their attacks upon Ghulla and Khore Fukaun, and having thus reduced the whole of the Batinah Coast from Merya to Cape Musseldom to a state of subjection, and come to a satisfactory understanding of the partition to be made, they both returned to their seats.





Passing over the countless intrigues which the Joasmee stooped to commit, and confining the narrative to a bare relation of the actual deeds he performed, the doings of Shaikh Sultan in the year 1851 can be told in a word: he made peace with Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, out of spite to the Wahabee, because he favoured Shaikh Muktoom more than himself.

He received a remonstrance from the Ameer for effecting the alliance, and replied to His Highness that, in accordance with the wishes he expressed, he would break off the friendship contracted,—a promise it is needless to say he never intended to fulfil, for it was opposed to his interest to do so.

He rushed to the assistance of Syud Ghes, Chief of Sohar, in his conflict with the Imaum of Muskat, according to engagement, and was deceitful enough to accept presents in gold, and forsake the cause he had faithfully promised to uphold.

Such was the character of the Joasmee's proceedings during the year 1851.

In the spring of the ensuing year a Ras-ool-Khyma Buggalow, when on her return to the Persian Gulf from the African Coast, and while still in the neighbourhood of Zanzibar, committed a piracy upon a vessel belonging to that port.

The uncertain and tardy means of communication existing between the ports of Zanzibar and Bushire caused considerable delay in obtaining the information necessary to establish the true particulars of the case, and to fix the just amount of satisfaction to be demanded from Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur; for although Captain Kemball wrote to Major Hamerton on the subject of the piracy so early as the month of June 1852, and, receiving no reply up to the 3rd of August following, again addressed him regarding it, and finally, on the 4th of February in the succeeding year, found it necessary to write a

third despatch, begging to be favoured with an answer to his previous communications, it was not until the month of August 1853 that a reply from that officer reached the Resident at Bushire; and even then, the offending Buggalow, though owned by a native of Ras-ool-Khyma, yet being manned, as she was, by people of Kusbeeah, who are the acknowledged subjects of His Highness Syud Saeed, and the Joasmee Chief "repudiating his liability" to afford redress in consequence, Captain Kemball, considering the arguments adduced by Shaikh Sultan to be deserving of attention, thought it right to make a further reference to Major Hamerton on the subject, and up to the close of the year, no reply having been received, the matter remained unadjusted and pending.





During the years 1852 and 1853, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur would seem to have laboured under feelings of extreme irritation, and to have done all in his power to incur the displeasure of the British Government.

Twice during the period I have mentioned was our British Agent at Shargah subjected to insults whilst residing at his post within the Joasmee dominions,—once from people of Shargah, with the connivance of its chief, a son of the Joasmee, and once from parties in the interest of the Wahabee Ameer, whom Shaikh Sultan professed his inability to control. In either case was redress demanded and afforded; but scarcely had satisfaction been given, and a reconciliation between Shaikh Sultan and the British Agent been effected, in the presence of Commodore Robinson, than the former addressed a letter to the Resident, preferring a fresh set of charges against the latter, for misappropriation of monies entrusted to his care for delivery to others,—charges both vague and groundless, as was proved by the fact of his being compelled to retract every particle of the accusation he had made, when called upon to furnish proof of the truth of the allegations. Again, towards the close of the year 1852, Shaikh Sultan wrote a letter to the Resident, complaining bitterly of the manner in which he was brought to account for even the slightest case of maritime irregularity committed by his dependents, whilst the other subscribers to the truce, he said, were permitted to act with impunity, and were not remonstrated with on occasions of infraction of their engagements with the British Government. The Joasmee was favoured, in reply, with a communication from Captain Kemball, completely refuting every charge of partiality he had thought fit to adduce, and proving most clearly that one and all of his insinuations were groundless.

Much of this soreness of feeling was supposed to have arisen out of an ill-will borne to the British Agent, in consequence of divers disclosures he made to the Resident regarding the traffic in slaves carried on by the Joasmee's dependents. Another and far stronger cause of irritation, however, was to be attributed to an intimation conveyed to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur by Captain Kemball, "in compliance with the orders of the Honorable the Court of Directors, that Government refused its confirmation of the arrangement he (Shaikh Sultan) proposed to Colonel Hennell, for the payment through him, instead of direct to the injured parties, of monies which might be recovered hereafter as compensation for piracies, homicides, or other injuries sustained by his subjects."

This announcement would appear to have well nigh maddened the Joasmee. "He was very wroth";—so writes the Agent in a letter





dated 11th November 1852, some three months after the order had reached its destination, when he heard that some money exacted from Shaikh Syud bin Butye, for some people of his, who had been injured at sea, had been paid to the sufferers, and not to himself. Again, so late as the month of August in the ensuing year, Hajee Yacoob complained of the unfriendliness shown him by the Joasmee, in consequence of monies, exacted as compensation for irregularities at sea, "being paid to the individuals aggrieved" in lieu of himself.

During the absence of Shaikh Syud bin Butye, the Chief of the Boo Felasa, from his post, at Muskat, to which port he had repaired on a visit to His Highness the Imaum, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur supported the pretensions of the sons of the late Muktoom, who dared to aspire to the chiefship. His intrigues, however, were not attended with much success. He contrived, it is true, to bribe and entice Syud bin Maanaul Moheyree to quit Debaye with his tribe, and settle at Shargah, but all his endeavours in behalf of the youthful heirs to the chiefship were utterly frustrated by an alliance, offensive and defensive, that was suddenly concluded, on the 17th December 1852, between Shaikh Syud bin Butye and the Chiefs of the Benihas and Amulgavine Tribes.

There remains but to notice the part that was played by the Joasmee during the complications that arose in the spring of 1853, between the Wahabee and Muskat authorities. The course pursued by Shaikh Sultan was as objectionable as ever. He hastened to wait upon Abdoolla bin Fysul, so soon as he heard of his arrival at Brymee; he strove all in his power to prevent the conclusion of a peaceable arrangement between the contending parties; though made aware that the Resident had arrived off the coast for the purpose of meeting him, he manifested no inclination to return to his seat and wait upon him, but "proposed to make up for his absence by appointing certain deputies to communicate with Captain Kemball in his stead,"—deputies whom, there was every reason to suppose, he had not "vested with powers to conclude any definitive arrangement"; he strongly counselled an immediate march upon the Batinah districts; he pointed out the defenceless condition they were in; and he succeeded in raising himself to the highest favour in the eyes of the Wahabee commander.


His counsels, his plans, beyond those of the rest of the chiefs, one and all were agreeable to the wishes and desires of Abdoolla bin Fysul; and considering that a day had been fixed (so said Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon) for the march of the coalesced forces on the Imaum's dominions, matters might indeed have proved serious, had not a combination of circumstances conspired to damp the ardour of both Joasmee and Wahabee for a recourse to hostilities. The project of an invasion





was abandoned, and affairs were peaceably settled. Shaikh Sultan thereon returned to Shargah, and waited upon Captain Kemball on the 4th May 1853, on board the Honorable Company's sloop-of-war *Clive*. That officer did not fail to upbraid him for the detention to which his protracted stay at Brymee had subjected him, and to make him fully aware how distasteful his late proceedings would be to the British Government, when they learned that it was their old and faithful ally the Imaum of Muskat he so basely was striving to harm and injure.

The subject of the new treaty for a lasting peace being brought under discussion, Shaikh Sultan exhibited considerable readiness to become a member thereto, and affixed his seal to the document without hesitation or demur.







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HISTORICAL SKETCH  
OF THE  
UTTOOBEE TRIBE OF ARABS;  
(BAHREIN;)

FROM THE YEAR 1716 TO THE YEAR 1817.

PREPARED BY

MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,  
MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.

WITH

CONTINUATIONS OF THE SAME,

FROM THE YEAR 1817 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL;

FROM 1832 TO AUGUST 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

AND FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.



## UTTOOBEE ARABS (BAHREIN).

ABOUT A. D. 1716, three considerable tribes of Arabs, called the Beni Subah, Al Yalahimah, and Al Khaleefa, urged by motives of interest or ambition, entered into a compact, and took possession of a spot of ground on the north-western shore of the Persian Gulf, called Koweit. The Beni Subah were subject at this time to Shaikh Soleyman bin Ahmed; the Beni Yalahimah to Jaubir bin Uttoobee; and the Beni Khaleefa to Khaleefa bin Mahomed.

2. These chiefs strengthened the new settlement by intermarriages with the daughters of the other clans, with the view of being enabled by such alliances to resist the attacks of the Beni Khalid, who were a very powerful tribe.

3. The three tribes determined to follow the occupation of merchants and agriculturists, and to share the profits equally. In the formation of an administration, it was agreed that the sons of the Beni Subah should exercise the functions of government, those of Yalahimah should superintend and control the maritime, and the Beni Khaleefa the mercantile, branch of their concerns.

4. In the course of fifty years, by a prudent and cautious policy, the new settlement attained a very high degree of prosperity: but the accumulation of wealth rendered the mercantile branch desirous of seceding from the original league, that they might singly enjoy and add to their acquired riches.

5. They were obliged to have recourse to dissimulation to effect their purpose. Khaleefa bin Mahomed, an artful and politic chief, undertook to accomplish it. He represented to the other two the prospects of wealth that presented themselves by proceeding to the shores of that part of the Persian Gulf the most productive of pearls, and, by forming a settlement on some contiguous spot, to conduct the fishery themselves. Lured by the advantages thus held forth, the Beni Khaleefa Chief was permitted to leave Koweit, with a part of his tribe. He accordingly passed over and settled at Zobara, on the Arabian shore.





By his talents and his treasures he soon acquired a considerable portion of the fishery, and by his prudent liberality to the neighbouring Arab Chieftains, and to those of his former associates, he drew over the rest of his own tribe to the new colony, and at length completely separated himself from the other two, and established his independence at Zobara.

6. The sons of Subah and Yalahimah discovered too late the true motives that influenced Khaleefa's conduct, but were unable to resent it.

7. The more powerful clan of the two, the Al Subah, soon felt the absence of their commercial brethren, in a deficiency of their finances; and, following the example of their renegade brethren, first refused the Al Yalahimah their share of the revenue, and ultimately expelled them from the port and town of Koweit.

8. The Yalahimah Tribe sought and obtained the protection of their kinsmen at Zobara, to each of whom, according to his rank, was assigned an adequate income. In a few years they renewed their claims to rights founded on their original compact, which they were not, however, in a condition to enforce.

9. Urged by necessity, and a sense of wrong, the Yalahimah quitted Zobara, and took up their residence at Raveish, a barren spot at a short distance eastward of Zobara, and turned their whole attention to the increase, equipment, and preservation of their fleet, contemplating the object of revenging themselves on their proud and perfidious neighbours. They commenced an extensive system of maritime depredation, and, by capturing their property, created in the minds of the Beni Khaleefa fears for their existence, and such a thirst for the punishment and destruction of the Yalahimah Chief, that, adding to their own force all the mercenaries their pecuniary resources could obtain, they environed the marauders on every side. The treasures which the Yalahimah had amassed, which they were determined to defend to the last, and the feelings of animosity that existed between them, led to a desperate contest: the Yalahimah Chief having been killed at an early period of the action, the overwhelming superiority of their enemies obtained a complete victory, and a few infants and females were alone saved from the massacre that ensued.

10. Subsequently to this event, the influence and power of the Beni

A. D. 1775-76. Khaleefa rapidly increased. They acquired an accession of wealth and respectability, on

the attack of Bussora by the Persians, at which period one of the Shaikhs of Grane retired to Zobara, with many of the principal people, and accompanied by some of the Bussora merchants also. A great part of the pearl and Indian trade in consequence centered at Zobara, and at Grane, during the time the Persians occupied Bussora; and those places





increased in strength and consequence. This state of prosperity excited in particular the fears and jealousy of Shaikh Nassir, of the Bomeheere Tribe, who was also Shaikh of Bushire and of Bahrein, and who had been empowered by his sovereign of Persia to reduce Zobara. Repeated but ineffectual attempts were accordingly made to reduce that place between the years 1777 and 1801.

11. Availing themselves of the general warfare that prevailed in the Gulf on the death of Kureem Khan, the Zobara  
A. D. 1782-83. Arabs made a descent on the island of Bahrein,

and, after a short conflict, obliged Shaikh Nassir to retire to the fort: after plundering and destroying the town, they returned to Zobara, taking with them one of the Bushire gallivats that had been sent to Bahrein to receive its annual tribute to Persia.

12. In pursuance of orders from Ali Moorad Khan, Shaikh Nassir prepared an expedition against Zobara, for the destruction of his powerful rival, in which he was to be assisted by the Shaikhs of Bunder Reig, Genowa, Dushistan, &c. The fleet sailed from Bushire with two thousand of the Dushistan Arabs for Bahrein, under the command of Shaikh Mahomed, Shaikh Nassir's nephew. Though deemed sufficient to attack Zobara, it appeared to be Shaikh Nassir's object to bring the Arabs to terms by blockading their port, for which purpose the Persian fleet kept constantly cruising between Zobara and Bahrein.

13. The Uttoobees, unable to oppose them, offered through Meer Gunneeh, of Bunder Reig, to restore the whole plunder taken at Bahrein, as the price of peace. That Shaikh proving unsuccessful in his negotiations, Shaikh Rashid of Julfar engaged to settle all the differences to the satisfaction of both parties.

14. These negotiations also failing, the Persian troops landed at Zobara to storm the fort, which they expected to reduce with little opposition. The Persians, however, had scarcely landed, when they were resolutely attacked by a force much greater than they expected, which sallied from the fort, and, after an obstinate conflict, the Persians threw down their arms, fled, and embarked on board their gallivats. Shaikh Mahomed was killed in the action, and a nephew of Shaikh Rashid's, and some men of consequence belonging to the Shaikh of Ormus. Intoxicated with their success, the want of means of transport alone prevented the Zobara Arabs from proceeding to the attack of Bahrein.

15. The Grane\* fleet, consisting of six gallivats, and a number of armed boats, arrived on the same day at Bahrein, set fire to, and plundered the town, and obliged the force left to protect it to return to the fort.

\* The Al Khaleefa, or Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs, occupy Grane.





## UTTOOBES.

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16. Shaikh Nassir, after this unsuccessful attempt, proceeded with Shaikh Rashid to Aseeloo, to re-equip a force for another attack of Zobara. The latter would appear, notwithstanding his recent interference as a mediator, to have taken an active part against the Uttoobes, on account of their having captured a boat of his, and put eighteen of her crew to the sword. Shaikh Nassir, however, returned to Bushire on the 12th of June, and on the 5th of August Shaikh Rashid arrived with the Persian garrison of Bahrein, which they had been under the necessity of surrendering on the 28th of July.

17. The Al Subah, who had continued to increase their power and possessions at Koweit, hearing of the distress of their old confederates, prepared to relieve them. On their way to Zobara with that view, they intercepted a small fishing-boat, which had been despatched by Shaikh Nassir to his son at Bahrein, to apprise him of his defeat, charging him to be resolute and watchful in defending the island until assistance should reach him. The information was valuable, and led to their adopting prompt and decisive measures. They immediately sailed to Bahrein, and obtained possession of the principal forts. The news of this success having reached Zobara, every effort was made by the Al Khaleefa to raise auxiliaries for the subjection of the island, which they soon accomplished.

18. On the conquest of Bahrein, they proceeded to reward their companions on this service. The four sons of Jaubir bin Uttoobee were among the number. These, not at all instructed, nor improved by their habits of life, and without even the power their father appeared to possess to substantiate their claims, demanded from the Khaleefa Chief the enjoyment of territorial and political rights, which being refused, they left the island in disgust, and prosecuted the mode of life in which their ancestors had been bred, in which they have ever since persevered.\*

19. Active preparations were still made by the Shaikhs of Julfar and Ormus to join Shaikh Nassir in another attack of the Zobara and Grane Arabs, in which they were to be assisted by a force of six thousand men, which Ali Moorad Khan promised to furnish at the close of the year. However, every design to proceed on a second expedition appears to have been abandoned for a time.

20. Preparations for that purpose were, however, renewed in the close of the following year, and on the 12th of February 1785 Shaikh Nassir proceeded by land to Congoon, and the Bushire and Bunder Reig fleets sailed for that place

\* For a continuance of their history, see "Khor Hassan," in the latter part of this Selection.





on the 21st, where they were to be rejoined by the Shaikhs of Ormus and Julfar. A small force from Shiraz had already arrived at Congoon, to join the expedition. The death of Ali Moorad Khan, however, arrested the prosecution of offensive operations against the Uttoobees.

21. The contests for the succession that ensued in the interior of Persia on that event, in which Shaikh Nassir of Bushire took a part, left the Uttoobees in

A. D. 1799.

quiet possession of Bahrein, and no mention is made of them until the year 1799, when the Imaum of Muskat, in compliance with the wish of the Beglerbeg of Fars, proceeded with four ships and six Dows, and armed gallivats, to attack the Uttoobees, and subdue Bahrein. The Uttoobees had only three ships, which were on trading voyages to India, which were all taken, laden with merchandize, by the Imaum, on their return.

22. The Uttoobees at Bahrein wrote on this occasion to Shaikh Nassir at Bushire, stating that the island originally belonged to the Turkish Government, but that it was many (about seventy) years since they were in possession of it; that they were now desirous of becoming subject to the King of Persia, to whom they would pay a tribute. Shaikh Nassir availed himself of this invitation, and privately proceeding to Bahrein, received the tribute for the preceding year.

23. In the year 1800, the Imaum of Muskat reduced the island of Bahrein, and sent all the head men, consisting of twenty-five families, to Muskat. The Uttoobee Shaikhs proceeded to Zobara with their followers, and solicited the protection of the Wahabees, which was readily extended. In the following year, assisted by all the Wahabee dependents in the district of Khutter, the Uttoobees attacked and retook Bahrein, having forced the Imaum's governor and his son to leave the island with only their private baggage; and in consequence of the Persian Shaikhs having assisted Syud Sultan in the reduction of Bahrein, the Uttoobees made prize of every Bussora or Persian vessel they fell in with.

A. D. 1800-01.

24. The Uttoobee Arabs at Zobara became at this period, in common with every tribe on the Arabian shore of the Gulf, under the control of the Wahabee power. They would appear, however, to have been at war with the Muskat Arabs since Syud Sultan lost his life in an engagement with the Uttoobes, joined by the Joasmees.

25. It is difficult to trace the varying policy of the different tribes in the Gulf, influenced as they were, at a period so unsettled, by those changes which affected their interests. In 1805 we find the Uttoobees promoting a plan projected by Syud Beder, the Imaum of Muskat, to destroy the Joasmees, and to throw off the Wahabee yoke. Captain Seton expressed

A. D. 1804-05.

their interests. In 1805 we find the Uttoobees promoting a plan projected by Syud Beder, the Imaum of Muskat, to destroy the Joasmees, and to throw off the Wahabee yoke. Captain Seton expressed





an opinion on this occasion, "that this coalition would succeed, and ought to be encouraged, as the Wahabee, in gaining the ascendancy, would order the Muskatees to plunder every vessel they met, as the Uttoobees and Joasmees had been obliged to do."

26. Orders having been issued by the British Government for the attack of the Joasmee vessels in the Gulf, the Shaikhs of Zobara and Grane required information in respect to the nature of those instructions, as they were aware of the outrages committed on our trade by the Wahabees; and the Uttoobees being their subjects, they wished to know if the Government had included them in the orders in question. They explained that the Wahabee Shaikh was daily pressing them to proceed on a piratical cruise to India; that they had evaded a compliance with his wishes, and that he had received their excuses, as the Wahabees had not the power of compelling them to join in their plans, for want of a naval force, and for fear of inducing them to retire from Zobara to Bahrein; but as the Wahabee had set aside the Chief of the Joasmees, and established his own officers in the Seer principality, they were apprehensive that they should be obliged to join in their piratical schemes. These Shaikhs required a direct answer whether, in the event of their retiring from the main, and withdrawing themselves from the Wahabee allegiance, the British Government would lend them such support as would enable them to remain undisturbed at Bahrein,—the greatest assistance they would require would be a vessel or two for a short time.

27. Captain Seton urged in strong terms the advantages of such a connection, in securing the future tranquillity of the Gulf. Their situation on one side of the Joasmees, and that of Muskat on the other, held out every prospect of effectually checking this new and pernicious system, arising out of the avarice and fanaticism of a desperate tribe in the centre of Nujd, who, reducing their neighbours to poverty and misery, have made them the unwilling instruments of their robberies and piracies; that it would be supposing the British Government had lost sight of those generous principles that had heretofore actuated their policy, to imply a doubt that they would step forward to rescue from such abominable slavery those who by their trade had so long encouraged their Indian produce and manufactures; that it would be imagining the British Government to be blind to its own interests to conceive that it would allow these traders to be drawn into a state of actual robbery and piracy, preying on their own subjects and allies, without an effort to prevent it.

28. Captain Seton explained on this occasion that the Uttoobees, carrying on a brisk trade direct from Bahrein to India, without touching at Muskat, and thus evading the half duties paid by the other States in





the Gulf to Muskat, induced Syud Sultan to attack Bahrein in 1800; that compelled by that attack to seek the protection of the Wahabees, they had suffered so much from their tyranny, that of late the Uttoobees had endeavoured to conciliate the Muskat Government, had frequented the port, and paid duties, as other States. The Imaum had also on every occasion shown them a preference, and encouraged them; and that the only obstacle that opposed the conclusion of a solid agreement between the Uttoobee Arabs and those of Muskat was the want of a guarantee, who would secure the due performance of it on both sides.

29. The Bombay Government entertaining doubts as to how far the Persians would be equally disposed to come into such a plan as the Imaum of Muskat, abstained from all interference.

30. The Uttoobees manifested the same disposition, when the Wahabee Shaikh, having established his influence over the Joasmees and Muskat, was urging them to proceed against Grane and Bussora, which they declined.

31. The Wahabees in 1810 assumed the government of Bahrein and Zobara, and appointed Abdoolla bin Oofeysan Vukeel over those places, together with the district of Kateef, and the whole of the Khutter district.

32. The Uttoobees continued in administration of the island; they were, however, obliged to pay tribute to the Vukeel, who was placed at Bahrein to convert the Uttoobees to the Wahabee faith.

33. The successful progress of the Turkish troops under Ibrahim Pacha having obliged Abdoolla bin Saood to collect his adherents and his troops, the garrisons of Zobara and Bahrein were reduced. The Imaum seized this opportunity of attacking those places: the former was burnt, and, landing on the latter place, the Wahabee Vukeel, Oofeysan, was made prisoner, and the Uttoobees recovered possession of the island.

34. In 1811 a desperate action would appear to have been fought by the Uttoobees and Rahmah bin Jaubir, who was in connection with the Wahabees, in which the Uttoobees were victorious.

35. In 1813 we find the Uttoobees of Bahrein offering to co-operate with a fleet of from fifteen to twenty sail, and two thousand men, in an expedition which the Imaum contemplated against Ras-ool-Khyma, and proposed to join His Highness at the port of the Heza Arabs, a little to the eastward of Aboothabee, and between it and Ras-ool-Khyma.

36. Mr. Bruce having proceeded to Bahrein, for the purpose of ascertaining\* more correctly the engagements and views the Arabs of Bahrein and the Joasmees had towards the Imaum, who was on his way with a large





expedition to reduce those Arabs to his allegiance, arrived at that island on the 19th of July. He was received with marked kindness by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who was fully prepared to oppose any native force the Imaum might bring against him. Mr. Bruce looked upon it as fortunate his having visited the island, for he found the impression which the Imaum had made on the minds of the tribe against us to be so great, and had impressed them with such a thorough belief that we had determined to take up his cause, and support him to the utmost in our power, that, from the full conviction that we should seize all their vessels if they visited our ports, they were deliberating upon joining the Joasmee pirates as a mode of existence; which was thus fortunately prevented. "Shaikh Abdoolla, in explaining the cause of dispute between him and the Imaum, said that Syud Saeed had broken his treaty with them, and that in the most faithless way; that he never wished to be upon any terms but the most friendly with the State of Muskat, nor had he or any of his tribe ever done anything contrary to this view; that the Syud had seized fifteen sail of his vessels, richly laden, from India, and that at a time when they supposed him most friendly towards them, as they had only put into Muskat on the faith of the Syud's own letter to Shaikh Abdool Rahman, in charge of the fleet, when off the port; that not content with this, he had written to the Wahabee Chief privately, saying, if he would march down and attack Bahrein from the main, he would do so by sea with his vessels,—that this very letter had been sent to him by the Wahabee Chief, with offers of any kind of assistance he required, to support him against the Imaum, and that he had availed himself of these offers, which the Imaum's conduct had compelled him to do, particularly as Rahmah bin Jaubir was the person who had joined the Imaum, and who he intended to put in charge of the island if he should conquer it; but in this he trusted in God he would not succeed, as he was fully prepared to receive His Highness with any force he could bring; that he had 7,000 men at present under arms, and could procure from the Wahabee Chief as many more as he might require; that Shakboot, of the Beni-yas Tribe, as well as the different chiefs on the Persian shore, had refused to join the Syud, who, in consequence, had applied to the prince at Shiraz to furnish him with troops; but at this he was not alarmed. He then asked in a direct manner in which light was he to look towards us,—friends or enemies. On Mr. Bruce's saying, why should he doubt our being friends, he replied that the Syud had given out we had taken up his cause, and intended to join him with four or five ships, to assist in reducing the island; that he was not conscious of ever having done anything towards us, contrary to the strictest rules of friendship, or





would they ever do so ; that he was exceedingly happy Mr. Bruce had arrived, as he was on the eve of sending over to Bushire, to ascertain if there was any truth in the Imaum's reports ; that if we did intend to assist him, he confessed candidly he was not able to cope with us ; but as for any native power, he was not alarmed ; that his ports were ever open, and should continue so to us, and every aid at all times rendered to our vessels, whenever they should arrive ; and asked if we would allow his vessels to continue to visit India on the terms they had hitherto done. On Mr. Bruce replying certainly, he was overjoyed, and said he now did not care anything for the Imaum, as this was the most he had at heart. He said the Imaum had always given out that it was owing to his intercessions we allowed the Arab States to visit India. To convince him the more fully of our friendly disposition, Mr. Bruce said he would, although not authorised by Government, draw out a few articles of agreement, which we would exchange, and had no doubt but that they would be approved of, and be sanctioned by the British Government. He was highly satisfied with this. He then informed Mr. Bruce that the Wahabee Chief had directed a large force to march against Muskat by land, under command of one of his brothers, which would compel the Imaum to return ; that then he should fit out all his vessels and boats, and proceed to blockade Muskat ; and that he might rely on the strictest orders being given to his boats to respect the British flag in the highest degree, from a ship to the smallest boat. He hoped hereafter our vessels would frequent Bahrein more than we had hitherto done ; that there was a great field open to us, as they had hitherto received a great portion of their Indian goods through Muskat, which we could now furnish them direct by our own ships,—particularly the article of rice, several ship loads of which were annually required for the interior of Arabia, and which went all from Bahrein, and came *viâ* Muskat."

37. Mr. Bruce represented the Beni Attaba Arabs of Bahrein to be a very strong and powerful body of maritime Arabs, who carry on a very extensive traffic with India, and who have always been very peaceably inclined, preferring commerce to a predatory life, but which they were on the verge of falling into, from the late extraordinary proceedings of the Imaum of Muskat.

38. That from the account of Bahrein, the Government would be able to appreciate the necessity of keeping on terms of friendship with its inhabitants, when such an extensive mart for commerce and speculation was held out, and when the balance of trade was so much in our favour, we only supplying the produce of our soil and labour for specie and pearls.

39. The Imaum was at this time on his way to the attack of Bahrein ;





and in a letter to the British Government stated that he was urged to the measure by the Uttoo-bees having joined the pirates, and acknowledged themselves subject to the Wahabees. His Highness added, "that when that power reduced the island, the Uttoo-bees sought an asylum at Muskat, and surrendered their country to him. Under that assurance, he went forth with his fleet and army, and wrested the country from the possession of the Wahabees, and gave the Uttoo-bees a place of abode in it, on their engaging to remain subject to his authority; but they had broken the treaty with him, and joined the Wahabees a second time."

40. A few days after Mr. Bruce left Bahrein, His Highness arrived at the island. The troops landed at Arad,\* and commenced an attack, with some prospect of success, but ultimately experienced a signal defeat, with great loss, two of his relations and principal Sirdars being killed on the occasion.

41. The Imaum, after this defeat, proceeded to Congoon with the whole of his fleet, for the purpose of taking on board a reinforcement of troops which the Prince of Shiraz had engaged to furnish, on condition of the Imaum's engaging to defray their expense, and to pay an annual Peshkush should the troops embark and the expedition be abandoned, but if they landed and reduced Bahrein, the Imaum was to pay 10,000 Tomans annually to the Government of Shiraz.

42. The expedition was abandoned, the Imaum discovering that the Government of Persia had been actuated by motives of treachery, and contemplated his seizure, and that of the different Arab Chiefs, and carrying them off to Shiraz.

43. In the following year Mr. Bruce represented the Chief of Bahrein to be affording the fullest and most effective aid in his power, in grain and stores of all kinds, to the Joasmees, who hourly frequented the ports of the island, and that the piratical boats kept up a constant communication with Bahrein, to which place they conveyed all the property they captured, great portions of which finds its way across to Bushire and the other ports on the Persian side of the Gulf, by the Grane boats which trade to the island.

44. The subsequent unfriendly conduct of the Shaikh of Bahrein, when he defied our power, is entirely irreconcilable with the friendly spirit that distinguished it on his interview with Mr. Bruce. The encouragement and protection which the pirates met with at that port, in the reception and disposal of their plunder, are subjects of further representation by the Resident at Bushire.

45. Mr. Bruce remarked that the pirates not only experienced a

\* An island separated from Bahrein by a narrow channel for boats.





ready mart for their plundered property at Bahrein, but purchased, with the proceeds, supplies of dates and rice, and of all kinds of stores necessary for their vessels, which were brought to Bahrein in abundance by the ships belonging to Arab owners residing at Bombay.

46. That it was impossible under these circumstances to look on Bahrein in any other light than that of a piratical port; for although they may not individually commit piracies in their own vessels, the assistance they afford to those freebooters operates to the same end, and, in fact, considerable numbers of the crews of the pirate boats are actually composed of the inhabitants of that island, who proceed to Ras-ool-Khyma, and enter on board for a cruise. If successful, they return to their homes; if not, they continue there until their avarice is satisfied.

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CONTINUATION OF THE FOREGOING SKETCH, TO  
THE YEAR 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL.

Mr. Warden terminates his account of this tribe in A. D. 1817, by alluding to the opinion entertained by Mr. Bruce, that although not actively engaged in piracy themselves, they could be looked upon in no other light than as piratical, as they were the receivers and purchasers of a great portion of the property plundered by the Joasmees, and not only gave them free access to their ports, but supplied them with all kinds of provisions and warlike stores.

Notwithstanding the signal defeat experienced by the Imaum in his attack upon this island, the Uttoobees were kept for some time in a state of suspense, in consequence of His Highness proceeding with his fleet to Congoon, to wait for the reinforcements promised him by the Shiraz Government, for the purpose of making a second attempt. But their apprehensions were subsequently removed by the arrival of a messenger by name Sikundur Khan, who was sent over by that Court to Bahrein, to offer terms to the Shaikhs, which they agreed to, and, in return for the presents which they sent, were presented with honorary dresses by the Prince of Fars.

In the month of February 1819, a report having been received that several Indian women had been brought from Ras-ool-Khyma, and publicly sold in the bazar of Bahrein, Captain Lock, of His Majesty's Ship *Eden*, in company with five vessels of war, proceeded to that island, to procure their liberation. After some negotiation, the Bahrein Shaikh succeeded in convincing the





British authorities that the report was without foundation, and entered into an agreement with Captain Lock, by which he bound himself down to prevent the sale of captured British property in his territory,—to which engagement it appears, however, from subsequent accounts, he did not pay the slightest attention. At Captain Lock's request, he opened a communication with Hussein bin Rahmah, the Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, offering on the part of the British Government the release of a number of Joasmee prisoners, in exchange for several females who had been captured by the pirates. This proposal was finally agreed to, and seventeen Indian women were thus restored to liberty.

On the 17th January 1820, after the capture of Ras-ool-Khyma, and the destruction of the Joasmee fleet, by the expedition under Sir W. G. Keir, the Shaikh of

A. D. 1820.

Bahrein delivered up the vessels belonging to the piratical powers which were in his harbour, to Captain Lock, of His Majesty's ship *Eden*, for the purpose of being destroyed; and at the same time entered into an agreement not to admit any boats of the above description into his port until permitted by the British Government. The General Treaty between the British Government and the Arabian Chiefs, negotiated by General Keir, was first signed in Ras-ool-Khyma by the Vukeel of the Uttoobee Shaikhs, and subsequently by themselves in Bahrein.

Influenced, probably, by the general impression conveyed by the success of the British troops, and the increased degree of confidence acquired by the Imaum from his co-operation with them, the Al Kha-leefa (Shaikhs of Bahrein) deemed it prudent to take measures to avert the attack preparing by His Highness, in conjunction with the Prince of Shiraz, against their island. They accordingly sent an Agent to Muskat, who concluded an agreement, by which they bound themselves to pay His Highness 30,000 German crowns per annum; both parties, however, stipulating for the guarantee of the British Government, which does not appear to have been afforded. In return, His Highness engaged to release some of the Uttoobee Shaikhs detained by him, and restore all the vessels and property, belonging to Bahrein, which he had put under an embargo, on their way up from India. Of this tribute the sum of 12,000 crowns was subsequently remitted.

In April 1822, an Agent of the Bahrein Chief made a verbal request, on the part of his superiors, that the British

A. D. 1822.

Government would mediate an adjustment of the dispute between them and Rahmah bin Jaubir, on the principle of *status quo ante bellum*. This was acceded to, and instructions to the effect were issued to the Resident at Bushire, with a strict reservation, however, that the Government was not to be pledged in any way to enforce the fulfilment of the conditions. Shortly after Shaikh Abdoolla





bin Ahmed proceeded to Bassadore, but, from the unreasonable expectations of himself and Rahmah bin Jaubir, the Acting Political Agent failed in settling their dispute.

About the end of this year a Buteel belonging to a Bahrein merchant was taken in Bussora river by His Britannic Majesty's ship *Sophia*, on a charge of piracy committed on a Bushire boat. The Buteel and crew were carried to Bombay, but the charge of piracy not being considered as substantiated in the Recorder's Court, she was released, together with the crew, and an explanation of the circumstances afforded to the Chief of Bahrein, who however disavowed the proceedings of the vessel in question.

In February 1824, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed made up his quarrel with Rahmah bin Jaubir (through the mediation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf), upon several conditions, among which it was stipulated that the Bahrein Chief should be permitted to chastise the Aboosemate Tribe, which had fled from his territory, and taken refuge at Demaum, without any interference on the part of Shaikh Rahmah in their favour.

Shaikh Mahomed bin Shakboot, the brother of Shaikh Tahnoon, failing in his endeavours to obtain the assistance of the Mohariba Tribe in renewing his attack on Aboothabee, sought the protection of the Shaikh of Bahrein, and took up his residence in Huailah, which is within the territories of the Uttoobee Chief, but over which he has little control. In the beginning of 1824, a report was made by the Resident that he had received information of a piracy having been committed on a boat from Debaye (a town in strict alliance with Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot), by Mahomed bin Shakboot. This proceeding appeared to the Resident in the Persian Gulf to call for immediate notice and chastisement, and he accordingly required Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, as the ostensible superior of Huailah, to take steps for this purpose, and offered the use of the squadron in the Gulf to co-operate if he found himself unable to do so alone. The Government, in its reply to the report, expressed its opinion that it would have been better to make further inquiries into the affair before offering the use of the marine force against Huailah, and at the same time detailed the reasons which made the case in question come rather under the description of a feud for supremacy than a case of piracy. The whole account of the transaction, however, was subsequently reported to be entirely without foundation.

In 1825, Salmin bin Nassir, the elder brother of Shaikh Abdoolla, died, and was succeeded in his property and political influence by his eldest son, Shaikh Khaleefa, who in consequence shared the net revenue of the island in equal propor-





tions with his uncle. Notwithstanding this arrangement, the executive power and transaction of all public business still remained in the hands of Shaikh Abdoolla, although the concurrence of his nephew to every act of the Government was considered necessary. An attempt, made at this time by the Resident, to effect a reconciliation between the Aboosemate Tribe and their former chief (the Governor of Bahrein), was unsuccessful.

Information having been received in Bombay that His Highness the Imaum proposed supporting the claims of the sons of the late Shaikh to the supreme authority in Bahrein, and that he intended to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity to seize the island for himself, a strong letter of advice was addressed to His Highness by the Governor, in which, after pointing out the evils likely to arise from such a line of conduct, he was earnestly dissuaded from interfering in any way in the actual disputes of that island as long as other powers abstained from doing so.

In the latter end of this year a Bahrein boat, on her way to Muskat, was attacked by two Shargah vessels near Anjar, and not only plundered of a considerable quantity of dollars, but three of her crew put to death. Although Shaikh Abdoolla did not prefer any complaint himself on this occasion, it was thought necessary by the British authority that immediate and active notice should be taken of it; and preparations were accordingly made to enforce satisfaction, by blockading the port of Shargah. This vigorous measure had the desired effect, and an arrangement was made by the Joasmee Chief, which fully satisfied the Governor of Bahrein.

In August 1825 the Resident at Mocha reported to the Government, that some delay having taken place in that town in settling a claim of 400 dollars preferred against certain traders by the Nakhoda of a Bahrein Buggalow, that person had boarded by night a Mocha vessel lying in the harbour, and, after wounding one man, and binding the rest of the crew, had carried off twenty bags of coffee, belonging to the Company's broker. This case being referred to the British authority in the Persian Gulf, he reported that the Buggalow in question having put into Muskat on her way back, His Highness the Imaum had compelled the Nakhoda to give up the property taken, which had been restored to the proper owner.

About the commencement of 1826 Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed was nearly involved in a serious quarrel with Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee, in consequence of his having permitted some of the subjects of the Beniyas Chief to settle in Biddah, and from thence harass the trade of Aboothabee. On being

A. D. 1826.





applied to on the subject by the Resident, he disavowed their proceedings, and stated they had left his territories, but that he would seize them if they ever returned.

Nearly at the same time as the above occurrence, the ill-will so long subsisting between the Uttoobee Shaikh and Rahmah bin Jaubir came to an open rupture, in consequence of three men belonging to the latter being put to death by the inhabitants of Bahrein, on a suspicion of their having endeavoured to set fire to the town. In retaliation of this proceeding, Rahmah seized a Bahrein boat, put one of the crew to death, and threw two others overboard. The presence of the English cruisers (stationed off Demaum for the protection of the trade of Kateef from the aggressions of Shaikh Rahmah), however, prevented the two chiefs from carrying on regular hostilities against each other, and as they were not prepared for active warfare (Rahmah on account of the smallness of his force, and the Uttoobee Shaikh owing to his apprehensions for the safety of his trading vessels then absent in India), they were both well satisfied with the arrangement, and were proportionably alarmed on the removal of our vessels of war, agreeably to the orders of the Bombay Government. An attempt was made by both parties to have a truce for some time proclaimed, but the British authority declined interfering in any measures that did not tend to the re-establishment of general tranquillity. Hostilities were accordingly carried on until the end of 1826, when Shaikh Rahmah's Buggalow was attacked by a Bahrein vessel of equal size. After a desperate action of some hours, finding that he had no chance of success or escape, Bin Jaubir set fire to his magazine, and blew up himself, vessel, and crew.

In the month of May 1827, a daring act of piracy was committed on a Bushire Buteel off Gunowa, while on her way to Bunder Dillum with passengers and treasure, by an individual of the Monasir Tribe, named Obed or Abdoolla bin Mohunnah, who had lately taken up his residence in Biddah, under the protection of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein. Several of the people on board the Buteel were put to death, and the remainder, after being completely stripped, were landed on the Persian Coast near Bordakhan. Every exertion was made to trace and seize the perpetrators of this outrage, as well as to recover the plundered property, but with little success. The principal actors in it were ascertained to be the individual above mentioned, and Hussein bin Jassim, a native of Bahrein; and subsequently a small portion of the stolen goods was found in that island, and restored to the owners. To our demands for the seizure and surrender of the above two individuals, Shaikh Abdoolla replied that it was not in his power to do so, as they had fled from his territories,—which was really the case.





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The British authority, however, did not cease his exertions and inquiries, and availed himself of the opportunity afforded, in a personal interview with the Bahrein

A. D. 1828.

Chief in April 1828, to point out the necessity of his doing everything in his power to bring the notorious characters before alluded to to condign punishment.

The Boo Ayen Tribe, residing in Biddah, having in May 1828 displayed symptoms of a refractory spirit on the occasion of their Chief, Mahomed bin Khamees, being placed in confinement by the Uttoobee Shaikh, for stabbing an inhabitant of Bahrein, the latter caused their fort to be destroyed, and all the inhabitants to be removed to Rowees and Fowarah, where they were more immediately under his control.

Some time before this arrangement took place, the notorious characters Soodean bin Zaal and Syf bin Thykhan, already mentioned as having fled from Shaikh Tahnoon's authority, and taken refuge with the Uttoobee Chief, left Biddah, and returned to their old residence in Aboothabee.

In the month of September 1828, Obed bin Mohunnah, the chief of the pirates who committed the outrage on the Bushire Buteel in 1827, again put to sea in a large boat, with a number of followers. After taking out the cargo of two or three small vessels near Bahrein, he proceeded over to the Persian Coast near Zeerah, where he landed, for the purpose of making inquiries regarding the destination of a small Buggalow, then at anchor: but the suspicions of the natives being excited by a report of his boat being filled with armed men, he was taken prisoner, after a desperate resistance. The crew of his vessel, chiefly composed of the Monasir Tribe, finding their chief detained, made the best of their way over to the neighbourhood of Aboothabee, on the Arabian Coast, plundering on their way four Aseeloo boats of all their pearls and cargoes near Seer Beniyas, for which aggression, however, full compensation was subsequently afforded by Shaikh Tahnoon.

Obed bin Mohunnah was detained some days in Zeerah, and afterwards sent to Bushire at the request of the political authority, where a strict examination having been set on foot, he was satisfactorily identified as the person who planned and executed the attack upon Bin Musharee's Buteel in 1827. A short time afterwards, on an application being made by Shaikh Abdool Russool for the prisoner to be given up to him, to answer for the murder and plunder of his subjects, he was delivered over to that personage by the Acting Resident, and would probably have met with the punishment his crime so well merited, had he not been enabled to effect his escape in the confusion attending the storm and plunder of Bushire by Prince Timor Mirza in November 1828.





The reports of the Imaum's preparations for the attack of Bahrein having now become very prevalent, the chief of that place applied all his energies to meet the impending storm, and spared no exertions to place himself in the best posture of defence his resources would admit. The small and middling sized vessels were ranged round Muharag, the large Buggalows collected together in the Khore of Fasht, the forts repaired, and large reinforcements of Arabs, both horse and foot, brought in from all quarters. The chief source of the Uttoobee Shaikh's alarm was the circumstance of Shaikh Tahnoon joining the Imaum against him; and he endeavoured, both by large presents and earnest entreaties, to induce that chief to remain neutral,—apparently without effect, although subsequent events afford every reason to believe that it was treachery on the part of the Beniyas Chief that caused the failure of His Highness' enterprise. After being considerably scattered by a violent gale on the 27th October, His Highness' fleet entered Bahrein harbour on the 31st, and cast anchor off Sutra, outside the Khore of Killa. Khaleefa bin Suliman, the nephew of the Bahrein Shaikh, immediately proceeded with a body of troops, and took post opposite to His Highness' vessels, and subsequently a second party, under the command of the governor's son, was sent to support him. After remaining there three days without any active operations, he received orders to take up a position near Horah, to the east of Munama. During the first four days after their arrival, the Imaum's people were employed in opening the passage of the Khore of Killa, which had been blocked up by means of sunken boats filled with stones. This being effected, two small vessels and eleven Buggalows entered, but before anything more decisive was attempted, an effort was made by the Chief of Makulla, Shuheer, to induce Abdoolah bin Ahmed to agree to such arrangements as would spare the effusion of blood. Whether this was with the knowledge of His Highness is unknown,—at all events the only answer returned was one of defiance. On the night of the 5th November, a part of the Imaum's troops landed near the fort of Sutteah, and took possession of that place, and the next day an abortive attempt was made by some of His Highness' vessels to cannonade the town of Munama and fort of Killa. Affairs remained in *statu quo* until the 9th, when the Imaum was astonished to learn that the Beniyas, under Shaikh Tahnoon, were landing without any orders. Alarmed at the probable consequences of this imprudent, if not treacherous proceeding, His Highness collected all the troops available in such an emergency, and, accompanied by his Nubian slaves, hastened to the shore, but arrived only in time to witness the total defeat of his partisans by the Uttoobee forces, under the command of Shaikh Abdoolah bin Ahmed, who had marched out of Munama,





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and taken up a position opposite to the Imaum's troops, on finding that town threatened. The alleged immediate cause of the defeat appears to have been a sudden charge made on the flank and rear of the Muskat army by the Bahrein horse, which, at the commencement of the action, had been concealed in some contiguous date groves. The Beniyas were the first to give the example of flight, and they are said to have turned their arms against their own allies, and not only plundered them, but occasioned a considerable loss of lives, by preventing the fugitives from saving themselves in their boats. His Highness was carried off the field by his Nubians, but was obliged to swim a considerable distance before he was taken up, and while in the water received a spear wound in the sole of his foot. At the sight of this unexpected repulse, an universal panic seems to have seized the whole fleet, which immediately weighed and sailed out of the harbour, leaving behind a brig and a Buggalow, which in the confusion were run ashore, and fell into the enemy's hands. The Buggalow was subsequently got off by the Uttoobees, but the brig, having been stripped of everything on board by that tribe, was set on fire during the night by some of the Imaum's people. His Highness in this disastrous affair is said to have lost upwards of five hundred men, and appears to have quite sunk under the failure; for after making several ineffectual attempts to conclude a peace with the Bahrein Shaikhs, he sailed on the 21st November with all his fleet for Muskat, to the great joy of the Uttoobees, and the infinite discredit of himself. His Highness appears to have displayed throughout the whole affair an absence of decision, energy, judgment, and skill. The check which he had sustained, though not a trifling one, was certainly not of sufficient consequence to induce him to abandon so suddenly this long cherished project, in which his interest and fame were so deeply committed, and the only conclusion that can, therefore, be come to on the subject, is that he must have had some hidden reasons for taking such a precipitate step, arising either from the want of union in the various tribes composing his force, or the treachery of some of the chiefs immediately about him.

The Bahrein Shaikhs were no sooner satisfied that His Highness had dropped all further ideas of invading their island, than they determined to become the assailants in their turn, and accordingly made preparations for the equipment of a fleet of seven large vessels, which subsequently sailed on the 21st March 1829, under the personal command of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, in the direction of Muskat, for the purpose of cruising against the Imaum's territories. Two frigates were sent out by His Highness to meet the Bahrein fleet, and on their way up, falling in with the





Uttoobee Buggalow called the *Syar*, they made an unsuccessful attempt to capture her, and finally returned to Muskat without doing anything. If, however, they gained no great credit by their conduct on this occasion, the Bahrein vessels did not distinguish themselves by their superior bravery. On their way down the Gulf, they met a large Buggalow, belonging to their inveterate enemy the Shaikh of Aseeloo, but after several hours hard fighting were all beaten off, and the Buggalow reached her own port in safety. After cruising some time in the neighbourhood of Muskat, the Bahrein fleet attacked and captured a Buggalow belonging to Morbat, a place between Muskat and Mocha, in no way connected with the Imaum. With this prize they set out on their return to Bahrein, but when off Cape Moobaruk they were intercepted by two of Syud Saeed's ships of war. The Uttoobees immediately ran into shoal water, and placing the Morbat vessel in such a position as to shelter them from the cannon of the Imaum's frigates, they first transferred to their own Buggalow everything on board, and then, having scuttled and sunk her, they took advantage of the darkness of the night to alter their course, and, having by this means evaded the Muskat men-of-war, reached Bahrein shortly after.

During this period, the British authority had been using every exertion to induce the belligerents to settle their quarrel; but the Bahrein Chief declared he would make no peace that did not receive the guarantee of the British Government. As this of course was out of the question, and finding Shaikh Abdoolla deaf to all advice, the Resident declined interfering any further.

While, however, the correspondence for the termination of hostilities between Muskat and Bahrein was carrying on, the political authority in the Gulf was engaged in another discussion with Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, which gradually assumed a serious aspect. It will be recollected that when the Bahrein fleet was cruising off Muskat, it captured, plundered, and destroyed a vessel belonging to Morbat. As this was considered an act of piracy in every point of view, the captor was peremptorily called upon to return all his ill-gotten booty,—a demand which he evaded, on various pretexts, for a considerable period, until the Resident sent over two vessels of war, and stated explicitly, that if immediate attention was not paid to his demand for the cargo of the captured vessel, strong and unpleasant measures would be forthwith carried into operation. This menace produced considerable effect: property to the amount of Rs. 8,000 (being all that was not converted into cash and distributed) was given up, and a considerable quantity of goods belonging to people residing in Bahrein restored to the owners. On this occasion a reference was made by the British authority to the Government, as to whether further proceedings should be adopted to com-





pel the Bahrein Shaikh to pay in cash for such part of the plundered cargo as was not forthcoming; and at the same time it was stated, that to effect this object it would be necessary to blockade the port with four ships of war, and perhaps to destroy the shipping by means of shells and Congreve rockets, for which latter purpose a small vessel would be required. The Government, however, satisfied with the redress already obtained, determined to take no further steps in the affair.

On the 2nd December 1829, peace was concluded between the Chief of Bahrein and the Imaum of Muskat, through the mediation of Shaikh Mahomed bin Nassir, upon the terms that the tribute formerly paid by the Uttoobees to His Highness was to cease from henceforward; that no interference whatever should take place in each other's concerns, but that in the event of either Muskat or Bahrein being threatened by an enemy, mutual assistance was to be afforded. This last condition was not reduced to writing, being merely verbal. Shaikh Tahnoon was admitted as a party to the treaty, but the Aboosemate Tribe (principally residing in Aseeloo) was specially excluded by the Uttoobee Shaikh.

Everything appears to have gone on quietly in the island of Bahrein until the end of 1830, when Shaikh Abdoolla bin

A. D. 1830.

Ahmed was called upon by the Wahabee Chief to pay the annual Zukat or tithe, besides 40,000 German crowns, the alleged value of a number of horses left under his charge by the Wahabees many years previous. A demand was at the same time made for the surrender of the fort of Demaum to Busheer, the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir.

Aware how gladly His Highness the Imaum would join Shaikh Toorkey with his fleet, in any attack upon

A. D. 1831.

Bahrein, the Uttoobee Chief endeavoured to interest the British authority in the Persian Gulf in his favour; but finding that the Government were determined not to interfere in his internal affairs, he despatched a near relation to Riaz, to wait upon the Wahabee Shaikh, and make the most favourable terms in his power. After some discussion, it was arranged that the supremacy of Shaikh Toorkey bin Saood should be acknowledged, and the Zukat paid by the Uttoobees, in return for which he promised them his protection,—thus, *if bonâ fide* in his professions, putting an effectual termination to the designs of the Imaum upon their territory.

The Uttoobee Chiefs, however, at the present time still continue to entertain suspicions as to the ultimate views entertained by Shaikh Toorkey bin Abdoolla oos Saood regarding them. The recent establishment of Busheer, the son of their late enemy Rahmah bin Jaubir, upon Demaum, under the sanction and authority of the Wahabee Shaikh, has





given them great offence, which has not been diminished by the circumstance of Busheer having been joined by the larger portion of the Aboosemate Tribe, between which and the Uttoobees a most inveterate feud still subsists.

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FURTHER CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING, TO  
THE YEAR 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL.

We learn from the termination of Captain Hennell's Sketches, that the establishment of Busheer, the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir, at Demaum, through the influence of the Wahabee Chief and the Imaum of Muskat, had given great offence to the Uttoobees, which was aggravated by the accession to the number of that chief's dependents of the larger portion of the Aboosemate Tribe, with whom they (the Uttoobees) were at feud. The views of the patrons of Busheer appear to have been,—of the former, that his proximity to Bahrein would act as a check to the Uttoobees, and lead to the more punctual fulfilment of their engagement to pay annual tribute; of the latter, that he should have a useful and devoted adherent in the event of his again undertaking the attack of Bahrein.

The attempt (in January 1832) however failed, and Busheer having quarrelled with the inhabitants of Kateef, destroyed the fort he had just built, and left with his dependents for Muskat,—an event which was looked upon with the greatest satisfaction by the authorities in the Gulf, as removing one cause of continued disputes and misunderstandings in these quarters.

The piracy of a trifling nature, as having been unattended with any aggravated circumstances, committed in November 1831, in Hallilah Bay, by a person named Hussoom of Fowarah (a dependency of Bahrein), on a fishing-boat belonging to Congoon, was now traced. The boat was recovered, and subsequently restored to its owners, and the pirate denied refuge on the Arabian Coast. It appeared that, on leaving Hallilah Bay, Hussoom proceeded to Ajeer, where he attempted to surprise a Bahrein boat, but the crew being upon their guard, he was taken prisoner, together with eight of his people. After a detention of several days in Ajeer, the prisoners contrived to effect their escape, and proceeded to Huailah, where the captured boat was recovered from the pirate, and he with his people refused admittance into that or any other port of the Bahrein dominions.





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Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who with his sons Moobaruk and Nasir had remained for a length of time at his possessions on the Guttur Coast, to watch the proceedings of the Wahabees, now made up his mind to refuse allegiance to them, and to retaliate all attempts at aggression. His first step was to endeavour to induce the Imaum of Muskat, which he did successfully, to pledge himself not to interfere in the event of hostilities breaking out between Bahrein and Shaikh Toorkey, and the next to confederate the neighbouring Arab Tribes who were inclined to fall into his views and designs of opposition to the extension of Wahabee authority, and induce them, by money and promises, to make incursions into all parts of their territories.

He secretly instigated the Amayir Tribe, who, quarrelling with Shaikh Toorkey, left the neighbourhood of Kateef, and taking up their position in Demaum, established a very close blockade of the former port, plundering all vessels that attempted to enter, and putting to death all inhabitants of Kateef found on board any boats whatever.

At this time a gross insult was offered to the British Government in the person of its Native Agent, by the sons of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed. The cause of dispute would appear to have been a sum of money due by the Agent, on account of some mercantile transactions, to the Shaikh himself, which his sons were desirous of possessing, in opposition to their father's wishes. They demanded, and by abuse and ill-treatment enforced, payment of certain large sums of money; nor would the old Shaikh either settle the matter with them, or protect the Agent against their extortion. The offence was aggravated by a repetition of the ill-treatment while the Agent was actually employed in his official duties, having left his concealment for the purpose of going on board a British vessel then in the harbour. This, and the failure of early remonstrances in obtaining redress, rendered it imperative that some public and undeniable reparation should be insisted upon. The appearance of a respectable force, and the threat of resorting to coercive measures, at length induced the Shaikh to comply with the demand upon him, that his son, or, in the event of his failing to do so, he himself, should come on board the senior officer's vessel, with a Khelut or dress of honour for the Agent, and that the persons who had been instrumental in the ill-treatment should be flogged, either on board the ship, or alongside in one of his own boats, in presence of the crew.

On the demise of Toorkey bin Saood, and the absence of his son and successor, Fysul, from Kateef, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed succeeded, by bribery, in obtaining possession of the fort of Tirhoot, a dependency





of Kateef, producing annually from its date groves, and the usual taxes, an income of 30,000 dollars.

The vicious and oppressive conduct of the sons of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, added to the death on the 31st May 1834 of Shaikh Khaleefa bin Suliman (nephew and colleague of Abdoolla bin Ahmed), whose authority upon the island of Bahrein had been little inferior to that of his uncle, which relieved his turbulent and refractory brothers and sons of all control, promised eventually to prove a fertile source of anarchy and confusion.

A party of the Amayir Tribe (before mentioned as having joined the Shaikh of Bahrein) under the command of one Mooshrif, now made an attempt to recover their possessions at Lahsa and Kateef, but met by Omer bin Oofeysan, the Wahabee governor of the former town, were defeated with great loss, and compelled to retreat under the guns of Tirhoot, now held by the Bahrein Chief.

Upon the ejection of Abdoolla bin Moosharee, and the failure of the

A. D. 1835. attempt thereon made by the Wahabees to recover

Tirhoot, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed resumed the strict blockade of Kateef and Ajeer, and commenced plundering the boats belonging to those places.

While the war was being thus carried on with varied success, neither party gaining any material advantage, the attention of Abdoolla bin Ahmed was called to the internal dissensions in his own family, and among his relatives, which, owing to his own misrule, partiality, and leniency, began to wear a most serious aspect. The Chiefs of Huailah, until lately dependent upon his authority, now not only opposed him, but entered into communications of a tendency inimical to his interests with the Imaum and the Wahabee Chief. They were, moreover, joined by one of the sons of the old Shaikh, who, obtaining the aid of several hundred Wahabees, set the power of the father at defiance, and captured several boats belonging to Bahrein, within a short distance of that island. Another son, Ahmed, made his escape from the Coast of Guttur, and proceeded to Muskat, for the avowed purpose of soliciting His Highness the Imaum to espouse his cause, and to supply his party with ammunition and warlike stores. Some seizures having been made at sea by Ahmed, the circumstances were brought to the notice of the British authorities, who called upon him to make restitution,—a demand with which he did not hesitate compliance. His Highness the Imaum not only declined taking any part in the dispute so unhappily existing between the Shaikh of Bahrein and the members of his family, but sent his son Syud Hillal in one of his frigates to mediate between the contending parties. Syud Hillal's efforts, however, to effect a reconciliation, were nullified by the proceedings of the nephews and partisans





of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who, immediately subsequent to the re-establishment of peace, instigated a portion of the Al Gowarah Tribe to proceed against Huailah, where they sank a boat, and killed a dependent of Esai bin Tarif, one of the heads of the opposite party, who, on complaining of this infraction of the agreement so lately entered into,\* to the Bahrein Chief, could obtain no satisfaction. He, therefore, accompanied by Bin Sulemah and their followers, seceded from Bahrein, and took refuge at Aboothabee, whence he desired permission of the British authorities to carry on hostilities against the trade and territories of his late master,—a request which was of course denied him, on the grounds that he had established himself in a friendly, or at least neutral port, whose chief must either be responsible for his acts, or make common cause with him against Abdoolla bin Ahmed.

About the middle of the year 1836 Abdoolla bin Ahmed, alarmed at the revival of the claims of Persia, in consequence

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of the receipt of a communication from the energetic Mootamid of Shiraz, calling upon him as a Persian subject to tender his submission to the reigning Shah, and the possible contingency of the Imaum's co-operation being afforded in any attack upon the island, resolved to make up his quarrels as far as possible with the Arabs on the mainland, and, by a timely submission to the Wahabee Chief, to engage his support and assistance in case of invasion. Terms were accordingly entered into, Abdoolla bin Ahmed paying the small annual tribute of 2,000 dollars, and the Wahabee Chief on his side engaging to supply a contingent of troops to repel any invaders of Bahrein, and not to call for the vessels of that island in the event of his purposing to attack Muskat. The communication with Kateef and Ajeer was now therefore re-opened.

In consequence of the grinding oppression exercised by the sons and nephews of the Uttoobee Chief, many of the wealthiest inhabitants, finding that there was no security to life or property, left the island, to settle in other parts of the Gulf. The old Shaikh himself, too, unable to tolerate their refractory conduct, had determined upon proceeding with his family and immediate followers to Khor Hassan, but was induced to give up this intention by their expressions of contrition for past offences, and professions of obedience and amendment for the future. His conduct towards them was most unaccountable,—that, having the power and authority to repress them, he should tacitly acknowledge himself a cypher in the government, by studiously shutting

\* The principal articles of this agreement were that each should retain the advantages he might have acquired during the war; that Huailah should be evacuated and demolished; and that the inhabitants should return to Bahrein, under the guarantee of the Imaum for their safety.





his eyes to their tyrannous and extortionate proceedings, which, if unchecked, promised, at no very distant period, to effect the ruin and depopulation of the rich and fertile island.

The Shaikh was nevertheless fully aware of the probable results of these divisions in his family; and apprehending the necessity which might occur for bringing over troops from the mainland, for the purpose of re-establishing his authority, and the scene of bloodshed and plunder that must necessarily ensue, took the precaution, customary and sufficient in the eyes of the Arabs to absolve him from further blame or responsibility, to warn a Bushire merchant, in the presence of the British Agent, for the information of the rest, and also of the Shaikhs of that town, that he must no longer look to him for redress or protection.

The Shaikh then prepared for his removal to Khor Hassan, by despatching to that place two of his wives, with their families, together with the furniture of the houses, even to the very doors,—a proceeding which much alarmed his sons and relatives, as leaving them in doubt as to what ulterior measures he might have in contemplation; and tended for a time to check their insubordinate and unruly conduct.

The Amayir and Huwajir Tribes, (the Huwajir inhabiting Demaum, under the authority of the Uttoobee Chief,) taking advantage of the disturbed state of Nujd, in consequence of the struggle for power between Ameer Fysul and the pretender Khalid, commenced the systematic plunder of all boats belonging to Kateef, including also, occasionally, those from Bahrein. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed therefore solicited and obtained the sanction and authority of the Resident to chastise them, which he did by forcibly seizing two of their boats, in effecting which five of their number were killed.

Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, although anxiously desirous for the return to his authority of the rulers of the Al Ali and Boo Ejman, who had with their tribes seceded to Aboothabee, yet, with marked obstinacy and inconsistency, would make no concession, or yield no point which could lead to an amicable settlement; and further, complained (in October 1838) of permission being granted equally to them as to him, in the event of his desiring to resort to hostilities, forgetting that through the Resident's remonstrances and exertions alone had the Al Ali for three years past been restrained from revenging the injuries they had sustained at his hands, and imagining, apparently, that while free himself to adopt forcible measures against the Al Ali, they, on the other hand, were to be withheld from offering any opposition in self-defence.

All persuasions and attempts at mediation having failed, both parties were informed that no further interference would be made, and that on





the termination of the month Ramzan, when the pearl fishery would be concluded, they would be considered as at war, and at liberty to pursue their own plans for the attainment of what they considered their just rights, being at the same time warned of the restrictive line, whose limits were to be carefully observed.

Before the expiration of this limited period, Shaikh Abdoolla despatched his confidential minister to Bushire, to intimate his desire "to come to an amicable arrangement, if such could be effected with honour"; avoiding, however, to yield concessions that might lead to some understanding, and still tenaciously adhering to the condition he had before considered as a *sine qua non* of their return to Bahrein, to which he was aware they had as positively made up their minds not to consent, and modifying it only in their favour with the promise that their security and lawful claims should be guaranteed by the British Government,—a guarantee which could not of course, as he was aware, be afforded. The Coast of Guttur was then offered as their place of residence; and with the chance of such being accepted, as well as to avert the distress and misery incidental to war, the Resident placed a British vessel of war at the disposal of the Bahrein Chief, for the purpose of conveying himself or his accredited Agent to negotiate with the refugees at Aboothabee. The services of this vessel were declined on its arrival at Bahrein, it being supposed that any terms proposed would not, if accepted, be adhered to, unless guaranteed by the British Government. War therefore became inevitable.

Some objections were at the time made by the old Shaikh to the "war limit"; but the superior advantages of its restrictions to his own subjects over those of his opponents being pointed out, these were overruled and abandoned.

The conduct of the Shaikh throughout (for it was evident he was unwilling to go to war) would appear to sanction the supposition of his entertaining the belief that the British authorities were prepared to go any lengths rather than that hostilities should break out between himself and Aboothabee, and therefore to compel the return of his fugitive subjects to their allegiance in accordance with his wishes.

Upon the fall of the Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul, his General, Omer bin Oofcysan, sought and received asylum at Bahrein. His surrender was demanded of the Uttoobee Chief by the usurper Khalid, as also that the fort of Demaun should be given up to him. These demands much alarmed Shaikh Abdoolla, who evaded compliance with them, as well as those previously made for tribute, and the surrender of Tirhoot, under the pretence of connection with, and submission to the Persian Government. The





fears entertained by the Uttoobee Chief, that whatever concessions or submissions he was prepared to make would only lead to further exactions, and eventually to the entire loss of his authority, were now confirmed by the avowal of Korshid Pacha, the Egyptian commander, by letter to the British authority, of his intention to attack and reduce the island to subjection. The grounds upon which he stated himself to have come to this determination, it is needless to mention, were perfectly invalid: might, and the desire of aggrandisement, constituted his only rights; even the flimsy pretext of supporting the pretender (Khalid) against the legitimate ruler (Fysul) being abandoned, and Central Arabia openly claimed as a possession of Mahomed Ali Pacha by right of conquest.

Upon the strength of the overtures made by the Uttoobee Chief to the Persian Government, a certain Hajee Kasim, formerly supercargo of a trading vessel, was selected as envoy from the Prince of Shiraz to Bahrein, bearing a Rukum and dress of honour for its chief, and attended by an escort of ten Sirbaz. He was under directions to remain at Bahrein as Persian Agent, and to be the medium of receiving and transmitting the annual tribute, which the Persian authorities vainly flattered themselves the Bahrein Chief was disposed to pay for their countenance and protection.

Hostilities were in the mean time carried on between Bahrein and the Al Ali at Aboothabee, which entailed much distress upon the inhabitants of the former. The merchants, being naturally anxious for the restoration of peace, solicited the interference and mediation of the Resident, who accordingly despatched his Assistant, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation. Nothing resulted from this mission, as no terms would be entered into that had not the guarantee of the British Government. It was, however, ascertained that the Beniyas Chief had no intention of making common cause with Esai bin Tarif,—indeed that these two were no longer on friendly terms, the former requiring the latter either to leave his country, or settle there permanently as a peaceable subject. Civilities, too, in the shape of presents, had been interchanged between the Bahrein and Beniyas Chiefs, who shortly after entered into a treaty of peace, which of course deprived Esai bin Tarif of the alliance of the latter, and put an end to his carrying on aggressions against the former from the now friendly port of Aboothabee, which he consequently determined upon leaving on the conclusion of the pearl fishery, consenting of course to suspend hostilities up to that period.

Although no positive pledge of support and assistance in the maintenance of the integrity of his possessions could at this time be afforded by the British Government, yet Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed





having promised that he would communicate with the Resident, previous to placing himself under the protection of any other foreign power, it was not without much dissatisfaction that an intimation was received, through the Egyptian authorities, of his having become tributary to them; more particularly as he had received every encouragement from the British authorities to assert his rights, and was well aware of the light in which Korshid Pacha's proceedings were viewed by them. The fact was, that this chief felt hurt and annoyed that a more decided line had not been adopted, and also that authoritative influence was not employed to subdue the Al Ali, and compel their return to his territories, instead of their being, on the contrary, permitted to carry on hostilities against him; forgetting, apparently, that he had himself forced the British Government to withdraw from all interference, inasmuch as he had solicited to be allowed to attack them, whereas they had been repeatedly restrained from becoming the aggressors.

The Shaikh excused himself for having entered into any agreement with Korshid Pacha on the grounds that, having given up all hopes of support and assistance from the British, and conceiving himself left to his own unaided resources, and threatened with a war with Aboothabee,—his trade harassed by the aggressions of Esai bin Tarif,—his Bedouin subjects on the main going over in great numbers, and submitting to Korshid Pacha, who was then threatening an invasion,—the difficulty of defending Bahrein from an attack if made from the opposite coast, there being many places which admitted of a fleet of a hundred boats making its way across in a few hours, without the possibility of being approached by either ship or Buggalow, on account of the shallow water and numerous shoals,—he considered his own interests were best consulted by his agreeing to pay the Pacha so trifling a sum as 2,000 dollars a year, to secure the integrity of his own territories, and the undisturbed possession of his own authority over them, as it had been expressly stipulated by him that no Agent of the Pacha should reside in Bahrein.

He admitted that both himself and every other Arab detested the being at all connected with, or coming under the rule of the Egyptians; and declared, that if the British Government would give a distinct and written pledge to protect him and his from all attacks and aggressions, he would drop all further connection with him, and avow himself a dependent of Great Britain; but declined giving the substance of the above in writing, on the plea that, for the present at least, he had got rid of a pressing evil by a comparatively trifling sacrifice, and could not seriously commit himself until he had received the fullest and most satisfactory assurance from the British Government of its protection.





The quarrels and dissensions among the members of the Uttoobee Chief's family were by no means smothered by the sense of the impending danger. Finding that the heads of the tribe would not take part with him in an attack upon his sons and nephews, from the dread of encountering the effects of their deep and uncontrolled resentment, when, as before, they should have adjusted their misunderstanding by apparent submission, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed had recourse to the plan of entertaining a number of men belonging to the independent Bedouin Tribes on the main, for the purpose of overawing his disobedient kinsmen.

So great was the disgust created in the minds of the inhabitants of Bahrein by his weak and vacillating conduct, and the heavy exactions which, encouraged by the promised support of Korshid Pacha, he was beginning to levy, that the Boo Gowarah, a tribe numbering about 2,000 men, residing principally at Fowarah, applied for permission to quit, with a view to placing themselves under the protection of the British Government; and the most influential inhabitants only wanted a leader, to unite together and remove him from the chief authority.

No sooner had Esai bin Tarif and the greater portion of his dependents settled on the island of Kenn, on their peaceful removal from Aboothabee, than their desire to retaliate for the losses they had sustained at the hands of the Chief of Bahrein returned, and Shaikh Esai more than once expressed his wish to be permitted to cruise against the trade of that island, and also to seize from the Shaikh of Debaye a Buteel formerly belonging to himself, but confiscated, subsequent to his secession, by Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and presented by that chief to the Debaye Chief (Muktoom bin Butye). Although by the evacuation of Nujd by Korshid Pacha and the Egyptian army one great obstacle to the renewal of hostilities against Bahrein had been removed, yet the restrictive war limit having been once established, its infringement could on no account be permitted; more especially as it had been fully explained to Shaikh Esai, when in Muskat, that so long as he remained on Kenn, whose peculiar position without the boundary was pointed out to him, he must give up all idea of carrying on aggressive war against any part of the Arabian Coast. A similar reply was again given in May 1841, on the Resident's visiting the island of Kenn.

The project of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, of establishing himself at Kateef and Lahsa, the prosecution of which was favoured by the disaffection produced by the highly oppressive conduct of the Agent of Korshid Pacha, proved to be decidedly in opposition to the views of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the superior chief; and great risk was incurred of the two coming to open collision, and thus hastening a result





which the real enmity and jealousy existing between them, as well as the overbearing conduct of relations on either side, had long threatened to produce. Although a reconciliation was effected between the parties, and the impending rupture between them for a time averted, it was evidently nothing but a hollow profession on the part of both, but particularly the young Chief Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who subsequently addressed a letter offering his services to the British Government, and soliciting assistance against his grand uncle. He soon after proceeded to the Guttur Coast, and engaging the good will of the inhabitants, set up a species of opposition most annoying to his superior.

A piracy committed early in the previous year, upon a Koweit boat, off Boo Syf, baffled every endeavour on the part of the British authorities and agents in

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the Gulf to discover the perpetrators, until August 1841, when a clue was found, which tended to the inculpation of an individual named Syud bin Azeez, a follower of Shaikh Moobaruk (the son of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed), residing at Demaum. It was advisable, nevertheless, that it should be impressed upon the minds of the Maritime Arabs, that no lapse of time would be permitted to afford impunity to crime, which in this case having been traced and brought home to the culprit above mentioned, a demand was made upon the Uttoobee Chief for the payment of 274 Mahomed Shah rupees as the value of the plundered property, or the surrender of Syud bin Azeez and his boat. The former alternative was complied with, and the money paid.

Another case of aggression was likewise committed on the banks about the commencement of the pearl fishery, by some of the inhabitants of Bahrein. One Ali bin Yoosoof, an inhabitant of Lingah, having taken on board his boat at Kateef 250 bags of dates and 80 mats, was on his way to Bahrein, when she grounded on a Subeenah situated to the westward of Ras Reccan. While the crew were engaged in floating their boat, five Buggarahis, commanded by a person named Jallijeh, came off from the shore, and plundered them of 180 bags of dates, and the 80 mats, worth altogether 240 Mahomed Shah rupees. The complainant proceeded to Muharag, to lay his case before Nassir bin Abdoolla, the Bahrein Chief's son, who, in reply, promised to recover his property; but finding himself put off from day to day, without any prospect of receiving reparation, and ascertaining that his dates had been carried off to the banks, he returned to Lingah, and represented what had occurred to his Chief, Syud bin Guzeeb, who recommended him to the Resident for redress.

This being a case very closely allied to piracy, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed was held responsible that satisfaction should be afforded. As





the delinquents stated that they had only taken such portion of the cargo of the Lingah boat as had been regularly agreed upon as salvage, it was arranged that the value of the property claimed should be lodged in the hands of the British Agent, until the claim for salvage should be substantiated by oath of Zun Tulaak, in the presence of the Native Agent, which having been done according to form before the Kazeer, the money was returned.

The authority of the old Shaikh being now openly defied by his sons, who had each from one to three hundred followers, ready to commit any act of violence or aggression at the bidding of their leaders, the island became rapidly the scene of increased anarchy and confusion: as a natural consequence, the trade had diminished to nearly one-half within the last few years.

At this time (April 1842) Ameer Khalid came from Demaum to Khor Hassan, to meet Shaikh Abdoola, who treated him with great respect, and led him to hope that he would assist him in the recovery of Kateef to the utmost in his power. After visiting Mahomed bin Khaleefa at Bahrein, the ex-Wahabee ruler returned to Demaum.

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The Bahrein Chief, however, if he ever entertained such an intention, had already too much on his own hands to admit of his acting up to his promise, for the serious dissensions in his own family, as about to be detailed, had reached to such a pitch as to demand his utmost attention.

The immediate and ostensible cause of the present open rupture originated in the opposition offered to the marriage of Ahmed, the son of Abdoola bin Ahmed, with a young girl, the daughter of one Abdool Rahman bin Rashid. The suitors respectively threatened to possess her by force,\* when her guardian, Moobaruk bin Khaleefa, appealing to their mutual relation, Mahomed bin Khaleefa, against the injustice and disgrace of permitting such a violation, he having already selected one from his own family to be her husband (Mahomed bin Moojarrin bin Fail), angry discussions and threats were produced, and the efforts of the old chief, who came over from Khor Hassan for the purpose, failing to effect an amicable arrangement, both parties began to collect troops, calling in principally the ignorant but warlike Bedouins from the mainland, themselves in no way interested in the quarrel, and led on solely by the prospect of emolument and plunder.

\* The damsel on whose account so much disagreement had arisen resided at Muharag, and was on the commencement of hostilities at the mercy of her would be suitor, who, she moreover consenting, might without immediate opposition have possessed himself of her person; but as the real ground of the dispute had no reference whatever to her, so the contest did not cease with her possession.





The towns of Muharag and Munama formed the head quarters of the respective chiefs. These are merely separated by a narrow gut, in many places fordable at low-water. Abdoolla bin Ahmed in possession of the former, and the more powerful at sea, had complete command of the harbour of Munama, which he contrived effectually to blockade.

Several skirmishes took place between the contending forces, in which were killed Dhyj, the brother of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and the grandson of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, Mahomed bin Moobaruk, without, however, any decisive advantage resulting to either side; and the parties maintained their respective positions until the middle of June, when Abdoolla bin Ahmed, making a simultaneous attack by land and sea, entirely defeated the forces of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and obtained possession of his town.

That chief fled with a few followers to the Guttur Coast, and thence to Lahsa and Riaz, to solicit the aid of the new Wahabee ruler, Bin Sooneyan.

The Bedouin troops in the pay of Abdoolla bin Ahmed were let loose to plunder the town which had fallen into their hands. Friends and enemies shared the same fate; property was indiscriminately plundered; and, among the rest, some goods belonging to British subjects.

Many people and much property had been injudiciously, indeed irregularly, received under his protection, by the British Agent on the island: among the former were the sons and several dependents of one Shaikh Humood Omeree, who had been actively engaged in the last struggle.

It appeared from the Agent's statement, that the Zenana and children of Humood found refuge in his house with his sanction, but that his son and immediate dependents, on Mahomed bin Khaleefa's forces being broken, fled there for protection, and, finding the door open, entered without his permission; that having done so, he was unable to eject them without force, which he was unwilling to exercise.

Abdoolla bin Ahmed coming shortly after, with his victorious followers, demanded that the abovementioned should be given up to him; threatening, in the event of refusal, to level the house with the ground, and kill and plunder all the persons and property therein, the former amounting in number to above 1,000 individuals, and the latter in value to between thirty and forty thousand Keroonees.

Fearing and believing that that chief would carry his threat into execution, and thus the lives of himself, his family, and so large a number of harmless individuals be sacrificed, he thought it advisable to throw





down (from the top of his house) the persons demanded, who had hardly reached the ground when they were cut to pieces.

Abdoolla bin Ahmed, well knowing the timid and imbecile character of the late Agent, appears to have confined himself to threats and remonstrances to obtain the fulfilment of his object. When called upon, he offered the following explanation:—that at the commencement of the outbreak he had sent for the Agent, and given him the option of either coming with all his family and dependents, and taking up his temporary residence at Muharag, or proceeding on board the British vessel which happened at the time to be at anchor in the harbour; alleging that his mercenary Bedouins, being perfectly uncontrollable, he had reason to apprehend that some injury might result to himself or his house. That the Agent would not consent to this arrangement, but returned to Munama, and received under his protection a great quantity of property belonging to the inhabitants, which, on the place falling into his hands, he had found great difficulty in restraining his Bedouins from plundering; but that finding that the dependents of Humood bin Omeree, of the Amayir Tribe, of whom he was the head, —who were particularly obnoxious to him, by reason of their having killed his relative,—had taken refuge in the Agent's house, he sent to explain this circumstance, and requested their surrender, which was no sooner granted than the persons in question were cut to pieces.

The Shaikh's proceedings could not be pronounced entirely free from blame, he having himself in *propria persona* demanded the surrender of the victims, threatening the Agent, his family, and friends with instant death in case of refusal. As his own presence, however, appeared to have been with a view as well to secure his great object of possessing himself of his enemy as to prevent any outrage on the British Agent, and all other accounts corroborated his earnest desire to save the Agent from harm, both before and after capturing the town of Munama,—a courtesy which that individual requited by receiving under his protection a blood enemy of the chief, and thus unjustifiably taking a part in the civil broils,—no further notice was taken of his conduct, which yet deprived him of all claims to the sympathy of the British Government in the troubles which afterwards befel him; but the part taken by the Agent in the affair, as having been, too, induced generally, there was good reason for supposing, by the prospect of pecuniary benefit in return for the protection he afforded to persons and property, subjected him to immediate dismissal.

After the pillage of Munama (an impolitic measure, however severe a punishment the rebellious conduct of its inhabitants appeared to call for, as rendering him highly unpopular, and totally alienating them from his interests), Shaikh Abdoolla proceeded with his Bedouins to





Khor Hassan, on the main, which too he delivered up to partial plunder. He then, with a view to concentrating and strengthening his resources on the Guttur Coast, planned and commenced the rebuilding of Zobara, now deserted, but which forty years before had been the Uttoobee head quarters.

Omer bin Oofeyan, the Wahabee General, and Governor of Labsa, having seized the person of the Chief of the seaport town of Sohat, and compelled the destruction of that fort, the inhabitants (for the most part pearl divers), at the instigation of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, seceded to Bahrein, to the number of about three-fourths of the population.

The continued detention as a prisoner, by the Wahabee ruler, of Shaikh Shafee, the Chief of the Huwajir, a staunch adherent of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, whose release had been declared a *sine qua non* by that chief to the entertainment of any overtures of peace between them, precluded compliance on the part of the latter with the demands of the former, for the suspension of the blockade of his seaports of Kateef, Sohat, &c., and determined the former in favour of the cause of his guest, Mahomed bin Khaleefa, to whose solicitations his power had not as yet attained sufficient stability to admit of his actively acceding, in consequence of some of the Bedouin Tribes having failed to tender their submission to his authority. Mahomed bin Khaleefa accordingly commenced collecting forces on the mainland, for the purpose of renewing the war.

Affairs were in this state, and the unpopularity of the Uttoobee Chief at his height, when Esai bin Tarif, of the Al Ali Tribe, residing at Kenn, and Busheer, (with from three to four hundred adherents,) the son of Rahmah bin Jaubir (the famous Pirate Chief of Demaum, who in the latter end of 1826, worsted in an engagement with a very superior Uttoobee force, to avoid capture, with his own hand set fire to the powder magazine, and blew up himself and his vessel), visited Bushire together, for the purpose of intimating to the Resident their desire to make common cause with the junior Uttoobee Chief, who had invited them to join his standard; and of soliciting his permission to wage open war accordingly upon Bahrein.

The reason given by the latter for becoming a party to this formidable coalition\* was, that in consequence of the blockade maintained by Abdoolla bin Ahmed, he was unable to carry away the produce of his paternal estates at Demaum (near Kateef).

\* The outline of the cause of Esai bin Tarif's discontent has been already given. The public opinion was now very strong that the late disturbances at Bahrein had been instigated and fomented by him, who, having no adequate means singly of attacking Shaikh Abdoolla, forced on gradually by his intrigues that great object of his ambition, a powerful coalition against his enemy.





The Resident's sanction for the prosecution of open and proclaimed war having been duly given, these chiefs were reminded of the restrictive line, within the limits of which they would be compelled to confine their warlike operations at sea; and so also was the Shaikh of Bahrein, on the Assistant Resident's visit to that island, where he was deputed solely for the purpose of making known to him the public designs of his enemies, and their declaration of war against him.

This communication was received with much surprise and apprehension by the Uttoobee Chief, who appeared to doubt that permission had been granted to the parties coalescing. He stated that the news had reached him too late; that most of his vessels and dependents had left on their trading voyages, and that, his country therefore denuded of troops, and his means of defence gone, he earnestly hoped that hostilities would not be permitted to commence until their return; that otherwise, with however great contempt he looked upon the power of each individually,—the two, Esai bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah bin Jaubir, as insignificant, and the Wahabee Chief as deficient in shipping and means of transport,—it would not be in his power to cope with them united; hinting that he would be compelled to make the best terms he could with the latter, thereby virtually ceding the island to him,—a measure which he conceived would not be approved of or allowed by the British Government; that he had opened a negotiation with that ruler for the release of Shaikh Shafee, his relation, offering in return to deliver up Ajeer (a large and strong fort on the coast between Demaum and Kateef), and to raise the blockade of his seaport. He expressed his willingness to permit of Busheer removing his property from Demaum; but that he could not admit of his taking any of his large vessels into that harbour,—in other words, of his placing men and means at the disposal of his enemies.

His request for the suspension of hostilities until the return of his vessels was in the first instance referred to the British Government.

Mahomed bin Khaleefa's first object was to establish himself on the Guttur Coast, in order to have at his disposal the naval resources of its inhabitants, and to keep open his communication with his colleagues.

The Wahabee ruler now again opened a communication with the Bahrein Chief, acting the part of a mediator, and recommending peace with his grand nephew. He further released Shafee, who promised, on his arrival at Demaum, to exert his utmost influence to restore peace.

Shaikh Abdoolah, however, whether treating lightly the means and talent of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who must nevertheless be henceforth looked upon as by no means a despicable rival, or putting little trust in the sincerity of the Wahabee ruler, treated his mediatory efforts with





slight attention,—indeed employed somewhat threatening language, to urge his observance of perfect neutrality.

The representations at the same time (January 1843) of the chief men of his territories at Guttur, on the mainland, of their inability to defend themselves against any attack by Mahomed bin Khaleefa, proved that that chief had not abated in his preparations for hostilities, in which he was undoubtedly secretly assisted by the Wahabee ruler, without whose connivance or countenance he must certainly have abandoned them. The small fort of Meezeer, in Guttur, fell into the hands of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who, sending his troops, had forestalled those of his opponents in its occupation. The latter, on their approach, finding that it was already in his hands, retired, without attempting its recovery. A communication was thus established with the colleagues of Kenn. Several boats, also, coming over from that island, excited the fears of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who for the second time conveyed a request (February 1843) to the British authorities, similar in its object to his previous one, having reference to the proceedings of Esai bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah; but as, at the same time, reports were received at Bahrein from Kenn by a Muskat boat (which, arriving from the head quarters of his enemy, should scarcely have been deemed worthy of credit by a discreet and wise chief), that these parties had abandoned the objects they had in view, in the belief that the Wahabee ruler had withdrawn his aid and countenance from the cause of the younger in favour of the elder chief, the communication of these reports to Bushire led to the supposition that the necessity for making the request\* had passed away, and that, consequently, it did not require a reply.

\* This request was again implied as requiring reply in the report made subsequently by the British Agent of a conversation which passed between himself and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and again conveyed in the Agent's report of the 23rd of the same month; and further implied in the Shaikh's letter of the 20th March, when he was informed that there was no other reply than that given by the Assistant Resident when he met him.

These references are here noticed, because the ex-chief pertinaciously but unfoundedly attributed his misfortunes to his having been led to consider himself secure from attack by the coalesced forces, in consequence of a promise which he alleged to have been made by the Assistant Resident when that officer was deputed to Bahrein in November 1842, that hostilities should not be permitted to commence until his boats and adherents had returned from their trading voyages.

The following are extracts of a letter from the ex-chief of the 29th December 1843, and of Captain Hennell's reply of the 30th December, bearing upon this subject:—"For instance, when I told your man Hajee Jassim that it was my intention to launch my boats, and take the initiative with the people of Guttur and Kenn, before they could attack me, he forbade my doing so, saying that the English would not permit this. This is known to all the inhabitants of Bahrein and Bushire, and every one else. When your Assistant came to Bahrein, he told





The inhabitants of the Guttur Coast favoured decidedly the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and established him in Fowarah, whence he proceeded with a considerable force in five Buggalows, and effected a landing opposite to Ruffah (a village, with a fort, six miles in the interior of the island of Bahrein). Abdoolla bin Ahmed immediately sent a force, under the command of his son Nassir, who succeeded in gaining possession of the fort before the invaders could reach it. A fight took place, from which no positive advantage was obtained by either party; several men were killed, and some wounded. Measures, however, were adopted to surround them by land, and cut off their retreat by sea.

In the course of the hostile operations which ensued, a piracy was committed (March 1843) by the dependents of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, upon a Gooncha carrying British colours, and having on board a packet and some stores to the address of the Commodore at Bassadore.

It appeared that that chief had issued orders that no vessels should be permitted to remain at anchor in the harbour of Munama (the town on the main island opposite to Muharag), and on the vessel in question anchoring there, two boats were despatched with a message to the Nakhoda to weigh and return to Muharag. The crews of these, boarding, plundered her cargo, and, among the rest, the packet and stores adverted to; hauled down the flag, and tore it to pieces,—an aggravation of their crime which admitted of no excuse. The necessity of sending

me that Bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah had obtained permission to commence hostilities against me, and asked whether I had committed any aggression upon them. I replied in the negative. He then inquired what was the cause of their enmity. I answered that Fysul bin Saood wished to establish them in Biddah, for the purpose of plunder and rapine. At the time, also, when all my ships were scattered about in Bombay, Malabar, and Yemen, your Assistant told me that both the parties were prohibited from hostilities until the return of my vessels, and that an order would be sent to me by the Resident. Hajee Jassim, your Agent, was present when this conversation took place. On this account I was negligent, and did not send and get other men to assist me, in the place of those who were absent in my vessels. When, therefore, my subjects who inhabit the Guttur Coast perceived that my country was denuded of troops, they were instigated by a spirit of plunder to rise up against me, and that took place which God has brought to pass: For the above reasons you have now ground (for assisting me)."

*Reply.*—"Touching your complaint that my Assistant, when at Bahrein, had led you to believe that Essai bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah would not be permitted to attack you while your ships and men were absent in India, and that consequently you were negligent, and did not get troops to assist you in the place of those who were away, I would beg to observe that you are quite mistaken in supposing Captain Kemball ever gave such a promise. You are aware that his sole object in visiting Bahrein was to warn you that Bin Tarif and Busheer bin Rahmah had asked for and obtained permission to commence hostilities against you, and all he offered was to communicate your wishes to Colonel Robertson. When, however, you did not receive any answer from that officer on the subject, you ought to have been sure that he could not comply with your request for the temporary prohibition of hostilities until the return of your vessels."





two boats to warn off a friendly or neutral vessel was not apparent, and favoured, on one side the belief that the Shaikh did not know that the Gooncha was under the British flag, or suspected its having been hoisted by his enemies as a mere ruse,—to the benefit of which suppositions he had some title, inasmuch as it remained a doubt whether the Gooncha had shown her colours on entering the harbour, or only when approached by the Shaikh's boats,—and as the armed vessels of the Kenn Chiefs were hourly expected to the assistance of their colleague, who, as before mentioned, had already effected a landing on the island; yet, on the other side, it was asserted that due information had been given him of the Gooncha being under British protection, and thus left room for the suspicion that the Arabs merely acted in conformity with the directions of their master. The despatch of two well manned boats, with a peaceable object, indicated at least a most culpable want of care and precaution on his part against irregularities, aware, as he undoubtedly was, that the party consisting of mercenary Bedouins, proverbially not gifted with great discrimination, could not withstand the temptation of securing a prize, which their superiority in numbers and warlike equipment placed within their power.

The Shaikh denied all participation in, or delegation of authority for, the outrageous conduct of his agents. A vessel of war was with all haste despatched, for the purpose of making a due investigation, with a view to the establishment of grounds for demanding redress. The occurrences at Bahrein in the interim, however, rendered this of little or no avail.

The brother of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, coming to Munama with a party of horse and foot, and favoured by the inhabitants, obtained possession of the place, and was very soon joined by the allied chiefs from Kenn in great force.

The combined forces proceeded immediately (April 1843) to the attack of Muharag, and, defeating the troops of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, compelled him to take refuge in a small fort, situated at no great distance from the town, which they so completely invested as very shortly to have it in their power to dictate their own terms. Allowing him no more than one Buteel and one Gooncha, for the conveyance of himself and his personal property and dependents, they permitted him to quit the island. On the ejection of the father, the fort of Arad, held by his sons, surrendered at discretion: these were, however, permitted to remain and reside on the island. Shaikh Abdoolla proceeded to Demaum (the only place now left that acknowledged his authority), of which his eldest son Moobaruk was governor. Every precautionary measure was taken by his opponents to ensure the good will or neutrality of the neighbouring States; and this was the more





necessary, as the return to their homes of their Guttur subsidiaries being suddenly called for, in consequence of advantage having been taken of their absence by the Monasir, an inland Bedouin Tribe, to plunder their territory, they were deprived of the services of a large proportion of their fighting men.

Immediately antecedent to the active hostilities which lost Bahrein to the old chief, a Charrak boat (sailing under the neutral flag of Persia), into which property just arrived from Bombay, consigned to two Banyan merchants of Bahrein, had been transhipped, was plundered in the harbour of Munama by the men of the Huwajir and Suloota Tribes, his dependents. The latter, however, passing over to the side of the conqueror, and becoming under his control, cast upon him the responsibility of their act, and the consequent obligation of recovering the value of the plunder which had fallen to their share. It would have been objectionable, and in a measure unjust, immediately to have urged payment upon Mahomed bin Khaleefa, while the contest appeared yet doubtful, and while, from his fallen state, and consequent want of means, as asserted by himself, and moreover from the intangibility of his position to our naval force, similar redress could not be exacted from his rival. It was not, therefore, till February in the following year, when the authority of the former was firmly established, that he was called upon to restore the value of that portion of the property plundered by the Suloota, a demand which he acceded to without hesitation.

Abdoolla bin Ahmed commencing a system of annoyance upon the trade of Bahrein (June 1843), the colleagues despatched several vessels to blockade Demaum, and restrain his boats within the limits of its harbour.

The recent contentions between the contending chieftains, and their present doubtful position, afforded the legitimate Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul, who had now succeeded in re-establishing his authority in Nujd, the opportunity and pretence for interference; indeed, his aid and countenance being earnestly solicited by either, he very soon exercised an important influence in the affairs of the island, and its dependencies on the opposite Coast of Guttur, with the almost certain prospect of restoring the payment of the annual tribute, which had not been exacted since the early days of the rule of his father, Toorkey bin Saood.

It would appear that Fysul had not forgotten nor forgiven his former disputes and quarrels with the old chief, who had had generally the advantage, and from the first was inclined to favour the cause of the younger. Much time was spent in negotiations with either, which their presents and tempting promises, and the yet unstable nature of his newly recovered position, rendered it his interest to prolong, and also prevented his immediately taking an active part.





Shaikh Jaubir, Governor of Koweit,\* and a mutual friend of the contending chiefs, now (August 1843) volunteered his services as mediator. Aware that to effect a lasting peace between them was perfectly hopeless, on account of the conflicting views and interests of the colleagues on the one side, and the sons and subordinates on the other, between whom an irreconcilable hatred existed, and unprepared or unwilling to engage actively in the cause, this chief had hitherto refrained from any interference whatever.

Perceiving now, however, the elder chief reduced to the last extremity, and no longer able to resist, he evinced a generous desire to save him from further degradation, and, if possible, to induce him to return with him to Koweit; for this, it appeared, was his object, in the event of his mediation proving unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, no objection was offered to his carrying his proposal into effect, as conveyed in his communication on the subject to the British authority, who merely recommended his confining his proceedings to mediation alone, and not permitting them to assume the appearance of hostilities towards Mahomed bin Khaleefa, now allied, if not in a manner subject, to the Wahabee ruler, whose aid and countenance he had succeeded in securing, by the promise of renewing the payment of an annual tribute, such as was formerly exacted from the Bahrein Chief by his father, Toorkey bin Saood.

Shaikh Jaubir accordingly proceeded to Bahrein, accompanied by a fleet of eight large vessels, and there held a lengthened communication with the *de facto* ruler, the result of which was the despatch of a boat to seek the ex-chief, and invite him to a conference. The latter however, conscious, probably, that mediation alone, and not active interference, would be exercised in his favour, had left the neighbourhood (for Bushire), his pride precluding him from accepting or granting terms to those whom, though undoubtedly hereditarily entitled to a share of authority over Bahrein, he appears ever to have considered his subjects. His visit being thus rendered of no avail, and the further detention of his vessels from their commercial occupation profitless and prejudicial to the interests of his subjects, Shaikh Jaubir returned to Koweit, without having in any way achieved his object.

Mahomed, a son of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, with Hajee Bushab, the latter's Vizier, coming out of Demaum, which under these circumstances continued to be closely blockaded, for the purpose of collecting boats on the adjoining coast, were seized by the Governor of Kateef, who also made prisoner Ali, another son of the ex-chief, who had come over from Lingah with a small reinforcement of the Aboosemate tribe, to join his father.

\* The Koweit boats carry the Turkish flag, and its inhabitants acknowledge a nominal dependence to the Turkish Government.





An attempt on the part of his sons, who visited the Coast of Oman with this object, to engage the assistance of Sultan bin Suggur, his son Suggur, and Muktoom bin Butye of Debaye, in their father's cause, having failed, these chiefs evading immediate, but holding out hopes of eventual compliance (on the termination of the pearl fishery), provided they were not forbidden by the British Government or the Wahabee ruler, the ex-chief visited Bushire in person, for the purpose of obtaining the required sanction of the British authority to their joining his cause.

It was reported that the chiefs in question, however much to all appearance in earnest, only wanted some plea or excuse to rid themselves of the importunities of the ex-chief, and abstain from any interference whatever in his quarrel, from the knowledge, probably, that the colleagues on the other hand were not idle in their endeavours to arrange a counter alliance with the Beniyas and Amulgavine Shaikhs, with a view to meet the impending emergency. A correspondence had been opened by Esai bin Tarif with the former (Khaleefa bin Shakboot), and the latter (Abdoolla bin Rashid) visited Kenn in person, and received a valuable present.

Under these circumstances, the ex-chief was informed, in reply to his application, that the British Government, although prepared to act the part of mediator, without affording any guarantee, could not so far interfere as to reinstate him in his lost authority, nor could it permit of the Shaikhs of Oman taking any part in a war in which they had no interest or connection, as being bound by agreements with the British Government, and by a truce among themselves, guaranteed by it, to abstain from hostilities of any kind on the seas, whereas the engagement of their assistance by opposite and contending parties could not but lead to confusion throughout the Gulf, and hostilities between the tribes themselves, who, from being in the first instance allies, would very soon become principals, and this too without any benefit accruing to himself.

It would appear that one Shaikh Sulman, the nephew of the Mujtahid of Bushire, a person having no legal authority, or situation under the Government, had commenced a correspondence with Shaikh Abdoolla, while that chief was yet blockaded in Demaum, holding out to him hopes of assistance from Persia, in troops and guns, to retake Bahrein. To this his visit to Bushire was doubtless mainly attributable, —not that he really believed the Persian Government had it in its power to sanction and carry through the unauthorised proffer of Shaikh Sulman, but that, anticipating non-compliance on the part of the British authorities to the requests he had to make, he hoped to turn the existence of such overtures to some advantage in urging his case, and inducing acquiescence; and accordingly intimated to them (October





1843) in pretty plain terms, that if his solicitations were unheeded he would be compelled to throw himself into the arms of Persia. A copy of Shaikh Sulman's communication was forwarded to Tehran, and the ex-chief was informed that any declaration of war on the part of Persia against Bahrein must emanate in the King or Government, and be open and proclaimed. The ex-chief, after a short stay at Bushire, returned to Demaum, and thence proceeded to Nabend, on the Persian Coast, to await the course of events.

Esai bin Tarif, to whom it had been intimated that so long as he continued to reside on Kenn he could not, for obvious reasons, be permitted to exercise any further interference in the affairs of the opposite coast, evacuated that island, agreeably to his expressed intention, on the termination of the pearl fishery, and proceeded with his tribe to Biddah, on the Guttur Coast,—an arrangement considered in every respect highly satisfactory, as bringing him within the limits of the restrictive line, and placing that port (exceedingly difficult of access) in the possession of a chief in whose sincere wish to put down irregularities at sea, of a piratical nature, every confidence was placed,—inclinations very different to those entertained by Salmin bin Nassir Soedan, the former Shaikh of Biddah, whose proceedings, as already detailed in these sketches, left room for the suspicion that he secretly protected and encouraged predatory characters, in whose ill-gotten spoils he did not scruple to participate.

The ex-Chief of Bahrein again visited Bushire in December 1843, with six vessels, manned and armed, with the avowed purpose of having an interview with the Resident; but as he declined the invitation of the latter for a meeting on board one of the vessels of war then in the roads, given under the idea that his wish to visit him on shore was a mere pretext to cover his real purpose, which was to have a personal communication with Shaikh Sulman, and that if he really desired an interview he could make no real objection to the arrangement, it was concluded, with justice, that his real object was to endeavour to procure the aid from the Persian Government which had been so unauthorisedly promised by that intriguing individual.

He however, by letter, earnestly urged his claims to the interference and assistance of the British Government in his behalf, on the ground of his having rejected the overtures of the Wahabee Chief Fysul; as also his being a party to the General Treaty of 1820;—claims which were not admitted, as the letter of Ameer Fysul to his address, which he transmitted for perusal, so far from having a tendency to excite disturbances on the sea, appeared to exhibit a sincere desire for the promotion of peace and tranquillity, and for a reconciliation between himself and his grand nephew; and as the treaty alluded to had for its





only object the suppression of plunder and piracy, and nowhere contemplated any interference in lawful and acknowledged war, provided always such warfare did not lead to acts of aggression upon the lives and property of those having no concern therein.

While the ex-chief was yet at Bushire, a communication was received from his rival, complaining that a Buteel belonging to the son of Jaubir bin Busheer, of Bahrein, had been seized by the dependents of the former at Aseeloo, or Nabend, on the Persian Coast, and therefore within the neutral ground; and calling upon the Resident to exact redress. The remonstrance thereon had the effect of drawing from the ex-chief an order to the Governor of Nabend for the restoration of the Buteel. Before this document, transmitted by a British vessel, could reach its destination, an exchange of governors had taken place at that port, and the new one refused compliance with his instructions; nor was it till after much delay, and a lengthened correspondence, that the boat in question was restored to its owner (in July 1844), immediately previous to which time Shaikh Busheer bin Rahmah of Biddah most unauthorisedly seized and detained two Buteels belonging to Nabend, in retaliation for the continued detention of the vessel referred to: he however liberated them immediately on the receipt of the Resident's letter of remonstrance against his undue interference in an affair which was already in the course of adjustment by the British Government.

A further communication was received in January 1844 from the ex-chief, again earnestly urging his claims for the interference of the British Government, and soliciting its aid, on the ground of all his misfortunes having resulted from his having been taken unawares at a time when he had deemed himself perfectly secure, in consequence of his having been led by the British authorities to suppose that the colleagues would not be permitted to attack him until the return of his boats and subjects from their trading voyages. To this application a peremptory refusal was returned.

The long promised Nujdee land forces at length arriving, and laying siege to Demaum, the garrison was very shortly reduced to the last extremity for provisions and warlike stores. A supply, too, sent by the Chief of Koweit, failed of reaching its destination, and fell into the hands of the enemy, whose blockading squadron, gaining timely information of the arrival of the two boats in which it was embarked at Khore Balbul, whence it was intended to have been transported by camels to the beleaguered fort, despatched a force to intercept and make them prizes. Although the legality of the seizure was not for a moment questioned, and, the capture having been made within the restrictive war





limit, the British Government in no way called upon to interfere, so far as to attend to the complaint and requisition of the Chief of Koweit that it should compel the release of the boats, and the restoration of their cargoes, still it was deemed advisable to recommend Mahomed bin Khaleefa, rather than incur the risk of a misunderstanding with that powerful chief, to comply with his wishes, on the understanding that he should not interfere further in the quarrel, nor again attempt to throw any aid or supplies into Demaum. After some trifling hesitation, this judicious counsel was acquiesced in.

A few days after his arrival at Bushire, the ex-chief landed, and took up his residence in a bastion which had been prepared for his accommodation, while tents were pitched for the reception of his numerous followers, bringing his vessels (of which two only now remained with him) into the backwater, and drawing them up on shore. He was received with marked attention by the local authorities: a salute of three rounds of musketry was fired by the Sirbaz garrison, who were all paraded on the occasion. It is hardly probable that such marks of respect would have been exhibited, unless under instructions from the Ameer of Shiraz, and it was rumoured that Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed had asked for the aid of a body of troops, to consist of 100 horsemen and 500 infantry, and that, in addition to taking upon himself all the disbursements incurred in their equipment, had offered to pay a large annual tribute to the Shah, and to leave his son as a hostage for the due fulfilment of this engagement.

After waiting nearly three months for a reply to his proposition, or some token of its being taken into favourable consideration, and finding that it was mere loss of time and labour, the ex-chief determined upon taking his departure.

Visiting the Resident, he stated that his principal object in soliciting an interview was to express his earnest hope that the friendship and countenance of the British Government, which he had formerly enjoyed for so many years, would be once more extended to him; that the feeling of his not being viewed by the British authorities with the same favour and good will which had once existed, weighed heavily upon him, and paralysed his efforts; that he sought no aid or support in the recovery of his just rights beyond the belief that he might hope for the renewal of the friendly countenance once afforded him; and that the British Government would not possess a firmer and more devoted adherent than himself. In reply, the fact that his proceedings had not been satisfactory to the British Government was not disguised; nor the rejection of the overture made to support him in opposing the establishment of the authority of Mahomed Ali Pacha over Bahrein: the violation of the residence of the British Agent, by the seizure and





slaughter of those individuals who had taken refuge there; the plunder of the goods of a British subject, by his followers, during the attack upon Munama; the seizure of British property from a boat carrying British colours; and the forcible robbery of the Charrak vessel by his adherents of the Huwajir Tribe, had certainly tended to diminish the friendly feelings entertained towards him.

He endeavoured to explain these causes of umbrage to the British Government, and added, that his only reason for coming to Bushire was to seek a temporary refuge, while he matured his plans; that he was fully aware of the hollowness of the professions made by the Persian authorities of affording him aid in the recovery of Bahrein, but that he had made a convenience of them, to suit his own purposes.

It was not doubted that the Shaikh was perfectly sincere in his wishes to remove the unfavourable impression his conduct had made upon the British Government; but no credit could be attached to his explanation regarding his motives for coming to Bushire; for he was certainly at one time buoyed up by the extravagant promises and professions made to him by Shaikh Sulman, and it was only when he had reason to believe that these were without authority or foundation that he affected to despise them.

The ex-chief's departure was probably hastened by the intelligence now received that the garrison of Demaum, so hardly pressed for provisions, had been compelled to propose to Ameer Fysul the surrender of the fort, upon certain terms which had been rejected. On leaving Bushire, he proceeded over to the neighbourhood of Bahrein, and attempted to send in a boat to them, with a supply of stores and provisions; but the blockading force were on the alert, and having succeeded in capturing the boat in question, despatched four Buteels in pursuit of the ex-chief. These, however, did not overtake him, and he found a temporary refuge at Koweit. The fort of Demaum very shortly after surrendered, the garrison stipulating only for the safety of their lives, and permission to carry away their personal property. Nassir bin Abdoola and his younger brother returned to Bahrein, but the elder brother, Moobaruk bin Abdoola, the governor, fled with Shafee, the Chief of the Huwajir, to join the Bedouin Tribes, towards Biddah. From Koweit, where on this occasion he had taken refuge, the ex-chief revisited Bushire, and, at his own special request, had an interview with the Resident on the sea shore, about three miles from the town, where he was unwilling, as he stated, but without giving his reasons, to land. His ostensible object proved to be, to consult the Resident regarding certain overtures, of a very favourable nature, he had received from the Wahabee ruler, urging that it was not to be supposed that the latter had volunteered to procure the restoration of his property, vessels, and





territorial possessions, without intending to bind him down by some stringent engagements; but his real one was to ascertain what effect such an intimation would have, and whether the British Government was prepared to frustrate or supplant this anticipated paramount Wahabee influence on Bahrein, and take upon themselves the office volunteered by Fysul.

He received in reply no encouragement, and was, moreover, assured that the British Government sought no territorial aggrandisement in this quarter, and had only one object, that of the suppression of piracy, and the maintenance of the tranquillity of these seas.

At the present time (August 1844) the ex-chief resides at Nabend, on the Persian Coast, but most of his sons are located at Muharag, without enjoying, however, any share in the government of the island. Shaikh Moobaruk bin Abdoolla, it is reported, returned to Guttur, for the purpose of meeting Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and coming to some amicable arrangement, but that the latter positively refused to confirm or execute the agreement entered into with the sons of the ex-chief, in the presence of Ameer Fysul, and consented only to the ex-chief's returning to reside on the island as a private individual, provided his conduct was guaranteed by the British Government,—a condition which he was aware would never be accepted. It appears improbable that Mahomed bin Khaleefa and his brothers, the present Chiefs of Bahrein, will ever of themselves consent to the re-establishment of their grand uncle, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, at Bahrein;—at the same time, the deep jealousy of the power and independent bearing of Esai bin Tarif, entertained by the Khaleefa family, and growing desire to resist the encroachments of Ameer Fysul,\* may induce them to give their consent to arrangements which, under other circumstances, they would have opposed by every means in their power.

### CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

The proud and headstrong Abdoolla bin Ahmed had, we are told by Captain Kemball, at the close of his narrative of the Uttoobee Tribe, taken up his position at a place called Nabend, on the Persian Coast. The rival claims for superiority between himself and his grand nephew,

\* A. D. 1844.

\* The demand for arrears of tribute, although twice made, has not up to this time (1844) been paid.





Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, still continued, and every possible plan was being resorted to by the refugee chief to induce the Persian Government to espouse his cause. They, on their part, had apparently entertained in a favourable light the proposals that were made to them, and showed, by the pomp and ceremony with which they received their visitor, on the occasion of his coming to Bushire in the early part of the year 1844, that there was at least a desire, if not an intention, to lend him assistance. The proceedings of the Persian authorities were studiously watched by the Resident, and their every movement and expression represented by him to higher authority. It was thought advisable to check, in the outset, this uncalled for officiousness on the part of Persia: instructions were accordingly issued by Her Majesty's Government to Colonel Sheil, begging him to acquaint the Persian Ministers that unless the right of the Shah to take part in the quarrels of rival claimants to the possession of Bahrein were beyond dispute, the interference of His Majesty would be viewed with much jealousy by the British Government in India, and might possibly lead to serious discussions with England. Such an announcement as this, coming as it did from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, tended, no doubt, to damp the ardour of the brotherly feeling shown by Persia to 'Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and must likewise have blasted, for the present at least, all hopes that existed in the mind of the latter of obtaining assistance from that quarter.

From this period the ex-chief commenced a roving style of life,—first repairing with his Buteels to the neighbourhood of Bahrein, then suddenly quitting the island in search of plunder, and, after perpetrating all manner of mischief, returning to his place of asylum on the Persian Coast. By the Resident, these proceedings were beheld with much dissatisfaction, and eventually led to the issue of a positive order, prohibiting him from a continuance of hostilities against the trade and possessions of Bahrein, so long as he chose to reside on the shores of Persia. Fully, however, to comprehend the policy of the British Government with regard to the continued quarrels of the rival chiefs, it is necessary that we should watch the movements and doings of either party, and also observe the line of conduct pursued by the British towards them. Let us therefore proceed to consider a brief outline of all that occurred during the protracted struggle for the sovereignty of the Bahrein island.

Shaikh 'Abdoolla had not been long at Nabend ere he set out on a cruise with his Buteels in the direction of his lost possessions, and proceeded into the immediate vicinity of Bahrein. His unexpected arrival in that quarter threw the pearl divers and others into a state of extreme alarm and confusion, and it was not until the ex-chief assured them





that he had no intention to molest them,—that he was merely in search of the boats of the Al Ali, whom he wished to encounter,—that their fears were in any way relieved. To effect his purpose, he sailed to Biddah in quest of Esai bin Tarif, but finding his enemy on the alert, and well able to resist, he returned to the neighbourhood of Bahrein, without attacking him. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, when he heard of his arrival, sent a deputation of the principal merchants in the island to invite him ashore, and welcome him home: the reply, however, sent by the haughty Abdoolla, that he required the fort of Muharag to be restored to him, together with other demands of a most preposterous character, precluding all hopes of a meeting being effected between himself and his relative, he quitted the place, and sailed to Kateef, whence, after despatching one of his sons on a friendly mission to the Wahabee Ameer, and the seizure of two small vessels on the Dabil Shoal, he retraced his steps to Nabend. The above seizure, although it took place within the war limits of the restrictive line, and its legality was therefore not to be questioned, from the peculiar position of the ex-chief on Persian soil, it soon became manifest that Mahomed bin Khaleefa would be subjected to a series of attacks and annoyances from his rival, without being able to retaliate; for the latter, at perfect liberty to carry on hostilities within the restrictive line, would be constantly lying in wait for favourable opportunities to annoy the people of Bahrein, and, ere the injured parties could take steps for effecting reprisals, would make good his escape beyond the limits of lawful warfare. It was highly necessary, therefore, to place matters upon a more equitable footing, and this could only be done in two ways,—either by effectually restraining the ex-chief so long as he resided on the Coast of Persia, or by suspending the operation of the restrictive line, and permitting the Shaikh of Bahrein to pursue and attack Abdoolla bin Ahmed wheresoever he met him. The former mode had been already adopted towards Esai bin Tarif, Chief of the Al Ali, who, when located on the island of Kenn, had sought to disturb the people and dependents of Abdoolla bin Ahmed at the time he was Shaikh of Bahrein; but the isolated position of Kenn, and the ease with which our British cruisers could approach the place, rendered it a matter of no difficulty to bring Esai bin Tarif to an immediate account, should he refuse to refrain from hostilities; whereas, in the case of the port of Nabend, which was difficult of access, unsheltered from the prevailing winds, and formed part and parcel of the main land of Persia, there would be no way of punishing the offender save by a recourse to blockade, or to a direct aggression upon Persian territory, by destroying his vessels, drawn up on the beach. The Resident therefore determined, in the event of a complaint being preferred by the Shaikh of Bahrein, and exhortation failing to restrain the ex-chief, to adopt the latter mode of





the two proposed, pending a reference to the Bombay Government regarding it. He strove first, however, as a precautionary measure, by a written address to the Governor of Nabend, pointing out the risk he incurred of laying himself open to attacks from the Chief of Bahrein, should he permit his guest to molest the people of that island, to curb and check the hostile propensities of Shaikh Abdoolla. Nor did he write in vain: this appeal to his feelings and interests was warmly responded to by Ahmed bin Syf, and followed up by the despatch of a confidential messenger to Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, apologising for the conduct of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and promising to do his utmost to restrain him. So far matters went smoothly enough; but the ex-chief had no intention to permit of restraint being placed upon his actions: he had entered into an alliance with the Tribe of the Beni Malij, and they were at feud with Shaikh Ahmed bin Syf; and to show the latter how little he cared for his authority, he hastened to seize two more vessels of Bahrein.

Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, incensed at the injury, but more incensed at his inability to resent it, deputed his own brother, Shaikh Ali bin Khaleefa, to Bushire, to advocate his cause with the Resident, and to beg that officer either to coerce the ex-chief, or to give him permission to retaliate. Shaikh Ali was informed that an intimation would be conveyed to Abdoolla bin Ahmed, that unless he restored all the prizes he had made, and abstained for the future from mischief, the operation of the restrictive line would at once be suspended, and he left to the mercy of his more powerful enemy. Meanwhile, however, until a reply had been received to the above communication, affairs must remain on their present footing. The British Envoy at the capital was likewise apprised of all that was doing, and through his medium was an order issued to the Ameer of Fars, "directing him to compel Abdoolla bin Ahmed to restore the boats he had taken at Bahrein, and to adopt measures for preventing disorders so injurious to the commerce of the Gulf." Plainly perceiving that a refusal to abide by the directions of the Resident would only be detrimental to his own interests, the ex-chief gave a verbal assurance, that so long as he remained within the territories of His Majesty the Shah, he would abstain from aggressions upon the trade and dependents of Bahrein. This announced intention he shortly after found himself compelled to obey, for the British Government wrote up stringent instructions to the Resident, desiring him to prohibit Abdoolla bin Ahmed from committing any acts of aggression upon Bahrein soil or trade, so long as he was located in Persia; and the ex-chief having shown a reluctance to confirm in writing the verbal promise he had given, a vessel of war was at once despatched to inform him that he was under restraint, whether he wished it or no.





Before prosecuting this part of the narrative, it is necessary to describe a case of piracy committed in the early part of the year by Humeed bin Mujdell, of the Amayir Tribe, and to relate the steps that were taken to obtain redress from that lawless chief.

A. D. 1845.

A vessel of Karrack, under the command of one Abdoolla, having taken in a cargo of wheat at Bunder Reig, proceeded over to Kateef. On entering the backwater, Abdoolla spied three Buggalows coming towards him, one of which, being considerably ahead of the others, approached his boat, and, after a series of manœuvres, boarded her, and made her a prize. The two other Buggalows, both vessels of Koweit, on one occasion hailed the captors, to know what boat they had taken; whereupon the Amayir Chief threatened to cut off the heads of his captives if they dared to utter a syllable. Some two days after the capture "they reached Ras Boo Ali, where they anchored, and plundered the Buggarah of everything she contained, viz. cargo, arms, cloths, &c. to the value of 1,500 Mahomed Shah rupees"; and when the Nakhoda represented that the property they were plundering belonged to a person under British protection, Humeed bin Mujdell laughed him to scorn, and said "Who are the English?"

The crew were then liberated, and, being allowed to leave the place in their Buggarah, they made their way back to Karrack, and related all that had occurred to them.

After some investigation, it was ascertained by the Resident that the Amayir Chief "having broken friendship with part of his tribe," had, previous to committing the piracy, been compelled to quit his usual place of abode, Jazirat Boo Ali, and taken refuge within the dominions of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who treated him kindly, and supplied him with arms and ammunition. He had not been long, however, with his new master, ere he repaired with a number of followers to a small island, named Gunna, which lies near the entrance of the backwater situate between Jazirat Boo Ali and Ras Draeada. There he took up his quarters, and there, relying upon the strength of his position, he vaunted himself upon his deed of piracy, and expressed his utter contempt for any endeavours the English might make to bring him to punishment.

The piracy was of too open a character to be treated lightly, or "to admit of a compromise being made regarding it." In the month of May, accordingly, the Resident deputed his Assistant, Captain Kemball, with two vessels of the squadron, to Gunna, for the purpose of obtaining full satisfaction from Humeed bin Mujdell. Commodore Hawkins, too, proceeded in person, to superintend and carry into execution any measures that officer might be pleased to suggest; and two Native Buggarahs, fully armed and equipped, were engaged to accom-





pany the expedition. When the naval force approached the pirate's den, and Humeed bin Mujdell was called upon to afford redress for the wrongs he had committed, he sent back a reply of haughty defiance: he declared his perfect indifference for any plans the British vessels might think fit to adopt, and spoke in somewhat boastful terms of the deed he had done. The bold and resolute conduct of the Commodore, however, quickly brought the chief to his senses; for notwithstanding the strength of his position, and the numerous shoals that surrounded it,—so difficult of access that the *Coote* could not approach within five miles of it, and even the schooner *Constance*, after threading her way through an intricate channel, with frequently only six inches of water under her keel, was unable to get within effective range of her guns,—daylight of the morning succeeding their arrival found the town and vessels of the Amayir Chief closely confronted with a formidable line of gunboats, in battle array, all ready to pour forth their contents should resistance be offered, or satisfaction denied; and the insolent tone of contumacy hitherto held by the haughty pirate was instantly changed into one of profound submission. He hastened to wait upon Captain Kemball, and to pray for mercy, and finished by surrendering his Buggalow\* as a pledge for the payment of the demands preferred against him.

Thus were brought to a successful issue, without loss of life, or bloodshed, the operations against Humeed bin Mujdell, which, though short in duration, when we consider the terrific heat of the sun in the month of June, the risk incurred by the vessels, and the exposure to which their crews were of necessity subjected, must be pronounced to have been both arduous and harassing.

We now revert to the rival chiefs.

In October 1845, a letter reached the Resident from Abdoolla bin Ahmed, intimating his intention to leave the Persian Coast, and proceed to Kateef, for the purpose of recommencing hostilities. Kateef was at that time held by a Wahabee Governor, Abdoolla bin Saeed, who, although professing feelings of amity for the Shaikhs of Bahrein, was well known to be secretly planning an attack upon their island. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the ex-chief, who had lately received intelligence from the Wahabee Ameer, was invited to join in common cause with the Kateef Governor, and repair to his neighbourhood, with a view to aid in displacing Mahomed bin Khaleefa. The bland demeanour and loud professions of friendship that were made by Abdoolla bin Saeed, in lieu of producing the desired effect upon the Uttoobee

\* The Buggalow was redeemed in the month of October 1845, by the payment of 2,059 Mahomed Shah rupees in hard coin, and the deposit of property to the value of the balance of 141 Mahomed Shah rupees.





Chief, appear to have roused his apprehensions, and led him to act with a singular degree of energy ; for not only did he positively refuse to acknowledge the sincerity of the Wahabee's advances, but he responded thereto by placing the ports of Kateef and Oojeer in a state of blockade. He also employed Humeed bin Mujdell as his recognised dependent, to assist him in the undertaking—an unwise and impolitic measure ; for however unscrupulous, however ready to perpetrate any act that might be required of him, such an ally as Humeed bin Mujdell could hardly fail to lead his superior into all manner of difficulty, either by actual deeds of violence upon those that should be friends, or by a sudden resistance to his master's authority. Indeed, when we carefully study the character of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and observe the tone of his behaviour towards those beneath him, we can neither praise his justice nor commend his policy. We have already seen him heaping favours innumerable upon the faithless Humeed bin Mujdell,—a creature of lawless impulse,—one ready to forsake his cause so soon as a likelihood of obtaining better favours from others lay spread before him ; and we presently find him receiving with the utmost formality and coldness a new and powerful ally, one richly deserving of reciprocation of friendship,—I allude to the noble Esai bin Tarif ; with so much coldness, indeed, that we are struck with astonishment at the length of time and the faithfulness with which he adhered to his master's cause.

While affairs were in this condition, Abdoolla bin Ahmed made a stealthy approach in the direction of Kateef, and, having landed a messenger at Tanoorah, despatched him with letters to his son Moobaruk, and to Abdoolla bin Saeed, informing them of his being in the vicinity, and telling them to be on the alert, and ready for action. He promised to decoy the blockading force away from Kateef, by feigning an attack upon their vessels, and enticing them to leave the port in pursuit of himself, at which favourable moment he hoped no difficulty would be experienced by his son in carrying the island of Bahrein. The plan was plausible enough, and might, perhaps, have succeeded : the letters, however, were never destined to reach the parties for whom they were intended ; they fell into the hands of the Amayir, who immediately carried them over to Shaikh Ali bin Khaleefa, and laid bare the plot that was about to be aimed at the overthrow of his brother. Preparations were set on foot without delay to withstand and defeat any attack that might be meditated on the island, and vessels were sent without the port, to waylay and oppose the advancing fleet of Abdoolla bin Ahmed. The latter made his appearance at the appointed time, but quickly found himself compelled to retire, for long ere reaching the port of Kateef he perceived the hostile armament sailing towards him. He withdrew, accordingly, with all the speed in





his power, and made good his escape from the hand of the enemy : and finding that all his plans were frustrated, he determined to visit Koweit, and there he arrived in safety, after effecting the seizure of a Bahrein Gooncha he fell in with on the way. When the Resident became acquainted with all the occurrences I have related, he wrote word to Mahomed bin Khaleefa, that for any acts of piracy that might be committed by Humeed bin Mujdell he would be held responsible by the British Government, that chief having become his constituted dependent, and therefore amenable to his authority. He also addressed the Shaikh of Koweit, expressing a hope that he would not permit the ex-chief to commit aggressions upon the trade of Bahrein so long as he remained within his territory.

Matters continued somewhat in the same condition (Shaikh Abdoolla  
 A. D. 1846.                      residing at Koweit, and Mahomed bin Khaleefa  
    keeping up the blockade of the ports of Kateef  
 and Oojeer) until the summer of 1846, when the Wahabee Governor of the former port (Kateef) had the presumption to address the Resident, telling him that unless he took measures to expel the Amayir Chief from the position he held, and made him restore a Gooncha and five boats he had seized belonging to people of Kateef, he would let loose the Beni Hajir and other tribes to commit all manner of piracy. By way of reply to the above threat, Abdoolla bin Saeed was honoured with a visit from two British cruisers, that were sent to warn him in a friendly manner of the treatment he might expect to receive should he dare to carry into execution his haughty menace.

At this juncture, too, the Persian Ministers seemed once more inclined to espouse the cause of Abdoolla bin Ahmed; and notwithstanding the distinct intimation they had received that interference by them with the affairs of the island of Bahrein would not be tolerated by the British Government in India, the Regent of Fars went so far as to invite the ex-chief in June 1846 to repair to Bushire, where, he assured him, he should be liberally entertained at the expense of His Highness, and could remain in peace and quiet until such time as his plans were matured, and the season for action had arrived. Whether or not His Majesty the Shah had any intention to revive his asserted right to the sovereignty of Bahrein, or whether the Regent of Fars had merely invited the ex-chief in hopes of being able to realize from him an amount of tribute, it is difficult to say, and also, from the turn that took place in affairs, a matter of but little importance; for Abdoolla bin Ahmed, influenced no doubt by the favourable reception he met with from Shaikh Jaubir (Chief of Koweit), and buoyed up, perhaps, with the expectation of assistance from that chief, did not seem





inclined to trust himself anew to Persian protection, knowing, as he did, that they neither could nor intended to support him. He therefore, in August 1846, politely declined the invitation he had received, and begged leave to inform His Highness that a combination of circumstances precluded his availing himself of the aid and hospitality he so graciously proffered.

In the month of September 1846, shortly after making the above refusal, he re-visited the neighbourhood of Kateef, and took up his quarters in the immediate vicinity of Demaum. His sudden re-appearance caused the blockade of the port of Kateef, that had of late been somewhat relaxed, to be strictly enforced again, and led to two engagements between the land forces of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa and the Kateef Governor, wherein, however, the ex-chief took no personal part, and which terminated pretty evenly for both the belligerents, the Bahrein Shaikh proving victorious on the one occasion, and Abdoolla bin Saeed on the other. Either party now applied to the Resident for permission to call in certain allies to join his cause, and in either case did the Resident refuse to comply. First came the Governor of Kateef, petitioning him in October 1846 to permit the Maritime Chiefs of Oman to aid him with their naval force against Mahomed bin Khaleefa. His request could not of course be granted: the British Government considered them all to be independent chiefs, and with one and all had they entered into treaties, whereby each one of their number bound himself to keep the peace, and not to disturb the tranquillity of the seas. Now it was plain that, if one party coalesced with the Governor of Kateef, and another with the Shaikh of Bahrein,—and this would infallibly happen,—they would wage war the one upon the other, and create maritime disorder. On such grounds did the Resident decline to permit any one of the Shaikhs to proceed to the assistance of Abdoolla bin Saeed, and for the same reasons, too, when Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa shortly after sought the help of the Shaikh of Debaye (November 1846), was a refusal of necessity given.

In the early part of the ensuing year (1847), at a time when Abdoolla bin Ahmed was quartered at Tirhoot, without any followers, and war was still raging between Kateef and Bahrein, a quarrel took place betwixt Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa and the Amayir Chief, which ended in the eventual secession of the latter from his master's authority. Some of his principal men went over to Nujd to make their peace with the Wahabee ruler; others opened a correspondence with the Governor of Kateef, in order to effect a reconciliation with him;—the whole, in fact, of the Amayir Tribe

A. D. 1847.





forsook the cause of the Bahrein Chief, and united themselves to the Wahabees, which caused Mahomed bin Khaleefa to address the Resident, informing him that Humeed bin Mujdell, having renounced his allegiance, he could no longer be held responsible for any irregularities that chief might think fit to commit.

Somewhat later in the season (August), an amicable arrangement was entered into between Ameer Fysul and the ruler of Bahrein, by the terms of which the Ameer pledged himself, although he took Abdoolla bin Ahmed under his protection, and gave him asylum at Lahsa, not to aid or abet the ex-chief in any measures he might be pleased to adopt with a view to the re-establishment of his own authority. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa engaged on his side to pay the Wahabee the sum of 4,000 dollars; and thus for a time terminated the protracted struggle between the Shaikh of Bahrein and the people of Ameer Fysul.

Scarcely, however, had Abdoolla bin Ahmed taken up his abode at Lahsa, under the wing of the Ameer, than his discontented spirit began once more to cry aloud, and to crave a fresh recurrence to mischief. He suddenly left the place, and returned to Demaum, where he launched one of his vessels, with the supposed intention of proceeding to Kenn, for the purpose of entering into a confederacy with the discontented Uttoobees on that island against Mahomed bin Khaleefa. The fears of the latter chief were at once revived: his mind, never at ease, became haunted with pictures of nought but attacks and conspiracies to depose him; nor were those fears relieved by the unlooked for defection of his dependent, Esai bin Tarif, who took offence at some proceeding on the part of his master, formed a coalition with "his former deadly enemy, the ex-chief, and demanded from Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa the restoration of the vessels and possessions of his grand uncle, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed."

Preparations were set on foot by either party for an immediate recourse to maritime hostilities, and a collision would no doubt have ensued, had it not been for the opportune arrival of Commodore Lowe, in the *Elphinstone*, who placed an interdict upon any engagement at sea until the sanction of the Resident had been fully obtained. In due course of time this permission was granted, and hostilities commenced. An engagement took place on the mainland near Fowarit, between the troops of Esai bin Tarif and those of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, the latter commanded by the Shaikh in person, which ended fatally to the Al Ali side, who lost their chief, and were signally defeated. Whatever prospects of success might have been hitherto held by Abdoolla bin Ahmed must now have been effectually blasted, for not only was he deprived of the services of a strong and powerful ally by the





death of Esai bin Tarif, but he had violated his engagement to the Resident, by proceeding to the Persian Coast in quest of reinforcements, and thereby forfeited all right to prosecute warfare against Bahrein, and rendered his vessels liable to seizure by the British cruisers.

Previous to the action above referred to, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa had expressed to the Resident, in the strongest terms, the apprehension he felt lest an attack should be made upon his island by the confederate chiefs, and had sought permission either to proceed against the Uttoobees located on the island of Ges, and bring them back to submission, or to be furnished with a guarantee that no aggression on their part against his possessions would be tolerated by the British Government. These were questions, in the opinion of the Resident, of too great weight and importance to permit of a reply being given before consulting the opinion of higher authority, and were therefore referred for the decision of Government, who wrote back instructions, that in the event of any attempts being made upon Bahrein, such attempts were to be resisted by the naval force in the Gulf. Intelligence of such vital importance to the interests of the Bahrein Chief it was not deemed advisable to communicate, for Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, once more relieved from apprehensions by the death of Esai bin Tarif, and by the utter failure of all Abdoolla bin Ahmed's endeavours to induce the Uttoobee refugees in Ges to espouse his side, it was thought that were he once assured of support from the British in the hour of danger, he would be lulled into a state of security, and cease to trouble himself with the adoption of measures necessary for the defence of his territories.

We now arrive at a point in our narrative more than usually interesting.

The small but fruitful island of Bahrein appears at different seasons to have excited in an extraordinary degree the ambitious desires of divers nations. His Majesty the Shah, or the authorities under him, we have already seen, had on two separate occasions manifested an inclination to assert a right of supremacy over it; the Imaum of Muskat has from time immemorial longed and craved to possess the fertile spot; and now we find the Turkish authorities intriguing, and seeking to induce Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa to renounce his state of independence, and own his allegiance to the Ottoman Porte. A letter was addressed by the Mootasellim of Bussora to the above chief, inviting him to acknowledge his dependence on the Sultan, and to "furnish lists of his vessels, crews, &c., in order that the requisite registers might be prepared and forwarded." A Turkish brig of war, too, visited the Gulf, and although she did not actually repair to Bahrein, the better perhaps





to conceal her designs, still there seemed no doubt that an effort was being made by the Porte to extend its influence over the Arab Tribes in the Persian Gulf. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa sent, it is true, an evasive reply to the communication he had received from the Mootasellim of Bussora; but yet, from the tenor of a conversation held by him with the Resident, complaining that double duties had been levied from the vessels of his subjects and dependents by the custom house authorities at Bombay, and urging that no such demand had been made upon the ships of those who owned allegiance either to the Shah or the Imaum of Muskat,—that unless the British authorities therefore refrained from enforcing extra fees and customs from his people, he would be compelled to follow the example of the Shaikh of Koweit, and place himself under the guardianship of the Porte,—it became manifest, that if the British Government in India wished to preserve their paramount influence in the Persian waters they must adopt measures to rectify the present irregularities, by coming to a speedy understanding with the Bahrein Chief.

The harbour fees, &c. alluded to by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa had been levied in consequence of his vessels not being furnished with the requisite passes; yet, to show him how unwilling the British authorities were in any way to alienate or estrange his affections, the amounts were subsequently refunded, and he was informed that for the future all Bahrein vessels leaving the Gulf must be provided with registers, signed by the Resident, "else would they render themselves liable to the extra duties levied on foreign vessels entering Bombay harbour."

The Resident, too, was instructed to ascertain the feelings of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and whether or not he was inclined to enter into a closer connection with the British; also to avoid as far as practicable all discussion with the Turkish authorities relative to the designs they had in view of establishing a supremacy over the island, as the matter was being referred for the decision and judgment of the Home authorities.

The Persian Consul at Bagdad wrote strong letters of encouragement to Abdoolla bin Ahmed, assuring him of the support of the Shah towards the re-establishment of himself in his lost dominions, and begging him to make every preparation for carrying into effect the plans he might have in contemplation,—however momentous, however gigantic,—Persian assistance, full and powerful, would most surely be accorded him. Another letter did the same functionary address to the ruling Shaikh of the island, teeming with false assurances of friendship and amity; urging upon him in the blandest terms the great feeling of interest felt by His Majesty the Shah in his prosperity





and welfare,—a letter, in fact, one tissue of falsehoods,—neither more nor less than a ruse to blind and mislead the understanding of the self-sufficient Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa.

These attacks upon Bahrein independence were duly represented to the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, who wrote in reply that Meerza Abdool Jabbur (Persian Consul at Bagdad), in perfect ignorance of the relations existing between the ruler of Bahrein and the British Government, had thought it a clear matter of duty on his part to do all in his power to further the views of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who, from the day of his downfall, had been treated with so much consideration and respect by the Persian Government, but that now he was aware of the interest taken in Bahrein by the British State, he would abstain from further interference with the affairs of the island. Not many months after this had occurred, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa himself expressed a wish to the Resident that Bahrein should be taken under British protection. The Resident, who had been called upon to give his opinion as to the advisability or otherwise of entering into an alliance with the rulers of that island, had in the outset inclined against the measure; but the spontaneous offer of allegiance now preferred by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, combined with other circumstances, led that officer to alter his opinion, and to recommend the immediate acceptance of the proffer made by the chief. After much consideration, however, the Government of India, considering it inexpedient to make any alteration in the character of the relations then subsisting between the British Government and the Chief of Bahrein, and the Home Government concurring in that view, the Resident at Bushire was in September 1849 directed to decline the offer of the Chief of Bahrein, assuring him at the same time of the continuance of the good will and friendship of the British Government. In this wise terminated the long discussion, protracted over a period of more than two years, respecting the proposed alliance with the Shaikh of Bahrein.

A few occurrences worthy of notice have been of necessity passed over during the relation of other matters that engrossed our attention, and must be briefly described ere passing on to the consideration of future events.

At the latter end of the preceding year, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa made an unsuccessful attempt to induce the Shaikh of Charrak to expel from Kenn the Bahrein fugitives who had taken refuge on that island. He also behaved most improperly in the matter of one Khaleefa, of the Gubeysat Tribe, who committed a number of piracies,—amongst others, one upon a vessel belonging to his own dependents,—and who, although detained by the Shaikh for a time, at the instance of





the British Agent was eventually set at liberty, ere a reply to a reference made on the subject by Hajee Jassim had been received. This proceeding being, in point of fact, nothing more or less than a direct violation of an agreement entered into with the British Agent, was strongly condemned by Colonel Hennell, and led to a humble apology being offered by the Shaikh for his unfaithful conduct, together with a promise that he would do his utmost to seize and detain both Khaleefa and his vessel.

From the day that Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa had assumed the reins of government, his mind had been one continued succession of hopes and fears; and no sooner had he been relieved from some heavy weight of anxiety or impending calamity, than the clouds were again observed to gather, and fresh troubles assailed him.

About this period occurred the death, at Muskat, of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who had touched at that port on his way to Zanzibar, whither he was proceeding on a visit to his once deadly enemy, the Imaum of Muskat, hoping to be able to prevail upon His Highness to aid him in the recovery of his lost possessions. Such an occurrence as this tended, no doubt, greatly to dissipate the fears entertained by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa. The relief, however, was not of long duration, for four of the principal merchants of the Bahrein island, disgusted, it was said, with the arbitrary proceedings of the Shaikh, had in January 1849 secretly fled to the Persian Coast, and, taking up their quarters upon the island of Kenn, united themselves to the disaffected Uttoobees, who, already strong in numbers, being joined by parties of such weight and influence as these, became a most formidable enemy, and increased the alarm of the Shaikh to so great an extent that he deputed his brother, Shaikh Ali, to Bushire, to seek aid and advice from the Resident. Shaikh Ali was told, on arrival, that although the British Government would never permit of an expedition being organised from the Persian Coast for the purpose of attacking Bahrein, and the British cruisers would most assuredly seize or destroy any armed vessels found proceeding with such intent, yet, there being many and distant calls for the services of the vessels of the squadron, it was highly necessary that Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa should keep a strict look-out, and be well prepared to resist any sudden or unexpected attack that might, perchance, be made upon his territories during the absence of the ships of war. The Resident also strongly counselled him to strive, by conciliatory measures, to induce the seceders to return and settle upon the island. How far he followed the advice of the Resident does not appear, but through the intervention of that officer was a reconciliation subsequently effected between the Shaikh of Bahrein and Yoosof bin Ibrahim, the most influential of the four merchants who seceded from the





island. This person, together with two other seceders (Shaikh Mahomed bin Saeed, and Shaikh Jassim bin Mahomed), were conveyed to Bahrein by one of the British vessels, and, after some discussion and hesitation, matters were, in June 1849, amicably arranged between Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa and themselves.

In the following year (1850) a piracy was committed by some Bedouins of the Huwajir Tribe upon a Gooncha of Karraek. Towards the close of the month of

A. D. 1850.

June, the latter vessel "left Karrack with a crew of six men, and a cargo of wheat and barley, for Kateef." On arrival off Ras Tanoora, Abdool Rahman, her Nakhoda, was suddenly attacked by a party of twenty-six of the Huwajir Tribe, who were returning to their country in a Bahrein Buggarah, and, after a show of resistance, was compelled to surrender up his boat and people to the mercy of the pirates, who took them to the mainland, and stripped them of all they possessed.

The Resident had frequently warned the Chief of Bahrein that for any piratical acts committed by the Bedouins of the Huwajir Tribe he would be held responsible by the British Government, for not only had he connected himself by marriage with the people of that tribe, but he permitted them to frequent Bahrein in considerable numbers, and was, moreover, known to be secretly encouraging them in the prosecution of their lawless proceedings. Demands were accordingly made upon Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa for the payment of 100 Tomans, by way of compensation to the Nakhoda and crew, and instructions were issued to Commodore Porter to communicate with the chief, and point out to him the necessity of an immediate compliance with the Resident's requisitions. No measures of coercion proved necessary on this occasion, for notwithstanding the constant assertions of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa that he did not consider himself answerable for the acts of the Huwajir Tribe, he paid over without demur the 100 Tomans required from him, and brought the matter to a speedy settlement.

Scarcely had he adjusted the affair, however, apparently too with less reluctance than he was wont to display in cases of demands being preferred against him, than he suddenly plunged into the other extreme, and adopted a line of behaviour at once insolent and inexcusable towards the British Government. He received a number of letters from the Resident on the subject of certain complaints he had made to the British Agent regarding the death of one of his subjects, and at the contents of those communications he took offence, and sent back messages to Colonel Hennell, through Hajee Jassim, of the most "insulting and unbecoming character";—messages applying not only to himself in person, but reflecting upon the British Go-






vernment also. Explanation was demanded, and a ship of war despatched for the purpose of receiving the explanation. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, repenting the hastiness of his conduct, deputed his brother, Shaikh Ali, to Bushire, to offer his humblest apologies, and to crave the Resident's forgiveness. The Resident declared his willingness (October 1850) to forgive all that had been said so far as concerned himself alone, but as the expressions used by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa "bore reference to the British Government as well as to himself, Colonel Hennell considered it due to the dignity of the former, that on the first occasion of the Commodore proceeding to Bahrein the Uttoobee Chief should visit him on board his ship, and personally express his regret that anything incautiously spoken by himself, in a moment of irritation, should have been considered offensive or disrespectful to the British Government; and to this suggestion Shaikh Ali readily consented on the part of his brother."

We are now on the eve of great events,—of disturbances that again arose between Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa and the Wahabee Ameer. Fresh complications are presented to our view;—new disorders, in new shapes and new forms, of so violent and so dangerous a character, at this period occurred, that the Bahrein island was convulsed, and well nigh falling a prey to the combined attacks upon its independence.

Some three years before, it will be remembered, a peace was concluded between the Uttoobee Chief and Ameer Fysul. This peace had run a course smooth and uninterrupted, either party adhering to the terms whereunto he had pledged himself, until the present time, when divers matters transpired to engender a feeling of jealousy and enmity, which shortly after led to a rupture.

In the month of April 1850, Syud bin Mootluk repaired to the neighbourhood of Bahrein, and, on arrival, deputed his son on a visit to Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who received his guest with the utmost formality and coldness, and permitted him to leave the island without showing him the slightest mark of honour or respect. However imprudent such an act on the part of the Shaikh may have been,—however likely to be attended with grave results,—we cannot with justice blame his conduct; for only a short time previous to this occurrence Mahomed bin Abdool Raheem had been sent by Ameer Fysul on a mission to Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and every attention, every show of distinction had been heaped upon the envoy, who quitted Bahrein loaded with presents, and highly elated with the treatment he had experienced. These presents, these favours, one and all did they rob him of, when he returned to Kateef, and by order of the Ameer they confined Mahomed bin Abdool Raheem for having accepted the





gifts above mentioned. It was not likely, therefore, that Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, after such insults as these had been offered to his dignity,—after such indignities had been heaped upon one he had honoured, and merely because it was he that had honoured him,—would be eager to receive with grace or courtesy persons that might in future be deputed to his island on the part of the Wahabees. Shaikh Mahomed bin Kaleefa, when the above affronts occurred, remonstrated strongly with the Ameer, and went so far as to threaten to blockade the port of Kateef unless the envoy he had caused to be imprisoned were at once released, and unless fitting apologies were made for the unwarrantable acts he had been guilty of.

Such was the posture of affairs in the spring of 1850, and in such a position did they remain until the commencement of the ensuing year, when dangers began to thicken, and Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa to tremble for the integrity of his dominions. Ameer Fysul arrived within two stages of Biddah; the inhabitants of the towns on the Guttur Coast (Fuwarit, Wukra, Doah, &c.) deserted the side of the Bahrein ruler, and went over to that of the Wahabee; negotiations that had for a long period been carried on, through the intervention of the Resident, to strive and induce the sons of the ex-chief to accept an annual allowance, and abide peaceably on the island of Kenn, had utterly failed;—indeed in the month of July affairs had reached a crisis truly imminent. Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, against his better judgment, had made offers to the Ameer of compromising matters, by the payment of a small yearly tribute, and these offers had been rejected with scorn, and replied to by demands of an exorbitant character; the sons of the ex-chief had been invited to leave the Persian Coast, and join the Wahabee.

It is needless entering further into detail on this matter; suffice it to say, that in the end of July 1851 a peace was concluded, through the good offices of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, between Ameer Fysul and Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa. The fort of Biddah, too, was handed back to Shaikh Ali bin Khaleefa, and the Wahabee Ameer returned to Lahsa.

The rest of our narrative, though extending over a period of more than two years, can be told in the fewest words. It comprises scarcely anything new, but is a mere repetition of olden scenes and olden fears. We have the launching of Buteels and the expectation of attacks; seeking the Resident's advice, and speaking disparagingly of him for giving advice; the oppression of subjects, and the flight of the oppressed; the deputing of envoys, armed with full powers, to effect agreements, and the return of the envoys, to be censured for the agree-





ments they had effected ;—such, and such only, is the character of the doings of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa during the remaining portion of this narrative ; and having already entered so fully into detail on the subject of the occurrences that took place during his late struggle with the Wahabees, and other foes, and as it is chiefly with the same foes that we have still to deal, it can hardly be necessary to do more than describe with the utmost brevity the few facts that remain to be told.

The peace so happily concluded during the summer of 1851 was in danger of being again disturbed early in the  
 A. D. 1852.                      ensuing year, by the precipitate conduct of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, who commenced complaining aloud, and bitterly inveighing against Ameer Fysul, for locating the surviving sons of Abdoolla bin Ahmed on the island of Demaum. He would not, he said, so long as they remained in the above locality, disburse one farthing of tribute ; he would not allow himself to be trifled with, either by his kinsmen or by the Wahabee. Matters began once more to wear an unsettled appearance, and might in the end have proved serious, had not Captain Kemball, the Acting Resident, strongly counselled him to adopt a conciliatory rather than an arrogant tone of behaviour,—“to disarm rather than defy the Wahabee.” His brother, Shaikh Ali, too, a chief in every sense more temperate and wise than himself, did all in his power to restrain him, and succeeded, by dint of argument, in persuading him to pay the instalment of tribute that had now become due, and which a person on the part of the Ameer had been deputed to receive. The storm blew over, and for a short period the Uttoobee Chief showed more than his usual discretion. He deputed envoys to Bushire, to represent to the Resident the fears he entertained that a powerful combination was being secretly formed against him ; that the Imaum of Muskat was planning an attack upon his island ; that Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, not long since an ally, as also his recusant kinsmen, one and all were ready to join the league, with a view to ensure his downfall. These fears Captain Kemball in a great measure contrived to dissipate, but at the same time he advised the chief in no way to relax his efforts in defence of his territories ; that although he did not actually apprehend that contingencies such as he foretold would arise, yet was it highly incumbent upon him to be well prepared to resist any sudden attack that might perchance be made on his territories.

Other matters there were, submitted by the envoys : they revived the subject of accommodation proposed to be effected between their superior, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and the sons of the ex-chief ; they solicited the Resident's good offices to strive and induce Yoosoof bin Ibrahim to return and reside upon their island.

In reply, Captain Kemball commenced by expressing his surprise and





astonishment at the treatment he had so lately experienced at the hands of the Chief of Bahrein. That chief, said the Resident, had begged and craved his interposition to bring about an amicable settlement between himself and his recusant kinsmen; that chief had, in the presence of the British Agent, made use of expressions both uncalled for and disrespectful to himself,—the British representative.

To sum up in a few words:—Shaikh Ali, the last and most influential of the envoys deputed, after being reminded of the insulting language that had been held by his brother, supplied a written document, specifying that to such and such terms would Shaikh Mahomed agree, and in such and such places would he permit his kinsmen to reside; he also begged the Resident to forget the past, and accede to interest himself in his brother's behalf.


Captain Kemball, notwithstanding the wayward demeanour of Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, being placed in possession of the exact terms that were to be offered, and thinking the general interests of peace would be benefited by an amicable settlement, agreed to sound the feelings of the sons of the late Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and, if possible, without however in any way compromising the British Government, to effect an arrangement. The Uttoobee Chief had no sooner ascertained the particulars of the interview held by his brother with the Resident, and become acquainted with the favourable issue of his mission, than he showed a disposition to withdraw from the terms that had been agreed upon. It is scarcely necessary to add that no accommodation was eventually effected; the sons of the late Abdoolla bin Ahmed continued to reside at Demaum, where they were kindly, and even liberally entertained by the Wahabee ruler.

One more point remains to be noticed. Yoosoof bin Ibrahim refused to return to his home, unless the Resident would promise "to shield him from future molestation"; and as Captain Kemball would not consent for an instant to such a proposal, the idea of a return was banished from his mind for ever.

Shaikh Yoosoof continued for a length of time to reside at Bushire, and subsequently left for Lingah, where, in the summer of the year 1853, he fell sick and died.

A. D. 1853.









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HISTORICAL SKETCH  
OF THE  
WAHABEE TRIBE OF ARABS;  
FROM THE YEAR 1795 TO THE YEAR 1818.

PREPARED BY  
MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,  
MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY.

WITH  
CONTINUATIONS OF THE SAME,  
FROM THE YEAR 1819 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,  
BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL;   
FROM 1832 TO AUGUST 1844,  
BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;   
AND FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,  
BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;  
SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

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## WAHABEES.

THIS sect was founded about the year 1615, by an Arab of the name of Shaikh Mahomed, the son of Abdool Wahab, whose name they have taken. Shaikh Mahomed connected himself, in the attempt to reform the religion of his country, with Ebin Saood, the Prince of Deriah, the capital of the province of Nujd. Through the efforts of the saint, and the aid of the temporal power of Ebin Saood, and his son and successor Abdool Azeez, the religion of the Wahabees was established all over the peninsula of Arabia. The leading principle of the sect is to destroy and plunder all who differ from them; and those Mahomedans who do not adopt their creed were represented as far less entitled to mercy than either Jews or Christians. The first mention made of this in the Bombay records is in the year 1787.

2. Abdool Wahab, the Shaikh, inhabited the Desert about eight days' journey westward of the town of Kateef, on the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf.

3. Urged by the tenets of their religion, they had long threatened to destroy all those who acknowledged and followed the religious precepts of the Prophet. The Montific, Beni Khalid, and Anisa Arabs collected in that year a large force, under the command of Shaikh Tweney, of the first-mentioned tribe, and proceeded on an expedition against the Wahabees; it was not attended, however, with any advantage.

4. The Wahabee Shaikh had before 1795, in prosecution of his ambitious views, taken Lahsa, annihilated the power of the Beni Khalid Arabs, and threatened Bussora. The fears of the Turkish Government of Bagdad were excited by these events.

5. An Arab force was detached by the Pacha against the Wahabees, under the command of Shaikh Tweney, who, having been killed in an action on the 3rd July, led to the failure of the expedition. Preparations were however made by the Pacha for the prosecution of the war during the course of the winter.





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6. It was not, however, until the following year, that the Kia Pacha proceeded with a large army on an expedition against Lahsa and Deriah, the principal towns belonging to the Wahabees; and with the view also of observing the conduct of several Arab Tribes inhabiting the country between Bussora and the south-eastern shore of the Persian Gulf, the predatory incursions of the Wahabee Arabs having extended to the banks of the Euphrates, and the vicinity of Hilla, situated on that river, fifty miles from Bagdad.

A. D. 1798.

7. On the Pacha's arrival at Moghil, on the 2nd of December, great preparations were made by the Musleem for co-operating in the expedition, in which the Bussora, Grane, and Montific Arabs were to join. Bussora was at this time threatened by the Imaum of Muskat, on account of some ancient claims on the Pacha of Bagdad; and to enable him to execute his hostile intentions, the Imaum had negotiated a peace with his formidable enemy, Suggur bin Rashid, the Joasmee Chief.

8. The Pacha of Bagdad remonstrated against the conduct of the Imaum to our Resident, through whose mediation a satisfactory accommodation took place between the Pacha, the Imaum, and the Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma.

9. The Turkish troops having proceeded against the Wahabees, a battle was on the eve of being fought, when Abdool Azeez, the son of the Wahabee Shaikh, who commanded the Wahabee force, heard of the death of his father; an event which threw his troops into the greatest consternation, and drove him to the extremity of submitting to proposals of peace, which was ultimately concluded, when the Turkish army returned to Bagdad.

A. D. 1799.

10. Abdool Azeez, having succeeded his father as Shaikh of the Wahabees, now threatened to invade Oman. Syud Sultan proceeded to Julfar (Ras-ool-Khyma), where he joined Shaikh Suggur, the Joasmee Chief, with the view of opposing the attack, which was, however, arrested by a peace concluded between the Wahabees and the Imaum.

A. D. 1800.

11. The influence of Abdool Azeez in the following year was established over the Uttoobee Arabs. On the conquest of Bahrein by the Imaum, the Uttoobee Shaikhs quitted the island, and proceeded with their followers to Zobara, and solicited the protection of the Wahabee Shaikh, who encouraged them to settle at that place, for the purpose of employing them against Bahrein, in the recovery of which he assisted the Uttoobees in the beginning of 1802.

A. D. 1801.





12. The Wahabee troops again appeared near Oman, having compelled the wild Arabs in the vicinity to join them.

A. D. 1802.

They had at this period reduced to nominal submission the whole coast from Bussora river to Deba, which is the boundary between the Muskat and Joasmee territories, and, if allowed to strengthen themselves in their acquisitions, they would, it was apprehended, commence the same depredations by sea as they were prosecuting on shore. A conviction of this danger had united the mercantile powers in the Gulf against the sect.

13. The measures which the Wahabee Chief was actively prosecuting for the extension of his power and possessions, and the propagation of his doctrines, derived considerable support from the success of an expedition against Kerbelah, which he attacked on the 21st of April, pillaged the whole of it (the Mehallah or division of Abbas alone excepted), and plundered the Tomb of Hossein, slaying in the course of the day, with circumstances of peculiar cruelty, above five thousand of the inhabitants. This event, which made a deep impression on the minds of the Turks, Arabs, and Persians, was attributed to the guilty negligence of the Turkish Government, in failing to keep the Tomb of Hossein in a proper state of defence.

14. Unable to check their progress, the Imaum in 1803 acceded to

a truce of three years, with the Wahabee, who

A. D. 1803.

had succeeded in converting, or rendering tributary to his power, the Arabs who inhabited the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf.

15. This truce left the Wahabee Chief at liberty to prosecute his ambitious views of aggrandisement, which were next directed to the reduction of Medina and Mecca. The latter he soon reduced, having however previously attacked and taken Taif, which he converted from a fertile region to an absolute desert. He next invested Jedda, which having reduced to great distress, the Imaum succeeded in purchasing a truce for the sum of one lakh and forty thousand dollars. On the fall of Mecca and Yamboo, the extensive adjoining country submitted to the Wahabee, who was now in possession of nearly the whole sea coast on the western frontier of Arabia.

16. Returning from his victorious career in that quarter of Arabia, Abdool Azeez prepared, notwithstanding the three years' truce he had entered into with the Imaum, for the invasion of Oman by land and sea,—a detachment of his troops had already entered the province, and advanced within two days' journey of Burka, the summer residence of the Imaum of Muskat. Captain Seton observed on this occasion, that if the Wahabee reduced Oman, all Arabia must submit to his power, and the whole coast would become a nest of pirates, who would extend





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their depredations to India; of which there was some danger, as the Imaum had disgusted all his commanders, and stood alone.

17. The conquest of Oman was probably arrested by the murder of the Wahabee Shaikh early in the month of November, in his capital at Deriah, whilst at his evening prayers, in a public place of worship, surrounded by his own immediate adherents, by a religious fanatic, who was immediately killed by them.

18. Saood, the son of Abdool Azeez, succeeded his father as the head of the Wahabee Tribe.

A. D. 1804-05.

19. On the death of Syud Sultan, the Imaum of Muskat, which occurred in the latter end of 1804, the influence of the Wahabees prevailed over Muskat, and we find Saood interfering between the competitors for the government, but throwing the weight of his power in the scale in favour of Beder.

20. In the month of April 1806 Saood took the field, with about fifty thousand men. He first plundered the Dufeeh, and then the Anisa, and proceeded to Meshid Ali, on which he made an unsuccessful attack, and afterwards upon Semowka, from which he was also repulsed, with severe loss.

A. D. 1806.

21. In the following month, Bussora was thrown into the greatest consternation, by the appearance of the Wahabees near Zobeer, only a few miles from the gates of the town. Fortunately the Desert was at the time overflowed to its very walls, and Saood's troops, being in great distress, and having a number of wounded with them, no attempt was made against the place.

22. The Persian and Turkish Governments relaxing in their efforts to check the rise of the Wahabee power, the Imaum of Muskat having lost the influence which Syud Sultan had established over its dependent Shaikhs, and become entirely friendless, and the British deeming it a wiser policy to observe a strict neutrality as far as regarded the views of that sect, its preponderance was completely established in the year 1808, in Oman.

A. D. 1807-08.

By attacking the weaker singly, and compelling them to join his standard against their neighbours, the Wahabee gradually increased his power to a height which enabled him to overawe the greater States. The revenues of the upper part of Oman were paid to Saood, and it was only by a degrading submission that the Imaum prevented their inroads into the low country; he had appointed his own officers in the districts of the principality of Seer, and compelled the Joasmee Chief to abandon his country.





23. It was under the influence of that ascendancy that the Joasmees extended their cruises to India, and in the month of April 1808 they first made their appearance in these seas, to the northward of Bombay. The Wahabees had long contemplated that object. Saood had established a new power, the Zahib Tribe, in the tract of country from Musseldom to Ramse, and had greatly added to his strength by taking from the Joasmees the two strong forts of Feguera and Bithnay. Their Shaikh, Hussein bin Ali, a Joasmee, who was the Chief of Ramse also, was called to Deriah.

24. Hussein bin Ali having been conciliated to the support of the Wahabee, was appointed his vicegerent in the Seer principality, with authority to compel the heads of the Joasmees residing at Lingah and Ras-ool-Khyma to send their vessels to sea in conjunction with those from Ramse, and to cruise in the service of the Wahabee Shaikh against all vessels, without exception, appearing in the Gulf, reserving one-fifth as his share of the pirated property, the remainder being divided among the captors. This systematic plan of piracy created such a degree of fear of the power of the Wahabees among all the tribes of Arabs within the scope of it, that whatever might be their inclinations, they must either join Hussein bin Ali or expose themselves to the cruelty and vengeance of Saood. No dependence could under such circumstances be in prudence placed on the assurances of a pacific disposition given by any Arab inhabiting the shores of the Persian Gulf, for they were no longer free agents, and the exertion of power on the part of the British Government in India could alone give a full and effectual security to vessels in future visiting the ports of Bushire and Bussora.

25. Nor could any dependence whatever be placed at this period in the Government of Muskat, since, however much it was against the interests of the Imaum, it was apprehended that he also would be obliged to join in the general piracy, unless the British Government relieved Muskat from the pressure of all that side of Arabia employed by the Wahabees to reduce that seaport. Agents whom the Imaum had deputed to Deriah, to claim the restitution of Shinas and other forts taken from the Vali of Sohar, were ill received by Saood, and were detained until the Imaum ordered his vessels against Bussora, or gave proof of his attachment to the Mussulman cause by sending a predatory expedition to India, and threatening to visit Muskat in person on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca.

26. The common danger that threatened Oman, and the oppressions of the Wahabees, led to the manifestation of a disposition in the several Shaikhs to unite in a confederacy against Saood. They anxiously looked, however, to the British Government for assistance, to enable





them to recover the places on the sea shore near Musseldom dismembered from Sohar, which would reduce the defence of the country to one point, the passage across the isthmus. It was important to obtain that object before the return of Saood from Mecca; and it would give the Omanees sufficient time to unite and assemble for their general defence, encourage them to advance to meet the enemy, as they would be secured from attacks in their rear, whilst Saood's return might be delayed by a feint demonstration of an intention of attacking Bussora;—the active co-operation of the Arab States could be depended upon, and would render success certain and easy; but if the spirit of resistance which had displayed itself was allowed to be stifled by the unresisted power of the Wahabees, the trade of the two Gulfs must be annihilated, and that on the Malabar Coast, Kutch, Sind, and Guzerat exposed to constant depredations from a desperate and fanatic enemy.

27. The expedition to the Gulf, which was determined upon as well for the relief of Muskat as for the suppression of the Joasmees, was conducted with a degree of caution and of forbearance towards the Wahabee Chief which rendered its results efficacious but for a short period. Notwithstanding it was indisputable that the Joasmees Arabs were under the control of Wahabee officers, and compelled to engage in piratical depredations, "all operations by land were to be avoided, otherwise than might be momentarily necessary for the more effectual destruction of the pirate vessels in their harbours; and in any case Captain Seton was to be careful to make it in due time fully known to the Wahabee, and the officers of his Government, that it was our sincere wish to continue at all times on terms of friendship with him and with the other States of Arabia (which were all in subjection to the Wahabee), desiring only to provide for the security of the general commerce of the seas, and of the Gulf of Persia in particular, so long and so unjustifiably interrupted by the Joasmees, in breach, also, of a positive treaty concluded with their chief in 1806\*; the motives and objects of our interposition involving no views of aggrandisement on our part, but being altogether limited to the repression of maritime depredations (such as is equally condemned by the professors of every religion), and the just support of our ally the Imaum of Muskat cannot reasonably give offence to any other State or Government."

28. Before the armament sailed from Bombay, the confederacy that was forming against the Wahabees was brought to some degree of maturity, for we find the Imaum preparing an expedition on a large scale, which was to be

A. D. 1809-10.

\* The chief had abandoned the country, disclaiming all countenance to a concern in the attack of the *Sylph* cruiser in 1809, and professing a desire to maintain the treaty in question. The Joasmees were at this time under Hussein bin Ali, the Wahabee vicegerent.





joined by four thousand men from Bushire. Their avowed object was the attack of Khor Hassan, and the destruction of its Chief, Jillama. Another of its objects was stated to be against Hussein bin Ali, the Wahabee vicegerent in the Joasmee country, the malcontent Joasmees having invited the Imaum to make the attempt, which they had engaged to support. The Uttoobees and Persians co-operated in this expedition, which terminated without accomplishing anything.

29. No notice appears to have been taken by the Wahabee Shaikh of our attack on Ras-ool-Khyma. In the month of April, however, information was received of his troops being in the vicinity of Muskat, plundering the territories, attacking the possessions, and destroying the date plantations of the Imaum. They had taken post at Swadee Mooal, about forty miles from Burka, where they maintained an obstinate conflict with the Imaum's troops for thirteen days, and had afterwards proceeded to the attack of Ismaylee, in the defence of which it was acknowledged His Highness lost two hundred of his troops. The Imaum solicited the aid of the British Government, which was declined, with the view of not giving ground of offence to the Wahabees.

30. We have now to notice the events which led to the downfall of the Wahabees, which was as rapid as their ascent, by the successful progress of the Turkish troops under Mahomed Ali Pacha.

A. D. 1811-12.

31. After entering Jedda and Mecca without opposition, Abdoolla the son of Saood, who was the governor of the latter city, abandoned it with the whole of his troops, on the approach of the Turkish force. Mahomed Ali sent a detachment against Taif, the only place that remained in the hands of the Wahabees, whose power over that part of Arabia was thus early completely annihilated.

32. The successful progress of the Turkish troops led the Wahabee Chief to collect his adherents, and to concentrate his forces: with that view he withdrew their garrisons from Zobara, Kateef, Lahsa, Khor Hassan, and Khutter.

33. At about this period Rahmah bin Jaubir, the Shaikh of Khor Hassan, having entered into a connection with the Wahabees, took, in conjunction with that power, possession of Zobara, from the Uttoobees, who were also obliged to surrender the island of Bahrein to the same political ascendancy. Abdoolla bin Oofeyan was appointed the Wahabee Vukeel over those places, exclusive of the districts of Kateef and Khutter. The Uttoobees remained in charge of the administration of affairs, but were obliged to pay tribute to Abdoolla on account of the Wahabees.

34. The reverse of fortune which the Wahabees experienced led to overtures which were made by the chief to the different powers in the





Gulf. He deputed an envoy (Ibrahim bin Abdoolla Kureem) to the Governor of Fars, with the view of conciliating his friendship, and to prevail on the Persian Government to postpone the march of a force it meditated against the Wahabees, which had alarmed Abdoolla bin Saood. The mission was well received; the Persian Government, in fact, did not possess the means requisite for attacking the Wahabees, as her ports on the coast were at this time more under the influence of the chief of that sect than her own. Whilst, therefore, it was politic in Persia not to disclose its own weakness, it was equally so in Saood to use every means to prevent the chance of an attack from the Persian side of the Gulf, which the reverses he had experienced rendered him very ill able to resist.

35. On Abdool Kureem's return from Shiraz, he waited on Mr. Bruce, and communicated the anxiety of his master to form a connection with the British Government of mutual amity and friendship, such as might be beneficial to both States, and that the ports of each nation might be open to each other, and a free and unmolested trade be carried on by their subjects. These overtures having been submitted to Bengal, the Supreme Government deemed it inexpedient to negotiate any treaty, or to form any intimate connection with the Wahabee Chief-tain, but considered it politic to maintain a friendly intercourse with him, and to endeavour, by a cordial and conciliatory conduct, to confirm the amicable disposition which he professed to entertain towards the British Government.

36. The power of Saood was however still very considerable; for independently of the predominance of his influence on the Persian side of the Gulf, the whole of the sea coast on the Arabian shore was subject to him, except the island of Bahrein, which had been recovered by the Uttoobees, and the port of Grane. To the southward, his influence extended to Cape Mus-seldom on the sea coast, and in the interior joined the Muskat territories, where, again, his power was acknowledged to the southward of Ras-ool-Gate. Kateef, his principal seaport, was twelve days' march from Deriah.

37. The Wahabee Chief was also negotiating a peace with Muskat, but, as the Imaum wrote to Mr. Bruce, "nothing has taken place between us, as the Agent wished the Imaum to enter into engagements which were inconsistent, nor could His Highness enter into his views as long as Ras-ool-Khyma remained the obstacle between them."

38. Saood died on the 10th of April 1814, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Abdoolla bin Saood, who, after making the necessary arrangements incident to the death of his father, proceeded on an expedition against the Nujd Arabs, who had in a great measure thrown off the Wahabee yoke.

*Gyphians?*





39. Remonstrances having been made to the Chiefs of the Wahabees and of Ras-ool-Khyma for some captures made by the Joasmees, Hussein bin Mahomed bin Gaith arrived at Bushire, as the Agent of the Joasmee Chief, Hussein bin Rahmah, and with letters from the Wahabee Shaikh, disapproving of the conduct of the former, and of his tribe, and binding himself to compel Hussein bin Rahmah to deliver up such property as we could prove they had captured.

40. Ibrahim Pacha, prosecuting the advantages he had obtained over the Wahabees, again defeated them at Manwiah, seven stages from the capital of Deriah. Abdoolla bin Saood retreated to Bundah, in the district of Kassime, four stages from Deriah. Following up this success, Ibrahim Pacha invested and reduced the Wahabee capital on the 10th of September, destroyed the fortifications, towers, and plantations of date trees, and removed the inhabitants to Lahsa, which he intended to establish as the seat of government.

41. Abdoolla bin Saood was made a prisoner on this occasion, and sent off, with five others, under an escort, to be delivered over to the viceroy, Mahomed Ali Pacha. The Wahabee Shaikh's family were to be sent to Medina, until the orders of the Porte should be received. Kateef, the principal seaport belonging to the Wahabees, next surrendered to the Turkish troops, and Ibrahim Pacha's army having been recruited by considerable reinforcements from Egypt, he detached a force against Beriâmi, bordering on the province of Oman, which was formerly subject to the Turkish Government; and was preparing to attack Ras-ool-Khyma and the pirate ports, Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Shaikh of Bahrein, offering whatever vessels might be requisite for the transport of troops against those places.

42. Thus rose and fell—it is to be hoped never to rise again—the extraordinary sect of the Wahabees, under whose protection and encouragement maritime depredations were carried on in the Gulf, and in the Indian seas, with a degree of success, audacity, and barbarity, which has been surpassed only by the atrocities of the Algerines in Europe.





CONTINUATION OF THE FOREGOING, FROM  
1820 TO 1831,

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL.

Mr. Warden's account of this once powerful sect concludes by describing their complete overthrow in 1818, when Ibrahim Pacha captured their capital, Deriah, by a general storm, and sent away their chief as a prisoner to Egypt. Nothing further appears to have been heard regarding the Wahabees till 1820, when a report was made to the Government that one of their chiefs, who had been taken prisoner in 1818, had effected his escape into the Desert, and, collecting a considerable

A. D. 1820.

number of Arabs together, had taken possession of the State of Deriah. In consequence, the Chiefs of the Beni Khalid, who had been established by Ibrahim Pacha in Lahsa and Kateef, marched against him with a large force, and compelled him to surrender himself and followers.

A. D. 1822.

In 1822 Mahomed Ali Pacha stationed a body of 700 horse, under one of his officers, in the fort of Arrizah, and at the same time directed them to rebuild the fort and works of Deriah, for the purpose of being garrisoned by a Turkish force. Shortly afterwards 100 Turkish cavalry, stationed at Riaz, were surprised and cut up by the Bedouins in the neighbourhood.

A. D. 1824.

The Wahabees appear to have remained quiet until the beginning of the year 1824, when a large body of men was collected under the command of Shaikh Toorkey bin Abdoolla oos Saood, who proceeded against the Turkish provinces to the westward, but was foiled in his attempt by Ahmed Pacha, the Governor of Mecca, and forced to retreat, with considerable loss. Nothing daunted by this repulse, the Wahabees soon after made another attempt, in which they were successful.

From this period, the power and resources of this sect appear to have gradually advanced, and shortly after, their Chief, Toorkey bin Abdoolla, commonly known by the name of Toorkey bin Saood, opened a correspondence with all the Shaikhs on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, inviting them to renew the relations which had subsisted between them prior to the overthrow of the Wahabees by Ibrahim Pacha. On the occasion of an interview, about the end of 1825, with the British Resident in the Gulf of Persia, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur made a dexterous attempt to ascertain the light in which his connection with the now rising sect would be viewed by the British Government, particularly with reference to the injury which might arise to the





Imaum from his so doing. (The policy which the British Government determined to observe towards the Wahabees is detailed at greater length under the head of "Joasmees," 1825.)

From 1824 to 1830 the proceedings of this sect appear to have been confined to carrying on hostilities against the Beni Khalid family, under Shaikh Mahomed and Shaikh Majid, of the Al Arrasen Tribe. The capital of the dominions of these chiefs was called Lahsa, and they also possessed the seaport of Kateef, upon the mainland, opposite to Bahrein. In this warfare neither party gained any decisive advantage until the beginning of 1830, when the Beni Khalid Shaikh advanced with a large army into Nujd. Upon receiving intelligence of this movement, Fysul, the son of Toorkey bin Saood, the Wahabee Chief, marched with a considerable force from Riaz to meet them. Unfortunately for the cause of the Beni Khalid, Shaikh Majid, the only leader of any talent they possessed, was suddenly taken ill, and died shortly afterwards. Shaikh Mahomed, the remaining brother, conscious, apparently, of his own incapacity to command in the field, readily gave his consent to the nomination of his nephew, Bargheshee, as the successor of the deceased chief. The new leader did not immediately commence operations, but after a short time advanced in such a manner as to compel the Wahabee army to fall back. Encouraged by his first attempt, he followed them closely, but, unfortunately, left his original post (a place called Duberah, from whence he drew his supplies of water) unprotected. This improvidence being reported to Shaikh Toorkey bin Saood, he left Riaz on the night of the 23rd March 1830, with a force consisting of 1,200 horse and foot, and keeping to the left, he succeeded in turning the flank of the enemy, and getting possession of Duberah, thus cutting off the Beni Khalid from their water, and placing them between his son's army and his own. In this situation they remained for one day, but the next morning a simultaneous attack being made upon them, both in front and rear, by the two Wahabee Chiefs, they were entirely defeated, and the rout was so complete that the whole of the horses, camels, and cattle of the Beni Khalid Shaikhs, together with all the tents, baggage, women, and children fell into the hands of the victors. It was currently reported and believed at that time that 100,000 camels, and nearly a million head of cattle, were among the fruits of this victory. Shaikh Mahomed fled with a few horsemen to Lahsa, where he was soon afterwards joined by Bargheshee. The success of the Wahabee Chief was however so decisive that the greater portion of the Bedouins of the Beni Khalid Tribe made their peace with the victor by a timely submission. Shortly afterwards, Shaikh Toorkey moved upon Lahsa, which fell into his hands without resistance, and a party having been sent on to Kateef, that place immediately surrendered. Having thus succeeded in expel-





ling the Beni Khalid Shaikhs from their hereditary dominions, the Wahabee Shaikh set about consolidating his new conquests, and, by friendly letters and presents, endeavoured to conciliate the good will of all the chiefs of any consequence in his neighbourhood. The report of his success was received with much joy by the greater portion of the Joasmees, who anticipated a renewal of their former profitable practices of piracy through the restoration of the Wahabee ascendancy. The chief of that sect, however, was much more enlightened than his predecessors, and his proceedings were evidently dictated by rules of policy, instead of being guided by the burning zeal for the propagation of the Wahabee faith which had characterised all former leaders.

So far from interfering in the religious observances of the individuals residing in the places lately fallen into his power, he issued a proclamation, intimating that pilgrims, whether Soonees or Sheeas, were at liberty to proceed through Nujd to Mecca and Medina, and that he himself would guarantee their safety. The only article of the former strict tenets of the Wahabees, the observance of which he thought proper to insist upon, was that tobacco should not be smoked openly in the streets. It is likewise related, that when urged by Shaikh Rashid of Ejman to give him permission to cruise against all the enemies of the Wahabee faith, he peremptorily refused, saying that it was for authorising such proceedings that his father had been visited by the indignation of Heaven, and that at all events the English being masters of the sea, he was not able to contend with such a powerful nation. Shaikh Toorkey, in making the rapid progress above detailed, gave out that he acted as a free and independent chieftain; but this was not really the case, as he still continued to pay a small annual tribute to Mahomed Ali, Pacha of Egypt, and took measures to represent his proceedings to that ruler in so favourable a light as to obtain his approval to them. After placing garrisons in all the towers and strongholds he had taken, Shaikh Toorkey returned to his capital, Deriah, and, with the exception of some feeble and unsuccessful demonstrations that were made against him by Mahomed bin Arrareer, the surviving Chief of the Beni Khalid Tribe, remained in quiet possession of his new conquest, which he governed with great prudence and justice, taking from them only the Zukat or tithes, and by his vigorous measures putting a complete stop to the system of robbery and plunder, as well as the internal disputes of the different tribes, which had characterised the rule of the Beni Khalid Shaikhs.

The acquisition of Lahsa and Kateef appears to have produced a greater effect than Shaikh Toorkey could have ventured to anticipate, for His Highness the Imaum, desirous of obtaining the aid of so powerful an ally in the promotion of his schemes upon Bahrein, sent off





messengers to Riaz, with large presents, and not only acknowledged the supremacy of the Nujd Chief, but is said likewise to have intimated his readiness to pay the Zukat. The Wahabee Shaikh, however, appears to have availed himself of the desire of His Highness to obtain the island of Bahrein, for the advancement of his own views, as he forthwith laid before Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed the alternative of war or submission; the latter was preferred, and agreeably to an arrangement concluded at Riaz by a relation of the Uttoobee Shaikh, that chief was to be taken under the protection of Toorkey bin Saood, on acknowledging his supremacy, and paying an annual tribute. Thus the whole of the Arabian Coast, from Ras-ool-Hud to Grane, with the exception of Aboothabee (the capital of Shaikh Tahnoon bin Shakboot), became tributary to the Wahabees.

About the middle of the year 1831, a communication was made to the Governor of Bombay by the Wahabee Chief, through Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman, expressive of his desire to be upon the same intimate footing as that formerly existing between the British Government and his ancestor Saood. To this a reply in general but friendly terms was transmitted, through the Resident in the Persian Gulf.

At the present time (December 1831) reports are very current that serious disturbances have broken out in Nujd, owing to the intrigues of a relative of the Wahabee Chief, named Musharee, who, having joined the Kahtan and other tribes in the interior, which have hitherto refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Shaikh Toorkey, is now said to be preparing to commence hostilities.

The Beni Khalid and Amayir\* Tribes, in consequence of these rumours, were encouraged to make a simultaneous attack upon Kateef and Lahsa, but have been repulsed, and compelled to retreat, and will probably soon be visited by the indignation of the power they have so imprudently provoked.

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FURTHER CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING,  
FROM 1832 TO 1844,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL.

The members of this powerful tribe, or collection of tribes, following the Wahabee tenets, were in the latter end of 1831, as mentioned in Captain Hennell's Sketches, divided amongst themselves, owing to the intrigues of one Musharee, a relative of their lawful head, Toorkey bin

\* A small tribe, under Shaikh Durbash, dependent upon the Beni Khalid, occupying an island between Kateef and Grane.





Saood, who, having joined the Kahtan, and other tribes in the interior, had with them refused to acknowledge his supremacy, and was preparing to establish his position by force of arms. The Beni Khalid and Amayir Tribes, in consequence of these rumours, had been encouraged to attack Kateef and Lahsa, but had met with a repulse.

Hostilities continued to be prosecuted, and early in 1832 the Amayir\* seized a boat belonging to Bahrein, lying off Kateef, laden with dates for the latter place. Of thirty Kateef people on board, they killed twelve, and took the remainder prisoners, with a view to their ransom. After plundering the boat of all property belonging to Kateef, they permitted it to depart, without offering molestation to the Bahrein men either in person or property.

The affairs of Nujd about this time, owing to internal dissensions, became in a most unsettled state, and the power of Toorkey bin Saood, the Wahabee, threatened so rapidly to decline, that the Governor of Kateef sought the protection of the Chief of Bahrein, and offered to transfer his allegiance; but this temporary diminution of his authority, occasioned by the opposition of his relative and competitor, Mushiaree, who claimed a prior right by descent, and stated himself to have escaped from confinement in Egypt, quickly gave way to the superior energy of his character.

The Zukat or tribute of five per cent. began to be exacted, and his influence to be completely established over the inhabitants of the coast; but, unlike his predecessors, he opposed himself to the wishes of the Joasmees, and other lawless tribes, desirous of his sanction for the renewal of piracy, which they supposed would have ensued on the revival of his power; whereas they found, that instead of reaping the profits of old times, arising from plunder, Shaikh Toorkey was inclined to take from them a portion even of the little they had.

The measures adopted in urging the demands against the Joasmees, now virtually Wahabee dependents, for the restitution of the property (or its value) plundered from a vessel belonging to a British subject, by some men of Khan (three of whom had taken refuge at Aboothabee),

\* This tribe was described to consist of about 400 families, separated into the two divisions of Bedouins and fishermen. The latter, who were at war with Kateef, occupied the small island of Jinnah, a few miles to the north of Bahrein. They were the weaker of the two divisions, not exceeding 100 families, but had associated with themselves about an equal number of the Soodean and Duwad Arabs. Their feud with the people of Kateef originated in a quarrel regarding the discontinuance of certain payments formerly exacted by the Beni Amayir. Several on both sides were killed; but those who fell on the side of the latter being of greater rank, a claim was made on their behalf for the balance of the price of blood. Both parties appealed to Toorkey bin Saood, the Wahabee Chief, who recommended them to make peace; but in consequence of the high demands of the Beni Amayir, this was not effected, and another engagement took place, in which Shaikh Abbasee, their chief, was killed, and the whole tribe took up the feud to revenge his death.





threatened to give umbrage to Toorkey, and elicited a most intemperate letter from his Agent, Abdool Azeez, to the British Agent at Shargah. As the former wrote without any authority, no direct notice was taken of his communication; but the latter was instructed, in reply, to explain, that previous to the adoption of coercive measures, a whole year had been consumed in negotiation, without success, and no interference volunteered on his part for the promotion of the ends of justice; and, further, to use other arguments, importing the evident existence of our right to demand redress. Abdool Azeez returned for answer that Toorkey bin Saood was now the only authority on the continent of Arabia, and that both citizens and Bedouins, maritime as well as inland tribes, having all acknowledged his supremacy, he was in fact the ruler of the country, including Haajar, Oman, and the coast from Jaalan to Kateef, and that therefore, on the occurrence of any piracy, it should be reported to the Wahabee Chief, or, in the event of his being at too great a distance, to his Agent at Brymee.

The blockade of Kateef and Ajeer by the Bahrein party caused the greatest annoyance and distress to the people of those places under the authority and protection of the Wahabee Chief, who now called in the assistance of the Joasmees of Ras-ool-Khyma and Lingah. His violent death, however, at this time, by the hand of his nephew, Musharee, led to the suspension of offensive operations, and introduced into the affairs of the Wahabee Tribe such confusion and discord as to counteract the operation of any ambitious views of late entertained by the murdered chief, and for a time at least to leave the maritime tribes in the same relative position as heretofore. There was every reason for supposing that this violent and daring act had been instigated by Abdoolla bin Ahmed, who had kept up a correspondence with the murderer, and who received the news of the death of the Wahabee Chief with the firing of guns, and other demonstrations of joy.

Musharee was not permitted long to survive his victim, whose son, Fysul, immediately quitting Kateef and its neighbourhood, which he had been defending against the attacks of the Bahrein forces, marched against him, and laid siege to the fort of Koot, in which he had taken refuge. Treachery on the part of the adherents soon placed Fysul in possession of the fort, when he avenged the murder of his father by putting Musharee, with twenty others, to the sword.

About the middle of the year 1835 arrived at Muskat, from Mecca, a person by name Abdoolla bin Musharee, at one time a very respectable merchant of Bahrein, bearing letters from Ahmed Pacha to the Imaum of Muskat, Abdoolla bin Ahmed the Uttoobee Chief, and Fysul bin Toorkey the Wahabee

A. D. 1835.





ruler, intimating to them that he had been pleased to give him the grant of Kateef at a stated revenue, from twenty to twenty-four thousand dollars, and directing that he might be permitted to take possession of and keep the territory committed to his charge, without molestation. By the Imaum he was received and treated with much courtesy, and furnished with a Buteel and provisions to convey him to Kateef, and letters to Fysul bin Toorkey and Abdoolla bin Ahmed, represented to be of a conciliatory and peaceful tenor.

On hearing of the arrival of this personage at Kateef, and the receipt of the several letters of which he was the bearer, Ameer Fysul immediately marched a body of troops into that place, in order to support the assertion of his superior right over, and determination to keep it, as well as the surrounding district, now so unceremoniously farmed away by the Pacha of Mecca.

Abdoolla bin Musharee did not await the arrival of the Wahabee troops, who took possession of Kateef, and subsequently attempted, but without success, to capture Tirhoot, the place already mentioned as having fallen into the hands of the Uttoobees during the confusion which ensued on the violent death of the late Wahabee Chief, and while his son, the present chief, was engaged in establishing his right to succeed to his authority, against the pretensions of his father's murderer, Musharee.

The mission of Bin Musharee was supposed (and the subsequent arrival of his sons with letters of recommendation, procured from the Government of Bombay, and the correspondence he was keeping up with the Imaum, and the Pacha of Mecca, appeared to identify him with the late events) to have been not unconnected with the design of Ahmed Pacha to engage the Wahabee Chief in operations towards the north-east, whilst he was prosecuting his conquest in the south-west quarter of the Arabian peninsula, and with the wish of the Imaum to see his ancient enemy, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein, engaged in renewed hostilities with so powerful an opponent as the Chief of the Wahabees, whose attention he was also interested in drawing in a direction opposite to his own territories.

The preponderating influence of Mahomed Ali Pacha on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula began now to afford a salutary check upon the encroachments

of the Wahabee sect towards the coast of the Persian Gulf. He summoned Shaikh Fysul to meet Ibrahim or Hussein Pacha, and afford his co-operation against the Aseer tribe, who had hitherto successfully frustrated their attempts to reduce it to subjection; but this chief declining compliance, on the plea of sickness, sent his brother with some horses, &c. as a present, and to apologise for him. It was reported that a very large Egyptian force was at this time collected at Medina.





The Wahabee Agent at Brymee, at the suggestion of his master, endeavoured, but without success, to secure the maritime assistance of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat and the coast tribes against Bahrein, the former replying, to the requisition for the use of his ships of war, that he was not at liberty to employ his vessels on such enterprises without the previous knowledge and sanction of the English Government. Circumstances, however, shortly after inducing the Bahrein Chief to make overtures of peace and submission, and the proffer of a small annual tribute, Ameer Fysul, mindful of the encroachments of the Egyptians on the western, was fain to receive them, and thus creditably rid himself of an active and indefatigable enemy on the eastern side of the Arabian peninsula.

It soon became evident that the fears entertained by him, in consequence of the proceedings of the Egyptian ruler, were not destitute of foundation.

The object of the latter, to establish a ruler in Nujd more compliant to his views, and more devoted to his interests, by whose means would be easily effected the subjection of the Bedouins to the south-west, to whom, on the contrary, the present ruler was supposed to have granted aid in their hitherto successful resistance to the progress of the Egyptian arms, was indicated in the open support he now afforded, in the shape of a body of troops, to the pretender Khalid bin Saood,\* who early in this year set up pretensions to the chief authority over Nujd, and was preparing to establish them by the sword.

Ameer Fysul lost no time in making every exertion to meet this new and serious contingency, which he further endeavoured, but now too late, to avert, by despatching messengers with most submissive letters to Mahomed Ali Pacha, with a view to induce him to withdraw his support and assistance from Shaikh Khalid.

This pretender successively captured Gusseem and Deriah; and at length, meeting the forces of his rival near Riaz, defeated them in the open field. Fysul, compelled to retreat, fell back upon Riaz, but found the fort already in the hands of some of the adherents of the victorious usurper. Thus the province of Nujd fell virtually into the hands of Ameer Khalid, for Lahsa and Kateef only awaited his approach in force to tender their submission.

Little doubt could be entertained that he was a mere puppet in the hands of the Egyptians, who were of course to reap the benefits of his success, obtained through their assistance. These auxiliaries, or rather principals in disguise, consisted only of from 1,000 to 1,500 horse and

\* Saood was great-grandfather to both Fysul and Khalid.





500 foot, with 12 guns and 4 mortars ; but such was the terror inspired by the Pacha's name, that nothing like determined resistance appears to have been offered, although Fysul stood generally high with the Bedouins of Nujd.

This effectual subversion of the authority of Fysul, and approach of the Egyptians, created great alarm in the mind of the Uttoobee Chief, who had apparently just grounds for supposing that their ulterior objects were not, as at first conjectured, directed towards any part of the Turkish territories, but to the conquest of Bahrein, in which their aid and co-operation had been secured, it was reported, by the Imaum, in a secret agreement, whereby it was stipulated that he should be maintained in possession of the island, and of the districts of Lahsa and Kateef, and in return pay an annual tribute of 300,000 crowns.

Korshid Pacha now arrived with a reinforcement of regular troops, and commenced his march upon Riaz, Lahsa, and Kateef. He used every means to conciliate

A. D. 1838.

the Arab Tribes, and despatched emissaries to Bahrein for the purpose of procuring grain, provisions, and necessaries for his force, against its arrival. An attempt at treachery, on the other hand, amongst the Amayir Tribe at Lahsa, having been discovered, it was severely dealt with by Ameer bin Oofeysan, Ameer Fysul's General, who put to death three of their chief people.

Ameer Fysul was shortly after compelled to fly to Dillum, which was immediately besieged by three bodies of troops, under the respective commandants of Ameer Khalid, Korshid Pacha, and the Shaikh of the Moojariba Arabs, and, being very hardly pressed, to deliver himself up. Lahsa and Kateef thereon surrendered, and the Wahabee General, Omer bin Oofeysan, took refuge in Bahrein.

Fysul was sent a prisoner to Egypt in December 1838, and his successor Khalid, the Egyptian tool, called upon the Uttoobees to resume the payment of the annual tribute which had formerly been exacted by Toorkey. The Egyptian General now threw off his disguise as the auxiliary of Khalid, openly declared Nujd a possession of his master, and avowed his intention to improve and extend his conquests.

On the defeat and surrender of Ameer Fysul, Korshid Pacha, with the whole of the regulars and artillery, which, including the irregular Mughribee and horsemen, amounted to about 3,000, fixed his head quarters at Sulimeah (distant from two hundred to two hundred and fifty miles from the coast), garrisoned Lahsa with 300 irregulars, as also Kateef, Sohat, and Ajeer, and only awaited the arrival of reinforcements to carry into effect his meditated attack upon Bahrein. With this view, he expected the co-operation of four armed vessels from the Red Sea, with a supply of arms and ammunition. Emissaries were





despatched to Koweit, Mohumrah, and other places, for the purpose of collecting grain and provisions.

Strong remonstrances, however, with His Highness Mahomed Ali Pacha, from the British Ministry at home, as well as those of the British authority in the Gulf with Korshid Pacha, had the effect of inducing the Egyptian Government to postpone, and eventually actually abandon, the fulfilment of its plans of aggrandisement.

Syud bin Mootluk, who during the lifetime of Ameer Toorkey resided at Brymee, as his Naib or deputy, and who  
A. D. 1839. possessed great personal influence among the

Arabian Tribes, as also a perfect knowledge of their various and conflicting interests, having been removed by Fysul bin Toorkey, the now deposed Wahabee Chief, joined the Egyptian commander, and was by him despatched to Ras-ool-Khyma, to persuade the chiefs on the Coast of Oman to acknowledge the authority of Mahomed Ali in reality, but ostensibly that of his tool Khalid, the now nominal head of the Wahabee sect. This individual contrived, by a mixture of threats and promises, to persuade the Joasmee Chief to unite with him in requiring the Beni Naeem, who had lately got possession of Brymee, to surrender it to the Nujdees; but these nobly replied that they would rather bury themselves in its ruins than give it up, and lost no time in applying to the Beniyas Chief, as also Syud Humood bin Azan of Sohar, for support to meet the common enemy. This call was immediately responded to by the latter, who instantly sent his brother Ghes, with two hundred men, to reinforce the garrison of Brymee.

The perseverance and resolution displayed by the Agents of Mahomed Ali Pacha in forwarding his schemes of conquest, and the constant success which had hitherto attended the progress of his General, began to exercise a powerful influence over the tribes in this quarter,—an influence which nothing less than a positive assurance of protection from the British Government against his further encroachments could suffice to counteract. A protest in form was therefore entered by the British authorities, against the agreement between the Bahrein Shaikh and the Egyptian Agent, as having been formed in direct opposition to the assurances given by His Highness Mahomed Ali to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and the several Maritime Chieftains of Oman were invited to certify in writing their determination to cultivate more sedulously their relations with the British Government, to abide by its wishes and instructions, and to resist to the last extremity all attempts of Korshid Pacha to subjugate them.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur was called to account for his extraordinary and vacillating conduct with reference to Syud bin Mootluk. He in reply urged that he had been earnest in his promises, but that his





arrangements had been thwarted and overturned by the treacherous conduct of the Beni-yas Chief, who had entered into a close and intimate correspondence with the Egyptian Agent, and had offered him an asylum in his fort in case of his expulsion from Shargah; in corroboration of which statement he produced a letter from Shaikh Khaleefa to the address of that individual, alluding to the little assistance afforded him by the Joasmees during the four months he had resided on their coasts, and pledging himself to support him with the whole of the resources of the Beni-yas, whether by land or by sea, whenever called upon. He was informed that Shaikh Khaleefa had subsequently pledged himself in writing to drop all further connection with Korshid Pacha or his agents, and that therefore his objections were removed. Upon this he requested to be furnished with a document, requiring him to demand the immediate departure of Syud bin Mootluk, which was accordingly supplied; and it was at the same time intimated to the Egyptian Agent, that Humood bin Suroor and Mahomed bin Abdoolla, the Chiefs of Naeem in Brymee, having with their tribes been taken under the protection of the British Government, he would consequently be held responsible for any injury he might inflict upon them. He was moreover called upon, under the assurances of His Highness Mahomed Ali Pacha, to quit the Arabian Coast, and return to his immediate superior, Korshid Pacha.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur further agreed to enter into no correspondence or engagements with Mahomed Ali or his dependents, or any foreign power, without the knowledge and permission of the British Government, and to consider its enemies as his enemies: he was, in return, to be furnished with warlike munitions in the event of his being attacked from any quarter, on consideration of his compliance with the wishes of the British Government.

The application of the Beni Naeem Shaikhs to be placed under British protection was favourably received. They were encouraged to stand firm in their resolve to maintain their independence; and it was determined to send an Agent to reside at Brymee, and to furnish them with ammunition, if necessary.

The local Government of Muskat was also called upon to unite in the views and policy of the British Government, and to afford every aid and support to the inhabitants of Brymee.

To keep up or recover the semblance of the character under which the Egyptians first entered Nujd, and as a blind to their designs of further aggrandisement, Ameer Khalid was invested with a dress of honour, and proclaimed ruler of the province of Nujd.

Syud bin Mootluk, on receiving the Resident's protest, and hearing of the measures which had been adopted by him with reference to the





inhabitants of the coast and of Brymee, at length evacuated Oman, and, embarking from Shargah, proceeded to Ajeer, having been previously personally assured by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur that if he returned to Oman in force he would join him, and place all his resources at his disposal. His removal from Oman proved a severe blow to the Egyptian influence, and broke up the combination rapidly forming in his favour. On his voyage from Shargah, having landed on the island of Kenn, on the Persian Coast, he forcibly carried off four hundred sheep, and other property,—a gross and wanton aggression upon the subjects of a friendly power, which was duly brought to the notice of Mahomed Ali Pacha, and led, among other causes, to its being subsequently intimated to the Shaikh of Kateef, the Egypto-Wahabee seaport, that any expedition against Oman or the territories of the Imaum would be opposed by the British squadron in the Gulf.

A portion of the Naeem Tribe (a branch of that which had so openly resisted the encroachment of Korshid Pacha and his Agents at Brymee), residing on the Guttur Coast, having refused to pay the Zukat or tribute, when called upon through Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein, Mahomed Effendi, the Egyptian Governor of Lahsa, despatched a party of regulars, assisted by some of the Mookazeebah Arabs, to ravage their pasture lands and date groves. Before this foray could be effectually made, the expedition was compelled to retreat, in consequence of the murder of Mahomed Effendi, its originator, by some Arabs, in the suburbs of Lahsa.

A Gooncha (belonging to Koweit) reached Kateef from Hodeida, in the Red Sea, in November 1839, laden with ammunition and military stores for the use of the Egyptian forces in Nujd. The Agents on board did not fail to spread all sorts of extravagant reports regarding a fleet of some eighteen or twenty vessels, laden with troops and warlike stores, being about to follow.

The remonstrances of the Home Government began now, however, to have full effect; moreover, the quarrels and dissensions amongst the Egyptian Agents themselves, and the jealousy lately imbibed by Mahomed Ali Pacha of his General, Korshid, tended very much to weaken their power and influence, which were threatened by, among other disaffected tribes, that of Ejman, numbering upwards of four thousand men, whose chief had lately succeeded in effecting his escape from Lahsa, where he had been treacherously seized and confined by the Pacha's orders. Communications between the different towns and districts began to be seriously interrupted, and the supplies for the Egyptian forces at Thurmidah, the head quarters, needed escorts of considerable numbers of horse and foot to ensure their safety. Syud bin Mootluk was distrusted, and sent

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under surveillance to Riaz. A movement by Khalid into the districts, attended by the Egyptian cavalry, for the purpose of confirming his authority, and receiving the allegiance of the various unsettled tribes, indicated an intention on the part of his allies to evacuate Nujd, and their desire, by putting him forward in a more prominent position of outward authority than he had hitherto enjoyed, to check the growing disaffections previous to his being left at the head of affairs.

Just as the blockade of Kateef, Sohat, and Ajeer, held by the Egyptian troops, began seriously to be contemplated by the British Government, intelligence was received (May 1840) that Lahsa had been evacuated, and that the main body of the Egyptian troops had actually left Nujd; which being corroborated by the declaration shortly before made by Mahomed Ali Pacha, the Egyptian ruler, to Her Majesty's Consul General at Cairo, and subsequently in a measure confirmed by the despatch of a vessel to those ports, which were now found to be in the hands of Arabs, adherents of Ameer Khalid, although the Egyptian Agent still continued to exercise the actual authority and control, rendered the adoption of this measure unnecessary. The grossly oppressive and extortionate conduct of the Pacha and his Agent further afforded a plausible reason for the belief that the Egyptians no longer contemplated the permanent occupation of Central Arabia.

As a sacrifice to the memory of his deputy, Mahomed Effendi, who was shot while Governor of Lahsa, Korshid Pacha's last act, previous to his departure, was to put to death Burgeish, the Chief of the Ali Humeed. It was evidently intended, that on Nujd being made over to the charge of Ameer Khalid, that chief should nevertheless continue to act under the authority of the Egyptian Agent whom it was intended to establish at Medina, a post whence he could exercise a general superintendence over the country of the Hujeeb Arabs and Central Arabia; but the moral influence of the usurper among the various tribes, which under the most favourable circumstances had ever been very trifling, was now entirely lost: despised, disliked, and deprived of the support of his patrons, he had very shortly his hands fully occupied with the intrigues which were set on foot to dispossess him of his illegal power.

At the period of the evacuation of Lahsa and Ajeer, one Mooshrif arrived at Bahrein, despatched probably by the inhabitants of those places, to invite Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa (the grandson of Soleyman, the brother of Abdoolla bin Ahmed) to come over and claim those districts, when they would throw off their allegiance to Ameer Khalid.

The spirit of disaffection now developing itself in Central Arabia was in no slight degree promoted and encouraged by the current report of Ameer Fysul having effected his liberation from Cairo, and commenced his journey to Medina,

A. D. 1841.





as well as by the news of the reverse sustained by the Egyptians in Syria, and the consequent reduction of Mahomed Ali Pacha's authority within its legitimate limits.

Syud bin Mootluk nevertheless continued to address letters to the Chief of Oman, announcing his march into that province; but these intimations (the excitement they at first caused having worn off, from their having been so often made, and having as often proved without foundation) produced little effect.

There was indeed little probability, under existing circumstances, of Ameer Khalid actually making any attempt on the province of Oman: it was however decided by the British Government, that in the event of the expedition being undertaken, it should be met with as much active resistance as his means afforded of arraying against it.

It now appeared that the Sublime Porte advanced their claims to authority over Nujd; and certain it is, that having received some presents from Ameer Khalid, that Government appointed him Wulee of that province.

His submission was of course hollow enough, having been in all probability prompted by Korshid Pacha, to be disavowed whenever it might meet the views of the Egyptians.

He addressed a very friendly letter to the British Native Agent at Bahrein, expressing an earnest desire to renew the amicable and cordial relations which formerly subsisted between his late father, Saood, and the British Government; hinting that he had wished before to open the correspondence, but had been prevented by Mahomed Ali Pacha.

On his arrival at Lahsa, in October 1841, notwithstanding these professions, he prepared a force, destined (as announced by the Native Agent at Bahrein) for the invasion of Oman, and the siege of Brymee, and to be commanded by the notorious Syud bin Mootluk. The British Government having provided for this contingency in its instructions that the Resident should endeavour to obtain accurate information of Ameer Khalid's movements, and, if he were preparing for the invasion of Oman, should warn him of the opposition of the British Government, and require him to desist from the undertaking, and good grounds existing for the belief that the expedition was now really in contemplation, it was deemed expedient and advisable by him to despatch a British officer to wait upon the Ameer in his camp at Lahsa (distant seventy miles from the coast), with written and verbal communications, indicative of the views of the British Government: to which he replied that he had not sent, nor entertained any intention of sending, Syud bin Mootluk into Oman; and supposing him to have been so disposed, it subsequently turned out that he really had not the power; and this was the more





fortunate, as the Maritime Arabian Chiefs, although outwardly professing their determination to maintain their own independence, were known to be secretly carrying on intrigues and correspondence with him, and as the irregular proceedings of the Brymee Chiefs, in foraying the districts of Syud Humood bin Azan of Sohar, must have greatly diminished, if not altogether destroyed, the prospect of any co-operation on the part of the latter in the event of an attack upon Nujd.

A very short time sufficed to show how little able was the titular chief, when deprived of the support of his Egyptian allies, to maintain even his own position.

Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, the son of Mahomed, the younger brother of Saood, father of Khalid, entertaining pretensions to the sovereignty of Nujd, and finding himself suspected by Khalid, had fled to Koweit, where he remained some time, secretly supported by Toorkey Heezanee, a Chief of Khurij. He returned in September of this year, and took possession of Zoomah, where, under certain pretences, he seized and executed an inhabitant named Zaghur, confiscating his property, to the amount of 8,000 dollars. He then took successively Syah and Munfoohad (one or two marches from Riaz), in which latter place, by the execution of a wealthy inhabitant, he secured his property, amounting to 4,000 dollars. With these means at his disposal, he satisfied the immediate wants of his followers, said to consist of one thousand men; besides which the tribes of Graymigah, Soohool, and Toorkey Ahranee, well disposed towards him, could furnish fifteen hundred more. Three other tribes, the Ali Moorah, Ejman, and Soobaya, numbering about three thousand men, although said to have openly promised their support to his opponent, would, it was supposed, either remain neutral in the approaching conflict, or side with Abdoolla.

In December 1841 he threatened Riaz, the major part of whose inhabitants were said to be in his favour. Khalid was represented as having in his service about eight hundred Egyptian troops, one half cavalry the other infantry, mostly irregular, indifferently armed and mounted, and somewhat discontented, in consequence of not receiving their arrears of pay, now due for a whole year. These were looked on with much jealousy and disfavour by the Arab Chieftains, who, when Khalid was left in authority over Nujd, had expressed their dislike to the strangers, and stipulated for their dismissal, in return for their own friendship and support,—a measure to which he at the time acceded, but its execution he had been led to defer, in consequence of the revolt of Abdoolla bin Sooneyan. In addition to the Egyptian troops, he could too, it was reported, depend on the assistance of three thousand men from the Anisa, Muhtari, and Beni Hajir tribes. There was no artillery on either side, unless a few honey-combed and badly mounted





guns, in the possession of Ameer Khalid at Hoofoo, Kateef, &c. deserved the name.

On Abdoolla's approach to Riaz, the army of Ameer Khalid advanced to oppose him: a skirmish ensued, and the former sustained a defeat; but on the same day, the leading inhabitants of the city secretly invited him to repair with his adherents to the south gate at dusk, when they would be prepared to act in concert with him. Abdoolla accepted the invitation, and effecting an entrance within the walls, was proclaimed ruler of Nujd. His first act was to put to death three of the leaders of the opposing army,—sparing, however, the life of Omer bin Oofeyan, a resolute man, and one on whom entire dependence had been placed by Ameer Khalid.

On its becoming known at Lahsa that Riaz had fallen into the hands of Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, its inhabitants secretly wrote to him, tendering submission, while Ameer Khalid, doubting their loyalty, assembled the head men, and a second time pledged himself to disband his mercenary troops. He nevertheless despatched to them orders to repair to him in haste and secrecy at Kateef. His stay, however, at this latter place, was not of very long duration: the inhabitants conspired with his own traitorous generals against him, and he was compelled, after dismissing his western or Egyptian troops, to take refuge with Moobaruk (son of the Bahrein Chief, Abdoolla bin Ahmed), the Governor of Demaum, who came out to meet and offer him asylum.

His hopes in this quarter of recovering power were now entirely destroyed, and he shortly left Bahrein for Koweit, with the design of proceeding thence to Gusseem, a town three days' journey from Medina, where he believed himself to possess some staunch adherents.

Moobaruk bin Abdoolla made a diversion in favour of his guest upon Lahsa and Ajeer, but his success was only partial and temporary, his troops being compelled to retreat on the approach of those of Abdoolla bin Sooneyan.

Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, in February 1842 fully acknowledged Wahabee ruler, desired to extend his authority and influence over the tribes of Oman, with whose chiefs he commenced a correspondence by letter, intimating his intention of sending Syud bin Mootluk as his Agent to them, and inviting them cordially to unite with and afford him every aid and assistance.

The originals of these letters, with the exception of that to the address of Khaleefa bin Shakboot, the Beniyan Chief (who alleged his right to keep, and denied that of the British authority to ask it of him), were procured by the Acting Resident, Colonel Robertson, who thereon addressed a letter of remonstrance to the Wahabee ruler, explaining the ill effects which had hitherto resulted from the establishment of Wahabee





tenets among the pirate chieftains, which had led to their chastisement by the British Government; deprecating his present attempts to bring them again under Wahabee authority and influence, as calculated to recall to their minds the deeds of other times, when they were similarly stimulated by his predecessors, and to arouse the savage propensities of those who were now quietly settling down into peaceable natives, and thereby to draw down upon them the just vengeance of the British Government.

Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, in reply, declared his intention to co-operate with the British Government to check piracy; that he had promulgated the same to the people of Oman, whom he called his subjects, and to others of other countries, enjoining them to abstain from inflicting injuries upon others, and, with regard to the sea, to act in the very manner pointed out,—professions which, rated at their true value, were probably worth nothing; but, whether sincere or faithless, were a matter of little moment, his authority being by no means confirmed, and his views, therefore, liable to any change, as his fame and influence increased or diminished.

The Brymee Shaikhs claimed, in their public answers to the ruler of Nujd, a species of connection with the British Government, which, although not absolutely subsisting, was possibly adduced in the hope that, if Abdoolla bin Sooneyan were ignorant of the truth, he might be deterred from interfering in their concerns from fear of the supposed alliance. There were those among them, however, who courted the good will and friendship of the new Wahabee ruler, and desired to tender their submission to him; and the contents of their letters, secretly despatched, were supposed to be of a very opposite tenor to that above alluded to.

The heavy exactions levied upon the inhabitants of Kateef and other places under his authority, by Ameer Abdoolla bin Sooneyan, rendered him for a time unpopular. Some of the Bedouin Tribes still refused to make their allegiance, and a faint effort on the part of his rival, the deposed usurper Khalid, at Gusseem, to recover his lost position, instigated and encouraged, it was reported, by emissaries from the Turkish Government, threatened at one instant to jeopardise his newly acquired authority.

This danger was no sooner averted than, in March 1843, news of Ameer Fysul's arrival at Gusseem were received; and although he still continued to keep up a correspondence with the Oman Chiefs, Abdoolla bin Sooneyan's attention was evidently too much taken up in his own affairs to admit of his entertaining any designs immediately opposed to the policy of the British Government on the Arabian Coast.

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The report of the re-appearance in June 1843 of the legitimate ruler, Ameer Fysul, in Nujd, proved correct. His march to the southward and eastward was attended with undisturbed success, and Abdoolla bin Sooneyan very shortly found himself invested with a few followers in the citadel of Riaz (which place itself had fallen into the hands of his opponent), and compelled to surrender at discretion.

Khalid, the first usurper, was still at Medina, and refused Fysul's invitation to join him. The latter had now, however, nothing to fear from this quondam antagonist, whose assumption and loss of power had been coeval with the occupation and evacuation of Nujd by the Egyptian troops, upon whose support he had been dependent, having at no time carried with him the good will and hearts of the inhabitants.

Ameer Fysul sent a messenger, in July 1843, with letters to the maritime and inland Shaikhs of Oman, intimating his intention of sending an army under Syud bin Mootluk, on the termination of the hot weather, for the purpose of bringing that province under his authority. These communications were generally favourably received by the former, Muktoom of Debaye being the only Shaikh who exhibited a disinclination. Of the latter, the Chiefs of Brymee, Humood bin Suroor and Mahomed bin Abdoolla, addressed letters in November 1843 to the Resident, stating their belief in the earnestness of the Wahabee ruler's intimation, and requesting the aid and support of the British Government in order to repel the invaders. They were informed, in reply, that the communications formerly entered into with them by the British Government had reference solely to the advance of the Egyptian troops, and the connection subsisting between His Highness Mahomed Ali Pacha with Nujd; but that these circumstances being now altogether changed, and the impending danger removed, by the departure of the troops under Korshid Pacha from that province, it was the intention of the British Government to withdraw from all interference in the internal affairs of Arabia.

At this very time, too, the Resident received a communication from the Ameer himself, expressive of a desire for the renewal of the amicable relations which existed between his father Toorkey and the British Government. These sentiments of friendship were duly responded to, and the sole object of the British Government in this quarter being the suppression of plunder and bloodshed on the seas, and the security of all well disposed inhabitants of the shores of the Gulf, in the prosecution of their several employments, represented to and impressed upon him,—views which he had equally declared to be entertained by himself. The knowledge that a friendly intercourse was kept up between the English authorities and the ruler of Nujd could not fail to make a favourable and beneficial impression upon the minds of the Maritime Arabs.





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In December 1843 he made an attempt to mediate a reconciliation between the Bahrein ex-Chief and his grand nephew, Mahomed bin Khaleefa; but his good offices being refused by the former, who declined coming to any friendly arrangement with his successful rival, he determined upon supporting the latter. The fort of Demaum, held by the ex-chief's sons, continued therefore under blockade at sea, and the Wahabee Chief promised to send a force to invest it by land, and check the proceedings of certain tribes opposed to his re-establishment in authority, and who in the meanwhile had espoused the cause of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and continued to supply the garrison with such necessaries as it required.

This long promised land force at length made its appearance, its march having been delayed in order to carry into effect the chastisement its leader was called upon to inflict upon those tribes who had hitherto refused to acknowledge him, and who had, further, been concerned in the plunder of Persian pilgrims, and other robberies.

Demaum fell, and was immediately taken possession of by Ameer Fysul, who has since maintained a garrison there, with a view to appropriating the revenues, to the prejudice of the lawful owner, Busheer bin Rahmah; who, having joined the coalition in the hope of ultimately recovering his patrimony in the event of success,—its restoration having been, indeed, guaranteed to him in such case by Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa,—is of course much disappointed.

Ameer Fysul having gained the object for which he engaged in the war, viz. the cession of Demaum, would appear inclined to permit the contending parties to prolong or terminate the struggle without any further interference on his part, provided he were not alienated from the cause of Mahomed bin Khaleefa, and induced to take part with the ex-chief, by the former's being so blind to his own interests as to persist in neglecting to fulfil his engagement for the payment of the annual tribute.





CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

The Wahabee proceedings are so fully detailed in the Sketches of Muskat, the Beniyas, and the Uttoobees, that it does not appear necessary to do more than run over as briefly as possible the chief acts of the Ameer, and the parties His Highness deputed to Brymee, Kateef, and the ports on the shores of Arabia.

Early in the year 1845 Syud bin Mootluk arrived from Nujd in the vicinity of Brymee. The force that accompanied him was by no means considerable,

A. D. 1845.

and he seems accordingly to have been somewhat mistrustful as to the reception he would meet with from the people of the tribes through whose territories he had to pass on his journey; for we find him sending messengers and spies in advance of his troops, to feel the way before him, and to report on the state of feeling generally manifested towards him. These precautions, however, proved scarcely necessary, for the holders of the Brymee forts hastened to tender their submission when they heard of his approach; the maritime chiefs proceeded to wait upon him; the Nacem, Zowalim, and Shuanil Tribes joined him, and delivered over such forts as he required;—in short, one and all appeared to vie with each other as to who should welcome him most, and afford him the greatest support.

Speedily availing himself of so favourable a moment, now that he stood high in the favour of all, Syud bin Mootluk sent forth demands upon the Muskat and Sohar Governments for the payment of tribute. Syud Soweeynee and Syud Humood bin Azan, the chief authorities of these places, cordially uniting, held a joint consultation regarding the course it would be best to pursue, and, finally, it was agreed between them that the Sohar Chief should satisfy the demands of the Wahabees at once, lest his territories, which lay in such close proximity to Brymee, should be doomed to invasion; but that Syud Soweeynee should declare his determination to make a reference to his father, Syud Saced, at Zanzibar, ere disbursing a farthing.

The above are the terms that were proffered, and the Wahabee Lieutenant professed himself willing to agree to them. By what motive he was subsequently prompted is not known, but scarcely had he accepted the above conditions than he sent word to Syud Humood





bin Azañ, telling him plainly that the tribute originally required at his hands was too small in amount, and directing him to pay an additional sum; and when objections were raised, he hastened to ravage his territories, seizing upon the fort of Mugees, and ruthlessly butchering the whole of the garrison within it. Syud Humood made preparations for resistance, but guided and influenced by the advice of the elders of his tribe, rather than witness the horrid scenes of bloodshed and slaughter that must inevitably have followed, had he with his poor resources dared to encounter the powerful Wahabee, he made good the tribute demanded.

This breach of faith was quickly succeeded by another.

In June 1845, before an answer had been received by His Excellency Syud Soweeynee from his father, the Imaum, pending the arrival of which Syud bin Mootluk had pledged himself to refrain from hostilities, he (Syud bin Mootluk) summoned the heads of the tribes to flock to his standard, with their forces, and declared his intention to march upon Muskat as early as possible.

A large army was speedily collected, and fears were entertained by the Resident lest an attack should really be made upon His Highness' dominions.

A strong naval demonstration was accordingly made off the Batinah Coast, and letters were addressed by Major Hennell to the Wahabee Ameer, as well as to his Lieutenant in Brymee, exhorting the former to restrain his representative in Oman from such faithless proceedings, and desiring the latter to desist from hostilities until he was possessed of further advices from his superior, the Ameer. These measures proved successful, and were, moreover, responded to in a satisfactory manner by the Wahabee. The storm blew over. His Excellency Syud Soweeynee engaged, in the name of his father, to disburse annually the sum of 5,000 crowns as tribute to the Ameer; adding thereunto on the present occasion the sum of 2,000 crowns, by way of a present to Syud bin Mootluk. Peace was concluded, and the Wahabee forces, after restoring the fort of Mugees, so unlawfully taken, withdrew from the Sohar territories.

The welcome accorded to Syud bin Mootluk, when first he arrived at Brymee, that bade fair to be so lasting and firm, did not prove of long duration.

His proud and arrogant behaviour quickly alienated the affections of all the tribes in Oman. Chief after chief conceived a hatred against him, and ranged themselves in opposition to his cause. Of the maritime chiefs, one alone (the Chief of Amulgavine) remained staunch to his side.

The Shaikh of the Nacem, a powerful clan, and Syud Humood bin





Azan, united together, and were shortly joined by the Muttawas, for the purpose of withstanding the oppression of one they styled an invader. The roads from Brymee to Nujd were infested with robbers, opposed to his ascendancy,—so much infested, indeed, that not a messenger of his could pass but was beaten; not a fraction of treasure could be sent to the Ameer in Nujd;—yet, notwithstanding the manifold proofs of the disgust that was growing towards him, he issued orders for the assemblage of a large force at Brymee, on the termination of the fast, for the purpose of either seizing upon the fort of Zeit, in the vicinity of Ejman, or of covering the erection of a stronghold on a spot where fresh water abounds, about seven miles inland, by means of which he would be enabled to hold the maritime Shaikhs of the coast more completely in check than was the case at present.

This design the whole of the Joasmee Chiefs, excepting Abdoolla bin Rashid of Amulgavine, were determined to oppose. In the meanwhile Syud bin Mootluk, having failed in his intrigues to gain possession of the strong fort of Zenich, belonging to the Boo Kheriban branch of the Naeem Tribe, one of the most productive and flourishing spots in that quarter, exhibited such evident intention of making himself master of it, even by force, that Shaikh Ahmed bin Ali, having, through the mediation of the Chief of the Beni Ghafir, effected a reconciliation with those members of the Al Boo Khamis branch with whom he had been upon unfriendly terms, and been assured of their support in the event of actual hostilities, at once decided that he would defend his possessions at all risks and hazards. The Shaikhs of Debaye and Shargah, finding the hands of the Wahabee Agent thus effectually tied for the present, have contented themselves with detaining two men from each pearl boat, to guard against a surprise, and have permitted the remainder to proceed to the banks.

Towards the close of the year, so strong was the party in league against Syud bin Mootluk, so precarious did he feel his position to be,—for reports had reached the Ameer that he was appropriating to himself a considerable portion of the treasure he had collected,—that he meditated proceeding in person to Nujd, to wait upon his master, and try to dispel from his mind all credence in the evil reports so freely circulated against him. A day had even been fixed for his departure from Brymee, when the unexpected arrival of messengers with letters from the Ameer—"confirming him in his position, but desiring him to send without delay any ready money he might have in his possession"—led to the sudden abandonment of the plan, and the despatch of a considerable sum to Nujd, through the medium of Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan, who, as well as his father, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, having been favoured with flattering communications from the Ameer by the same





opportunity, hastened to provide a vessel for the transmission of the treasure.

The year 1845 is also remarkable for the hostilities that arose between Abdoolla bin Saeed, the Wahabee Governor of the port of Kateef, and the Shaikhs of Bahrein. The cause of the quarrel and the proceedings of either party have been so fully detailed in the Sketch of the Uttoobees that to repeat them here were idle and profitless; suffice it to say, therefore, that dissensions continued to rage until the month of August 1847, when matters were brought to a peaceable settle-

A. D. 1847.

ment, the Ameer pledging himself in no way to assist Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the ex-Chief of Bahrein, in his efforts to recover his position as chief of the island, and Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa engaging to pay the Wahabee the sum of 4,000 dollars.

A. D. 1848.

In the ensuing year, the Wahabee prestige received a severe check from the Shaikh of the Beniayas, who contrived to reduce the forts of Brymee, to defeat and discomfit a Nujdee force sent specially against him, and so completely to paralyse the efforts of Syud bin Mootluk to recover his lost authority in Oman, that he drove him to seek refuge at Shargah, and there to remain until forces could be collected by the Joasmee and his allies to give him assistance. These troops were speedily assembled, and towards the close of the year the combined armies of Shaikh Sultan, Muktoom bin Butye, and Humeed bin Rashid, set out from Shargah with Syud bin Mootluk, and the remnant of the Nujdees, to attack Shaikh Syud at Brymee. Affairs, however, through the mediation of an envoy deputed by the Sherreeff of Mecca, to compose the differences that had arisen, precluded the necessity for a recourse to active hostilities. Peace was concluded, and the Wahabee commander reinstated in his position at Brymee.

A. D. 1849.

In the following year Ameer Fysul appears to have entertained the design of reducing the island of Bahrein to submission to his own authority. From a reference to the Sketch of the Uttoobees will be gathered how the Ameer came to the neighbourhood of the island in person; how His Highness induced the inhabitants of the Guttur Coast to forsake the Uttoobees, and come over to the side of the Nujdees; how the sons of the ex-chief suddenly equipped a fleet from the Persian Coast, and, after attacking and forcing their way through the line of Uttoobee vessels blockading the port of Kateef, succeeded in joining the Wahabees; how Shaikh Mahomed was on the point of being compelled to succumb to the overwhelming force in league against him; and, finally, how the timely arrival off the island of our ships of war, blasting the hopes and ambitious designs of both





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the Wahabees and the refugees from Kenn, matters were peaceably settled (July 1851), and the integrity of the island of Bahrein was preserved.

There remains but to notice the fear and trepidation caused in the minds of the Muskat authorities by the approach of a Nujdee force, under the command of no less a person than a son (Abdoolla bin Fysul) of the Ameer himself.

A. D. 1852.

Full and ample particulars connected with the affair,—the steps adopted by Abdoolla bin Fysul, and the result of those steps; the proceedings of the Resident to oppose the ambitious designs of the Wahabee, and the success that attended those proceedings,—these have all been so fully detailed in the Muskat narrative, that I will conclude by saying that the invasion of the Batinah districts, at one time contemplated, was abandoned, and matters were brought to a settlement, in 1853, by His

A. D. 1853.

Excellency Syud Soweeynee agreeing to pay an exorbitant amount of tribute to the Ameer annually, and a treaty offensive and defensive being entered into between the Wahabee and Muskat authorities, in the name of their respective superiors, the Ameer of Nujd and the Imaum of Muskat.





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HISTORICAL SKETCH  
OF THE  
BENIYAS TRIBE OF ARABS,

FROM THE YEAR 1761 TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1831,

PREPARED BY

LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL;

WITH

CONTINUATIONS OF THE SAME,

FROM 1832 TO SEPTEMBER 1843,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

AND FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO MAY 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.





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## BENIYAS.

NEITHER Aboothabee, nor the Beniyas Tribe inhabiting it, appears to have met with a separate notice in Mr. Warden's Sketches. It is situated just below Ras Suffan, on a portion of land formed into an island by a backwater, which admits boats, but which is fordable at one spot during low-water. The anchorage off the town is unsafe: vessels drawing fourteen feet water are obliged to lie a mile and a quarter off from the shore, and are completely exposed to the violence of the north-westers; while, from the low nature of the shore, and prevalence of hazy weather, it is extremely difficult of access. The town, with the exception of the Shaikh's house, or small fort, is built entirely of cadjans, the policy of the present ruler, Tahnoon, being opposed to the erection of stone buildings, as rendering his subjects too independent of him, and, at the same time, causing him to be more tangible by an attack on the sea side. The number of inhabitants fluctuates, but may be taken on an average at about 18,000 souls. During the pearl fishing upwards of 600 boats visit the banks, each carrying from seven to fifteen men. The soil is arid, and unproductive, and the water on the island brackish. Aboothabee is consequently dependent upon other places for its supplies of provisions, and is soon reduced to great distress by anything like an effective blockade.

The Beniyas Tribe is composed of several others, such as the Marier and the Kemzan, descended from the Beni Sukur; the Hawamul and the Mujalibah, from the Al Ali; the Sumeesat, from the Abedal; the Rameesat, from the Beni Humeed; the Maharibah, from the Beni Naeem; the Bomaher, from the Shubeeb and Kalazy; the Al Boo Felasa, from a branch of the Beniyas; and the Beni Kaab, from the Kaab. The rulers over this collection of tribes have generally been selected from the Huboo Fulah family, from which Shaikh Tahnoon is descended.

The original seat of the Beniyas, like that of the Arabian Tribes, was in Nujd, but on leaving that part of Arabia they settled in the tract of country extending between Biddah and Brymee. The larger portion of the tribe was composed of Bedouins, residing in the interior, and tending their flocks and herds; but some few individuals, reduced






to poverty through the loss of their cattle, took up their abode on the shores of the Persian Gulf, on the line of coast between Debaye, and a short distance from the island upon which the town of Aboothabee now stands, but which at that time, from its being supposed to be wholly destitute of water, was uninhabited. It was, however, sometimes visited by the Beniyas fishermen, as a place well adapted for the prosecution of their employment; but on these occasions they were under the necessity of taking their supplies of water with them. One of these individuals, however, having occasion to dig into the ground, was delighted to find the pit fill with tolerable water; a discovery which induced the visitors to take up their permanent residence upon the island of Aboothabee.

The first establishment (which consisted of twenty houses) took place about the year 1761. The intelligence of water having been found quickly spread through the tribe, and before two years had elapsed the place had increased to four hundred houses; from which period to the present additions to the population and dwellings have been constantly making. The Shaikhs of the tribe for many years continued to reside in the interior, paying occasional visits to Aboothabee, and receiving presents from the inhabitants. According to one opinion, the original founder of the Huboo Fulah family was Shaikh Yas bin Amer bin Ghes bin Nuzur. (From the last the Prophet of Islam is said to be descended.) It is, however, asserted by others that Shaikh Tahnoon's ancestor was Zhelal, a lineal descendant of Gharrem-ool-Zeighee. Nothing, however, appears to be known regarding his successors until after the death of the great grandfather of Shaikh Shakboot, the father of the present ruler of Aboothabee. This person left four sons, named Inhian, Saadoon, Mahomed, and Sultan. These soon quarrelled with each other, and the Beniyas Tribe, being consequently divided into four parties, a sanguinary and protracted contest was carried on between them. On the death of the three first, they were succeeded by their respective sons, Esa bin Inhian, Zaed bin Mahomed, and Sultan bin Saadoon, during whose lifetime the feud became still more virulent. Esa was succeeded by his son Zheab, as the nominal head of the Beniyas. The new chief observing that the inclinations of the bulk of the tribe were inclined to his uncle Zaed bin Mahomed, availed himself of a favourable opportunity, and put him to death, by which means he finally established his authority over the whole of the Beniyas. He continued to govern undisturbed for some time, until a grandson of Mahomed, named Huza bin Zaed, who resided in Aboothabee, endeavoured to stir up the neighbouring tribes against him. At this time Shaikh Zheab resided in the interior, paying only occasional visits to his capital.





On the occasion of one of these visits, in 1793, Shaikh Zheab thought proper to give orders that the family of Huza, together with all his dependents, should leave Aboothabee, and settle in the interior. At this time Huza was absent in Bahrein, but, receiving intelligence of the proposed removal, he hastened back, and, in the course of an angry dispute with his relative (Zheab), drew his sword, and struck him dead upon the spot. This action again split the Beniyas into two divisions, one of which supported Huza, while the other and larger portion adhered to Shakboot (the son of the murdered chief), who prosecuted the feud with such success as to put to death the ten individuals who were present at the time of his father's murder. Dreading a similar fate, Huza at last left Aboothabee with his dependents, and settled in Aboo Ali.

After his departure, Shaikh Shakboot assumed undisputed possession of the chief authority in the tribe, and continued at its head until 1816, in which year his eldest son, Mahomed, succeeded in deposing him. Mahomed remained as Shaikh for two years, when his younger brother, Tahnoon, having received a Buggalow, together with a considerable sum of money, from the Imaum, returned from Muskat to Aboothabee, and, with the assistance of his father, and good will of the majority of the tribe, succeeded in expelling the usurper in 1818. For some time after this event both father and son acted together as heads of the tribe, but gradually the authority of Shaikh Tahnoon became superior. To this alteration in their respective relations Shakboot appears to have submitted quietly, as he continued to reside in Aboothabee and its neighbourhood, and was at all times employed by Tahnoon in the arrangement of any affairs of negotiation he might be engaged in. Mahomed bin Shakboot with some difficulty saved his life by flight, and, taking refuge in Biddah, claimed the protection of Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein. Until this period the Beniyas had always been the close and intimate allies of the Joasmees, but the connection formed by Shaikh Tahnoon with the Imaum of Muskat gradually weakened the friendship existing between the two tribes, until at last a total change ensued in their relations, and they became bitter enemies.

In 1820 the Beniyas Tribes were admitted members of the General Treaty\* concluded by the British Government with the Maritime Arabs of the Persian Gulf, for the effectual suppression of piracy in that sea.

About the year 1822, an individual of some rank, named Soedan bin Zaal, fled from Aboothabee, to avoid the payment of his debts, and at the same time

\* Vide pages 76 to 80 of this Selection.





carried off a number of boats belonging to that place with him. After leading a wandering life for some time about the Gulf (during which his proceedings were viewed with more than ordinary suspicion by the British authorities), he finally settled in Biddah, under the protection of the Bahrein Shaikh. Shaikh Tahnoon, enraged at his flight, prosecuted very active operations against him, and succeeded in capturing some boats and property belonging to him. These proceedings being considered as likely to endanger the tranquillity of the Gulf, and lead to a renewal of piracy, an intimation was made to His Highness the Imaum (who was supposed to hold some control over the Beni yas Chief), through Colonel Kennett, (the Political Agent), that unless Shaikh Tahnoon gave up what he had seized, and desisted in future from any such proceedings, a vessel of war would be sent to Aboothabee to compel restitution, and destroy his fortifications.

In the end of 1823 Shaikh Tahnoon's brother, Mahomed bin Shakboot, having collected together a body of the Monasir Tribe, attacked and plundered Aboothabee. The former immediately marched with 1,500 men to relieve the town, and after an action, which lasted some hours, Mahomed was forced to retreat, after losing thirty-five men, and subsequently took refuge in Shargah. This place being threatened by Shaikh Tahnoon if the fugitives were not given up, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur collected troops, and prepared to resist, but soon after Mahomed bin Shakboot left his protection, and took up his residence in Huailah, under the authority of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein.

About this time a treaty of peace between the Imaum, Shaikh Tahnoon, and Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, was concluded, through the mediation of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, the principal condition of which was the destruction of the towers of Brymee, as well as the fort of Derah, a small fort between Shargah and Debaye, occupied by the Soodean Tribe, under Salmin bin Nassir. A number of secret intrigues appear to have been carried on in respect to the former place, which cannot now be unravelled; but Shaikh Sultan showing considerable hesitation in fulfilling his portion of the engagement, the Beni yas Chief made preparations for the renewal of hostilities, which were only averted by the influence of the Imaum and the Resident in the Persian Gulf, both of whom, it was at last arranged, were to send messengers along with Sultan bin Suggur's people, to see the stipulation of the treaty regarding the destruction of the towers of Brymee carried into effect. This arrangement was, however, rendered useless by Shaikh Sultan violating the truce, and attacking Derah. This proceeding was the signal for the renewal of hostilities, which were carried on for some time, without any material advantage being gained by either party over the other.





About the latter part of the year 1825, the Imaum having arrived in the Gulf with a fleet, His Highness offered his mediation, which was accepted, and a peace between the Beniyas Chief and Sultan bin Suggur was again concluded. The terms agreed upon were that the fort of Derah should be demolished, and Salmin bin Nassir, with the Soodean Tribe, removed out of Shaikh Sultan's territories, while the fort of Debaye was to receive a party of troops, under the command of an officer of the Imaum.

A. D. 1825.

In 1826 Obed bin Sadoon (a follower of Soodean bin Zaal, already mentioned as having fled from Aboothabee in 1822) and Syf bin Thykhan sailed from Biddah, and captured a Buggalow belonging to Aboothabee, killing and wounding several of her people. They also took possession of an Amulgavine boat, in which there was one man killed, and another wounded; but afterwards allowed her to proceed on her voyage. Subsequently, these marauders stripped a Bahrein boat, and carried all the plunder to Biddah, from which place they made their escape. These proceedings created a lively indignation in the mind of Shaikh Tahnoon against Abdoolla bin Ahmed, the Chief of Bahrein, for the countenance and shelter afforded to his rebellious subjects. He appealed very earnestly to the British authority for redress, and was with some difficulty restrained from declaring war against the Uttoobee Shaikh.

A. D. 1826.

The terms of the treaty lately concluded between the Joasmee and Beniyas Tribes, relating to the demolition of Derah and the removal of the Soodean Tribe, not having been carried into effect by Shaikh Tahnoon, the Joasmee Chief applied, in September 1826, to the Resident, for permission to endeavour to dislodge the occupants by force. He consented however to delay his proceedings until it was seen whether the Aboothabee Shaikh would attend to the recommendation given him by the British authority for him to withdraw his countenance and support from the Soodean Tribe. No attention, however, was paid by Tahnoon to the personal exhortations of the Resident, who, in the course of an interview at Aboothabee, endeavoured to convince him that the evacuation of the place in question had become necessary for the preservation of the public peace, which was constantly perilled by the outrageous conduct of Salmin bin Nassir's followers towards the neighbouring tribes, and that both his credit and interest depended in a great measure upon the due performance of his engagement regarding the demolition of Derah, as the treaty containing this article had received the sanction of His Highness the Imaum, and the English Government. Finding the Beniyas Chief inflexible, the British authority proceeded to Muskat, and there, having acquainted His Highness the Imaum with the contumacy displayed by Shaikh Tahnoon, His Highness promised to send two





vessels to cruise off the fort, to prevent assistance being sent by him, while the Joasmee troops from Shargah and Ras-ool-Khyrna invested it by land.

No steps, however, were taken in the affair till March 1827, when the Imaum sailed with his fleet for Derah, and

A. D. 1827.

caused that place to be demolished. At the same time, as a sort of compensation to Shaikh Tahnoon's wounded dignity, he supplied him with cannon and ammunition, besides using all his influence to induce the inhabitants of Debaye to place themselves under his authority. Prior to His Highness' appearance, a negotiation for peace had been commenced between the rival Shaikhs, which had nearly been brought to a favourable termination, when the arrival or intrigues of His Highness (who has always felt disposed to view with a jealous eye any combination between these powerful chieftains) threw matters into the same disorder and confusion which had formerly existed. Tahnoon, availing himself of the support afforded to him by the Imaum, made a sudden and vigorous attack on Debaye, which was successful.

In November 1827 Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur declared war against Tahnoon, on account of his continued aggressions. Among these was the seizure of several Shargah pearl boats by Khaleefa bin Dumeethar, the Governor of Debaye, who, however, was compelled, by the prompt and efficient measures taken by the officer commanding the vessel of war cruising on the pearl banks, to restore both the vessels and cargo.

The proceedings of Dumeethar produced a strong remonstrance from the political authority to Shaikh Tahnoon, and

A. D. 1828.

subsequently, in an interview held with that personage in April 1828, Major Wilson pointed out the ill effects likely to arise if he permitted his dependents to conduct themselves in such an irregular manner. Shaikh Sultan, however, does not appear to have acted upon his declaration of war, as he took no further steps after publishing it, and affairs remained as they were.

Agreeably to the arrangement previously made with the Imaum, Shaikh Tahnoon joined His Highness with a large contingent in October 1828, and accompanied the expedition against Bahrein. From what has since transpired, there is reason to believe that a secret understanding existed between the Beniyas Chief and the Shaikh of Bahrein; for after the appearance of the fleet before that island, the inhabitants were minutely informed of everything in agitation, while the irregular and insubordinate conduct of Shaikh Tahnoon and his followers was the principal cause of the total failure of the whole affair.

The two notorious characters Sooedan bin Zaal and Syf bin Thykan, mentioned as having carried off a number of boats from Aboothabee,





and fled to Biddah in 1822, having effected a reconciliation with Shaikh Tahnoon, left the latter place, and returned to their old residence in the Beni yas capital.

In July 1828 two Bahrein Buggarabs and one Koweit Buteel were captured near the former place, by some of the Beni yas Tribe. These vessels were, however, subsequently recovered, and restored to their owners; but the pirates, making their escape into the interior, avoided the punishment they so well deserved.

In September 1828 a boat, manned principally by people of the Beni yas Tribe, under the command of an inhabitant of Bahrein, named Obed bin Mohunnah, proceeded over to the Persian Coast, for the purpose of cruising, but their leader having been seized while landing at Zeerah, a small village on the Persian Coast, they returned to the Arabian side of the Gulf. On their way back they fell in with four Aseeloo boats, near Seer Beni yas, which they plundered; and afterwards proceeded to the neighbourhood of Aboothabee, to which place the sufferers likewise hastened, to lay their complaints before Shaikh Tahnoon, who behaved on this occasion in a very creditable manner, having afforded them such compensation for the aggression committed as fully satisfied them.

Hostilities having again broken out in February 1829 between Shaikh Tahnoon and the Joasmee Chief, Aboothabee, the capital of the former, was at one time reduced to very great distress, by the blockade maintained by Shaikh Sultan. Both parties, however, felt the inconvenience of carrying on war during the season of the pearl fishing, and at length a peace was concluded between the belligerents in the month of June 1829, through the good offices of Shaikh Mahomed bin Guzeeb, the Governor of Lingah.

The Imaum of Muskat and the Shaikh of Bahrein having dropped further hostilities, and entered into amicable relations with each other, Shaikh Tahnoon, as the ostensible ally of His Highness, was admitted as a member of the treaty of peace concluded in December 1829, although no act of hostility had ever been displayed towards him by the Uttoobees.

The Beni yas Shaikh appears to have remained quiet till the beginning of 1831, when, on the occasion of the Imaum declaring war a second time against his relation Humood bin Azan of Sohar, he sent down a number of men to Muskat, with an offer of their services in the approaching contest. Whether suspicious of the Shaikh's fidelity, from observing the invariable ill success which attended all the operations in which a share was borne by the Beni yas Tribe, or from some other cause, is uncertain, but all his proffers were peremptorily rejected by His Highness. Irri-





tated at this repulse, and probably alarmed at the increase of influence likely to be acquired by his rival, Sultan bin Suggur, from the favour of the Imaum, Shaikh Tahnoon appears to have thrown himself into the opposite scale, and, by a well-timed expedition into the Joasmee territories, prevented that tribe from affording any efficient support to His Highness' operations against Sohar. The consequence of this foray was a declaration of war on the part of Sultan bin Suggur, who made extensive preparations for the blockade of Aboothabee. The prospect of hostilities, however, during the pearl fishing season, excited great discontent in the minds both of the Joasmees and Beniyas, in consequence of which the good offices of Shaikh Mahomed bin Guzeeb of Lingah were sought by both parties, and after a short negotiation a peace was concluded, in July 1831, through the mediation of that chief, and the subjects of both parties proceeded forthwith to the pearl banks.

Shortly after this arrangement, a piracy was committed by some people of Shargah upon two Beniyas pearl boats. In retaliation for this outrage, Shaikh Tahnoon laid an embargo upon fourteen Joasmee Buggarahs which happened to touch at Aboothabee. These, however, on the restoration of the captured boats and cargoes by Shaikh Sultan, he liberated, but detained the pearls and slaves belonging to the Shargah vessels, until certain claims preferred by one of his subjects against a man of Debaye (now residing under the protection of the Joasmee Chief) should be settled. At the present time (December 1831) this affair still remains unadjusted, and it is to be feared will eventually terminate in the renewal of hostilities.

#### CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING, FROM 1832 TO 1843,

BY LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL.

The latter end of the year 1831, according to the historical sketches up to that time, found Shaikh Tahnoon, the Beniyas Chief, in the course of negotiation with his enemies, Sultan bin Suggur and his dependent the Chief of Ejman, relative to the mutual restoration of property taken at sea by the subjects of either party. The war which had threatened in consequence of the depredations of Tahnoon upon the territories of his opponents, at a time when they were occupied with their forces on the Batinah Coast, had been averted through the mediation of the Chief of Lingah.





The only measure adopted by Shaikh Tahnoon during this year was one of precaution, in despatching some well armed Buggalows to convoy his trading vessels, and secure them from the attack of the Joasmee boats, which were cruising against the trade of Muskat, &c.

A. D. 1832.

By giving asylum and protection to three refugees, inhabitants of Khan (a place near Shargah, under the authority of the Joasmees), who had been concerned in the piracy and plunder of a boat belonging to an English subject, off the Persian Coast, he greatly offended the British authorities, and drew upon himself the responsibility of their act, which, as being Joasmee subjects, would otherwise have properly attached to the Joasmee Chief.

Although the piracy was committed in May 1832, it was not until early in the following year, in consequence of the repeated evasions and delays of Shaikh Tahnoon, and immediate means to enforce redress not being available, owing to the pressing contingencies in other quarters (Shaikh Nassir's proceedings at Bushire, &c.) requiring more urgently the services of the cruisers of the Gulf squadron, that the Resident's demand upon him for the exposure and delivery of the culprits, or the payment of 1,500 German crowns, was acceded to, by the adoption of the latter alternative. The satisfaction thus afforded, however, put it out of the power of Shaikh Sultan to excuse any further delay in making good his share of the value of the property plundered; and he was accordingly called upon to disburse the sum of 2,000 German crowns.

A. D. 1833.

In the exaction of the full penalty in the latter case it became necessary, on the part of the officer commanding the vessels despatched on this duty, partially to fulfil his threat of destroying a Buteel belonging to Shargah, lying near Ejman, which he crippled, by knocking away her poop deck, and lodging several shot in her hull.\*

In April 1833 Shaikh Tahnoon's life was sacrificed to the ambition and jealousy of his two brothers Khaleefa and Sultan, who with their own hands put him to death. Apprehending the chances of their intriguing against his life and authority, he had long excluded them from Aboothabee, but yielding at length to the entreaty of the father, Shakboot, recalled them from banishment, under the proviso that they should not exercise any share in the government, or carry arms. A very short time, however, served to discover them in league with some of the principal men of the tribe to murder him, upon which he cast the latter into prison, but thereby unfortunately so

\* This paragraph perhaps more properly belongs to the section on Joasmees, but it is inserted here in consequence of Shaikh Tahnoon having been mixed up in the affair, as above detailed.





offended and alarmed the remainder that they too secretly entered into a conspiracy in order to put the original design into execution with the brothers. Accordingly, Shaikh Khaleefa, having concealed a loaded pistol under his clothes, took the opportunity of Tahnoon's being off his guard to shoot him in the side, when Sultan immediately despatched him with his dagger. While Tahnoon lived, the reduction of the tribe to submission promised much difficulty to the Wahabee Chief; but the first act of the usurpers was to tender allegiance and the payment of Zukat, in return for which, Toorkey bin Saood intimated to the Joasmee Chief that they were under his protection, and that he would permit of no aggressions upon them.

The oppressive and arbitrary conduct of the usurpers very soon disgusted the tribe, and a conspiracy was formed (August-September 1833) by some of the principal members, who communicated their plot to a nephew of Shaikh Shakboot, the person they had selected to put his cousin Shaikh Khaleefa to death, and become chief in his room. This individual, however, betrayed them to Shaikh Khaleefa, who retired within the fort, and seizing the chief conspirators, put three of them to death, viz. Sultan bin Majid, Mahomed bin Rumeen, and Mahomed Muleefa. He likewise imprisoned two merchants, with the intention of killing them; but the ferment thereby raised among the people of Aboothabee, combined with his brother Sultan's entreaties, induced him to spare their lives. One of them, Bin Iyan, however, after beating and stripping him of his property, he sent away, together with his relatives, in a Buggarah to Lingah. Consequent upon the discontent and disgust created by these proceedings, two branches of the Beniyas, the Boo Felasa and Rumsha, consisting of about eight hundred persons, determined upon leaving the place on the first favourable opportunity: accordingly those on the spot, leaving all their effects behind them, proceeded to Debaye, which town was after a little hesitation and delay given up to them by the Beniyas Governor, and they summoned the rest, who were on the pearl banks, to join them there. Nothing could have afforded more satisfaction to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, the Joasmee Chief, than these dissensions and divisions among the Beniyas, and the prospect of destroying his enemies by means supplied by themselves. He lost no time in proceeding to Shargah, and agreed to assist Bin Iyan with a large force in an attack upon Aboothabee. Accordingly, despatching two boats, he recalled his subjects from the pearl banks, and likewise sent orders for all the disposable men in Ras-ool-Khyma to meet him at Shargah. Impressed with the belief that, under present circumstances, he had only to land with a few men near Aboothabee, to ensure the capture of that place, Shaikh Sultan refused to attend to the remonstrances of his principal adherents, pointing out the injury he





was inflicting upon his people by withdrawing them from the pearl banks before the season had half elapsed, the probability of his involving himself with the English and the Wahabees, and the advisability of permitting the Beniayas to destroy themselves, without his interference.

On the 7th September the united forces, consisting of seven hundred men of the Boo Felasa and Rumsha Tribes in eighty boats, and five hundred and twenty men in twenty-two boats, under the command of Sultan bin Suggur and Hussein bin Rahmah, set sail for Aboothabee, in the full conviction that the place was deserted, and would be taken without difficulty.

The threatened attack, however, had had the effect of settling the disputes between Shaikh Khaleefa, Sultan, and the father Shakboot, and a force of 3,500 men of the Beniayas and Monasir Tribes had been assembled in Aboothabee. On the afternoon of the 10th, the Joasmee force landed at Khore Suffan, about four miles from the Beniayas capital, where they intended to pass the night, and make the attack on the following morning. At sunrise they were astonished to find themselves surrounded by a much superior force, supported by cavalry and camel-men, and a panic seizing them, they broke at the first discharge of firearms, and fled towards their boats, the greater portion of which, owing to the ebb tide, were now high and dry. Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, with four of his slaves, got into a small boat, which sank under their weight, and he had a narrow escape from drowning. His loss amounted to thirty men killed, including the brother of the Shaikh of Lingah, and a Buteel and five boats taken; that of his allies to fifteen men killed, and sixty boats taken; besides two hundred and thirty-five men made prisoners, who had no other resource but to return to their families at Aboothabee.

The three Beniayas boats mentioned under the head "Joasmees" as having evaded the blockading squadron now before Aboothabee and put to sea, proceeded to Cape Bostana, where they captured an Ejman\* Buggarah carrying eight men, seven of whom they killed. They afterwards fell in with a Muskat Buggalow to the westward, out of which they took some kharas of dates, 3,000 dollars, and all her guns, and killed five of her crew. The Joasmee fleet in pursuit now heaving in sight, they deserted the Buggalow, and, making all sail, escaped from their pursuers, and returned in safety to Aboothabee. Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot made a foray upon the Ghufflah Tribe, who had assisted the Debaye people in cutting off the supplies by land; and, surprising one of their villages, killed thirteen men and wounded eleven, and

\* The people of Ejman were acting as allies to the Joasmees, and consequently declared enemies of the Beniayas.





carried away three hundred head of cattle. Encouraged by his success, he made several other incursions into the interior, killing and plundering wherever he went. These vigorous measures alarmed the Bedouins, who thenceforward refused to give any further assistance to the Debaye people.

The explanation afforded by the Beni yas Shaikhs, for the plunder of the Muskat vessel before mentioned, having been accepted by the authorities of that place, (who, since the occurrence, had made the former a present, with the desire, probably, of conciliating them, as a counterpoise to the Joasmees,) rendered the interference of the Resident uncalled for.

Peace was shortly after concluded between the contending parties, through the mediation of the Shaikh of Lingah, but it was destined not to be of very long duration. A successful predatory inroad into the Joasmees territories by the Monasir, a Bedouin Tribe closely connected with Aboothabee, and the capture in retaliation of ten Beni yas pearl boats, carrying about eighty men, and pearls worth 4,000 dollars, on the banks, by the Boo Felasa of Debaye, led to the renewal of hostilities. Both parties having been necessarily obliged to withdraw their subjects from the banks, to avoid the effect of reprisals on the one side, and of further aggressions on the other, apprehensions of future distress were raised, by their being thus deprived of their share of the produce of the annual pearl fishery, forming the chief source of subsistence to the Maritime Arabs of the Gulf, as being almost the only means they possess of gaining a livelihood. Moved by the earnest solicitations, therefore, of his dependents, Shaikh Khaleefa sent his father (Shakboot) to Shargah, who succeeded in concluding a peace with Sultan bin Suggur; one of the conditions being that the Boo Felasa, the branch of the Beni yas residing in Debaye, should thenceforth be under the authority of the Joasmees.

While the people of Debaye, about the middle of 1834, evincing a piratical spirit, were making depredations upon the general trade, some of the Soodean Tribe,

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formerly from Ejman, but now residing at Aboothabee, attacked a Mootarish Buteel from Muttra, and plundered her of property to the amount of 1,000 dollars; fortunately no lives were lost. Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot failed to afford redress, in compliance with the demands of the Resident, until he was made aware, by the appearance of vessels of war off his port, of the determination to enforce it.

The predatory spirit which had from time to time evinced itself on the part of the different Arab Tribes, by the occasional plunder of individual vessels, for which satisfaction and ample reparation had always, however, been exacted, now broke out into open and avowed





piracy on the part of the Beniyas, not only upon Native boats, but likewise those under British colours.

They openly asserted to their captives that they were determined to leave off all trade, and commence piracy; that their dwellings, constructed of sticks and cadjan mats, could be moved into the interior at will, and thus placed, with themselves, out of the power of the English.

The extent of their success of course depending upon despatch, their fleets cruised for a length of time on the Persian Coast, in the general track of the Gulf trade, committing the most daring depredations, attended with the greatest cruelty, involving in some cases the murder of the whole of the crews of the boats that fell into their hands. The most speedy and ample retribution was therefore imperatively necessary, to deter the other tribes from following the example, and thus rendering unsafe the commerce between this Gulf and the Indian seas.

All the available vessels of war were immediately despatched on a cruise, to intercept the piratical fleets. One only, however, had the good fortune to fall in with them, and the following is a detailed account of the action which ensued, in the words of Captain Sawyer, her commanding officer:—

“ At daylight of the 16th, observed three Buggalows, one Buteel, and three Buggarabs, to the NW., standing SW. Turned the hands out, and made all possible sail to come up. At 6 A. M. got them broad off the lee bow, and found we gained upon them. Beat to action, and prepared to engage. At 7 o'clock fired the larboard bow gun, and hoisted our colours. Discovered the headmost Buggalow to be completely crowded with men, and having in tow a large one. She fired a gun, hoisted a red flag, and dipped it three times, apparently in contempt and defiance. The whole then closed, and formed, and fired a shot, which fell rather short. The leading Buggalow immediately returned it, and the shot was seen to take the water about midway. The whole then struck their colours, and one of the Buggarabs lowered her sail, and pulled towards us, evidently with the intention of attracting our attention. On minutely observing her, found she was full of men. There was now no doubt of this being the piratical fleet belonging to Aboothabee, and the Arab pilot confidently assured us they were. On closing, he recognised the vessels, and declared the leading one contained Shaikh Sultan bin Shakboot. On finding we were gaining, he cast off the tow, and they lowered their sails, and closed within pistol-shot, with the other boats formed on their beam for battle. We immediately stood between them, having just room to do so without touching, having the Shaikh's Buggalow on the starboard, and the tow on the larboard side. In passing between them we poured into each a broadside, round and grape, the guns nearly touching. The crew of the Shaikh's vessel cheered,





crying 'Alla Akbar al Kaffer.' Some were seen in the act of attempting to throw grapnels into us, but were immediately shot. About ninety or a hundred men rushed towards the head, with their long spears, which touched our quarter, for the purpose of boarding us, in which they failed, having met with a most destructive fire from small arms. There must have been at least two hundred men in this vessel, and they presented a most formidable phalanx, with their towering spears. Very serious damage must have been sustained by these vessels, as large splinters were seen flying in all directions. Immediately after passing, about ninety men jumped overboard from the tow, and were picked up by the Shaikh's vessel, who hoisted her sail, and stood to the northward, accompanied by one of the Buteels, which afterwards parted. Endeavoured to close with him, but he outsailed us. Shifted the bow gun to the bridle port, in the hope of being enabled to cripple him, but without effect, the shot falling short. The remainder of the boats hauled up for the abandoned Buggalow, and stripped her of her sail, and some other small articles, and then stood to the SW. At 9 o'clock observed the chase heaving overboard some articles that we could not make out. The wind decreasing, plied his sweeps, by which he gained. Lowered the two cutters, sent them ahead to tow, and got out the longest oars for sweeps, but without effect. We continued the chase until sunset, when he rounded the eastern point of Polior, about five miles ahead of us. Having lost sight of her, and night coming on, deemed it advisable to give over the pursuit in our present direction, and hauled up to the southward, in the expectation of meeting with her at daylight; which not doing, stood on for Aboothabee, and about 8 A. M. of the 17th discovered the abandoned Buggalow, and stood for her. At 10 o'clock observed a raft, with men waving flags, about five miles to the eastward. Sent an officer to take possession of the Buggalow, who found eight bodies on her deck, and committed them to the deep. Sent the pinnace to the raft, who found nine men on it, and brought them on board. On examining them, they stated that they were part of the crew of the Buggalow we had taken possession of, called the *Nassir*, belonging to Congoon; had been forty days from Mangalore, when she was captured by the fleet we found her with, near Koong, four or five days ago; the crew consisted of forty originally,—a few are supposed to have escaped, but the others and Nakhoda were put to death; that the mode of intended attack was to board us in passing between the two Buggalows in different points, and that they were confident of success. They boasted of having large vessels of oil boiling for the purpose of dipping us in when taken. They had no idea of the effects of a broadside from 32-pounders, and were completely paralysed; so much so, that they forgot to fire themselves, and immediately jumped overboard. Salim states that





his party threw twenty-five bodies overboard, and that the same number were taken away wounded. This makes thirty-three killed in this boat alone, and it is highly gratifying to me to find that none of the survivors originally belonging to the vessel were hurt by us. Two of them had been cut and stabbed by the pirates, and two others injured in the contest with them. They abandoned the Buggalow about 4 P. M., preferring the peril of a raft to again falling into the hands of the pirates, whom they expected to return. The other Buggalow must have suffered much more, and it is a matter of deep regret that we could not get up with her. Salim states that it was the intention of the pirates, after taking the *Nassir*, to proceed to Ras-ool-Hud, for the purpose of committing more depredations."

This exhibition of the determination and power to put down piracy very materially facilitated the attainment of our objects, and accelerated compliance with the demands now made, of which the following is a list, enumerating the various vessels plundered, not including the Muskat brig *Curlew*, the British Buggalow *Durya Dowlut*, and various boats belonging to the Joasmees and others (between whom, however, and the Beni yas war had again lately broken out):—

*List of the demands to be made on the Chief of Aboothabee, in compensation for the outrages committed by the Beni yas on the peaceable Arabs of the Persian Gulf.*

Number.	Description of Vessels.	Value of Vessels and Cargoes, in German Crowns.
1	Muskat Buggalow and cargo .....	10,000
2	Bahrein Buteel .....	439
4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 15	Boats of various descriptions of Lingah .....	5,903
3	Bahrein Buggalow ( <i>Nukhlowe</i> ) .....	500
6	Nukhlowe Buggarah ( <i>Mahomed</i> ) .....	250
7	Lingah Buggarah .....	250
11	Karrack Buggalow .....	500
12	Bushire Buggarah .....	766
13	Moolla Hussein .....	300
14	Losses inflicted on people of Bassadore .....	..
16	Bunder Malla, &c. ....	439
17	Bin Saleh's Buteel .....	500
18	Sooedad's Buteel .....	250
19	Congoon Buggalow .....	4,500
Total.....		24,597

A Beni yas Buteel, with a valuable cargo from India, touching at





Muskat, was placed under embargo by the authorities there, who were authorised to detain her as a set-off against the claim of 10,000 dollars advanced by them for the Muskat Buggalow plundered by these pirates.

With reference to the other cases, one brig, seven Buggalows, two Buteels, five Buggarahs, and the greater part of the goods on board the *Durya Dowlut*, were recovered, together with upwards of 10,000 German crowns in cash and property, besides an engagement for 1,600 more on the termination of the pearl fishery, towards the liquidation of the claims made for the cargoes of the vessels destroyed and plundered. All their captives were released, and the two pirates Mahomed bin Suggur bin Zheab and Mahomed bin Majid, who headed the outrages upon the British flag, surrendered. The three principal Beniyas vessels concerned in the late piracies were put into our possession, as pledges for the settlement of the balance due on account of the English Buggalow. Add to this the seizure of their own Buteel with a valuable cargo in Muskat, as above mentioned, in compensation for the loss occasioned by the plunder of a Buggalow belonging to that port, and the chastisement inflicted upon the piratical fleet, which make up a summary account of the reparation obtained from the Beniyas, without any further recourse to hostilities.

The engagements entered into by Shaikh Shakboot, the father, and accredited Agent of the Beniyas Chief, for the gradual liquidation of the amount of the claims remaining unadjusted, were confirmed by his son, and subsequently strictly fulfilled. The surrendered pirate commanders were sent to Bombay, where the principal one was tried, found guilty, and condemned to death; but a point of law being raised, the question was referred to the King in Council, and the sentence subsequently commuted to transportation for life. The other, Mahomed bin Majid, against whom, unfortunately, no prosecution could be maintained, was returned, to be handed over a prisoner to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, to whom was left the infliction of adequate punishment. The prisoner, however, effected his escape unobserved, by swimming from the vessel in which he was being conveyed, on its arrival off Shargah, and succeeded in reaching the shore, distant about four miles. This just retribution exacted from the Beniyas led many of the tribe, who had actively engaged in the late piratical proceedings, and shared in the advantages resulting from their success, to take shelter under the protection of another power until the demands pressing so heavily upon them should be liquidated, in order thus to avoid a participation in the consequences of their acts—a punishment they so justly merited.





To prevent Aboothabee being depopulated, and the consequent impossibility of enforcing our demands, it became necessary to comply in a measure with the request of their chief, and discourage the different Arab Chieftains from affording asylum and protection to Beni yas subjects. The Gubeysat branch, under Khadim bin Nahman, nevertheless seceded, and proceeded to establish themselves at Adeed, leaving debts to a considerable amount unsettled. Previous to taking their departure, they plundered some Aboothabee fishing-boats. All arguments and endeavours on the part of the Resident to bring about a reconciliation having failed, he was under the necessity of withdrawing himself from any further interference, and of permitting the parties to take their own measures for the settlement of their respective claims.

The situation of Adeed and Wukra afforded particular facilities as places of resort to pirates, and other desperate characters, who supposed themselves intangible to our naval force; and the evil effects of the secession of the Gubeysat from Aboothabee, and their establishment at the former place, began now to manifest themselves. A member of that tribe, Jassim bin Jabbur Rugragee, and two others, Soheil bin Ateesh, and Ali Howlee, each acting independently of the other, and commanding each a small boat, containing a crew of from twelve to eighteen men, principally Bedouins of the interior, commenced a systematic course of plunder. Their practice, on the capture of a boat, was to convey it or the cargo found in it to Merfa, a desert spot situated between Adeed and Aboothabee, behind Khore Bizzum, near Ras Aswamee, there load their booty on camels kept in readiness, and, having made arrangements for its disposal, re-embark, and put to sea in the prosecution of further depredations.

It became imperatively necessary to undeceive the perpetrators of this dangerous species of piracy with regard to their fancied security; and Merfa being utterly inaccessible to the means at the disposal of the Resident, the only course left to him was to hold the Chiefs of Biddah, Wukra, and Adeed responsible for their acts,—a measure justifiable on the grounds of their having identified themselves with them, inasmuch as Jassim had, in the first instance, issued from the last place, and, there was every reason to believe, received support from Khadim bin Nahman, until the publicity of his conduct had rendered it dangerous to countenance him any longer. A portion of the property had been sold at the other places; and further, it was known that it was in their power to put an end to these lawless acts, by the seizure of the persons in question, and the destruction of their boats, they being dependent upon them for their water, and other necessities of life.





With these objects, and to remove the impression that that part of the dangerous and intricate coast between Ras Reccan and Adeed could not be approached by our cruisers, two sloops of war and a schooner were despatched to make the attempt, which succeeded, after threading the numerous and dangerous shoals, in touching at Biddah, Wukra, and Adeed, and returning in safety. The governors of these places (Salim bin Nassir, Ali bin Nassir, and Khadim bin Nahman) bound themselves by an engagement to do their utmost to seize the boats of the pirates. The last (Khadim) was, through his Agent (Mahomed bin Ateef, the chief himself being absent) further required to afford security, in the shape of money or property, in value to the amount of 600 dollars, to be returned on the fulfilment of his promise.

A fleet of Uttoabee boats, wellmanned and armed, also sailed in quest of the pirates, with whose secret haunts the commanders professed themselves to be well acquainted, but effected nothing. Although the pirates themselves were not seized, their lawless proceedings were put down, and the objects of the expedition fully attained. The amount, therefore, of the pledge, with the exception of 227 dollars in cash, (returned also in May 1838,) was after the lapse of several months restored to the Wukra Shaikh, who, with the others before mentioned, were informed that they would be held responsible for their future acts.

Three of Jassim bin Jabbur's gang were subsequently secured by the Chief of Aboothabee, while engaged in an act of piracy, attended with loss of life, upon a Bahrein boat. After having detained them in confinement four months, during which time one had died, he set the remaining two at liberty, further punishing them by the seizure of their boat, which he subsequently, at the request of the Resident, and in his presence, publicly burnt on the beach.

The Shaikh of Aboothabee, at the instance of his guest Esai bin Tarif, and probably at the instigation of the Imaum, who had for some time maintained a correspondence with the disaffected members of Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed's family, intimated to the Resident his wish to join his (Esai's) cause; but was in reply informed, that permission could not be granted without the special sanction of the British Government, whose decision he was called upon to await, on the grounds of the late serious misdemeanours of his tribe, and of his having no *causa belli* with the Uttoobees. The departure of Esai bin Tarif and Sultan bin Salameh, with a large proportion of their followers, from his territories and protection, for the purpose of joining the expedition of the Imaum against Mombassa, deprived him of any pretext for further urging his proposal to wage war against Bahrein.





Shaikh Khaleefa at length availed himself (May 1837) of the permission afforded by the Resident, to adopt his own measures against Adeed, held by the Gubeysat seceders from Aboothabee. He contrived to surprise them, killed fifty of their number, and rendered the place uninhabitable, by destroying all the forts and buildings, throwing into the wells the bodies of the slain, and filling them up with the ruins.

This act of vengeance caused much irritation and alarm in the minds of the Joasmee and Debaye Chiefs, with the latter of whom some of the Gubeysat took refuge; but the conduct of Shaikh Khaleefa towards his revolted subjects, subsequent to his bringing them again under subjection, being characterised by moderation, all those re-located in Aboothabee having had their boats restored to them, and the Shaikh publishing a full amnesty and pardon to such of the fugitives who might choose to return, at the same time promising to give back to them their vessels and property, on the condition of their demeaning themselves for the future as quiet and obedient subjects, Shaikh Khadim bin Nahman, and most of the heads of the tribes who had made their escape on the occasion, were shortly induced by these favourable terms, held out by the Beniyas Chief, to return and resettle in Aboothabee.

The whole of the Boo Eyneen Tribe, to the number of about three hundred families, inhabitants of Wukra, on the Guttur Coast, under their Chief, Ali bin Nassir, having vacated and destroyed that place, now (March 1838) took up their residence at Aboothabee. This measure they adopted in order to avoid the probable consequence of their long continued insubordinate conduct towards their ostensible chief, Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of Bahrein, who, having removed from the island to Khor Hassan, on the main, greatly increased his influence over the Coast of Guttur, and brought its inhabitants more under his immediate surveillance and control.

Shaikh Khaleefa, who had suffered for a length of time much injury and annoyance at the hands of his lately rebelled subjects, the Boo Felasa of Debaye, now (May 1838) determined upon retaliation. During the absence of the majority of the tribe on the pearl banks, he went clandestinely with a small force, for the purpose of destroying their date groves in the neighbourhood; but ascertaining that the sea tower was badly garrisoned, was tempted to make the attempt, and succeeded in getting possession of it. On hearing of this occurrence, the people of Debaye returned from the banks, and having obtained the powerful assistance of the Shaikh of Shargah, Suggur bin Sultan, after three days dislodged the Beniyas garrison (to which their chief could afford no relief), and completely destroyed the tower. The effect of the above





was to render necessary the recall of all the fishing-boats belonging to the parties concerned, and hostilities at sea, in the shape of aggressions upon each other's boats (highly irregular, as being contrary to truce), were the result. An accommodation was, however, immediately effected, by the mutual restoration of the slaves and plundered property, and their boats returned to resume the fishery.

Subsequent to the meeting of the several maritime chieftains, who had been assembled on board a British vessel,

A. D. 1839.

Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, contrary to his promise, held friendly communication with Syud bin Mootluk, the Egyptian Agent; and it was not until required by the British authorities to declare openly, in writing, his views and intentions, that he avowed his determination to abide by the wishes of the British Government, in opposing to the last extremity the Egyptian aggressions. In direct opposition to all his pledges and engagements, however, Shaikh Khaleefa proceeded in person with a force to the attack of the Naeem Tribe of Brymee, in pursuance, it was asserted, of an agreement between himself and Syud bin Mootluk, by which he bound himself to harass the people of that place by every means in his power, pending the return of the Egyptian emissary with a large and efficient force.

The Naeem Tribe of Brymee, however, repulsed these treacherous attacks, and gave him so severe a check that he proposed terms of peace, which they in their turn rejected, being fully aware that his object was only to save his Bedonin allies from the retaliation they had lain themselves open to at the hands of those they had so much injured. He contrived subsequently to effect a peace with two out of the three tribes, upon the understanding that all past aggressions were to be buried in oblivion; but was nevertheless informed by the Resident, that if within the space of three months he had not restored the camels belonging to Ras-ool-Khyma and Debaye, or did not produce a satisfactory letter from the Brymee Chiefs, certifying that he had fully adjusted all the causes of complaint existing against him, he would be considered an enemy to the British Government, and compelled to pay down the sum of 1,000 German crowns, as a moderate compensation for the injuries he had inflicted upon the Naeem and Shuwamis Shaikhs, and as a punishment for the violation of his most solemn pledges and promises to the British Government.

On his at length, after some vain excuses, producing a letter from the Naeem Chiefs, acknowledging their terms of friendship with him, and their satisfaction for injuries received, these demands were foregone, but conditionally upon the future tenor of his conduct with reference to Brymee and the Egyptians.

A. D. 1840.





A misunderstanding, of which the following are the particulars, arose during the year 1840 between the Shaikh of Debaye and Aboothabee, whose settlement was delayed until the present time, but which happily led to no serious consequences. It appeared that an inhabitant of the latter place, named Belor Shat, had proceeded to the pearl banks with a boat furnished to him by his Chief, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, but, instead of returning to his own port, had conveyed the boat to Debaye, where he remained until the present season, when, having manned her with other men, from the Boo Felasa Tribe, he proceeded to the island of Azema to fish for pearls. At this spot several other Debaye and Aboothabee boats were assembled, and Sultan bin Shakboot, the brother of the Beniyas Chief, happening to visit the island, and finding the crew of Belor Shat's boat on shore, took possession of her, and seizing his brother's fugitive subjects, returned with his capture, including pearls, arms, &c. to Aboothabee. The Debaye men, finding themselves thus unexpectedly left on the island, with the loss of all they had in Belor Shat's craft, embarked in a boat belonging to some of their own people, and surprising a Beniyas Buggarah, seized her, and carried her into Debaye, where she and her crew were detained. Two other boats were seized by either tribe, but subsequently returned uninjured by the respective chiefs, who now contented themselves with referring the dispute for the decision of the Resident, their subjects prosecuting the fishing in the interim without any further interference with each other.

Towards the final adjustment of the dispute, it was insisted that Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot should release Belor Shat, together with the boat, arms, pearls, &c. taken by Sultan, his brother; that person being left at liberty to return to Aboothabee or not as he pleased, and the boat, if proved to belong to Shaikh Khaleefa, being returned to him at the termination of the pearl fishery; and that Muktoom on his part should surrender the Beniyas boat (seized in retaliation), with her cargo and crew, and make good whatever articles his people might have taken therefrom.

These requisitions were acquiesced in by the respective chiefs.

A respectable person of the Amayir, who some years previously had

A. D. 1841. separated himself from his tribe, and taken up his abode at Taknoonyah, opposite to Bahrein,

south of Ajeer, was on his way from the former place to Bahrein with his family and property, when his Buggarah ran aground. He landed, with his family, leaving his property in the boat, intending to return to it at the rise of the tide. At night they observed a Buggarah, manned by fourteen persons, approach their boat, for the purpose of plundering her. A fight ensued; but the pirates succeeded, after killing one man





and wounding several, in effecting their object, and gaining possession of all the money and property she contained. The perpetrators, it was ascertained, belonged to the tribes of Monasir and Howamil, established in the Khorain Beniyas. On their crime being brought to the notice of Khaleefa bin Shakboot, that chief imprisoned five of the Howamil, who were at Aboothabee, as also several of the chief men of the Monasir; and embarking, went in person, with two or three Buggarabs, and cruised on that ground (Khor Beniyas) in search of the remainder, and finding a boat in one of the creeks, he burnt it. Fifty camel-riders were also despatched, to trace them into the desert: these succeeded only in seizing five of the Howamil, known thieves, together with their women, children, &c., and bringing them with fifty camels to Aboothabee. The above measures on the part of the Beniyas Chief, when contrasted with the late atrocities committed under his sanction by the tribe, afforded a pretty good proof of the success and efficiency of the policy pursued by the British Government.

It was proposed to Khaleefa bin Shakboot in April 1842 to become one of the subscribers to a truce, binding the parties to abstain from making aggressions upon

A. D. 1842.

each other by land as well as by sea, during the pearl fishery,—a proposal which he not only declined, but intimated that he was just preparing to attack the Joasmees during the fishing season, as the time most suited for success, in revenge for the checks and losses he had sustained in his late forays. He had accordingly opened a negotiation with Muktoom of Debaye, who agreed to remain neutral.

On the termination of the pearl fishery, in October 1842, Muktoom sent his cousin, Syf bin Dulmooj, to Khaleefa bin Shakboot, who received and treated him with much kindness. His representations so much gratified the Beniyas Chief that he was induced to depute, in return, his relative, Viab bin Esai, to the Chief of Debaye, to make a final settlement, and establish a lasting alliance.

When the Aboothabee ambassador arrived at Debaye, the Chief, Muktoom, considering it politic to invite Sultan bin Suggur and Suggur bin Sultan to join in the friendly relations about to be established, and being also afraid to enter into bonds of amity with Khaleefa without apprising these chiefs of his intentions, and in a measure obtaining their consent, sent a message to them, to ascertain their wishes in regard to the proposed arrangement. They answered that they would be very glad to be at peace with Khaleefa bin Shakboot, if that chieftain was sincere in wishing for peace. They therefore requested that Viab bin Esai should come to them; but on his arrival, Sultan bin Suggur having ascertained that the basis of any terms of peace must be his abstaining from molesting the Imaum of Muskaʿ, his





cousin Syud Humood bin Azan, and their subjects, broke off the conference, and declined entering into the proposed league. The envoy then returned to Debaye, and from thence to Aboothabee.

A deputation now (March 1843) went from Debaye to Aboothabee, to invite and escort back the Beniyas Chief, in the hope that a personal interview between the chiefs might lead to a mutual understanding and settlement of disputes, and promote and confirm their reconciliation. A meeting took place in the fort, where Shaikh Khaleefa was received with all honours, and it was agreed, after the usual manner, that all differences should thenceforth be forgotten, and a lasting peace established between them.

These proceedings, as might have been anticipated, gave umbrage to the Joasmee Chieftains, who but ill concealed their disapprobation. Shaikh Muktoom declared them, however, necessary to his best interests, and offered his services as mediator for peace between them and his new ally, knowing full well at the same time that it would not, and in fact little intending that it should, prove effectual. Debaye being situated between the territories of the two great rival chieftains, good policy demanded that Shaikh Muktoom should use every endeavour to maintain the best possible terms with either, and yet a perfect neutrality in their endless quarrels. His advantage and independence, indeed, depend upon their being inimical; for the balance of power would be with him who, reducing Debaye to subjection, secured, whether by force or conciliation, the resources of its inhabitants to forward his own ends. Thus the choice of peace or war may in a manner be said to rest with Muktoom, the execution of whose threat to join his opponent is dreaded by either.

In the course of the struggle for supremacy between the rival Chieftains of Bahrein, Sultan bin Sulameh came to Aboothabee as the envoy of Esai bin Tarif, to solicit, with most tempting offers, the assistance of the Beniyas Chief. Khaleefa, however, replied that he could not grant it without the permission of the British Government.

Shortly after the visit of Khaleefa to Debaye, his brother, Sultan bin Shakboot, left Aboothabee with one hundred and fifty camel-riders, on a Chupao (plundering excursion). They attacked the Beni Kuttub (allies of the Joasmees), killed three men, and carried away seventy camels, and much property. They then plundered two Kafilas, one of which was bound from Brymee to Shargah, and robbed and killed three men of the Naeem Tribe. After an absence of seven days, they returned to Aboothabee with the loss of two men killed, and two wounded.





A hollow treaty of peace on land was entered into in July 1843 by the Joasmee and Beniwas Chiefs, but immediate or temporary advantage, of however trifling a nature, being the only rule of action among Arabs, it was not destined to have a longer existence than its predecessors. Khaleefa bin Shakboot, accompanied by a respectable force of horse and camel-men, principally of the tribes of Monasir and Moozareah, proceeded (August-September 1843) on a foray, and plundered the Beni Kuttub, Ghuffah, and Naeem Bedouins, tribes in alliance with the Joasmee Chief, the greater portion of whom were themselves absent on a Chupao on the Batinah Coast, of a great number of camels and sheep, and much property. On their return, they also carried off a number of camels belonging to the same tribes, which had been sent for security to Zeit, in the immediate neighbourhood of Ras-ool-Khyma, and under the protection of its chief.

Muktoom bin Butye of Debaye was supposed to have instigated this open rupture of the treaty of peace by land, which had so lately been formed. The remonstrances of Sultan bin Suggur, and his son Suggur, prevailed only so far as to draw forth promises of restoration of the plunder on the part of the Beniwas, which were of course never meant to be fulfilled.

### CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

Captain Kemball informs us, at the close of his Sketch of the Beniwas Tribe, that a hollow treaty of peace on land was

A. D. 1843.

concluded between the Joasmee and Aboothabee Chiefs, in the month of July 1843; that the latter, at the supposed instigation of the Chief of Debaye, hastened to break the peace, by proceeding on a foray in August and September 1843, and plundering the Beni Kuttub, Ghuffah, and Naeem Bedouin Tribes, in alliance with the Joasmees, the greater portion of whom were themselves away on the Batinah Coast; and finally, he tells us that promises to restore the plunder were made by Khaleefa bin Shakboot, which it was supposed he never meant to fulfil.

Such was the posture of affairs at Aboothabee towards the close of the year 1843, and in such a condition did they

A. D. 1844.

remain until the summer of the ensuing year, when we gather, from reports furnished by the British Agent at Shargah,





that Khaleefa bin Shakboot set out, in the commencement of the summer months, on a tour of the country around, and contrived, by a rare combination of dexterity and skill, to induce the very tribes he had but lately been plundering to forsake the Joasmees and enter into alliance with himself. Other tribes, too, did he manage to win over to his side,—indeed he appears to have conciliated the whole of the people he met with; for Syud Humood bin Azan, Chief of Sohar, quitted his territories, and repaired to Brymee to meet him; Syud Kahtan bin Syf, the Governor of Shinas, hastened to wait upon him; and with one and all was he said to have entered into a close and strict confederacy.

While at Brymee, too, he invited Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye to go and join him, telling him he was anxious to settle the feuds existing between himself and the people of Ghufiah. The Debaye Chief, however, somewhat mistrustful of Khaleefa bin Shakboot's motives, politely declining the kind invitation he had received, on the plea of the expected arrival of a British vessel at his port, deputed his brother Syud bin Butye to proceed and wait upon him, instead of himself.

In the month of December 1844, after Shaikh Khaleefa had returned to Aboothabee, an affair occurred that led to endless correspondence and trouble, which I will endeavour to describe in the fewest possible words.

Shaikh Faris, the Chief of Chaab, at a time when all was peace and quiet, took it into his head, without the slightest provocation, and upon the frivolous pretext of a claim he possessed upon the Aboothabee Tribe of more than thirty years' standing, to seize and detain a Buteel belonging to the subjects of Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, that happened to touch at the port of Mohumrah. This aggression, as uncalled for as it was sudden, led to an appeal to the Resident by the Shaikh of Aboothabee, who begged that officer either to cause full reparation to be afforded him, or to permit him to proceed with his maritime forces against the presumptuous Shaikh Faris.

The Resident, after inquiring into the particulars of the case, and finding that the Chaab Chief had acted in a most unjustifiable manner, addressed a communication to Shaikh Faris, pointing out to him the injustice of his behaviour, and advising him to release the Buteel, and everything appertaining to her.

Shaikh Faris not only disregarded this appeal to his feelings, but expressed his intention to commit further injuries upon the people of Aboothabee, unless their chief chose to make good the claims he insisted he had a full right to demand,—claims, it may here be observed, that not only referred to occurrences which transpired previous to Shaikh Khaleefa assuming the reins of government, but which, also, were found to have been forfeited by the course of subsequent events.





Such was the language held by the Chief of Chaab,—high and mighty it must be admitted. Notwithstanding, however, the haughty tone of the reply, Major Hennell determined, ere leaving the respective chiefs to decide their quarrel by a recourse to hostilities, to depute his Assistant, Captain Kemball, to remonstrate with the wayward Shaikh Faris, to point out to him the folly of the conduct he was so blindly pursuing, and, in fine, to strive and induce him to give up the Buteel and her cargo.

Captain Kemball proceeded accordingly, in February 1845, in the Honorable Company's schooner *Emily*, on the performance of the duty assigned him, but was

A. D. 1845.

unable, on arrival at Mohumrah, though Shaikh Faris was but two days' journey inland, and though he was allowed a period of eleven days to make his appearance, to obtain an interview with the chief, who carried his want of courtesy so far as to omit replying to a written communication he received from the officer deputed to meet him. The mission therefore of necessity failed.

Major Hennell, still anxious to prevent warfare and bloodshed, referred the matter to Colonel Sheil, the British Minister at Tehran, who transmitted in reply a Firman from the Shah, and a letter from Hajee Meerza Aghasee, the Persian Prime Minister, to Suliman Khan, the Sirteep in command at Mohumrah, directing him to cause the restitution of the Buteel and her cargo, or its value, amounting to about 150 Tomans. Even this did not produce the desired effect, as might well have been expected, at once. Recourse was had to shifts and evasions: the Buteel should be delivered up, but not so her cargo; the cargo should be surrendered, but a portion retained;—and it was not until fresh orders had been elicited from the Persian Prime Minister, and forwarded to the Resident for delivery, that the matter was finally settled. In the month of May 1845, the Beni yas Buteel and her stores were recovered, and handed over to Lieutenant Ford, who had been deputed in the Honorable Company's schooner *Constance* to obtain her release.

Khaleefa bin Shakboot succeeded to the Chieftainship of Aboothabee in 1833, after having, with the assistance of his younger brother, Sultan, killed his elder brother Tahnoon.

From that time to the present (A. D. 1833 to July 1845) he remained at the head of the tribe, and by his gallantry, firmness, and prudence, raised it to be one of the most powerful of the maritime and inland communities of the Persian Gulf. He moreover ever showed himself disposed to cultivate a good understanding with the British Government, and strove, not without success, to restrain his people and dependents from committing irregularities at sea.

Such was the character of Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, who in the





month of July 1845, together with his brother, fell victims to the revenge of Esai bin Khalid. The latter chief, as it should seem, had long meditated carrying this plan into effect; but, owing to a favourable opportunity not presenting itself, deferred its perpetration until a time when the town of Aboothabee was nearly denuded of inhabitants, who had gone for the most part to the date groves in the neighbouring districts; then, considering the season had arrived for striking the blow, he repaired to meet the unsuspecting Shaikh Khaleefa and his brother on the beach, and after partaking of an entertainment that was spread under the shade of a Buteel, he rose, with his sons and other accomplices, and slew Shaikh Khaleefa and his brother. Having committed this dastardly act, he assumed the reins of government, summoned the heads of the tribes around, and was quickly acknowledged the chief of the place.

Scarcely, however, had Esai bin Khalid been in power a couple of months, ere he, an assassin, was assassinated by one Zaab bin Esai, who, in his turn, fell a prey to the revenge of Khalid bin Esai, the son of the murdered Esai bin Khalid.

The latter chief, who brought the scenes of bloodshed and murder to a close, did not attempt to usurp the authority he had managed to destroy, but "left Aboothabee, and returned to Shargah after a slight skirmish with some people of the Beniyas." His brother, however, contrived to get possession of the fort of Aboothabee, whence he was speedily ejected by the Beniyas, under the command of two influential leaders, named Mahomed bin Humeed and Rashid bin Fazil.

These chiefs declared their intention to retain the authority they had gained until the arrival of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, who was considered the rightful heir to the chiefship, and had been invited to come and assume it. In due course Shaikh Syud arrived, and finding himself well received by the majority of the Beniyas Tribe, and also that he was supported by the Resident, who had been studiously watching the course of events, and now hastened to give all the moral aid in his power to ensure the establishment in authority of the lawful chief, he at once placed himself at the head of affairs, and was speedily recognised by the whole of the Beniyas as their true and rightful chief.

Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon had not been long installed in his new position ere he received and accepted overtures to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the hereditary enemy of his tribe, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. How the Beniyas Chief was induced to listen to proposals of such a nature from one bearing the name of Joasmee it is hard to comprehend; how he induced the people of his tribe to act in concert with those of Shaikh Sultan is more incomprehensible still: that he did so, however, is certain. The Beniyas and Joasmee Chiefs





united cordially for the purpose of crushing Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and his allies of Ejman and Amulgavine, and they remained in alliance until the commencement of the year 1847, when a difference of opinion arising regarding a proposed attack upon the town of Debaye, a rupture shortly after ensued.

A. D. 1847.

Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, deserted by the Joasmee, and perceiving no hopes of reducing Debaye, thought it advisable—now that he stood alone, and, moreover, knowing as he did that the Wahabee Lieutenant owed him a grudge, for an attack he had made upon the people of Ghufta\*—to strive and conciliate Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye. The Joasmee pursued the self-same policy, and succeeded in gaining his object. Shaikh Syud, however, requiring the Bedouins of the Beni Kuttub to be included as parties to the treaty about to be concluded, and the Debaye Chief refusing to admit them, difficulties presented themselves (February or March 1847), that only found a solution in angry words and disputes; and somewhat thus did matters remain

A. D. 1848.

until early in the succeeding year, when Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, incensed at the treachery of the sons of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, in making an insidious attack upon the fort of Ejman, and responding to the invitation of Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, whose turn it now was to make overtures, consented in January 1848 to join in alliance with the rest of the maritime chiefs, leaving the Joasmee and his treacherous sons to stand alone, and to lament the folly of their perfidious behaviour. The alliance, however, was merely nominal, and did not, as far as I can ascertain, lead to a direct aggression upon the Joasmee dominions.

Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon shortly after, detaching himself from the rest of the tribes, none of whom appeared inclined to do more than to plot and intrigue the one against the other, formed the project of expelling the Wahabee Lieutenant from the Brymee territories,—a bold and daring step, it must be admitted; one, the accomplishment of which all the maritime chiefs were anxious to behold, for they were weary of Wahabee oppression; one which nought but a general coalition of the tribes, it was thought, could bring to pass, and jealousy precluded their coalescing; one which, as will be seen in the sequel, was bravely and skilfully carried out by the Beniyas Chief, and which led to a great increase of his power; one which compelled the crest-fallen Wahabee to crave the assistance of the rest of the tribes, and induced Shaikh Syud—who, though unaided by others, shrank not from a conflict with

\* The people of Ghufta called upon the deputy of Ameer Fysul, to whom they had paid tribute, to afford them redress. He responded to the call, and Shaikh Syud disregarded his orders.





all the troops they could summon—to agree to a peace, and to give back the forts he had so ably possessed himself of. The mode in which all these things were accomplished may be thus briefly related.

Shaikh Syud invited Shaikh Syf bin Humood, the son of the Sohar Chief, as also the head of the Naeem Tribe, to enter into an alliance with himself. They did so, and made preparations to join him. Their aim and plan were one,—they resolved to crush and trample under foot the high-aspiring and boastful Wahabee.

The Beniyas, impatient of delay, and calculating his own strength, as well as the weakness of the enemy, determined to proceed to work at once, and not to wait the approach of his allies,—promptness of action was the chief thing needful. The minor lieutenants at all events could be fought and conquered, if not the great lieutenant himself. On the 4th of May accordingly did he, with his own troops, and a number of men from the Zowahir, Amayir, and other subordinate tribes, hasten to attack Shaikh Syf bin Ali, who held command of one of the Wahabee forts in the Zowahir country. Resistance was offered, but not with success: the fort, with all it contained, was quickly surrendered into the hands of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, who was wise enough to rest content with the laurels he had won, and to await the arrival of his expected allies ere venturing to beard the lion in his den at Brymee. These shortly arrived, and on the 16th of June operations commenced in good earnest against the stronghold of Brymee. The one, Soobauh, was occupied by Mahomed bin Syfut Ujajee in person, and after a cannonade of two days' duration was compelled to surrender. Mahomed bin Syf, however, was not to be found; he had deserted his followers, and, unknown to all the soldiers in the fort, he, the chief of the place, had fled in the dead of night, and sought refuge among the troops in the adjoining and only remaining fort of Khunduk, which, so confounded were the Wahabees at the activity displayed by the enemy, so disheartened at the fall of Soobauh, and the ignominious flight of its commander, they did not attempt to retain. The fort was vacated, and handed over, together with the horses and property therein contained, to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, who permitted the vanquished Nudjees to quit the place without being harmed or molested.

These were great and heroic exploits no doubt,—sweet to Shaikh Syud, but bitter to the Wahabee, and equally bitter to the rest of the maritime chiefs, who, though inwardly abhorring the latter, viewed with still more abhorrence the growing power of the former. A coalition was formed against the Beniyas,—he who had forcibly ejected the Nudjees was in his turn to be forcibly cast out from Brymee. Such a plan was in course of formation, and such a plan, had not dissensions and jealousies arisen amongst the allied parties, might well, perhaps,





have succeeded, for the son of the Sohar Chief, owing to a misunderstanding between himself and the Beni yas, was suddenly expelled the fort of Brymee, and thus was Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon left to contend single-handed against the formidable league about to be arranged against him. No way daunted, however, and fearful for nothing, he proved for a length of time more than a match for the whole of his enemies. He fought and shamefully discomfited a considerable Nujdee force that was sent to annihilate him; he forced the proud and not unskilful Syud bin Mootluk to flee for protection to Shargah; he showed himself ready to confront the combined forces of the Nujdee, Joasmee, Debaye, and Ejman Chiefs; he experienced but one reverse, and that but a slight one; when, finding he was not likely to receive the succours promised by the Muskat Government, he gave ear to the voice of a mediator, who had been sent by the Sherreeff of Mecca to conciliate the contending parties.

A peace was concluded in February 1849, by the terms of which "the Brymee forts were restored to Syud bin Mootluk, all that had passed was to be buried in oblivion, and all parties were to return to the *status quo ante bellum*."

Judging from the subsequent movements of Shaikh Syud, however, it does not appear that he had any intention of remaining satisfied with the settlement that had thus been effected. Peace, it is true, was concluded; but his visit to Shinas and Muskat, which occurred some few months later in the season, was supposed to have been for the sole purpose of conferring with Syf bin Kahtan and His Excellency Syud Soweynee on the subject of what could be done against the Wahabees. The plans that were concerted, the complications that ensued,\* and the result of those plans and complications, will be learned in the sequel. Before prosecuting, however, this part of the narrative, it is necessary that we should accompany Shaikh Syud home to Aboothabee, and watch his proceedings on arrival.

The year had well nigh drawn to a close when Shaikh Syud reached his seat, and found, to his great disgust, that "on the termination of the pearl fishery, all the boats of the Gubeysat Tribe, that should have returned to Aboothabee in October, had proceeded to the Guttur Coast, and sought an asylum at Biddah."

The Gubeysat Tribe originally dwelt at Aboothabee, and there continued to reside until the year 1836, when the piratical acts of the subjects of the Beni yas Chief leading the British Government to demand payment of considerable sums of money, by way of compensa-

\* The complications are detailed more fully in the Sketch of Muskat than in any of the others.





tion to the injured parties, they seceded, and located themselves at Adeed, "a town situated in a backwater between Bahrein and Aboothabee, and considered by the inhabitants to be quite inaccessible to our vessels of war."

In this, however, they were sadly mistaken; for they had scarcely taken up their position, and commenced indulging in piracy, ere Major Hennell proceeded with the squadron of the Gulf, in command of Commodore Lowe, and exacted full satisfaction for past offences. In the following year (1837) they were again disturbed by Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot, then Chief of the Aboothabee Tribe, who attacked them in their den, and completely demolished the place. The greater portion of the Gubeysat members, now scattered and powerless, were induced to go and reside once more at Aboothabee, where they remained until the present year (1849), when, partly from the dissatisfaction with which they viewed the friendly demeanour of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon towards the people of the Moharibah, a tribe at feud with themselves, and partly owing to the intrigues of Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, who assured them Bin Saood would shortly send a force to rebuild Adeed, and re-locate them therein, they were led to adopt the course of proceeding to Biddah.

The intrigues of his enemies, the cause of the secession, and the mischief likely to emanate therefrom, all these things were perceived at a glance by the discerning Shaikh Syud.

He resolved (November-December 1849) to nip the evil in the bud, and by promptness of action to crush the disaffected spirit of the offending members. The measures he adopted bore the impress of his wonted energy; but were far removed from the uprightness and honesty of spirit that had hitherto been the principal characteristics of his dealings with others.

He seized the heads and rulers of the tribes still left in Aboothabee, and cast them into prison; he deputed a messenger to induce the leaders to return to their homes; he received and welcomed them, on return, with marks of the utmost kindness and respect; he gave them every reason to believe that past offences were forgiven, and forgotten,—that they were no longer labouring under the displeasure of their Chief;—in short, he succeeded in lulling them into a state of unsuspecting security. What, then, must have been their surprise, when the day succeeding their arrival dawned upon them, to awake and find their boats had been stripped in the night of sails, masts, and rudders, and that means of escape had been snatched from their hands; to find orders had been issued to the people of Aboothabee that all parties possessing claims upon the Gubeysat Tribe were to enforce immediate payment; that a fine of no less than 2,000 dollars was inflicted upon them;—in





fine, to perceive that they had been ensnared by one whom they never suspected of deceit. The position they were in was a painful one: they were driven to the greatest straits, and so much pressed for payment of the money demanded, that they had no resource but to dispose of their boats and all the goods they possessed.

We now revert to the proceedings of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon and His Excellency Syud Soweeynee.

They entered into a strict alliance, and set on foot preparations for acting offensively against the Wahabee Lieutenant in Oman. Such at least was the ostensible reason for which they united, and such, too, was the real and sole desire of the Beniyas Chief, who was anxiously longing for an opportunity to drive the Nujdees at the point of the sword once more from their position of Brymee. His Excellency, however, had many plans in contemplation: he wished to oppose the ambitious designs of the Joasmees against Khore Fukaun, and his other possessions on the Batinah Coast; he was anxious to persuade, or, failing persuasion to compel, the Sohar Chief to coalesce with himself, and the Beniyas. All these matters have been so fully discussed in the Sketch of the Muskat Tribe that to repeat them here is unnecessary.

The first mention we find of the despatch of troops by the Beniyas Chief in the direction of the Wahabee position is

A. D. 1850.

in the month of March 1850, when "four hundred men of the Beniyas and Monasir Tribes joined His Excellency Syud Soweeynee at Shinas, having been sent by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, under the command of his cousin, Mahomed bin Syf, and Fazil bin Mahomed.

As to Shaikh Syud himself, he proceeded with a large force to the immediate vicinity of Brymee, and commenced destroying the water-courses that irrigated the date trees around. Meanwhile, the combined forces of the Joasmee, Debaye, Ejman, and Amulgavine Chiefs arrived on the spot, and, luckily for Shaikh Syud, perhaps, the ends and aims of the allies were opposed the one to the other,—no two of their number had wishes alike: the Joasmee had in his mind ambitious expectations of aggrandisement on the Batinah Coast; Shaikh Muktoom possessed but one desire, that of expelling Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon from the Brymee territories; the minor Chiefs of Ejman and Amulgavine, whose contingents were small compared with the rest, appear to have had no fixed purpose or object whatever;—in short, after some discussion, and not a little hesitation, the Joasmee counsels prevailed, and a move was made in the direction of Sohar, when commenced the operations against the fort of Shinas and others that have been so fully recounted in the Muskat history.

The exact course pursued by the Beniyas after the departure of the





allies is not known. He would seem, however, after perpetrating all manner of mischief on the plantations and country adjacent to Brymee, to have gone back to Aboothabee, and there to have remained for a while, when he again returned to Brymee, and amused himself foraying the districts of Shargah and Ras-ool-Khyma, and engaging in skirmishes with Mahomed bin Abdoolla and the tribe of the Naeem Al Boo Kheriban.

He does not appear to have afforded active support to His Excellency Syud Soveynee against the Joasmee confederacy; and as regards the subsequent aggressions upon the Brymee territories, with which we are more immediately concerned, no further mention is made of the subject until the month of November 1850, when we find the Joasmee, Beniyas, and Naeem Chiefs acting in concert against the Nujdee garrison at Brymee.

The years 1849 and 1850 were noted for the number of disputes that occurred between the people of Aboothabee and those of Debaye, regarding the seizure and counter-seizure of slaves from boats at sea. These were all satisfactorily settled through the endeavours of Colonel Hennell, and the remonstrances he addressed to the chiefs of the respective tribes.

In the autumn of 1850 a gross violation of the Maritime Truce was made by the subjects of the Beniyas Chief, who seized upon a boat of Himreeah, and killed two of the crew on board of her.

The vessels of war were despatched to demand satisfaction from Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, in the shape of the payment of 600 dollars, the sum required as the Deeah or price of blood for the two Joasmees slain, and the surrender of the captured Himreeah boat, with the stores pertaining to her.

The boldness displayed by Lieutenant Manners, in command of the *Tigris*, as also by Lieutenant Tronson, of the *Euphrates*, in taking their vessels through the intricate channel that leads for upwards of three miles to the inner harbour of the port of Aboothabee, thereby bringing them within effective gunshot range of both the town and the native craft on the beach, somewhat astonished Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, who had never before beheld a British cruiser so close to his home, and led him to comply with the requisition preferred against him without hesitation or demur. The 600 dollars were paid in October 1850, and the boat and stores surrendered so soon as demanded.

A few words will suffice to relate the proceedings of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon in the year 1851. He concluded a peace with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, notwithstanding the intrigues set on foot by Shaikh Muktoom to prevent it; he proceeded to the assistance of the Bahrein Shaikhs in their struggle with the Wahabee ruler, and through his good offices it was that

A. D. 1851.





matters were brought to an amicable settlement in July between the belligerent parties; and finally, in the operations carried on by His Highness the Imaum of Muskat and the Shaikh of Debaye, against the ill-starred Syud Ghes, the Chief of Sohar, the part sustained by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon was selfish, and savoured rather of duplicity than honesty.

The next occurrence worthy of notice connected with this tribe is a case of maritime irregularity that took place early in the spring of 1852, which would seem to have been committed by order of Shaikh Syud himself. The circumstances attending the affair were these:—On the 31st of March 1852 a person called Obed bin Butya, an inhabitant of Debaye, called upon Hajee Yacoob, the British Agent at Shargah, and informed him that, having a boat which he was desirous to sell, he had embarked in her for Biddah with this object, and that after disposing of her there, he had embarked on board a Buggalow, belonging to Zaal, of the Beniayas Tribe, located at Biddah, in order to return to his home.

When they arrived opposite Aboothabee, so near as to discern the place, a Buggarah came out by order of Syud bin Tahnoon, and seized the boat, and conveyed her into that port, when they hauled her on shore, and appropriated to themselves whatever was in her. From the people of Debaye they took two slaves, five Kerans, two Abbas, and an Arab head-dress, releasing four men who belonged to that place, and sending them away in a Buggarah; but they detained two of the crew belonging to Biddah, whose slaves they also took. Syud bin Tahnoon observed to the people of the boat that he had received orders from Ameer Fysul bin Saood to seize all Beniayas vessels he might find at sea, unless they returned to Aboothabee.

The crew of the boat that issued from Aboothabee consisted of twenty-five men.

A letter of remonstrance was addressed to the Beniayas Chief, calling upon him to afford redress for so open a case of infraction of the Maritime Truce, and desiring the immediate restitution of all the property and individuals that had been so unlawfully seized. Commodore Robinson followed in the wake of the letter, with a view, in the event of contumacy being displayed by the delinquent chief, "to give weight by his presence to the requisition preferred against him, and to warn him of the consequences which must ensue from such a wilful disregard of his engagements with the British Government." Such were the steps adopted to bring Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon to account, and nothing could exceed the readiness exhibited by him to obey the Resident's instructions. Before the arrival of the Commodore, immediately on receipt of Captain Kemball's letter, he despatched a special messenger





to Hajee Yacoob, for the purpose of handing back the property plundered, and of intimating his intention to restore the slaves he had taken, so soon as they returned from the pearl banks.

But two more points remain to be noticed ere we draw this Sketch to a close.

Towards the end of the year 1852 the Beniyas Chief espoused the cause of Shaikh Syud bin Butye, the new Shaikh of Debaye, whose right to the chiefship being disputed by the sons of the late Shaikh Muktoom, his brother, had led to the latter fleeing for protection to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and craving his assistance towards regaining the seat they had so lately won, but been unable to retain.

In the spring of the ensuing year, on the occasion of the advent to  
A. D. 1853. Brymee of Abdoolla bin Fysul, with a consider-

able Nujdee force, the course pursued by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon was diametrically opposed to that of the Joasmee. Finding that the latter was doing all in his power to induce the Ameer's son to invade the districts of Batinah, he at once expressed his strong disapproval of the proposed plan, by dismissing to their homes the larger portion of his followers, and begging, if the expedition were finally determined on, to be permitted to withdraw.

The measures adopted by the Resident, coupled with the above show of opposition, and the assumption of a hostile attitude by His Excellency Syud Soweeynee, dictated to Abdoolla bin Fysul the advisability, if not the necessity, of abandoning the project of an attack on the Imaun's territories, and satisfying himself with demands for payment of an increased amount of tribute.

When matters had been brought to a settlement, Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon returned to Aboothabee to wait upon the Resident, who was off that port on his tour of the Gulf, and on arrival he subscribed to the new Treaty of Peace\* (May 4th, 1853) concluded by the Maritime Chiefs of Oman, for a complete cessation of hostilities for ever at sea.

\* Vide pages 88 and 89 of this Selection.





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HISTORICAL SKETCH  
OF THE  
BOO FELASA TRIBE OF ARABS,  
(DEBAYE,)  
FROM THE YEAR 1834 TO 1841,  
PREPARED BY  
LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;  
WITH  
CONTINUATION OF THE SAME,  
FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,  
BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;  
SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.





## BOO FELASA (DEBAYE).

THE secession of the Boo Felasa branch, under Obed bin Syud and Muktoom bin Butye, from the body of the Beni-yas Tribe at Aboothabee, in which originated the war between the latter and the Joasmees; its settlement at Debaye, and existence thenceforth in virtual independence; require that its subsequent history and proceedings should be separately treated, as being totally unconnected with that of the main tribe, with which it was frequently engaged in hostilities. Suddenly freed from the control of a firm and vigorous chief, on the establishment of peace between the great rival tribes, parties of the Boo Felasa commenced depredations upon the general trade of the Gulf, and had committed the acts of piracy below detailed before measures could be taken to check them :—

- 1st.—The plunder of a Nabend Buteel by the Debaye fleet.
- 2nd.—The attack and plunder of a Muskat vessel, and murder of five of the crew, by a Debaye boat, under the command of Abdool Mowajea, having with him twelve men.
- 3rd.—The plunder of a village on the Coast of Batinah, not far from Muskat, and the attack and plunder of a Nabend Buggarah by a Debaye boat, under Syf bin Dulmooj.
- 4th.—The attack and seizure of a boat belonging to Bahrein, by a boat under the command of Abdoolla bin Buddur, inhabitant of Debaye.

In the last case, the Chief of Bahrein adopted his own means of obtaining redress; and placing an embargo on all Debaye boats present at the time in that harbour, further compelled a merchant of that town, then on the island, to pay to the injured party the sum of 300 dollars in lieu of the amount plundered by his countrymen.

Any necessity for interference on our part in the first case was also obviated by the release of the Nakhoda, and the restoration of the property taken from his vessel. With reference to the second and third,





however, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur having disclaimed the possession of any control or authority over Debaye, and remonstrances having failed to bring the Shaikh of that town to afford ample reparation, it became requisite to resort to demonstrations of force, and threats of coercive measures, which had the desired effect, and secured the payment of 920 dollars, the amount of the value of the property plundered.

The death of Obed bin Synd, the principal, on the 9th June, left the supreme and undivided authority at Debaye in the hands of Muktoom bin Butye, a young, haughty, and inexperienced character.

From the date of the secession of the tribe, and its defeat in the attack on Aboothabee, when co-operating with the Joasmees, it had not failed to offer every annoyance to the Beni-yas Chief, by offering asylum to his discontented subjects, and shelter to his enemies, as well as occasionally plundering his boats.

The latter, fully alive to the injuries thus inflicted upon him, was only waiting his opportunity to retaliate. During the year 1838 he succeeded in surprising and capturing the sea tower of Debaye, but was very shortly compelled to vacate it.

Early in the year, a piracy was committed by a Debaye Buggarah upon one belonging to Khaboora. The former, having on board a Nakhoda and eight men, proceeded to Khassa, and thence to the Batinah Coast, on its way to Muskat. When off Burka, observing a Buggarah at anchor, the crew waited until night, and attacked her, with the intention of plundering. Her crew, however, were on the alert, and offered resistance, until six of their number having been wounded, the remaining three jumped into the sea. These were afterwards permitted to regain their vessel, but two of the wounded having subsequently died, the aggressors were, through their Chief Muktoom, called upon to pay the Deeah, or price of blood, and to make good the property plundered.

An individual named Bin Asker, one of the Gubeysat Tribe (that which had seceded to Adeed, but was subsequently compelled by its Shaikh, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, to return to Aboothabee), upon whom that chief's brother had claims for money advanced previous to his going to the pearl banks, quitting Aboothabee, plundered on his way two Buggarahs belonging to the Beni-yas Tribe, of pearls to a large amount, and took refuge at Debaye, the chief of which place granted him asylum. He was, however, called upon to surrender Bin Asker to his own chief, and to pay the sum of 200 dollars as the value of the property subsequently plundered by his dependents from the three Aboothabee boats in Belor Shat's affair,\* a

\* Vide page 482 of this Selection.





reparation which he persisted in refusing to afford, until coercion was employed. He however compelled the return of twenty of the Gubeysat Tribe who had accompanied Bin Asker. The Debaye Buggarah, in which these were sent, landed them on the coast near Aboothabee, without provisions, and stripped of their arms. As they were proceeding towards Aboothabee, they observed a Debaye Buggarah fishing near the shore, and going on board, seized her in retaliation, and prosecuted their journey by sea. Their chief, however, on their arrival at Aboothabee, deprived them of their capture, and sent it to the British Agent at Shargah, with a request that it might be delivered over to the Chief of Debaye, who however in the first instance refused to receive it, his object being really to have it in his power to urge some cause of complaint to the Resident against the Beniyas.

In retaliation for a foray upon the cattle of Debaye made by the Aboothabee men, under the personal command of their chief, some men of the former, joined by about twenty Bedouins, commenced to search the Beniyas creeks, but finding nothing, a portion of their number embarked in a small Buggarah, and discovering one belonging to Aboothabee, at a place called Inzeerah Sadiat, with three slaves in her, belonging to the chief of the former place, engaged in cutting wood, seized the slaves, and whatever property was in the Buggarah; then, breaking her up, returned to their homes. This being a decidedly piratical act, and a breach of the Maritime Truce, Shaikh Muktoom was held responsible for the amount of the value of the boat and property, estimated at 200 dollars.

After a repeated evasion of these accumulated just demands upon him, his port was visited by the squadron, which had just completed the object of its mission to Biddah, by exacting satisfaction from the chief of that place for the piracies committed by Rugragee's gang; and he was peremptorily called upon to pay the sum of 400 dollars, or their equivalent in goods, valuables, &c., and further to surrender the two Buggarabs, with their masts, sails, &c. brought over from Aboothabee by Bin Asker. After some little delay, taken up in frivolous and unavailing excuses, and on two shells being at a long interval fired over his town, he was induced to afford compliance.

Shaikh Muktoom obtained permission from the Joasmee Chief to erect a fort at Derah, a spot between Shargah and Debaye, with a view to afford a secure residence to his people, who, leaving only a small guard, had entirely deserted their town, in consequence of the severe fever which still continued to prevail there, the dreadful mortality arising from which had prompted them to cross the creek, and raise their huts on the spot selected for the tower in question. He was how-





ever required to furnish a written document, duly signed and sealed, setting forth that the ground to be occupied belonged to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and that the tower was to remain there only so long as he thought proper, and to be destroyed upon his requisition to that effect. This occurred at a time, too, when a division had arisen among the Debaye people, which had led to the secession of five hundred of the Boo Muhair to Shargah, owing to their disgust at Muktoom's usurped and severe authority,—an occurrence which afforded unfeigned satisfaction and delight to the Joasmee Chief, as diminishing the power and influence of one whose former encouragement and support of his son Suggur, when in open rebellion, still evidently rankled in his breast.

The absence of the Debaye people from their tower, the only guard left therein being twenty-five men from the Persian Coast, and the men of the tribe being themselves for the most part engaged in the pearl fishery, afforded to Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot a further opportunity of prosecuting his revenge upon the Boo Felasa. Having made up matters with the Beni Kuttub and other inland tribes, and secured himself from any opposition on their part, the Beniyas Chief issued secretly from Aboothabee, with a party of one hundred and fifty men, for Debaye, which he reached in two days. After doing much injury to the date groves, the party succeeded in surprising and gaining possession of the town and fort, plundered the market and houses, and burned all the stores of rice and \*dates that could be found, as also the Buteel\* which had been presented to Shaikh Muktoom by the Chief of Bahrein, killing two men who happened to be on board.

Muktoom, immediately on gaining intelligence of the above, solicited the aid of Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan of Shargah, who joined him with two hundred men, but too late to be of any avail, for the Beniyas, after having done all the mischief in their power, had left the place, and taken up their position at Joomeerah, distant about eight miles from Debaye. Not yet satisfied with the very serious blow inflicted at Debaye, Khaleefa bin Shakboot a few days subsequently sent out a foraying party, which surprised Khan (a village on the coast between Debaye and Shargah), and completely stripped the place, carrying off fifteen slaves, without any loss to themselves. The presence of this courageous and energetic chief greatly harassed and annoyed the Shargah and Debaye people, keeping them constantly on the watch; for nearly all the male inhabitants, having proceeded to the fishing, had left their territories in an almost defenceless state. Reinforcements were sent to Shargah from Ras-ool-Khyma and Lingah, upon which the Beniyas Chief returned to Aboothabee, but shortly again set forth

\* This Buteel was originally the property of Esai bin Tarif, but was confiscated on his seceding with his tribe from Bahrein.





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upon plundering excursions into the Brymee country, and on his return secretly left Khuttum with four hundred followers, with the intention of making a night attack upon these two places (Shargah and Debaye), but his object being betrayed, he was compelled to relinquish the design, and proceeded in the direction of Ras-ool-Khyma. Here, however, he found Shaikh Sultan prepared to receive him, and was therefore unable to inflict any serious injury. After killing four and wounding two men of the Joasmees, he was obliged to retreat, with the loss of three men killed, and his own riding camel, with accoutrements, which fell into the hands of the enemy.\*

# CONTINUATION TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

The Shaikh of Debaye in the early part of the year 1843, at a time when contentions were raging between the Joasmees and Aboothabee Chiefs, after observing a strict neutrality for a considerable period, suddenly entered into an alliance with the latter, and offered his services as a mediator between the two belligerents. "This proceeding," we are told by Captain Kemball, "gave umbrage to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who but ill concealed his disapprobation": indeed the aversion of the chiefs must have been reciprocal; for at one moment we find Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye acting mediator, and presently we observe him, after a peace has been effected between the two rival chieftains, instigating the one, his ally (Shaikh Khaleefa, Chief of Aboothabee), to break the peace by foraying the territories of the other (Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur), his enemy. The subjects of either party, too, those of the Joasmees as well as of Debaye, began to show their feelings of enmity, by a course of petty aggressions, which however, it must be allowed, do not seem to have been committed with the knowledge or consent of either of the chiefs.

Mahomed bin Majid, a subject of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, having seized (August 1844) a native of Chaab from a Debaye boat, the people of the latter tribe, not choosing to await reparation that they knew would be, and which eventually was, afforded them by the Resident, took upon themselves to

\* The subsequent proceedings and intrigues of the Debaye Chief, being generally connected with the occurrences among the Beniys and Joasmees, are recorded in the Sketches of those tribes.





effect reprisals, and to board and plunder a Buggarah belonging to Abdoolla bin Butye of Shargah. This act was not in any way countenanced by Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye: far from it,—he inflicted punishment upon his offending subjects; caused whatever had been taken from Shaikh Sultan's people to be restored to them; and went so far as of his own free will to bind over the delinquents to keep the peace, by making them lodge in the hands of the British Agent the sum of 100 crowns, as security for their future good behaviour. A striking proof was this of the well working of the system in operation for the suppression of piracy; for it was Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye who in former years gave as much if not more trouble to the British representative than any one of the maritime chiefs, by the open manner in which he encouraged a spirit of maritime irregularity.

From the commencement of 1845 to the close of the ensuing year

A. D. 1845-46.

the Joasmee and Aboothabee Chiefs did all in their power to reduce the Shaikh of Debaye to a state of submission. Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and his staunch and faithful ally the Chief of Amulgavine, proved, however, more than a match for their formidable adversaries: they successfully defended themselves against all the attacks, both foul and fair, that were made upon their territories, and at the close of 1846, when a last and tremendous attack was about to be directed on the fort of Debaye, a quarrel arose between the two allied chiefs, each of whom suddenly shifting his policy, preferred overtures of peace to the common foe,

A. D. 1847.

Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, who entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, but refused the advances of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon.

When we commenced our narrative, the Beniyas and Joasmee Chiefs were in the thick of contentions; then came the Shaikh of Debaye, who by joining the former offended the latter; presently the Beniyas and Joasmees entered into an alliance offensive and defensive, and attacked the Shaikh of Debaye; and now we find the Debaye and Joasmees acting in concert, and the Beniyas at enmity with either.

The last arrangement, however, though scarcely more than nominal

A. D. 1848.

in the outset, remained unbroken until the month of July 1848, when a truly close and intimate alliance was entered into between the two (Debaye and Joasmee), for the purpose of opposing the plans of aggrandisement which the now all powerful Chief of the Beniyas seemed to entertain in the direction of their respective territories.

Shaikh Muktoom, fearing an attack upon Debaye, found it to his interest to remain in league with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who on his side, too, trembled for the safety of his possessions on the Batinah





Coast. It was clearly, therefore, fear and apprehension alone that drove these chiefs to unite, and grow, as it were, into one, for much jealousy had been of late displayed by either. They combined, however, and strove in union well together.

The two chiefs were shortly joined by the Shaikh of Ejman, and when the Wahabee forces had been defeated, and the Beniyas had reached the zenith of his power, the three chiefs espoused the cause of the fallen Syud bin Mootluk, and repaired to Brymee, for the purpose of ejecting therefrom Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon.

A number of skirmishes followed, in the immediate vicinity of the forts; but owing to the arrival of a mediator in February 1849, and the acceptance of peace by the belligerent parties, the whole of the chiefs returned to their seats, and hostilities ceased.

Shaikh Muktoom still kept up a friendly intercourse with the Joasmees; and both chiefs, especially the former, strongly advised Ameer Fysul in November 1849 to rebuild the town and fort of Adeed, and to replace therein the people of the Gubeysat Tribe. Their intrigues, however, did not produce the desired effect: the tribe in question thought fit, during the absence of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon at Shinas and Muskat, to secede from Aboothabee, and repair to the Guttur Coast, —a step which so incensed the Beniyas Chief that he resorted to measures of the greatest severity to bring the offenders to punishment,—measures untempered with mercy or honesty, that eventually reduced the power and resources of the tribe to a state bordering on nothingness.

To relate the part that was taken by the Debaye Chief in the Muskat, Brymee, and Sohar complications, will not detain us long.

Shaikh Muktoom cordially hated the Beniyas Chief, and was ever striving to reduce and weaken his power; and when the Joasmee summoned the rest of the tribes to unite with himself and proceed to the aid of the Chief of Sohar, nothing would have tempted the Debaye Shaikh to declare himself one of the league, had he not thought an attack upon Shaikh Syud was sure to be made during the course of operations.

This, and this alone, prompted him to equip a body of troops, and repair to Zeit, to meet the rest of the chiefs; but when he found Shaikh Sultan caring for the interest of none but himself,—when he saw him bent on a move in the direction of Batinah,—he was no longer eager for strife: he reluctantly followed as far as Shinas, and, after the reduction of that place, returned to his seat at Debaye.

Early in the ensuing year we gather, from the tenor of a conversation held by the Resident with Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye on the 30th January, that

A. D. 1850.

A. D. 1851.





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the Debaye Chief had entered into terms of friendship and amity with Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa; and, in consequence thereof, "had written to Ameer Fysul, strongly dissuading him from his scheme of forming a settlement at Khore al Adeed," which led the Wahabee to express his surprise and astonishment at finding the very chief who proposed the plan, and urged its immediate fulfilment, suddenly thwarting and opposing the project.

This intrigue was quickly followed by another.

In the month of March 1851 arrived at Debaye, on his way to Aboothabee, one Moobaruk bin Suroor, the Chief of the Monasir, with letters from Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon. Negotiations, it would seem, had for some time past been carried on by the chiefs above mentioned, and the letters now in the possession of Moobaruk were nothing more or less than the acceptance of offers that had been made to the Joasmees by the Beni yas Chief.

The envoy had scarcely placed foot on the soil of Debaye ere Shaikh Muktoom became aware of the important documents he held in his hands. Moobaruk was seized, and thrown into confinement; a plain and distinct intimation was sent to Shaikh Sultan, that if he wished to keep on good terms with the Debaye Chief, then must he neither permit the letters nor the envoy to go to Aboothabee.

Shaikh Sultan, unwilling to break with Shaikh Muktoom, but more unwilling to remain at feud with Shaikh Syud, did not boldly and manfully declare his determination to make peace with the Beni yas whether Muktoom wished it or no, but resorted, to effect his object, to his usual mode of duplicity.

He feigned compliance with the desires of the Debaye Chief, by despatching his Secretary, Mahomed bin Ali Boo Shelabee, to bring back the letters he had sent, and so soon as he returned to Shargah he forwarded the identical documents in charge of a man of the Aboo Heyle straight to Shaikh Syud at Aboothabee.

The result of the affair was that peace was concluded between the Joasmee and Beni yas Chiefs, and Shaikh Muktoom, fearful for himself, drew more closely to the Wahabees.

The time was now at hand for the arrival of His Highness the Imaum from his possessions at Zanzibar, on the African Coast. He had long talked of repairing to Muskat, for the purpose of adjusting and arranging the quarrel that had been so unhappily raging between his son and the Sohar Chief.

Shaikh Muktoom, enraged with the Joasmee for the alliance he had lately contracted, and thinking the moment favourable for cultivating the friendship of the Muskat authorities, deputed his brother on a friendly mission to Syud

A. D. 1852.





Soweynee, and eventually, when His Highness arrived, and commenced operations against the Sohar Chief, he afforded him active support, and remained in union until the spring of the succeeding year, when, while on his way from Muskat to the island of Kishm, he was seized with an attack of small-pox, which carried him off before he reached the end of his journey.

There was much of good in Shaikh Muktoom: he was a chief of undoubted bravery and ability; he was also, so far as we are able to judge, as much esteemed and beloved by the people of his tribe as any one of the maritime chiefs; and, as regards the fulfilment of engagements with the British Government, I cannot do better, I think, than quote the opinion expressed by Captain Kemball in one of his letters to Government regarding him:—

“Shaikh Muktoom,” he tells us, “though manifesting on his first establishment at Debaye a refractory spirit, which led to the adoption of coercive measures towards him, had at least for the past ten years been distinguished among the chiefs of the coast for the general observance of his engagements, and apprehending clearly the policy of the British Government as conducive to the advancement and prosperity of the Arab States, for the earnestness of his endeavours in support of its arrangements to preserve the maritime tranquillity of the Gulf.”

Shaikh Muktoom was succeeded by his brother Shaikh Syud bin Butye in the Chiefship.

Shortly after assuming the reins of government, Shaikh Syud bin Butye (on the 2nd October 1852) repaired to Muskat, on a visit to His Highness Syud Saeed. His departure at so early a season, before he was firmly seated in his new position, was scarcely prudent or wise; for he must have been well aware that there were aspirants to the chiefship he held, eagerly seeking an opportunity to take to themselves what they looked upon as their hereditary right. We find, accordingly, that Syud bin Butye had barely left his seat ere “the sons of the late Muktoom, by name Soheil and Husher, with their maternal uncle Majid bin Dulmooj, and some of the Al Boo Felasa, surprised the fort of Debaye, whose garrison acted treacherously and had an understanding with them, and they took the fort, seizing the guardian appointed by Syud bin Butye, by name Syud bin Rashid, the maternal uncle of Muktoom, who was asleep, and whom they placed in confinement, together with another person, named Khaleefa bin Saeed.” Syud bin Rashid did not remain in captivity long; he was set at liberty, and permitted to assume the title of chief, but not to resume command of the forts, which continued in the hands of Soheil and Husher. By no means content with the mere nominal power that thus reverted to himself, Syud bin Rashid resolved to resort to treachery for the purpose of





expelling Muktoom's sons from Debaye. The measures he adopted were crowned with success: Soheil and Husher were compelled to quit the place, and to flee for protection to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur.

Such was the posture of affairs when Syud bin Butye returned to his seat at Debaye. He perceived at a glance the enormity of the evil existing; he saw how much it was likely to increase, now that the Joasmee had mixed himself up in the quarrel. Nor was he mistaken,—Shaikh Sultan was busy intriguing in every manner and shape: he had already induced one Syud bin Maanaul Moheyree, by tempting offers in gold, to quit Debaye with his tribe, and to go and settle at Shargah; and it is difficult to say how matters would have ended had not Syud bin Butye made advances to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon that resulted in an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two chiefs, who were likewise joined by the Shaikh of Amulgavine, thereby forming a coalition too strong for the Joasmee to dream of opposing it.

Nothing of importance connected with this tribe occurred from this period until the spring of 1853, when Captain

A. D. 1853.

Kemball proceeded on a tour of the Gulf, for the


purpose of arranging matters connected with the Perpetual Treaty of Peace\* to be entered into by the maritime chiefs. It is not unworthy of notice that Shaikh Syud bin Butye alone of their number failed to wait upon Abdoolla bin Fysul on the occasion of his arrival at Brymee with a Nujdee Force,†—he only remained at his post; and from the tenor of a conversation held by him with the Resident on board the Honorable Company's sloop of war *Clive*, off the port of Shargah, may be gathered how extremely averse he was, or affected to be, to the presence of a Wahabee force in the province of Oman.

From the promptitude displayed by Shaikh Syud bin Butye in repressing maritime irregularities whensoever committed by his dependents, and from the readiness he showed to subscribe to the new treaty of peace, it is plain that he was anxious to cultivate the good will and friendship of the British Government in the same degree as had been done by Shaikh Muktoom, his brother, before him.

\* Vide page 88 of this Selection.

† Syud bin Butye deputed his maternal uncle to Brymee, in his stead.









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HISTORICAL SKETCH  
OF  
THE TRIBE OF EJMAN,  
FROM THE YEAR 1820 TO 1841,  
PREPARED BY  
LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;  
WITH CONTINUATION  
FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1853,  
BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;  
SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.





## EJMAN.

At the date of the General Treaty for the Suppression of Piracy in this Gulf, concluded by Sir William Grant Keir in 1820, the port of Ejman would appear to have been considered a dependency of the Shaikh of Shargah, having been included in a treaty with that chief for the surrender of the towers, guns, and vessels of certain places therein enumerated.

So shortly subsequent, however, as the beginning of 1823, Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman addressed a letter to the Resident, complaining of the aggressions committed against him by Sultan bin Suggur, and declaring that he never would submit to his authority. An attempt on the part of the latter chief to induce the Resident, while on a visit to Shargah in the same year, to recognise his supremacy, by showing him a paper signed by several of the Shaikhs in that neighbourhood, in which they acknowledged their dependence upon him, would allow also of a supposition that his jurisdiction was not altogether undisputed.

On the other hand, in a case of piracy committed upon two Debaye boats by a subject of Rashid bin Humeed in 1827, a remonstrance addressed to Sultan bin Suggur occasioned the offender, with two of his followers, to be placed in confinement, without any objection being raised on the subject of his responsibility, or right of interference.

The revival of the Wahabee power under Toorkey bin Saood, in 1827, was seized by the Shaikh of Ejman as a new opportunity for intrigue, and, according to the correspondence of the Government Agent at Shargah, he appears to have endeavoured to persuade the Wahabee Chief to furnish him with troops, for the purpose of enabling him to throw off his dependence upon Sultan bin Suggur, or even to supplant him in his superiority amongst the Joasmee Tribes. Toorkey bin Saood, in reply, is said to have told him that he conceived it would be highly beneficial if Sultan bin Suggur were to resume the supremacy which he formerly exercised, and that it was expected he (Rashid bin Humeed) would demean himself accordingly towards that chief. He added, that





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as the sea was under the dominion of the British Government, he had no power upon that element.

Alluding to this interview, Shaikh Rashid himself, in a letter to the

A. D. 1831.

Resident, dated in 1831, speaks of the pacific views of Toorkey bin Saood in terms of the

highest praise, and takes credit for exertions to establish a good understanding between the British Government and the Wahabee Chief, from whom he procured a letter to the address of the Governor of Bombay. No belief, however, was placed in his sincerity, there being little doubt that his real intentions were to excite hostility and disturbance,\* and to obtain a sanction for the renewal of the former system of indiscriminate aggression and piracy.

A. D. 1838.

Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed died, and was succeeded in the authority over Ejman by his son Humeed.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez, the elder brother of Shaikh Humeed bin

A. D. 1841.

Rashid (the acknowledged chief), contrived with his slaves to effect, in May 1841, an entrance

into the fort of Ejman, and, being secretly supported by the greater part of the inhabitants, to maintain his position: nor did Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, though the father-in-law of Humeed, exercise any interference, but treated the affair entirely as a family quarrel.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez, however, alarmed at the preparations making by his deposed brother to erect another fort in the neighbourhood, deemed it advisable to restore him to his former authority, until a better opportunity should offer to forward his object.

He has since succeeded in supplanting him, and is now the acknowledged ruler of Ejman.

## CONTINUATION TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

Taking up the history of this tribe in continuation of Captain Kemball's Historical Sketches, the first occurrence

A. D. 1844.

worthy of notice is that of a collision, in September 1844, between two boats on the pearl banks, the one belonging to Shargah, the other to Ejman. In this case the people of the Joasmees were decidedly the aggressors.

\* Such acts and proceedings of the tribe occupying Ejman as are worthy of notice, or mixed up with the Policy of the British Government, are recorded in the Sketch of the Joasme Tribe. (Vide page 329 of this Selection.)





"One Esai bin Jassim, an inhabitant of Shargah," to quote the words of the British Agent, "with a number of pearl boats belonging to that tribe, were anchored among those pertaining to other tribes. By chance the Buggarah of one Syf, a native of Ejman, was engaged in the pearl fishery near that of the abovementioned Esai bin Jassim, when a misunderstanding took place between them on the subject of the cables of their anchors. It was at first confined to talking and abuse, but Esai bin Jassim shortly after fired a matchlock at the Ejman Buggarah, and then boarded her, thrust a spear into the body of one of the crew, and struck another three blows on the head with an iron mace.

"The Ejman people did not resort to arms, but flung themselves into the sea, and were eventually picked up by pearl divers of their own tribe, and conveyed home in their boats."

This matter, when it came to the ears of the Resident, was at once taken up by that officer, who wrote to Shaikh Abdool Azeez, asking him whether he wished the case to be settled according to Mahomedan law, or would prefer its being treated by the British authorities as one of violation of the Maritime Truce.

The reply of the Ejman Chief leaving the adjustment of the affair in the hands of the Resident, demands were immediately made upon Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur for redress, in the shape of 200 dollars, which sum Esai bin Jassim was to be compelled to disburse, as compensation to the wounded Ejmanee.

The vessels of war were despatched to Ras-ool-Khyma and Shargah, to support the requisition, and a communication was addressed to the Chief of the Joasmees, acquainting him with the object of their visit. No hesitation was exhibited by Shaikh Sultan to comply with the demand preferred against him; on the contrary, he hastened (December 1844) to furnish an order for the amount required at the hands of his lawless subject, and brought the matter to a peaceable settlement.

About this time, also, took place an affair reflecting the greatest credit upon the character of the chief of this tribe.

Two vessels, having embarked a quantity of rice at Lingah, on the 5th December 1844, proceeded over to Shargah, but being caught in a storm, and unable to make the port in consequence, they strove to enter the backwater leading into Ejman harbour.

One vessel foundered in making the attempt; the other, however, after getting rid of 100 moras of her cargo, succeeded in reaching the inner harbour.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez, hearing what had occurred, hastened down to the beach, accompanied by his brother, and both of them, drawing their swords, swore a solemn oath that they would cut down the first man who dared

A. D. 1845.





to approach the boat, or lay hands on the rice. After a while, the owners of the cargo, apprised of what had befallen their vessels, came to Ejman, where they remained a period of six days, drying their rice, and eventually left for Shargah, without having lost a grain of their property.

So marked was the conduct of Shaikh Abdool Azeez, so far removed from the usual spirit of mischief displayed by the chiefs in cases of like temptation, that the British Government thought it right to notify their approval of his behaviour by a special vote of thanks. Major Hennell, therefore, was requested to intimate to the Ejman Chief how highly the Government he represented appreciated his praiseworthy exertions and conduct.

In the early part of the ensuing year (1846), Shaikh Abdool Azeez entered into an alliance with the Chiefs of Debaye and Amulgavine, for the purpose of resisting and repelling the combined attacks of their common foes, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur the Joasmee Chief, and Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon the Beniyas Chief. He scarcely, however, deserves the name of an ally, for in lieu of remaining staunch and firm to the cause he had espoused, and to which, moreover, it was his especial interest to adhere, he was ever inconstant and changeable.

We find him on one occasion permitting himself to be detached from the side of Shaikh Muktoom the Debaye Chief, and acknowledging his subservience to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, merely, it was supposed, to enable him to proceed to the fishery.

Again, we are told by Major Hennell, some three months later in the selfsame year, that "the Chiefs of Debaye, Ejman, and Amulgavine, one and all loudly complained of the Joasmee's unfriendly proceedings, in preventing intercourse between their respective subjects"; and lastly, in a letter from the same officer, bearing date the 15th of December 1846, we read that "the Shaikh of Ejman had found himself so pressed by the adherents of the Joasmees on either side of his port, that he had been compelled to withdraw from his alliance with the Chiefs of Amulgavine and Debaye, and place himself under the protection of his former enemy, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur." From which it would seem that he accommodated himself entirely to the existing state of circumstances, and had no hesitation in declaring for this party or that party, according as he thought would be most beneficial to his personal interests.

There is nothing of importance to relate until the summer of the year 1848, when, after the Brymee forts had succumbed to the prowess of the confederate Chiefs of Aboothabee and Sohar, the Joasmee and Debaye chiefs, trembling for

A. D. 1848.





the integrity of their respective possessions, entered into a close and strict alliance, and proposed to the Shaikhs of Ejman and Amulgavine that they also should join the league against the Beniyas Ruler. Either, however, declined the invitation received, and refused to take part in the machinations of the Joasmee and his complying associate of Debaye.

In the month of September 1848 a serious conflict occurred between the people of Ejman and those of Himreeah.

A feud, it would seem, had long existed between the inhabitants of the two places, and although for some time past it had lain apparently dormant, it was all of a sudden revived, and hostilities were resorted to with more than their usual ferocity. The circumstances attending the renewal of strife were these :—

On the 18th of September, Syf bin Abdoolla dying, the people elected in his stead one of their elders, Abdoolla bin Abdool Suteef. Whether the step gave umbrage to Shaikh Abdool Azeez, or whether he thought a favourable moment for a recourse to coercion had arrived, is not known. By whatever feeling he was actuated, however, he set out with a force of no less than four hundred followers, for the purpose of inflicting chastisement upon the people of Himreeah. His brother, Humeed bin Rashid, also accompanied the expedition. One half of his army was posted on the banks of the Khore, and with the rest he proceeded to Himreeah direct. The foe was well prepared to receive him : they left a small body of troops to defend their town, and with a party, some hundred and twenty in number, hastened to meet the invader. The detachments encountered, and notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the Ejmanees, the people of Himreeah proved quickly victorious. The former, perceiving the fall of Abdool Azeez, their Chief, and also that Humeed bin Rashid, his brother, was wounded, finding themselves deprived of a leader, were seized with a panic, and fled from the field in the greatest disorder.

The Himreeahites followed close in pursuit, until they reached the very walls of the town of Ejman, whence, after killing and wounding a considerable number, they retraced their steps to Himreeah. Such was the result of the conflict. As to casualties, the Ejmanees, besides their chief, suffered a loss of twenty-six killed and twenty men wounded. On the side of Himreeah, the chief and five others were killed on the spot, and as many as twenty-two placed *hors de combat*.

Humeed bin Rashid was elected Chief of Ejman, and the son of Syf bin Abdoolla head of Himreeah.

Hostilities continued for a length of time, neither chief permitting his subjects to proceed to the pearl fishery, the season for which had now arrived, until Abdoolla bin Rashid, Chief of Amulgavine, at the





EJMAN.

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invitation of the Chief of Heera, repaired in person to Ejman, and mediated a peace between the contending parties.

Humeed bin Rashid had scarcely been chief a couple of months ere he espoused the cause of the defeated Wahabee, and joined the league against Shaikh Syud at Brymee. What part, if any, he took in the skirmishes that were fought with the Chief of the Beniyas, does not appear. Of his subsequent proceedings no mention is made. We simply gather, from a letter addressed to Major Hennell, on the 8th of December 1848, that he set out on the 4th of the month with the Nuj-dees, Joasmees, and Boo Felasa, to attack the holders of Brymee.


A general peace was concluded in February 1849, in the terms of which Humeed bin Rashid was of course included.

In the spring of 1850, when the Joasmee repaired with his allies to Sohar and the Batinah Coast, for the purpose of assisting Syud Ghes, repelling Shaikh Syud, and contending with Syud Soweeynee, Shaikh Humeed bin Rashid proceeded to Zeit, to join Shaikh Sultan, with a detachment of two hundred men.

Not one single matter of interest remains to be told, affecting this tribe, further than a simple mention of the Treaty for Perpetual Peace at Sea,\* entered into by the Maritime Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, to the conditions of which Shaikh Humeed bin Rashid exhibited the greatest readiness to subscribe in the month of May 1853.

\* Vide page 88 of this Selection.









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HISTORICAL SKETCH  
CONNECTED WITH  
THE TRIBE OF AMULGAVINE;

BY  
LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE,  
ASSISTANT TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

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*Submitted to Government on the 19th August 1854.*

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## AMULGAVINE.

THE first subject worthy of mention connected with this tribe is the re-establishment of friendship between its Chief, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, and Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, the head of the Joasmees.

The latter chief, as it would seem, was driven, in October 1844, by adverse winds, to take shelter in the port of Amulgavine, and notwithstanding the blood feud existing between the Joasmee and Amulgavine Tribes, Shaikh Sultan, at the pressing invitation of Abdoolla bin Rashid, went ashore, and partook of the hospitality that was graciously proffered him. He continued the guest of the Amulgavine Shaikh for the space of a night and a day, when, after professing his feelings of friendship and amity, he quitted the place, and proceeded on his way to Ras-ool-Khyma.

In the month of October 1845 the Chief of Amulgavine identified himself with the Wahabee at a time when the latter was contemplating the seizure of the fort of Zeit, in the vicinity of Ejman, and when the whole of the maritime chiefs, save himself alone, had arrayed themselves against him, and determined to oppose with all the means in their power the execution of the design he had in view. It is needless entering further into detail here on this matter, full particulars having been already given in the narrative of the Wahabee Tribe, with whose history the subject is more particularly connected.\*

Early in the ensuing year Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, finding Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur was bent on compelling him to renounce his independence, and own allegiance to himself, entered into the closest alliance with Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, for the purpose of opposing the ambitious designs of the Joasmee.

Shaikh Muktoom was delighted to fall into the views of Abdoolla

\* Page 457 *et seq.* of this Selection.





bin Rashid ; indeed it was he that proposed a coalition, for he beheld a fortified structure in course of erection at the very door of his territories (at Aboo Heyle, within three miles of Debaye),—a structure which, if once completed and manned, might almost endanger the safety of Debaye itself. These towers were not to be built: all the maritime chiefs agreed with Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, that such a building, within gunshot range of the outskirts of his capital, must not be permitted to rise. One and all combined to oppose its construction, and Shaikh Sultan would not have been able to stand for a moment had he not contrived to win over the Beniyas Chief to his side, and to estrange the affections of the Chief of Ejman.

The Shaikhs of Debaye and Amulgavine, the only two that were left, remained closely united. The former chief said, that so long as the Maritime Truce existed he feared no danger from the side of the sea ;—he declared his perfect indifference for any attempts they might make from the land. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid bore an active part, and behaved himself nobly throughout the hostilities: he it was who commanded a party of his own people, when attacked by a body of troops from Shargah; he it was who, after a ferocious struggle, put them to flight, and sent them back without a leader, that leader being slain on the field, and no less a person than a son of the mighty Shaikh Sultan; he, too, ever acted in concert with Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and, unlike the vacillating Shaikh Abdool Azeez, who was now for, now against, the Chief of Debaye, he neither swerved to the right hand nor to the left, but co-operated with him on every single occasion, and remained in unison until the spring of 1847, when a Treaty of Peace

A. D. 1847.

being entered into between Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Muktoom, he was also included. "Aware, however, of the feelings of bitter enmity with which he was regarded by the former, who had reaped nothing but damage, both in power and reputation, since the commencement of the aggressive proceedings, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid was not disposed to allow himself to be lulled into security by the hollow engagement" that was now concluded.

Nothing of importance occurred until early in the year 1848, when hostilities commenced between the Beniyas

A. D. 1848.

Chief and the Wahabee Lieutenant, during which all the maritime chiefs, save one, ranged themselves on the side of the latter,—that one was Abdoolla bin Rashid. He appears to have been favourably inclined to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, and to have viewed the brilliant successes of that chief with as much delight as he beheld with distaste the attempts of the Joasmee confederacy to re-establish Wahabee supremacy in the province of Oman. As far as





can be learnt, he took no active part whatsoever in the quarrel; and notwithstanding the pressing invitations or demands of the Joasmee, that he should act offensively against Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, contrived to preserve a strict neutrality throughout the contention.

A. D. 1848-49.

In 1850, however, when a series of hostilities were commenced by the Joasmee Chief and his allies against the Muskat authorities, Abdoolla bin Rashid declared for Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur,—he went so far, at least, as to send a small detachment of camel-men to join the Joasmee forces at Zeit, and can therefore no longer be said to have remained neutral. Shaikh Sultan was, as usual, peculiarly grateful for the succours afforded. He hastened to show unmistakeable symptoms of gratitude. By way of return for the aid that was proffered, he seized upon all the date groves and other property pertaining to Amulgavine that were to be found in the neighbourhood of Shinas. Abdoolla bin Rashid remonstrated, but without effect: the seizures were retained, and the people of Amulgavine, fearing an attack upon their capital, were unable to proceed to the pearl banks.

A. D. 1850.

Nothing of sufficient interest to be related occurred until the close of the year 1852, when Abdoolla bin Rashid entered into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Shaikhs of Aboothabee and Debaye.

A. D. 1852.

The two latter chiefs were in the midst of negotiations, owing to the intrigues set on foot by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who had determined to support the pretensions of the sons of the late Muktoom bin Butye to the Chiefship of Debaye, in supersession of Shaikh Syud bin Butye, when Ali bin Abdoolla bin Rashid, the son of Abdoolla bin Rashid, arrived at Aboothabee, and the three chiefs contracted the engagement already alluded to.

There remains but to mention that in the month of March 1853 Abdoolla bin Rashid proceeded to Brymee, to wait upon Abdoolla bin Fysul, and, in seeking permission to return to his port, for the purpose of meeting the Resident, had some degree of restraint imposed upon his actions. In the month of May, however, when the Muskat and Wahabee complications had been brought to a close, he repaired to Shargah, and having visited Captain Kemball on board the Honorable Company's sloop of war *Clive*, subscribed the Perpetual Treaty of Peace entered into on the 4th May 1853\* by the Maritime Chiefs on the Arabian Coast, for the future entire cessation of disorders at sea.

A. D. 1853.

\* Vide pages 88 and 89 of this Selection.





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SKETCH OF THE PROCEEDINGS

(FROM 1809 TO 1818)

OF

RAHMAH BIN JAUBIR,

CHIEF OF KHOR HASSAN;

PREPARED BY

MR. FRANCIS WARDEN,

MEMBER OF COUNCIL AT BOMBAY:

WITH

CONTINUATION TO THE PERIOD OF THAT CHIEF'S  
DEATH, IN 1826;

AND ALSO A

BRIEF SKETCH OF THE PROCEEDINGS

(DOWN TO THE YEAR 1831)

OF

SHAIKH BUSHEER BIN RAHMAH,

SON AND SUCCESSOR OF THE ABOVE CHIEF;

BY

LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL,

ASSISTANT RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.





## KHOR HASSAN.

KHOR HASSAN is situated on the Arabian Coast, and held by Jaubir, of the Yalahimah Tribe of Uttoobees. The Sketch of the Uttoobees\* affords information of this, the maritime branch of the tribe, up to the date of their reduction of Bahrein.

The four sons of Jaubir having been dissatisfied with their portion of the rewards distributed on that occasion, left the island in disgust, and the survivor and his tribe have continued to prosecute the mode of life in which their ancestors had been bred.

After the death of their father,† these brothers took up their residence for some time at Bushire and Karrack, after which they returned to Khor Hassan, and betook themselves to piracy, in the course of which occupation Rahmah obtained the ascendancy. Abdoolla, the elder brother, resorted to Muskat, and sought the protection of the Imaum, soliciting his interference and assistance to enable him to recover possession of Khor Hassan from his brother; in which he does not appear to have succeeded, but died at Muskat.

The armament that proceeded against the pirates in 1809 did not attack Khor Hassan, since, notwithstanding the ferocity of the character of Rahmah bin Jaubir, the surviving brother, and the apprehensions entertained that he would prosecute piracy, he had always respected the British pass and colours. An additional motive for avoiding the attack was a knowledge that he had entered into a strict connection with the Wahabee power, which it was the policy of the British Government not to offend. The Chief of Khor Hassan pirated for himself, and chiefly against the Persians, in revenge for some injuries sustained at Bushire.

Subsequently to the attack of Ras-ool-Khyma, Rahmah bin Jaubir, who had been joined by some piratical boats that had escaped from the intermediate ports between it and Khor Hassan, having put to sea, fell in with a large fleet of loaded boats belonging to Bahrein and Zobara,

\* Page 362 *et seq.* of this Selection.

† The third brother, Rahmah, died at Khor Hassan; Abdoolla, the eldest, at Muskat; and Shaheer was killed by his brother Abdoolla.





eighteen of which he captured. He captured also a ship, and several Dows and small craft belonging to Muskat, Bushire, Congoon, &c., and, with very few exceptions, put the crews to death. Apprehensions were generally entertained that, if measures were not pursued to reduce his growing strength, the whole of the Gulf would, as soon as our cruisers quitted the station, be reinfested with his spoliators.

In the month of May 1811 Rahmah bin Jaubir again put to sea, on a cruising expedition, accompanied by a fleet of

A. D. 1811.

boats belonging to the Joasmee Tribe called Ejman, that inhabited the coast to the northward of Ras-ool-Khyma, which escaped without suffering any injury from the late expedition.

A desperate action was fought between Rahmah's fleet and the Uttoobees of Bahrein, in which the latter were victorious.

Some captures having been made in the Gulf, and remonstrances sent to the Wahabee, and the Chiefs of Ras-ool-

A. D. 1813.

Khyma and Khor Hassan, Rahmah bin Jaubir, in a letter dated the 27th of October, detailed the circumstances attending the capture of a Buggalow from Bussora with horses on board, belonging to the Honorable East India Company, of which he was not aware, but as soon as he found they were British property, he engaged boats to convey them to Bombay, where they all arrived in safety.

On the 26th of October 1816 Mr. Bruce reported that the famous Piratical Chieftain Rahmah bin Jaubir, with all

A. D. 1816.

his boats, and tribe, consisting of about five hundred families, had arrived at Bushire, and the Governor, Shaikh Mahomed, had received them, and allotted them a particular quarter of the town to reside in, on condition of being friends with his friends, and enemies with his enemies; that he possessed two very large Buggalows, a large Buteel, and several small Buggarahs. He gave out that he intended leaving off his predatory life, and to employ his boats on mercantile concerns,—at all events as long as he resided at Bushire. Mr. Bruce thought he would be on peaceable terms with most of the ports of the Gulf, as the Bushire Government was so with them.

The Imaum was anxious for Rahmah bin Jaubir to have accompanied him to Muskat, and offered him any of his ports to settle in; but his late defeat had shown such a want of foresight and judgment that he had lost his character much in the estimation of the Arab Tribes: Rahmah was therefore afraid to put himself so much in his power. He would not have left his former abode if he could have avoided it; but the Wahabee Chief, Abdoolla bin Saood, was so incensed against him for having taken part with the Imaum of Muskat, that he directed his property and family to be seized, and brought up to Deriah, and it was with great difficulty he was able to get them from Khor Hassan,





Rahmah bin Jaubir, after his arrival at Bushire, paid the Resident a visit, and renewed his professions of friendship towards the British Government, and requested the Resident to say that he should be happy to attend to any wishes Government might have towards checking the depredations of the Joasmees.

Mr. Bruce having communicated to Rahmah bin Jaubir the friendly disposition towards him of the British Government, he expressed himself highly flattered: he had just returned from a successful cruise to the southward of Bahrein, against the Joasmee boats, which frequented that island for supplies of dates, rice, &c. in return principally for the property of the Surat ships. He intercepted twelve boats laden with supplies proceeding to Ras-ool-Khyma, four of which he sank, after taking out their cargoes; four others he broke up for the want of men to man them, and four he brought to Bushire. He intended, after landing the property which he had brought to that place, to proceed again to the southward, to cruise between the piratical ports and Bahrein.

In 1818 Rahmah bin Jaubir proceeded to, and landed with some guns at Kateef, which he battered, in concert with Ibrahim Pacha, and commenced to rebuild his old fort at Demaum, which the Wahabees had blown up in July 1816, to which, when finished, he intended to remove from Bushire, with his family and adherents.

#### CONTINUATION OF THE PRECEDING TO THE YEAR 1831.

BY LIEUTENANT S. HENNEL.

Mr. Warden's Sketches conclude in 1818, by stating that Rahmah bin Jaubir had commenced the rebuilding of his fort at Demaum,\* which had been destroyed by the Uttoobees in 1816.

From the period above mentioned the records of the Bushire Residency make no mention of this notorious person till July 1819, when he is stated to have been at Kateef at the time Captain Sadlier landed there on his mission to Ibrahim Pacha, and that he rendered that officer every assistance, piloting the *Vestal* cruiser himself into the harbour.

\* A fort on a small island opposite Bahrein, and close to Kateef.





## KHOR HASSAN.

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In January 1820, an intimation from the Resident at Bushire was conveyed to Rahmah bin Jaubir, that his vessels were not to be permitted to leave Kateef to cruise against the people of Bahrein, unless acting with an authorised State in regular warfare, and that if they did so he would be punished by the British Government. The next month Rahmah came over to Bushire with three vessels, in order to co-operate in a projected expedition against Bahrein by the Prince of Shiraz. Orders at this time had been issued by Sir W. G. Keir for the destruction of all the vessels belonging to this chief, but as he was at the time of the receipt actually in the service of the Regent of Fars, it was judged expedient to suspend their execution until a further reference could be made. Rahmah sailed for Tharee on the 10th February, to join His Royal Highness the Prince of Shiraz, but on the way down, his large Buggalow was wrecked on the Verdistan Shoal, and it was with great difficulty he and his people escaped with their lives.

On the 13th April Rahmah bin Jaubir came over to Bushire, and on his waiting on the Resident, he was requested to become a member to the General Treaty, which he refused, under the plea of his being then a servant of the Persian Government. This statement being confirmed by the Shaikh of Bushire, and as the latter engaged to be responsible for his peaceable conduct in future, the excuse was admitted.

Notwithstanding these promises, Rahmah still continued his aggressions upon the trade of Bahrein, and in the pearl fishing season of 1821 he captured seven boats belonging to that island, and killed twenty men, which induced the Uttoobee Chiefs to apply to the British Government on the subject.

The Resident at Bushire was accordingly directed to prefer a remonstrance to the Court of Shiraz against his proceedings, in consequence of which the Persian Government ordered the Shaikh of Bushire to call on him to account for his conduct, and likewise to detain his son and family as hostages for his future good behaviour; but Rahmah having in the mean time left Bushire, and placed himself under the protection of the Imaum, this injunction was attended with no results.

In the commencement of the year 1822 this chief and Shaikh Abdoola bin Ahmed, of Bahrein, waited upon the Acting Political Agent in Kishm, for the purpose of adjusting their differences; but both parties were so unreasonable in their demands that the attempt failed altogether, and Shaikh Rahmah bin Jaubir proceeded to Muskat, to lay his case before the Imaum.

About November 1822 Rahmah bin Jaubir returned to Bushire, and at the same time a communication was received from His Highness the





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KHOR HASSAN.

Imaum, stating that so little reliance was to be placed upon his word, that he had determined to have nothing more to do with him, and therefore would not be answerable for his actions.

The removal of the British troops from Kishm appears to have afforded this restless character much pleasure, and he is reported to have publicly expressed his joy at having, as he conceived, the field thus opened for the renewal of his former system of depredation. At this time, although both old and blind, he still retained his original violence of disposition, as well as his inveterate hatred to the Uttoobee Chief, for the purpose of gratifying which, and prosecuting his aggressions upon Bahrein, he left Bushire, and took up his residence in Demaum.

A. D. 1823.

In February 1824 the Resident at Bushire succeeded in effecting a reconciliation between the Uttoobees and Shaikh Rahmah bin Jaubir, and articles of agreement were exchanged between them, by which the latter agreed to withdraw his protection from the Aboosemate Tribe, which had formerly taken refuge in Demaum from Bahrein. After paying a visit to Muskat, Rahmah returned to Demaum, and employed himself in devising plans for the recovery of a tribute formerly levied on the people of Kateef, who had lately withheld payment. In spite of his reduced resources and advanced age, his spirit still continued unsubdued, and about June 1824 he made an application to the Resident to be permitted to revenge himself upon the Shaikh of Bushire, who had received orders from the Shiraz Government to detain the family of his son, and treat him as a rebel, in consequence of his having made up his quarrel with the Uttoobees. At the interposition of the Resident, however, his son's family was permitted to return to Demaum. The pressure of his pecuniary difficulties appears to have been somewhat relieved about this time by the successful result of his blockade of Kateef.

A. D. 1824.

In the beginning of 1825 Shaikh Rahmah proceeded to Muskat, and soon after applied for, and received permission to assist Shaikh Tahnoon in his war with the Chief of the Joasmees.

A. D. 1825.

About the end of 1825, Rahmah bin Jaubir, on the ground of the non-payment of the tribute he had formerly exacted from the people of Kateef (as a species of blackmail to save their vessels from being plundered by him), commenced a series of predatory attacks upon the commerce of that place, paying no attention whatever to the remonstrances made to him upon the subject by the British authority. In consequence, it was at last judged necessary to station two cruisers near Demaum, in order to protect the peaceable traders in the vicinity from Rahmah's aggressions, and at the same time it was intimated to him,





that if he did not desist from such proceedings, he would be compelled to obedience. The refusal of this chief to attend to any remonstrances appears to have been produced by his belief in the advancing power of the Wahabees, and of their disposition to support him in every measure tending to a renewal of the former system of predatory warfare; more particularly in those which were likely to injure their old enemies the Shaikhs of Lahsa and Kateef (Mahomed and Majid al Arareer, Chiefs of the Beni Khalid Tribe). It was, however, subsequently decided by the British Government, that as long as Rahmah's hostilities were confined to the people of Kateef, we were not to interfere. At the same time, in a reply to a communication sent by him in explanation of his proceedings, he was strongly urged by the British Government to change his conduct.

Shortly before the removal of our cruisers from Demaum, consequent on the decision above alluded to, the misunderstanding so long brewing between Rahmah and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed broke out into acts of open aggression upon each other, without, however, their carrying on regular hostilities, from which the presence of the British vessels restrained them.

Notwithstanding the hostile nature of the relations subsisting between the Uttoobee Shaikh and Rahmah bin Jaubir, the withdrawing our ships of war from the neighbourhood of Demaum was viewed by both parties with considerable apprehension, neither being prepared for immediate and open hostilities. They both, therefore, applied to the British Resident to proclaim a truce, but as there appeared no disposition on the part of Rahmah to admit the people of Kateef to a participation of the benefits of the proposed arrangement, all further interference was declined, except such as would lead to a general pacification.

In the course of the many desperate actions in which Shaikh Rahmah had been engaged with the people of Bahrein, in consequence of this war, the greater portion of his tribe was by degrees destroyed. About the end of 1826, finding himself much pressed by his enemies, who had invested Demaum, Rahmah proceeded over to Bushire, with the view, if possible, to interest the British authority in his favour, and also to procure an addition to the crew of his Buggalow, which, from the reasons above alluded to, had suffered very materially. In his interview with the Resident, this singular old man (although nearly seventy years of age, totally blind, and covered with wounds) displayed the same haughty and indomitable spirit which had always characterised him, and he expressed equal ferocity and scorn against his Uttoobee enemies. Failing in his design of inducing the Resident to interfere in his behalf, he set sail

A. D. 1826.





from Bushire, with a reinforcement of twenty-five or thirty Beloochees, and proceeded over to Demaum, where he ordered his vessel to fire a salute,—a mark of contempt which so irritated the Bahrein Chiefs, that Ahmed bin Suleman, a nephew of the ruling Shaikh, volunteered to attack him in his own Buggalow. His offer being accepted, he laid himself along side of Shaikh Rahmah's vessel, and a most furious action took place, the struggle being for life or death. The people of the Uttoobee Buggalow, however, suffered so severely from the heavy and well directed fire of the enemy, that she was under the necessity of sheering off in order to recruit her exhausted crew from the other Bahrein vessels in the vicinity. Having procured a reinforcement, and refusing the assistance of the rest of the fleet, Shaikh Ahmed again advanced to the attack, weakened as his crew was in the former combat. Rahmah soon found that he was in no condition to carry on the engagement, and that in a short time he must be taken by boarding, unless he surrendered,—an alternative which was out of the question, considering the atrocious and sanguinary warfare he had so long carried on against Bahrein. Having, therefore, given orders for his vessel to grapple with the enemy, he took his youngest son (a fine boy about eight years old) in his arms, and seizing a lighted match, directed his attendants to lead him down to the magazine. Although acquainted with the determined character of their chief, and of course aware of the inevitable destruction which awaited them, his commands were instantly obeyed, and in a few seconds the sea was covered with the scattered timbers of the exploded vessel, and the miserable remains of Rahmah bin Jaubir and his devoted followers. The explosion set fire to the enemy's Buggalow, which soon afterwards blew up, but not before her commander and crew had been rescued from their impending fate by the other boats of the fleet. Thus ended Rahmah bin Jaubir, for so many years the scourge and terror of this part of the world, and whose death was felt as a blessing in every part of the Gulf. Equally ferocious and determined in all situations, the closing scene of his existence displayed the same stern and indomitable spirit which had characterised him all his life.

Shaikh Busheer bin Rahmah, the son of the above person, being now cut off from all chance of assistance, and all his provisions being consumed, was compelled to surrender Demaum unconditionally. The Bahrein Chief, however, spared his life, and even gave him his liberty. He afterwards proceeded to Muskat, where His Highness the Imaum permitted him to reside, and made him a present of a Buggalow, to enable him to obtain an honest livelihood by commerce.

As a proof of the restless and intriguing spirit of Rahmah bin Jaubir it may be mentioned, that after his death Sultan bin Suggur transmitted





to the political authority a letter which he stated had been addressed to him, in common with the other Arabian Chiefs, by the late Shaikh, just before the termination of his mortal career. The purport of this communication was to set forth that the most positive orders had been sent out to India from the King of England, directing the authorities in that country to withdraw themselves from any further control or superintendence over the Arabs; and he therefore invited him (Sultan) to permit his subjects to pursue their old occupation of appropriating to themselves the property of others. It is needless to add the whole was a gross fabrication on the part of Rahmah, which would probably have never been brought to our notice but for his death.


From this period until 1830, Busheer bin Rahmah continued to reside in Muskat, without any material alteration in his situation.

A. D. 1830.

In 1831, His Highness the Imaum endeavoured to procure his re-establishment in Demaum through the influence of the Wahabee Chief, but the timely submission of the Uttoobee Shaikh to Toorkey bin Abdoolah oos Saood prevented this arrangement taking place. His Highness, however, succeeded at last in obtaining permission for Shaikh Busheer to erect a fort on Dareen (a place on Tirhoot, opposite Kateef, which becomes an island at high-water). To this place he has now removed his family, and as he has been joined by a great many of the Aboosemate Tribe, who are still bitter enemies of the Uttoobees, there is every reason to apprehend that the re-establishment of this unprincipled character in these quarters will eventually lead to a renewal of the disputes and disturbances which interrupted the tranquillity of the Gulf during the latter part of his father's lifetime.

A. D. 1831.











**'REDUCED COPY OF CHART OF THE GULF OF PERSIA. Constructed from the Trigonometrical Surveys. Made by Order of THE HONBLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE UNITED ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY and to whom it is Respectfully Dedicated by their most obedient Servant GEORGE BARNES BRUCKS Commander H.C. Marine. 1830' [531a] (1/2)**







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MEMOIR  
DESCRIPTIVE OF THE  
NAVIGATION OF THE GULF OF PERSIA;  
WITH BRIEF NOTICES  
OF THE  
MANNERS, CUSTOMS, RELIGION, COMMERCE, AND RESOURCES OF  
THE PEOPLE INHABITING ITS SHORES AND ISLANDS.  
PREPARED BY THE LATE  
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INDIAN NAVY.

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## NAVIGATION OF THE GULF OF PERSIA.

### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

IN laying the following account of, and directions for, navigating the Gulf of Persia, before the Government, it is necessary for me to state that much of that part from Ras Musseldom to Gebil Ali, on the Coast of Arabia, has been compiled from my Private Journals, kept prior to my joining the survey, corroborated by such information as I have since been able to obtain, and from the surveys themselves.

Not having been present during the greater part of the period the above coast was examined, and my predecessor not having left me any information on the subject, I trust that should any errors be found, which I confidently hope, if they exist at all, do so only in a trifling degree, I shall stand acquitted of a want of care in drawing up this Memoir.

On the remaining part of the coast I have been constantly employed, and consequently can vouch for the accuracy of what is there remarked relative to navigation.

In regard to the population, religion, manners, customs, trade, and resources, it cannot be expected that a person situated as I am, having been at sea ever since I was eleven years of age, should be able to write these, either in an historical manner, or with that attention to grammatical rules which a person having had proper time to benefit by education would do: what I have done is to try and place the situation, numbers, and manners of the people I have visited, and who are little if at all known, in as clear a point of view as my information and abilities would permit.

My information has been obtained in the following manner: I have proposed to the chiefs certain questions relative to the tribes, and their localities, of the revenues, trade, &c., which I have noted, with their replies. This I have done to several other persons at different periods, and then taken such of the substance as appeared to agree the best; but it is impossible to trust to the native accounts in this part of the world, consequently it can at best be considered but an approximation to the truth.

Another difficulty I consider it necessary to notice is, my short stay at the several places; the different accounts, particularly as to the





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population, I have had to reconcile; also the disinclination in the more respectable classes of natives to give information on these subjects. I have endeavoured to render everything as plain as possible: in all places the native name is retained; and on the Persian side, of such objects as are known to, and have been named by European navigators, the native name is given in addition to the one by which it is generally known to the European.

It is also necessary to notice that the Bushire Residency is throughout considered as our first meridian, calling it in lat.  $29^{\circ} 00' 15''$  N., and long.  $50^{\circ} 51' 30''$  E. Except the survey of the first season, and part of the second, the variation of the compass has always been obtained on shore, and it may as well be here mentioned, that from observations obtained at different periods during the sixteen years I have been in the marine, and corroborated by those made by Lieutenant McClure and others, the variation in the Gulf is decreasing at the rate of about four miles and a half yearly.

All the latitudes and longitudes have been observed on shore with an artificial horizon, as the refraction in the Gulf has been found so great that observations made with the natural horizon seldom agree two days together.

The soundings have mostly, when near the shore, been carefully taken by the boats, always anchoring when any particular change occurred, and being fixed by angle taken between two well defined objects. All shoals have been fixed by a trigonometrical chain being carried round them. In all cases where the survey has been trigonometrical, which has been the case altogether, except from Bushire southward and westward, and here it has been partly so, care has been taken, by occasionally measuring bases of corroboration, and obtaining celestial observations, to verify the work.

I beg to state that the utmost care has been taken throughout the survey to prevent errors, but that some may occur I think more than probable, but trust they will be so trifling as to be of no importance to the navigation of the Gulf.

In regard to the statement that closes this Memoir, relative to the rise of piracy, its causes, and suppression, it is from the best information I could get, and might be considered a subject for another pen than that of a sailor in regard to that part relative to keeping it down. It is impartially drawn up, from an intimate knowledge of the people, and what from long experience I know to be both the least expensive and most efficient means. To Lieutenant Houghton, of the Honorable Company's Marine, and Lieutenant Haines, of the same service, I feel indebted for much useful information.

GEORGE B. BRUCKS.





## PART I.\*

## ARABIAN SIDE OF THE GULF.

## RAS MUSSELDOM.

Ras Musseldom, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 23' 45''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 35' 10''$  E., is the south-eastern point of the Gulf of Persia, and the outer or lowest point of the island of the same name. The island is a barren rock, about two miles in length, and half that in breadth. Its highest part is about four or five hundred feet, formed of steep cliffs. All round the cape is the lowest part, which is about thirty feet high, increasing in some parts to one hundred and fifty. It is at the southern entrance of the Gulf. Between the island (Jazeerat Musseldom) and the opposite promontory of Ras Goberhinddee there is a channel, with from twenty to forty fathoms in it; the narrowest part is not quite one-third of a mile wide, and the currents being strong and irregular, together with being liable to sudden shifts of wind, it is unsafe for navigation.

## RAS GOBERHINDEE.

Ras Goberhinddee (Cape of the Indian's Grave), or Ras-ool-Gebal (Mountainous Cape), the name by which it is best known to the Arabs, is the Maceta of the Greeks, and part of the Asabo or Black Mountains of the ancients; is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 22' 18''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 33' 44''$  E.; is opposite to Jazeerat Musseldom, and is about one hundred and fifty or one hundred and eighty feet perpendicular above the sea.

## RAS-OOB-BAB.

Ras-ool-Bab is a high, remarkable promontory, consisting of basaltic rocks; is nearly W. by S. from Ras Goberhinddee, and forms one point of a bay, about three miles in depth, and one in breadth. At its entrance, round the whole of which the land is high, barren, and rugged, the soundings are from twenty-eight to forty fathoms close to the rocks, the bottom hard sand and rocks. This bay should never be entered unless in case of necessity, the anchorage being bad, and the winds baffling. Close to Ras-ool-Bab stands a high perpendicular rock, with deep water close to it, and appears a part of the cape until you are close to it.

## KOOMZA.

Koomza is a town situated at the bottom of a cove, having soundings

\* Dated 21st August 1829.





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of from twenty to ten fathoms, over a bottom of sand and rocks, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 20' 40''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 29'$  E.; bears from the Great Quoin S.  $29^{\circ}$  W. It contains about three hundred inhabitants, subject to the Imaum of Muskat. These people are very poor, and appear a separate class from either Arab or Persian. Although most of them speak Arabic or Persian, amongst themselves they have a separate language. Some few of them reside on the sides of the hills, and live by their scanty flocks of goats, which feed on the few shrubs found there.

## JAZEERAT GOON.

About three miles north-east of Koomza is situated Jazeerat Goon, a high, rugged island, about one mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, having on its south-east end a point like a steeple. The depth round it is from eighty to sixty fathoms.

## THE QUOINS.

The Quoins are three rocks, near each other; two of them forming in some views like a Quoin, which name has been given them by European navigators. By the Arabs they are called Salama (welcome). The Great Quoin, called by the Arabs Salama, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 30' 25''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 34' 20''$  E. It bears N.  $8^{\circ} 34'$  W. from Ras Musseldom, distance seven miles nearly, and is between two and three hundred feet high, its highest part being to the north-west. The Little Quoin bears from it S.  $41\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  E., nearly two miles; and Gap Island, the smallest of the three, bears S.  $70^{\circ} 24'$  E. from the Great Quoin. Both these latter are called by the Arabs Bennaat. They have safe channels between them, which may be passed in case of necessity with soundings from twenty-two to forty-five fathoms; between them and the main the soundings are from forty-five to ninety fathoms.

## BAB SHEREETAH.

Bab Shereetah, or Perforated Rock, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 23' 54''$  N., long.  $26^{\circ} 57' 32''$  E., bears from the Great Quoin S.  $45^{\circ} 8'$  E., distant nine and a quarter miles; is thirty or forty feet high; has a hole through its centre; is a few yards long, and narrow.

## JAZEERAT ABOORASHID.

Jazeerat Aboorashid is north of Koomza two and a half miles, is about one mile long, and rather more than a quarter of a mile broad; has a conical hill on its southern part, and steep cliffs all round. It is about one-third of a mile off shore. Near this, in mid-channel, is a remarkable rock, called Bab Makaliff.

*Remarks.*—Several small rocks, some fifteen feet, others less, above water, lie near this, and the eddies caused by them, together with the irregularity of the currents, render it unsafe for navigation. Between





Perforated Rock and Aboorashid are three small coves, with soundings, over a bottom of sand and rocks, from eighteen to twenty fathoms, and twenty-five to thirty-five fathoms at their entrances. The centre cove has some remarkable basaltic rocks at its extremity. The hills are from six to twelve hundred feet high, with steep acclivities; one exhibits the basalt in the form of mountain caps. At the extremity of the eastern cove is a small basin, formed by a turn of the land, where, in case of great necessity, a vessel may haul in to repair, in three or four fathoms. All these coves are much open and exposed, with bad anchorage.

#### JAZEERAT GUNNEM.

Jazeerat Gunnem, its north point forming the northern entrance to Discovery Strait, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 23' N.$ , long.  $56^{\circ} 26' 10'' E.$ , and about two miles to the SW. of Perforated Rock. There is at this point a natural jetty of rock, about thirty-six feet above the level of the sea, and contracting the strait here to one-third of a mile. The island is about four miles long, and one wide in its broadest part, rugged, and increasing in height to the southward, over which stands a conical hill five or six hundred feet above the level of the sea. The southern point is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 20' 15'' N.$ , and long.  $56^{\circ} 25\frac{1}{2}' E.$  A few fishermen were found at the southern point, and a number of goats seen on the hills.

#### DISCOVERY STRAIT.

Discovery Strait, formed by the above island and the main, is about one-third of a mile wide at the northern, and one mile at the southern point, near the village of Ghurru. The soundings are from fifteen to twenty-four fathoms, over a hard sandy bottom. The tide sets fairly through the strait, but runs strong, and requires great caution. At the southern part of the strait, near the village of Ghurru (which is inhabited by some of the same tribe as those of Koomza), is a small bay, with from twenty to fifteen fathoms. The only danger in these straits is a coral reef off the pier, which has ten and twelve fathoms close to it, to avoid which do not come under seventeen fathoms in anchoring.

#### KUBBAI.

Kubbai is a village nearly opposite Ghurru, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 19' 40'' N.$ , and long.  $56^{\circ} 26' 20'' E.$

#### REMARKABLE CLIFF.

Remarkable Cliff, one mile and a half S. by W. of Gunnem Island, is nearly two hundred feet high, and surmounted by a conical hill, the summit of which is about nine hundred feet above the sea; its southern and western acclivities are less abrupt. Close in you have twelve and fourteen fathoms water, and forty fathoms about three quarters of a mile off shore.





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## COLVILLE'S COVE.

The entrance to Colville's Cove is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 17' 50''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 24' 10''$  E.; is nearly four miles deep, and generally about one mile wide; has soundings from twenty-eight fathoms at the entrance to seven fathoms at the bottom of it. At the northern point of the entrance is a high steeple rock, which is situated about one mile to the southward of Remarkable Cliff. At the entrance, both sides of the cove are formed of cliffs from one hundred to about one hundred and fifty feet high,—the northern one is nearly perpendicular; large masses of rock are constantly detaching themselves, and falling at the base. The rocks are much excavated by the beating of the sea against them. The cove runs nearly NW. and SE., and consequently is exposed to north-westers, when the sea runs high, and dashes with great fury against the rocks.

## ROOB ALI.

Roob Ali, a village at the bottom of Colville's Cove, has a small sandy beach in front of it, and a small mosque; a few date and fig trees grow among the houses. Some wells of good water were found here. The inhabitants are about one hundred, subject to the Shaikh of Kassaab, and are of the Shehaheen Tribe, mostly fishermen.

## ELPHINSTONE INLET.

The entrance to Elphinstone Inlet is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 12' 30''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 24'$  E. This inlet stretches in various undulations nearly eight miles, exhibiting many romantic aspects. Its width, at the entrance, is nearly two-thirds of a mile, and its narrowest part one-third of a mile. The hills, like most others about this part, are high and rugged, and the separation from the coves on the opposite side are in some places not above two hundred yards at the base. This was one of the many places into which the pirates used to escape from our cruisers.

## KASSAAB FORT.

Kassaab Fort is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 13' 10''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 20' 46''$  E., and bears from Ras Shaikh Mansood S.  $31^{\circ}$  E., about three and a half miles; is situated on a sandy beach, forming between two points of land, which project from it in a curve of about a mile wide, and the same depth. The hills are high and rugged, in some parts hanging over the sea. On the western one is a small look-out house. A flat runs off from the fort a considerable way, and dries at low-water. Under one of the hills, on the eastern side, are some wells of good water, convenient for watering. I watered here in the Honorable Company's cruiser *Psyche* in December 1821, with great ease. The hills at this time were covered with





foxes, which were so tame as to allow you to get within a few yards of them without their moving. The fort is a quadrangular stone building, with towers at the angles. It appeared to have been strong, but was fast going to decay. I saw but one gun, which was lying near it, old and unserviceable. The inhabitants are scattered about in the date groves. The place a little inland appeared to be well cultivated; wheat, barley, and vegetables growing in most parts. There appeared plenty of fresh water in the date groves, by which they were well watered. There are about three or four hundred inhabitants, of the Shehaheen Tribe, partly cultivators, and partly fishermen; they send boats to the pearl fishery, and have some little trade in salt fish, getting dates and grain in lieu.

The Shaikh acknowledges the authority of the Imaum of Muskat, and reckons under his government near five thousand men, distributed in different villages about the hills, and round the several bays hereabout. Close to the western point of the small sandy bay, in a small cove, is the village of Kuddai, situated in a date grove, with a small tower for its defence, having about forty or fifty inhabitants. The cove is half a mile wide, soundings eight to three fathoms, sandy bottom. On the western side of the entrance is the village of Mokkaï, containing about three or four hundred inhabitants, mostly fishermen. Here are some wells of good water, and the high tabular rocks on which the houses are built give it a very romantic appearance.

#### RAS SHAIKH MANSOOD.

Ras Shaikh Mansood is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 16' 15''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 19'$  E.; bears from the village of Mokkaï north about three miles, the coast forming several small bights between, in one of which is the small village of Hennai, having about forty inhabitants, mostly fishermen. There is a small date grove near it. Over this village, on the summit of a hill elevated nearly seven hundred feet above the sea, is the Bedouin town of Alareef, subject to the Shaikh of Kassaab, and containing nearly eight hundred inhabitants. From Ras Shaikh Mansood the Great Quoin is seen nearly in one with Perforated Rock, bearing N.  $46^{\circ} 23'$  E., distant twenty and a half miles, and the NW. point of Jazeerat Gunnem N.  $45^{\circ}$  E. Between this and Kassaab the soundings over the bay are from seventeen to twenty-two fathoms, within five hundred yards of the shore, over a bottom of rocks and sand, being all sand towards Kassaab.

*General Remarks.*—From Ras Musseldom to Ras Shaikh Mansood there is a continuation of coves and inlets, as heretofore described, with numerous rocks, some elevated little more than ten feet, others as high as two hundred feet above the level of the sea. The whole of these





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coves are safe to run into in case of necessity or in chase, but there is a risk in all, unless you have a commanding breeze, and in all it should be recollected the ground is bad for anchorage, especially where exposed to the prevailing winds.

The soundings outside are from twenty-two to ninety fathoms, but in some parts you will have thirty and forty fathoms. When under the perpendicular cliffs between Perforated Rock and Kassaab Bay, care is required to prevent your being carried into the coves, or Discovery Strait, by the tides, either ebb or flood, especially on the springs, when they are very strong, or in light winds.

Discovery Strait is easy of access, and forms a good sheltered anchorage for cruising vessels on this coast, if taken in blowing weather, but I would rather recommend Kassaab Bay for cruising vessels to run to during the hard north-westerns in the winter months; but vessels having no object in view I should advise never getting on this part of the coast if possible, for in light winds it will often cause considerable delay in their getting clear of the Gulf. In 1821 the variation in these parts was  $4^{\circ} 5' W.$ , now (1827) it is  $3^{\circ} 35' W.$

## RAS-ool-YEDDEE.

Ras-ool-Yeddee, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 13' 42'' N.$ , long.  $56^{\circ} 16' 30'' E.$ , is a high, bluff point, not very conspicuous unless when you are close in with the land. There are eighteen fathoms of water close in. The villages of Algceera and Yeddee are situated between this and Bokkai Point; they contain about one hundred and sixty inhabitants of the Shehaheen and Tannagee Tribes, mostly fishermen. At Yeddee are some wells of pretty good water, easy of access, but the exposed anchorage renders it a place unfit for watering, except in cases of necessity. The beach commences at Ras Yeddee. Ras Yeddee bears  $S. 41^{\circ} W.$ , nearly three miles and two-thirds from Ras Shaikh Mansood.

## BOKHA POINT.

Bokha Point, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 9' 27'' N.$ , long.  $56^{\circ} 14' 10'' E.$ , is something similar, when close in, to Ras-ool-Yeddee. In a small sandy bay, towards Yeddee, is a ruinous square Ghuree, with a few unserviceable old guns, mostly dismounted. The village contains between three and four hundred men, principally of the Tannagee and Shehaheen Tribes. The Shaikh is a dependent of the Imaum of Muskat. He has under his government about sixteen or eighteen hundred people of all descriptions. There are some other trifling defences about here, but none of any consequence. There are a few straggling date groves, and a small plain near. Before the pirates obtained such power as they possessed before the expedition, there were very extensive date groves about here, but destroying the date trees being a principal object in Arabian warfare,





these were mostly cut down by the pirates; but now (1827) they are getting thick again, and will no doubt resume their former state. Between this and Shaam Point are the villages of Fudthra, Rumpthra, and Tibbat, inhabited by fishermen, partly of the Shehaheen and partly of the Tannagee Tribe, in all about two hundred and fifty souls. The soundings about here are seven fathoms near the beach, to forty fathoms at two miles distant, sand and rocks.

## SHAAM POINT.

The land about here is high; there are three small bights, with sandy beaches, between this and Bokha, from which it bears S.  $32^{\circ} 20'$  W., distant seven miles nearly.

## SHAAM.

Shaam is a considerable village, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 1' 53''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 11' 14''$  E. (the fort), two miles to the southward of Shaam Point, and is inhabited by about two hundred and fifty of the Tannagee Tribe, with nearly as many strangers of mixed tribes; they are principally fishermen. A short distance from this place is a remarkable white patch in the high land that forms the Point of Shaam, and when the sun shines on it, it is seen at a considerable distance. The Shaikh of the village is also governor of the small district of the same name, and has altogether about nine hundred persons under his government, of the tribes above mentioned. This is the boundary of the dominions of the Imaum of Muskat. They suffered much during the predominance of the pirates, but are now recovering from it. Inland there is, towards the hills, a considerable tract of cultivated ground. In the date groves were found some good wells of water. Small supplies of cattle, poultry, &c. are procurable, and the Shaikh and people were quite civil. The range of hills runs from here southerly to some distance beyond Rasool-Khyma, where they take a south-easterly direction, and are soon lost sight of from the coast; the hills about here are about twelve hundred feet high. Here the bank commences with regular soundings from three fathoms near the beach to twenty fathoms two and a half or three miles off shore. The inhabitants here, as well as at those places before described, are Mahomedans of the Soonee faith, although some few Wahabees may be found among them.

## RAMSE.

Ramse was a town of some consideration, belonging to the pirates. It is situated on the side of a creek capable of receiving large boats at high-water, but small ones have a difficulty in getting in at low-water, the entrance then being nearly dry. This town is now in ruins, and is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 53'$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 8' 20''$  E. Prior to the last expedition this place was rising into some importance under Hussein bin Ali,





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an enterprising Shaikh, and who stood high, on account of his strict observance of the Wahabee tenets, with the late head of that faith, whose representative he was among the pirates; but since the fall of Ras-ool-Khyma, and his own hill fort of Zyah, it has fallen fast to decay, and is at present under the Shaikh of Shargah. There are in the date groves about three or four hundred of the Tannagee tribe, the remains of the former inhabitants. They send boats to the pearl fishery, and at other times employ themselves in the trading boats of Ras-ool-Khyma, and in fishing. Some few supplies may be obtained here. The soundings abreast here are three fathoms close to the beach, five to eleven from one to three miles off shore; bottom sand and broken rock. A little to the southward of this place there is a small creek running nearly from Zyah to Ras-ool-Khyma, but not navigable. The whole coast is flat and marshy.

## RAS-OOO-KHYMA.

Ras-ool-Khyma (or the Cape of the Tent). The Point is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 48' 12''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 4' 10''$  E. It was, prior to the expedition in 1819-20, the principal pirate port; was surrounded on three sides with a wall, flanked with towers, and to the south-westward of the town had a further defence of a strong square fort or Ghuree, and was at that time supposed to be defended by between six and seven thousand men, including the auxiliaries collected from the country round about, and about eighty boats of different sizes, from two hundred and fifty to forty or fifty tons, some mounting eight and ten guns. They had also about sixty or seventy pieces of cannon, of various descriptions, mounted round the walls, but most of them would be considered unserviceable by Europeans. A large number of their best boats were sent to Lingah and other friendly places, by which they escaped being destroyed, and are now employed in trade.

At the present time, from the best information I have been able to obtain, there are about two thousand four or five hundred inhabitants, of the Joasmee, Shehaheen, Zaal, and Mootarish, and strangers of various tribes. The Point forms the western side of the entrance to the back-water, which runs in about three miles, and is capable of receiving the largest boats unladen. The entrance is blocked up by a bar; the channel is very narrow, not having more than two feet water at low-water spring tides. The soundings inside vary from sixteen to five feet, but at low-water spring tides there is only a stream left in mid-channel.

Opposite the ruined town inland is the island of Maharah, on which was a tower; there is now a village. The present town is on the eastern bank of the creek, and is rapidly increasing; they have a square Ghuree in it, and several good houses. They now participate in the





trade of the Gulf, and have a number of boats thus employed, of from two hundred to forty tons. They trade to Bombay and the Malabar Coast during the north-east monsoon, and to the Red Sea; they also take a large share in the pearl fishing.

To the ESE. of the old town are situated the date groves, among which are several towers. The former chief, now a dependent of the Shaikh of Shargah, resides here, as Shaikh of the village of Huatial Faal. Wells of indifferent water are found scattered about among the date groves. In front of the town is a bank, with only seven or eight feet water on it, and within it two and a quarter and two and a half fathoms. A ship in anchoring here should do so with the creek open, in four and a half or five fathoms. Supplies of cattle, poultry, and other refreshments are to be had here, at reasonable rates. The town was completely destroyed by the Honorable Company's Marine, and parties from the military, when the force was removed to the opposite coast in 1820; and so effectually was this done, that it is now difficult to tell what might have been the form of the houses. This was done in the height of the hot weather, and cost several officers and many valuable men their lives, from fever brought on by the exposure. It is high-water here at 11h. full and change, rise and fall seven feet.

#### JAZEERAT AL HAMRA.

Jazeerat al Hamra, a small island with a backwater, joined to the main at low-water, with a town, was, prior to the expedition in 1819, fortified with a few towers, and is now inhabited by about one hundred and fifty or two hundred of the Zaal Tribe; they are principally employed in the pearl fishery; they have also two or three small trading boats. It is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 43' N.$ , and long.  $56^{\circ} 55' 10'' E.$  The backwater is shallow, and only capable of holding middle-sized boats. The Shaikh is a dependent of the Shaikh of Shargah. There is very little water here, and that quite brackish; trifling supplies are procurable. The coast between this and Ras-ool-Khyma is low, with soundings from two fathoms inshore, to five and seven at two and two and a half miles distant; bottom sand and broken rock.

#### AMULGAVINE.

Amulgavine, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 35' 12'' N.$ , long.  $55^{\circ} 41' 38'' E.$ , is situated on the outer point of a very extensive backwater, which runs inland several miles in different branches, and has seven fathoms water in some parts within, but the entrance is blocked up by a very extensive reef. There are ten or eleven feet on the bar at high-water full and change, and the rise of tide, as on most parts of this coast, is seven feet. The town of Amulgavine, now in ruins, appears to have been of some consequence. It bears from Al Hamra S.  $57\frac{1}{2}^{\circ} W.$ , distant sixteen miles,





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The coast between them is rather curved and low, fronted by an extensive coral reef, commencing soon after passing Al Hamra and ending off the creek of Amulgavine. A vessel in passing this should not come under seven fathoms in the night; in the day-time the reef shows itself. The backwater is formed by what is an island at high tides, and the point on which the ruined town stands.

The present town of Libini is situated on this island, and contains about six hundred inhabitants, of the Al Ali Tribe, subject to the Shaikh of Shargah: they take a share in the pearl fishery, and have a few trading boats. Supplies of cattle, very good, are procurable; water is also to be had, and the most delicious fish are in great plenty; but the inhabitants are indolent in the extreme, and seldom go to fish, unless driven by necessity. I was on shore among them surveying the backwater for nearly three weeks, and found them generally civil, but eager to impose on me. They were in 1822 strict Wahabees, and the Shaikh did not seem to be at all pleased with the present state of things. The best anchorage is with the square house on Libini E. by S.  $\frac{1}{2}$  S., in five or six fathoms; but the anchorage is very bad, being a bottom of sand and rock; high-water at 11h. 40m.

## EJMAN.

Ejman, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 25' 12''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 33'$  E., bears from Amulgavine S.  $37^{\circ} 10'$  W., fourteen miles; is situated on the southern bank of a backwater,—one of the best on the coast, having a better entrance than any other. There are five feet on the bar at low-water, and about ten to fourteen feet inside. The rise of tide is much the same as at other places, except when influenced by the wind, when it will rise one or two feet higher. It is high-water full and change at 11h. 20m.

The town is small, and in 1822 had a fortified house belonging to the Shaikh; but I believe its defences have been increased since. It contains, during the pearl season, from fourteen to seventeen hundred men, of the Mahamee Tribe. During the date season most of them retire to a place named Brahamce, distant a day's journey inland. The Shaikh, Rashid bin Ahmed, is independent, but the Shaikh of Shargah does not acknowledge it, although he has no power over him. They are mostly strict Wahabees.

Fresh water is procurable about half a mile from the town. The best anchorage is abreast the creek, in five fathoms, about a mile and a quarter off shore; just without the line of three fathoms is a rocky bank, with only two fathoms on it. Between this and Shargah the coast is nearly straight, with regular soundings from three to five fathoms, sand and rocks. About one mile from Shargah Creek entrance is the ruined village of Fasht, having a small creek for their fishing-boats, and inhabited by a few fishermen.





## SHARGAH.

Shargah (the square tower) is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 21' 40''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 29' 13''$  E., and bears S.  $44\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$  W., nearly five and a quarter miles. The town stands on the eastern bank of the backwater, which is narrow and shoal, being from one hundred to two hundred yards wide, with about three or four feet water at low tides. The entrance is about a mile to the northward of the town, and, like all others on this coast, has a bar. It runs about three miles, to Aboo Heyle, where it unites with the backwater there. The western side is bounded by an insulated sandbank, on which they are now erecting their huts. Shargah is at present the chief place of the Joasmee Tribe, and the head of it, Sultan bin Suggur, chiefly resides here.

The town is long, narrow, and open: the defences are a fort a little inland, mounting six pieces of cannon, together with some detached towers. In case of alarm from an enemy, it is stockaded round with date trees and wood sufficient for repelling the attack of Arabs, although of little service against regular troops. The inhabitants consist of the Joasmees, Al Ali, Shehaheen, and some mixed tribes, and are variously calculated from 2,300 to 5,500 men: but from my own observation, aided by inquiries on the spot, I should think in the pearl season, when most numerous, they may amount to about 3,500 or 3,800. Shargah sends from three to four hundred boats of various sizes to the pearl fishery. Each boat pays the Shaikh a tax of from one to two and a half dollars, according to the number of divers employed. The returns are reckoned at about a lakh of dollars.

The country for some distance inland is a complete desert, with a few scattered date groves; in the interior it is said to be better cultivated, but it does not afford sufficient supply for the inhabitants, who get large quantities of dates from Bussora and Bahrein. They have several considerable sized boats employed in the Gulf trade, and to the Malabar Coast and Bombay, but Ras-ool-Khyma, on account of its superior backwater, seems likely to form the principal place of trade on this side the Gulf.

A number of Banians are also settled here, as pearl merchants, goldsmiths, and cloth and grain-dealers. They generally adopt the Arab dress. Sultan bin Suggur, the chief, is, with the exception of Ejman, Shaikh of all the places from Ramse to this place. He is crafty in the extreme, enterprising, and, for an Arab, has tolerable abilities. He is more dignified in his manners than any other chief on this coast. He pretends great good will towards the English, but is not to be trusted. He possesses a good countenance, but rather a crafty one, and he is held as much in fear as reverence by the different Shaikhs along the coast.





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Cattle, very fine, though small, and other supplies, are to be had here; fresh water is procurable about half a mile from the town. Nearer the entrance of the creek, to the southward of the town, is a mound of a round form, which will be discerned before the town, and by which it may be known. The shore may be approached, in case of an attack on the town, to within two or three cable-lengths, but the anchorage is very bad, being broken rock, and sand. You have here two and three fathoms close to the beach, and five about a mile and a quarter out; but you should not anchor under five fathoms, with the entrance of the creek about SE. by S. Fish are plentiful. The inhabitants are all strict Mahomedans, partly Soonees and partly Wahabees. It is high-water here full and change at 12h. 40m., rise and fall between six and seven feet.

## ABOO HEYLE.

Aboo Heyle is a small village, situated about three miles to the SW. of Shargah, on the same creek with Khan village, on the other bank. They jointly contain about two hundred and fifty inhabitants, of various tribes, mostly fishermen, and are subject to Shargah.

## DARA.


Dara, a small village in lat.  $25^{\circ} 16' 50''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 26'$  E., now deserted and in ruins, was lately occupied by about four hundred of the Souidan Tribe, having established themselves there after some quarrel with the Shaikh of Shargah, when they quitted that place in 1826.

## DEBAYE.

Debaye, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 16' 26''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 24' 42''$  E., bears from Shargah S.  $36^{\circ}$  W., distant seven and a half miles, and stands, like most other towns on this coast, on the banks of a backwater, although rather more elevated than most of them, being about twenty feet above the level of the sea. It is inhabited by about seven or eight hundred of the Beniyas Tribe, and is defended by some towers. They are in some measure dependent on the Imaum of Muskat, who pays for the alliance of this tribe.

They possess several trading boats, and send a number of boats to the pearl fishery. There were here about one hundred Siddees, in the pay of the Imaum of Muskat, who formed a sort of garrison. Debaye may be considered the end of the Pirate Coast, although I believe they never took a very active part in it. There are several small banks off Debaye, and the coast is fronted by a reef to the distance of about three-quarters of a mile, extending nearly to Aboo Heyle. From this bank the soundings are a fathom and a half close to it, five fathoms about a mile and a half off, and increasing to seven, eight, and nine, four or five miles off. The rise and fall are about seven feet; high-water full and





change about 1h. There are wells of fresh water at the back of the town, near some small date groves; cattle and poultry may be procured. Shaikh Tahnoon of Aboothabee has recently taken possession of this place, and is acknowledged the head of the Beni-yas Tribe.

*Remarks on the Navigation, &c. between Ras Shaikh Mansood and Debaye.*—In passing Ras Shaikh Mansood, two and a half to three miles will be a good distance, until you get off Shaam, when keep along shore in five fathoms in the day-time, or six at night, until you pass Al Hamra, when I would advise your not coming under seven fathoms, especially in the night, until you are past Amulgavine Reef, which begins shortly after passing Al Hamra, and continues until abreast of the town of Amulgavine. This reef is composed of coral rock, and dry in many parts at low-water. It projects in some places to a mile and three-quarters nearly, and is dangerous to approach under four or five fathoms, even in the day.

After passing Amulgavine you may keep in any depth not under four and a half fathoms until past Ejman, where there is a small two-fathom bank about a mile off shore, in the line of three fathoms. Off Shargah you should anchor in five fathoms, with the creek SE. by S. There being little or no trade, except in fish and dates, at any of these places, I do not think it likely any merchant vessel will visit them, as I am convinced the smallest vessel could not sell half a cargo along the whole coast.

It is necessary that vessels on this coast, during the winter months, should be well found with ground tackling, and have good sails; but otherwise it is unsafe to be on the coast, as during the heavy north-westers, which set in with very little warning, the sea runs high, rolling on a dead lee shore; and the ground being sand and rock, is bad for holding, and if too close in you would find it difficult to work off shore. In Shargah Roads, in 1822, on one occasion the *Discovery* lost all her anchors, and was nearly wrecked, clearing the shore with great difficulty. From Ejman to Debaye five fathoms is a good depth to keep in.

#### GEBIL ALI.

Gebil Ali is a moderately elevated hill, nearly three miles inland, and in lat.  $25^{\circ} 1' 47''$  N., and long.  $55^{\circ} 14' 10''$  E.


#### RAS HASSAN.

Ras Hassan is a low, projecting point, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 52' 40''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 00' 45''$  E.

#### RAS GUNTOOR.

Ras Guntoor, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 50' 20''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 55' 30''$  E., is low, and not easily distinguished.





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GONADA.

Gonada, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 48' 5''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 52' 8''$  E., forms the entrance to a backwater of the same name, shoal at the entrance.

GORABEE.

Gorabee, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 47' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 50' E.$ , is another entrance to the same backwater.

RAS ELLORA.

Ras Ellora, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 41' 40'' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 42' 10'' E.$ , is the point of a considerable backwater which appeared to extend to, and join that of Ras-ool-Grab. The entrance being shoal it was not examined.

MARAFJAIN.

Marafjain, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 38' 30'' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 40' 20'' E.$ , is the point of a backwater, with a shoal entrance.

RAS-OOO-GRAB.

Ras-ool-Grab, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 36' 40'' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 38' 50'' E.$ , is a moderately elevated rocky headland, at one entrance of a large backwater; shoal at the entrance, but deep water within. It was on this account not examined.

RAS-OOO-LUFFAN.

Ras-ool-Luffan, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 31' 45'' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 34' 10'' E.$ , is a low point at the north-eastern entrance of the backwater that surrounds Aboothabee.

ABOOTHABEE.

Aboothabee, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 29' 21'' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 32' 20'' E.$ , is situated on a sandy island, and is the principal place of the Beniyas Tribe, and the residence of their Chief, Shaikh Tahnoon. The tribe consists of about two thousand four hundred men; but there are, of the Monasir and other tribes, near five thousand more, who acknowledge his government. These mostly reside in the interior, at several places in a district called Ruffthra. At Aboothabee the inhabitants are about twelve hundred generally, although much increased in the pearl season, consisting of people of the above tribes, and a number of Banians, who are traders and goldsmiths. There is in the town a fortified house, and a small tower. There are several more towers in different parts of the island, and two or three villages.

The inhabitants have a number of trading boats, and take a large share in the pearl fishery. These form their principal resources, as the country affords little or nothing; cattle and poultry are occasionally procurable, but the only water they have is quite salt. The anchorage is foul, and unsafe, except in southerly winds. Inshore, abreast the town, about





two hundred and fifty yards off shore, a vessel not requiring more than twelve or thirteen feet water may lie well sheltered in smooth water, but a pilot must be procured to take her in. There is another anchorage in a gap of the reef to the northward of the town; this place also requires a pilot to take you in. A ship anchoring in these roads should do so with the Ghuree or square house SE. to ESE., in five or five and a half fathoms.

The present Chief, Shaikh Tahnoon, is a fine looking man, possessing much of that open and hospitable frankness generally attributed to the Arab, and is, I think, attached to the English, both from inclination as well as interest. He is a firm ally of the Imaum of Muskat, and by far the best of the Shaikhs on this coast. His tribe, the Beni-yas, is one of the principal in Arabia, and is an independent race. From Debaye to this place the coast has no fixed inhabitants, but during the fishing season temporary villages are erected near the backwaters. Numbers of the Monasir Tribe wander about, and care should be taken in landing, to prevent surprise, as they are generally at enmity with the settled tribes, and not to be trusted. Fronting Aboothabee the ground is all rocky, with several patches of reef.

*General Remarks relative to the Navigation, &c. between Debaye and Aboothabee.*—Between these two places the coast is low, and in many parts swampy, with a continued chain of backwaters from Gonada to Aboothabee, shoal at the entrances, but some of them deep within. This part of the coast is destitute of inhabitants, or fresh water, except some few wells, nearly salt. At times, a few straggling Bedouins wander about near the coast. During the fishing season temporary villages are erected on the coast by the fishermen. The whole coast, after passing Gebil Ali, is unsafe to approach under six fathoms, and the ground is hard rock, covered with a thin coat of sand, and so smooth that an anchor will at times hold with difficulty. After passing Ras-ool-Grab in six or seven fathoms, you may haul in towards Aboothabee, until you get into five fathoms, when do not come under that depth until you get the fort SE. by E., when anchor in any convenient depth from four and a half to six fathoms. From Gonada to Ras Ellora the coast is fronted by a reef, having from one and a half to three and a half fathoms on it, to the distance of three miles off shore in some places, but following the above directions you will be quite clear of it.

*General Remarks as to the Appearance of the Coast from Ras Musseldom to Aboothabee.*—From Musseldom to Shaam the coast is high and mountainous, with a little beach. In some places, at the foot of the hills, after passing Shaam, the hills begin to break off inland, and the coast becomes low and flat, with a sandy soil. Here and there, near the towns, you find a few date groves: this continues with little alteration





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until you get to Gebil Ali, already described, when the coast continues flat and barren, with here and there a few rocky cliffs, until you reach Aboothabee, which is on a flat sandy island, without a shrub near it.

GEBIL STACEY.

Gebil Stacey is a small island and hill, situated in Aboothabee Creek, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 23' 40''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 26' 10''$  E.

JAZEERAT EL BARANY.

Northern Point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 26' 10''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 26' 40''$  E. This island is low and sandy, with some groves of trees in different parts. A reef fronts it to about two and a half or three miles.

GEBIL BUKSCHACEY.

Gebil Buckschasey is a hill on the island of the same name, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 18' 30''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 23'$  E. The island is low, and the inlet between it and el Barany has three fathoms within, but is nearly dry at the entrance at low-water.

RAS ZUBBAZIE.

Ras Zubbazie is a low point of the main, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 19' 20''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 21' 20''$  E.

RAS EL CHAAF.

Ras el Chaaf is a flat, elevated rocky point of the main, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 17'$  N., and long.  $54^{\circ} 18' 30''$  E.

OMAN MAJARIB.

The northern point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 13' 50''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 17' 30''$  E. This island is low, and covered with mangrove trees. There are two fathoms of water in the creek round it, but no entrance.

JAZEERAT GUNTOOR.

Jazeerat Guntoor is similar to the last; its east point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 11' 10''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 14' 25''$  E.

KHORE GUNTOOR.

The entrance to Khore Guntoor is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 18' 40''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 11'$  E., is about one mile wide, and has near three fathoms at the entrance at high-water spring tides, which is between two reefs; within it is narrow, and has four or five fathoms water.

GEBIL SULALEE.

Gebil Sulalee, on the island of the same name, is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 11' 50''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 9' 50''$  E. The island is generally low, except this hill, and a few mounds in different parts.

JAZEERAT BILLYAIRD.

The northern point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 15' 40''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 55' 40''$  E.;





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western point in lat.  $24^{\circ} 8' 50''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 43' 20''$  E. This island is situated on the southern side, at the upper part of Khore el Bezzim, and the northern part faces the sea. It is thirty-two miles in length, and about seventy in circumference; is formed of low sandhills, except at the eastern end, where it is more rocky, and has several groves of mangrove trees.

RUG RUG ZOIKEAN.

This bank is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 48' 40''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 50' 42''$  E., the centre composed of hard sand, and broken rock; least water three and a half fathoms; shoalest point in lat.  $24^{\circ} 47' 20''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 52' 45''$  E.; the soundings over it irregular, from eight to three and a half fathoms.

ARLAT UMBARRAS.

Arlat Umbarras is a low sandy isle, on the edge of the inshore reef. Its north point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 25'$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 35' 50''$  E.

ARLAT OWHALE.

Arlat Owale is another low sandy island, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 28' 10''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 34' 10''$  E. Its southern end is on the edge of the offshore or Walker's Reef, nearly opposite to Umbarras; the inshore channel being formed between them, having from six to eight fathoms.

WALKER'S REEF, OR FASHT OWHALE.

The inner part of this reef commences at Owale, and runs up to the northward to lat.  $24^{\circ} 35'$  N. nearly, and long.  $53^{\circ} 38'$  E.; then runs nearly due east and west, its north-western point being in lat.  $24^{\circ} 35'$  N., and long.  $53^{\circ} 20'$  E.; its south-western point in lat.  $24^{\circ} 29' 40''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 19' 30''$  E. This dangerous reef is dry in many parts at low-water, but will always be seen in the day-time. To avoid it, I should recommend a vessel leaving Aboothabee to steer a course direct for Zerchoa, and in passing the reef not to come under seven fathoms, as there are six fathoms close to the edge.

EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ISLANDS.

East India Company's Islands, from Jazeerat Jehnany, southern point in lat.  $24^{\circ} 10' 35''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 38'$  E., to Bezzim el Gurabee, the western in lat.  $24^{\circ} 18' 40''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 12' 10''$  E., consist of Jehnany, three others without names, and Bezzim el Gurabee. These, with Jazeerat Billyaird and the reefs, which connect the whole with each other from the northern side of Khore el Bezzim, and on the outside from the inshore channel, are low, in some parts rocky, and most of them covered with wood, but none of them contain any water.

CAPE MERITON.

Cape Meriton, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 7' 40''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 32' 50''$  E., is a low, rocky point on the main, on the southern side of Khore el Bezzim.





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## KHORE EL BEZZIM.

Khore el Bezzim is formed on the northern side by East India Company's Islands, and on the south by the mainland of Arabia, and is forty miles deep from its entrance at Bezzim el Gurabee, and from five miles at the entrance to one at the upper part wide, having soundings from nine to two fathoms at the upper part. The deepest water and best channel is about one-third over from the islands, near the main. Several small patches, with one and a half and two fathoms, lay scattered about. This place is said to have been one of the resorts of the pirates, and many of their boats were said to have been here at the time of the expedition.

## RAS HADWARKAH.

From Cape Meriton to Ras Hadwarkah, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 11' 40''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 47' 10''$  E., the coast is fronted, after quitting Khore el Bezzim, to a distance of fourteen miles, by a reef, and numerous small patches. Although there are channels between them, still, it being impossible to give a guide for avoiding the dangers, it cannot be considered safe to navigate.

Unless in case of necessity, or being in chase, no vessel should come here, in which case I can only recommend great attention to the lead and look-out, as the only guides they can have. After passing the sandy island of Aiche, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 17' 30''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 1' 35''$  E., when, if running for Khore el Bezzim, run in as near mid-channel, between the island of Bezzim el Gurabee and the main, as possible, keeping a sharp look-out for a small shoal patch bearing true W. five and a half miles from the body of the island. After passing it, steer boldly up the Khore, keeping near mid-channel until you near the fourth island, when haul in for it, and keep about one-fifth over from it towards the main, to clear a shoal patch on that side. After this, keep over on the island side, along the edge of the reef.

After passing this island, your soundings will be from four and a half to three fathoms, until you come to Jazeerat Billyaird, when it will not be prudent to go further, although you will carry three fathoms and two and a half near the island much further. If it is near low-water, a boat of moderate size cannot go through, but if high-water she will have six or seven feet water, and most probably get into the deep water between Billyaird and Salaly. Supposing you to be in chase, and the chase steered through Aiche, steer well up to the north, giving Bezzim el Gurabee a berth of six miles, to avoid the patch before mentioned, looking sharp out for a bank near the centre of the channel, whose west end is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 22'$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 9' 5''$  E., and east end in lat.  $24^{\circ} 27' 20''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 20' 5''$  E. Between this and the bank off the island





is a channel with three and four fathoms in, but very narrow at the western end. The whole of these large reefs show quite plain. Steer between this reef and the offshore one, or Walker's Reef. The distance between in the narrowest part, close to the east end of the centre bank, is rather more than two miles, soundings from ten to five fathoms. After passing this reef you will see Arlat Owhale and Umbarras: steer to pass between them, nearest the former when you are clear of the inshore channel.

## STANNUS' BANKS.

These form the northern boundary of the inshore channel. The north point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 39' 40''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 13'$  E.; the south point lat.  $24^{\circ} 31' 10''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 13' 30''$  E.; western point lat.  $24^{\circ} 32' 30''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 8' 10''$  E. There are several dry patches on these banks.

To enter the inshore channel from the north and west, steer down from Zerchoa SSW., keeping a look-out for Stannus' Banks until Arzenia bears true NW., and Dalmy W., when haul up E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  S. or E. by S., and the directions above will carry you through.

## ISLAND OF SEER ABONAIDE.

The south point of the island of Seer Abonaide is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 12' 20''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 22' 55''$  E.; is rather high, and contains large quantities of sulphur, and has some mineral springs. You may approach this island to seven fathoms in any direction.

## ISLAND OF ZERCHOA.

The island of Zerchoa is in lat. (south point)  $24^{\circ} 51' 35''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 13' 15''$  E.; is the highest island on this side the Gulf, and is much of the same substance as Polior, viz. apparently of volcanic origin. One mile and a half due south, off the south point of the island, is a small patch, with two fathoms on it. There is no other danger near it; you may pass the island at one mile distant in any direction. It affords good anchorage under the lee, in the prevailing winds of the Gulf. It contains no water. It has a low point at the south end.

## ISLAND JERNAIN.

The south point of the island of Jernain is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 55' 50''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 59' 30''$  E. It is remarkable for three peaks on it, two being on the north end. It appears also to be of volcanic origin. There is no danger near; it affords tolerable anchorage in the prevailing winds. It has no water.

## DAUS ISLAND.

The south point of Daus Island is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 8' 35''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 0' 40''$  E. It is a flat rocky island, moderately elevated, and, like the others, appears to be of volcanic origin. It forms a low point on the south end. There is no danger near this island; it affords anchorage in the prevailing winds. It has no water.





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## ARZENIA ISLAND.

The south point of Arzenia Island is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 46' 20''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 42' 25''$  E. It is moderately elevated, and about six and a half miles in circumference. The south point, like most of the other islands, is low, and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Good anchorage is found here under the island. It has no water.

## ARZENIA.

Arzenia Three Fathoms Bank. The centre of it bears true N.  $\frac{3}{4}$  E., distant three miles from the body of the island, and is long and broad. It has not less than three fathoms, over a coral bottom, but the depth, from the native accounts, appears to be decreasing.

Arzenia Two Fathoms Bank bears E., distant a mile and a half from the island; is very small; least water two fathoms.

Arzenia One and a half Fathom Bank bears nearly SE., distant two and a quarter miles, and has only a fathom and a quarter or a fathom and a half on one part; it is very small.

## SEER BENIYAS ISLAND.

The entrance to the cove is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 15' 10''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 46' 50''$  E. This island is rather high, having a peak in the centre; is seventeen miles in circumference, and appears of volcanic origin. On the southern side is a small cove, with five fathoms water in it, and three fathoms at the entrance. In rounding this island, to go to the cove, which you should do on the eastern side, pass the southern side of the small sandy island of Rusheed at a distance of three quarters of a mile, and run round, not coming nearer Seer Beni yas than two and a quarter miles, or seven fathoms, until you near the small dry sandbank, or get the peak to bear about W. by S., when haul in towards the island, keeping along at about one mile distant, until you get close to the south point, which haul round about a quarter of a mile distant, and anchor under the island in five or six fathoms off shore, from two cable-lengths to a quarter of a mile. You are well sheltered here from all winds. In rounding the island, the soundings in some places are irregular. You may run down to the SSE. of this island in soundings from fourteen to four fathoms, looking sharp out for a small dry sandbank in the fair-way; but there is no outlet, and is only mentioned in case of being in chase. Between Seer Beni yas and the main are two reefs, with a channel nearly a mile wide between them, having three fathoms at low-water in it; but the tides run in it with such rapidity, and the set is so irregular, that it is unsafe to navigate.

## ZABOOT.

Zaboot is an island to the south-west of Seer Beni yas. Its south end is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 5' 20''$  N., and long.  $52^{\circ} 37'$  E. It has a rock off the





northern end, and appears like a Buggalow under sail when at a distance. Between this and Ras Hadwarkah the coast is fronted by reefs, having a bight in them between these points, which has from seven to four fathoms in it. Two other detached banks lie to the north of Zaboot, distant five and a half miles, having narrow channels, with from three to four fathoms between them. Between these banks and Seer Beniyas the channel is so clear that you may follow a vessel into the bight in safety. The western side of Seer Beniyas may also be approached to a mile. North-west, distant six and a half miles from the rock off Zaboot, is a small patch, with two fathoms on it. With the exception of this patch, it is perfectly safe between the islands of Seer Beniyas and Dalmy and the islands of Jazcerat, the soundings being from twenty to five or six fathoms.

## GEBIL BARRAKAH.

Gebil Barrakah is a remarkable hill in lat.  $24^{\circ} \text{ N.}$ , long.  $52^{\circ} 30' 30'' \text{ E.}$  Is easily known from being, with the exception of a smaller hill, called Gebil Wooder, to the SSW. of it, the only high hill on this part of the coast.

## RAS ASSAY.

Ras Assay, the most southern part of the Gulf, is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 57' 35'' \text{ N.}$ , long.  $52^{\circ} 17' 45'' \text{ E.}$  It is quite low, running off swampy ground.

## RAS ASSELLAH.

Ras Assellah is a point in lat.  $24^{\circ} 3' \text{ N.}$ , long.  $51^{\circ} 47' \text{ E.}$  The coast between the island of Zaboot and this runs in an easterly and westerly direction, and has numerous small detached shoal patches off the western part, and is not safe to approach nearer than seven miles after passing Ras Assay. Between it and Zaboot you may approach as near or distant from that island to any distance from four and a half to two miles, taking care not to come under five fathoms.

## ISLAND OF DALMY.

The south point of the island of Dalmy is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 27' 35'' \text{ N.}$ , and long.  $52^{\circ} 27' 25'' \text{ E.}$  The island is rather high, and in the centre is a remarkably flat hill. Its south point is low, and has some wells of brackish water in it. Two miles below the south point is situated Arlaat Mussooma, a small sandy island. There is no danger off Dalmy, except between the south point and the sandy island, which you may round a mile distant to the southward, in seven fathoms. This island, like most others about this part, seems of volcanic origin. It is the next largest to Seer Beniyas of what are generally called Mandes Islands.

## ISLAND OF DAENY.

The south point of the island of Daeny is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 58' 15'' \text{ N.}$ , long.





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52° 25' 40" E. This island is low, and has a reef extending off all parts except the south end, to a distance of from a mile to a mile and a half. It is most extensive to the northward: off the southern end of this island you have good shelter in a north-wester.

## ISLAND OF SHERRAROW.

The south point of the island of Sherrarow is in lat. 25° 2' N., long. 52° 17' 40" E. It is small and rocky. Off the north side, distant one mile, is a high rock above water, having three fathoms close to it, and eight and nine between it and the island. This island affords worse shelter than any of the others in this group.

## YASSAAT, OR PSYCHE'S ISLANDS.

The Yassaat or Psyche's Islands are a group of low islands, the southern ones of which are formed of alternate strata of earth and gypsum. The northern point of the group is in lat. 24° 14' 50" N., long. 51° 58' 30" E.; and the southern part is in lat. 24° 9' 45" N., long. 51° 58' E. A chain of reefs commences off the northern part of the islands, and runs as far as Guffay, in lat. 24° 36' 10" N., long. 51° 42' 50" E. There is good anchorage under the lee of the islands, but in rounding them you must pass to the eastward, the reefs above mentioned blocking up the passage.

## MAHAMALAH.

Mahamalah is a small rocky islet, in lat. 24° 7' 35" N., long. 51° 53' E.

## OMAL ATTUB.

Omal Attub is a small island in lat. 24° 13' N., long. 51° 51' 15" E., with several rocky islets lying off it. There is good anchorage in six or seven fathoms off it.

## NEIGHTY ISLAND.

Neighty Island is a small rocky island, with several detached islets off it, in lat. 24° 16' 50" N., long. 51° 47' 45" E. A reef runs round the island, and the channel between it and the shore is not more than three quarters of a mile wide, with only three fathoms in some parts of it.

## GUSSAH ELBAYAH.

Gussah Elbayah is a small high rock, situated close to the shore, in lat. 24° 7' 50" N., long. 51° 47' E.

## RAS-OOO-L-MAECHEREEB.

Ras-ool-Maechereeb is a point in lat. 24° 17' N., long. 51° 44' 55" E. It forms the north-eastern entrance of Dooat al Nachiah, which is five miles deep, having from three to two fathoms in it; but there are several shoal patches near the entrance.





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NAVIGATION OF THE

RAS-OOI-MACHEIEH.

Ras-ool-Macheieh, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 16' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 41' 30''$  E., is a point running out between, and separating Dooat al Nachiah and Dooat al Guyfac.

JAZEERAT AL FAYAYAH.

Jazeerat al Fayayah is a moderately elevated island, laying off Ras-ool-Macheieh, and forming the north-eastern side to the entrance to Dooat al Guyfac. Its northern point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 19' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 40' 30''$  E.

DOOAT AL GUYFAC.

Dooat al Guyfac is seven miles deep, forming, when within, a fine cove, with from six to three fathoms water, but the entrance is so contracted, being only forty yards wide, that no one would pass it unless in case of necessity. There is not less than three fathoms in the entrance.

RAS-OOI-ADRAH.

Ras-ool-Adrah is the eastern point of Khore Don, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 22' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 37'$  E. It is a low rocky point, with several detached rocks off it. You may pass it one mile distant, in from four to six fathoms.

GOODWIN ISLANDS.

The Goodwin Islands consist of two low groups, the northern, or Guf-fay, being in lat.  $24^{\circ} 36' 10''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 42' 50''$  E., and the southern, or Mayamaat Entaint, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 23'$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 44'$  E. These islands are low, and have no fresh water. To the southward of Mayamaat Entaint are two rocky islets, called Fridgdaat. The whole of these islands, to the northern end of Yassaat, are nearly chained together by reefs, having narrow channels in some parts, but unsafe to navigate. When passing in emergent cases, a good look-out and attention to the lead will be the best, and indeed only guides.

MACHASSIB ISLAND.

Machassib Island is a small, low, sandy island, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 39'$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 49'$  E., surrounded by a reef running off it, nearly two miles in all directions.

RARAH, OR ST. THOMAS' ISLANDS.

Rarah, or St. Thomas' Islands, are a group of low rocky islands, situated in the mouth of Khore Don. The centre island is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 24'$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 34' 50''$  E. These islands are safe to approach to five or six fathoms distant in all directions.

KHORE DON.

Khore Don is a wide and deep bay, being eighteen miles deep, and





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thirteen wide, between Ras Aladia and Ras Boogmaise. The soundings are from eight to three fathoms, mostly over muddy ground, but there are a number of shoal patches scattered about, with only one and two fathoms on them. A good look-out and attention to the lead are the only guides in this place.

## RAS BOOGMAISE.

Ras Boogmaise is a low rocky point, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 36' 40''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 30' 50''$  E. A shoal, with only two fathoms, extends for four miles off this point. There is a small and narrow channel for boats between it and the point; from five to seven fathoms will be good sounding to round it in.

## GEBIL ALLADEID.

Gebil Alladeid is a high rocky hill, at the entrance of the Khore of the same name; it is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 36' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 27' 30''$  E.

## KHORE ALLADEID.

The entrance to Khore Alladeid is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 37' 35''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 27' 35''$  E., formed on one side by a high range of sandhills, and on the other by the high land on which Gebil Alladeid is situated. The entrance has a number of small rocky islets, and is nearly blocked up, the channel not having more than two and a half fathoms in it at high-water, besides being both narrow and intricate within. The soundings are from four to two fathoms at low-water, until you get to the upper end, seven miles from the entrance, when it opens into a large lagoon. The extremities of the lagoon are, the north part in lat.  $24^{\circ} 35' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 21' 55''$  E., the southern part in lat.  $24^{\circ} 30' 40''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 20' 20''$  E. This place was used by the pirates for securing boats they took, and a fort was built at the entrance by the people of the Dooasir Tribe, but they were obliged to quit it for want of water.

## RAS ALLARCH.

Ras Allarch, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 59' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 37' 40''$  E., is a low point, situated near a swamp. Immediately below this commences a range of high sandhills: the whole are called by the natives Meggehaa. They extend to Khore Alladeid in one continued range.

## ARLAAT DALMY.

Arlaat Dalmy is a small sandbank, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 42' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 59' 10''$  E., situated on the edge of an extensive and dangerous reef.

## JEZEERAT AIN LASSEIT.

Jezeerat ain Lasseit is a group of small, low, rocky islands. The centre is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 45' 35''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 37' 30''$  E., some shoal patches lying to the southward of these islands.





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## NAVIGATION OF THE

## FASHT ALLADEID.

Fasht Alladeid is a very extensive shoal, being nearly dry in most parts. Its south point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 54' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 47' 30''$  E.; the northern point is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 54' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 49' 20''$  E. This shoal shows itself distinctly, so that by keeping a good look-out there is no danger to be dreaded in the day-time, and at night I would not advise any one to keep under weigh on this part of the coast.

## FASHT AL ARIEF.

The south point of Fasht al Arief is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 54' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 42' 00''$  E., and runs off from Ras Allarch. Between the tongue of this shoal and the shore of Meggehaa is a bight, forming a capital harbour in a north-wester, with from nine to three fathoms in it.

## JEZEERAT MASHUIAH.

Jezeerat Mashuiah is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 57' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 37' 50''$  E.

## RAS ALLADRA.

From Ras Alladra to Ras Allarch the soundings are irregular, from five to eighteen and twenty fathoms, and a number of small patches, with only one and two fathoms on them, are scattered about, so that it is impossible to give directions to guide a vessel in this part. The anchorage is mostly good, and by keeping a good look-out, and paying attention to the lead, a vessel might always pass in safety during the day, but should not attempt to be under weigh during the night. The coast is as barren as it is possible to conceive, and has no fixed inhabitants. Landing, unless well armed, is unsafe, as numbers of the Monasir and other wandering tribes of Bedouins are constantly prowling about, and attack all they meet; our boats were several times attacked during the survey. There is no water in any part, except a little very brackish on Rarah Island.

## RAS AHMOOLOOL.

Ras Ahmoolool is a low point, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 4' 35''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 38' 00''$  E.

## GEBIL AL WUKRA.

Gebil al Wukra is a piece of moderately elevated rocky land, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 8' 5''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 37' 00''$  E. At three and a half fathoms is a rocky bank, extending from lat.  $25^{\circ} 1' 00''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 51' 00''$  E., to lat.  $25^{\circ} 13' 00''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 47\frac{1}{2}' 00''$  E., least water three and a half fathoms; it is composed of coral and small rocks. It joins on to an extensive bank called Rug Muchafit, dry in patches, and extending to long.  $52^{\circ} 7' 30''$  E.; the latitude the same at both ends.





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## RAS ABOO AL MASHUIT.

Ras Aboo al Mashuit is a low point, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 15' 10''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 37' 20''$  E. The soundings off here are rather irregular, from two and three quarters to five fathoms.

## RAS BOO ABOOT.

Ras Boo Aboot, the SE. boundary of Al Bidder Harbour, is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 17'$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 35'$  E. The reef that forms the southern side of the entrance to Al Bidder Harbour runs out two miles from this point, and continues along shore, running off about one mile, until it joins Fasht al Anief.

## JEZEERAT AL SUFFIC.

Jezeerat al Suffic is a low, semicircular, sandy island, its west point being in lat.  $25^{\circ} 19' 40''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 35'$  E. A reef runs from it in a southerly direction, and from the northern entrance to Al Bidder Harbour, in a northerly direction, it runs up as high as Ras Reccan, its distance off shore varying from one to seven miles.

## AL BIDDER TOWN.

Al Bidder Town is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 16' 50''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 33'$  E. It is situated at the bottom of a harbour, formed by the reefs before mentioned. The entrance is only half a mile wide, having three and four fathoms water in it in mid-channel, and rather less towards the northern reef, and towards the southern two fathoms. As the shoals show themselves distinctly, to enter the harbour you must be guided by them, keeping rather nearer to the northern one. The narrow part is not more than half a mile in length. When through, steer for the town, and anchor abreast the eastern tower, in three and a half fathoms, about half a mile off shore. This place contains about four hundred Arabs of the Nahune, Dooasir, and Abookara Tribes, and is frequented by the Monasir and other wandering tribes. In the pearl season the inhabitants are augmented to about twelve hundred, it being convenient to the banks, and so completely sheltered. The people are mostly fishermen; they have one or two trading boats, and, like all other inhabitants of this coast, take a large share in the pearl fishery. They are subject to Bahrein. Cattle and poultry are procurable here, but they are very dear. Water, pretty good, can also be procured. The defences are a small Ghuree in the town, two or three towers, indifferent, and a Ghuree a mile to the north-westward of the town, on the rising ground.\*

\* Due east of Al Bidder, about twelve miles, is a small patch, with only a fathom and a half on it. We traversed for it one whole day, but could not hit on it; a good look-out is necessary. In the chart a dotted line shows the part within which it lies.





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NAVIGATION OF THE

JEZEERAT AL ALI.

Jezeerat al Ali is a low, sandy island. Its south point is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 23' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 35' 10''$  E. It is surrounded by a reef, separated by a narrow channel, having two and four fathoms in it, from the one which lines the main.

RAS-OOI-NOUF.

Ras-ool-Nouf is a rocky point, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 37' 15''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 31'$  E. From this to Al Bidder, the coast forms a small bight, affording shelter for the pearl boats within the reef, and is called Dooat al Woosail. The reef between this and Jezeerat al Ali extends from six to seven miles off shore, and the coast being low, is not always discernible.

RAS MUT BUCK.

Ras Mut Buck is an elevated cape, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 40' N.$ , long.  $51^{\circ} 36' 15''$  E. This cape should not be approached under four or five fathoms.

KHORE SHEDITCH.

Khore Sheditch is a small boat harbour, to the southward of Ras Mut Buck, having from one and a half to two and a half fathoms water in it; its entrance is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 40' 10''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 34' 50''$  E. The point at the entrance of Khore Aegarah is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 43' 10''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 36' 40''$  E. The Khore is small, having only one fathom in it.

HAWLOOL ISLAND.

The south point of Hawlool Island is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 40' 15''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 26' 40''$  E. It is rather high, and has good anchorage under it in the prevailing winds. There are some wells, which contain water in the rainy season only. This is the island formerly called May.

RAS LUFFAN.

Ras Luffan is a low sandy point, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 54' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 36' 40''$  E.

AL OWHALE.

Al Owhale is a town in lat.  $25^{\circ} 56' 45''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 30' 30''$  E. It is defended by a small square Ghurce, and is the principal place on the coast. It is subject to Bahrein. It is inhabited by about four hundred and fifty of the Abookara Tribe, formerly one of the most powerful in these parts, but now incorporated with the Uttoobees. It has a few boats belonging to it, contains water, and has some supplies of cattle. The people are mostly employed as fishermen, or in the coasting trade. This is one of the principal stations during the pearl fishery season.





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RAS-ool-MAROONA.

Ras-ool-Maroonna is a point in lat.  $26^{\circ} 0' 50''$  N., and long.  $51^{\circ} 27' 40''$  E.

AFFEERAAT.

Affeeraat, a small fishing town, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 1' 50''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 26'$  E., is inhabited by about one hundred and fifty men of the Abookara and Uttoobee Tribes, subject to Bahrein. A few cattle and water may be procured here. There are some small hills near this town, by which it may be known.

RAS AMALISA.

Ras Amalisa is a point in lat.  $26^{\circ} 6'$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 26'$  E. It may be easily known by a small mound a little to the northward of it. A small mound, like a tomb, situated near the point of the main, a little within a backwater, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 9' 40''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 20' 20''$  E.

ROOSEE.

The centre tower of Rooese is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 8' 25''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 18' 50''$  E. It is a small town, much in ruins, situated on a shallow backwater, into which the boats belonging to this part of the coast enter at high-water. The inhabitants are about one hundred, of the Abookara and Uttoobee Tribes, subject to Bahrein; they are mostly fishermen.

RAS RECCAN.

Ras Reccan is a small island, in the shape of a T, and is the northern point. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 11' 25''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 18' 15''$  E., and is very low. It is nearly joined to the main at low-water, the shallow backwater of Rooese being the only separation. From the point to Al Bidder southward, and to Warden's Islands westward, the authority of the Shaikh of Bahrein is acknowledged.

*General Remarks on the Coast from Ras Allarch to Ras Reccan.*—After passing Fasht al Arief, and being abreast of Ras Allarch, you should not come under five fathoms, which will be from two and a half to three miles off shore, until you are abreast of Ras Abool Nasheit, when it will be necessary, if not bound to Al Bidder, to keep more to the eastward, not coming under four and a half or five fathoms, until you are well past Ras Mut Buck. To preserve this depth, you will in some places be ten and eleven miles off shore, abreast of Ras Mut Buck six miles. After being well past the Ras, you may then keep in four and a half or five fathoms, about two and a half miles off shore, until you get near Ras Reccan.

*General Remarks on the Coast from Aboothabee to Al Bidder.*—The coast is nearly all destitute of water, and uninhabited, except by straggling parties of the Monasir and other wandering tribes, and is





completely barren from the meridian of the Yassaat or Psyche's Islands, carrying a line eastward of Arlaat Dalmy, and to the northward and eastward of Fasht Alladeid, to Ras Allarch. Within this line the navigation is extremely dangerous, and should not be attempted except in chase, or other emergent cases, without a pilot. In cases of emergency, the directions already given, and the chart before you, will carry you clear. Boats should never land on any part of this coast away from the towns or villages, without being well armed.

## BOODESHOOF.

Boodeshoof, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 7' 50''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 16'$  E., is on the point nearly opposite Ras Reccan, and is subject to Bahrein, having about fifty men of the Abookara Tribe, mostly fishermen.

## YAMALE.

Yamale, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 5' 40''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 14'$  E., is a small village.

## YOSSFEE.

Yossfee, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 5'$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 14'$  E., is a small village, with a fort, belonging to Bahrein. It has about fifty inhabitants, of mixed tribes, all fishermen.

## KHOR HASSAN.

Khor Hassan is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 4' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 10' 55''$  E. It is a small village, with a square fort, belongs to Bahrein, and has about one hundred inhabitants, of the Abookara and Uttoobee Tribes, principally fishermen.

## FEYRAHA.

Feyraha is a small village, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 2'$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 9'$  E. It belongs to Bahrein, and has a few trading boats belonging to it. It has about one hundred and fifty inhabitants, of the Abookara Tribe, principally fishermen.

## ZOBARA.

Zobara is in latitude  $26^{\circ}$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 8' 30''$  E. It is a large town, now in ruins. It is situated in a bay, and has been, before it was destroyed, a place of considerable trade. The inhabitants are of the Tribe of Alassar, and subject to Bahrein; a number of fine Nujdee horses are still exported from this place. This was originally the principal place of the Uttoobee Tribe, until they separated.

*General Remarks on the Coast from Ras Reccan to Zobara.*—The coast runs south-westerly, and is fronted by reefs all the way, which are dry at low-water, to two or three miles from the shore. It is navigable to the last mentioned place, having a channel of four fathoms between it and the Debil Shoal. The villages are all subject to Bahrein, and supplies of cattle may be obtained between them. It is necessary to be on your guard, in landing, against the straggling Bedouins.





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## RAYBORRAIDGE.

Rayborraidge is a small village, at the back of Bahrein, on the main, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 57' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 6' 20''$  E. Between this and Bahrein the water is shoal, and full of patches. Towards Bahrein the reefs extend a considerable way off the island, and render it quite unsafe for navigation. It has about one hundred and fifty inhabitants, Uttoobees of the Bahrein Tribe.

## DOOAT AL UFZAN.

Dooat al Ufzan is an inlet running in on the western side of these islands, with shoal water over rocky ground. The bottom of it is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 31' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 1' 50''$  E.

## WARDEN'S ISLANDS.

Warden's Islands is a group of eight or nine islands and rocks, extending from lat.  $25^{\circ} 46' 25''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 55' 55''$  E., to lat.  $25^{\circ} 33' 30''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 53' 20''$  E. The principal is called Al Howahk, and is about four miles long. It has two fishing villages on it, and belongs to Bahrein.

## RAS SEVID.

Ras Sevid is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 36' 15''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 53' 30''$  E., and forms the eastern point of Dooat Eselva. It is moderately high and broken land.

## DOOAT ESELVA.

The bottom of Dooat Eselva, or the southern part of the bight, is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 8' 55''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 42' 20''$  E. The bight or inlet called Dooat Eselva is formed by Zucnonee and Ras Sevid, and runs in about twenty-seven miles nearly due southward, and has deep water in it.

## GEBIL MOWAH.

Gebil Mowah is a moderately high hill, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 19' 30''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 34' 15''$  E.


## FORT AND ISLAND OF ZUCNONEE.

The fort is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 33' 55''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 24' 46''$  E. The island is about four miles long, and nearly two broad in some parts. The fort is on its western side, near the centre. The inhabitants are about four hundred, of the Alassar Tribe, and acknowledge the nominal authority of the Shaikh of Bahrein. Nearly opposite to this, distant about twelve miles, is the southern point of Bahrein, called Ras-ool-Bhur, or Point of the Don, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 46' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 33' 30''$  E.

## GÉLLIE ADGUIERE.

This is a small fort, situated in a bay with two and three fathoms in it. It is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 39' 55''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 18' 30''$  E., and was during its prosperity considered the port of Deriah, the Wahabee capital, but is





now in ruins, and only occasionally inhabited by the people of Zucnonee, or some straggling Bedouins.

DOOAT EDLUME.

The north point of Dooat Edlume is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 27' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 13' 52'' E.$  It is a small bay, about four miles deep, having two and two and a half fathoms in it.

DOOAT ENSARREN.

The north point of Dooat Ensarren is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 9' 5'' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 15' 30'' E.$  It is a small bay, affording shelter for boats, with one and a half and two fathoms water in it.

DEBIL SHOAL.

Debil Shoal is divided by a channel two miles wide, having two and a half and three fathoms in it. The shoal is dry at low-water, and safe to approach to three fathoms. It also affords good anchorage under the lee of it, well sheltered in north-westers. The northern point of the larger shoal is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 18' 5'' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 59' 50'' E.$ ; the southern part in lat.  $26^{\circ} 12' 25'' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 59' 25'' E.$ ; and the centre of the smaller shoal is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 10' 20'' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 56' 25'' E.$  Between this shoal and the island of Bahrein there is a channel having from three to seven fathoms in it.

BAHREIN.

The island of Bahrein or Awal, and adjacent islands, were known to the ancients by the name of Tylos, and are mentioned by Arrian. We have no satisfactory accounts of them from that period, until in the possession of the Portuguese, who, soon after Ormus was taken by Albuquerque, established settlements here and at Kateef, and monopolised a great portion of the pearl fishery and trade of the Gulf. They were expelled soon after the fall of Ormus, by the Persians, who were shortly after expelled by Houd bin Jamain, the Shaikh of Alassar's people, who possessed the island for several years, when it was again conquered, after a severe struggle, by the Persians, and the whole of the Alassar town laid in ruins. Reinforcements soon arriving, the Alassar people again made head, and drove the Persians out of the island, and rebuilt several towns on the ruins of the former ones, which are to be seen at the present time.

About seventy or eighty years back, the grandfather of the present Shaikh, who was of a powerful family, originally from Alassar, of the Uttoobee Tribe, entered into a secret treaty with the then Governor of Bushire, stipulating to pay tribute to the Persian Government, if by





their aid he was placed in possession of the island. Having many followers, this overture was attended to, and, by the assistance of the Persians, he was made Shaikh or governor, and continued during his life in peaceable possession of the government. Soon after his death, some of the people belonging to his son and successor (Ahmed bin Khaleefa) were murdered by the Governor of Bushire, when the Bahrein people flew to arms, and threw off the Persian yoke. A large army was assembled by the Persians, consisting of the people of Bushire, Dillum, Bundereig, Congoon, and Lingah, from the Persian side, aided by the people of what have since become the Pirate Ports, and invaded the island.


The people of Bahrein were assisted by the people of Alassar and Kateef. After a war of several months, with various successes, and the loss of many men on both sides, they became tired of the war. Several of the allies on both sides having quitted them, they entered into a treaty, by which the Persian troops were withdrawn, and the Shaikh (Ahmed) consented to pay tribute to the Persians, which was continued until about 1790, when the Persian yoke was entirely thrown off, and they have been independent of Persia ever since.

Although frequently threatened with invasion, it has never taken place. They have had several wars with the Imaum of Muskat, who invaded the island about nine years back, but was beaten off with great loss, his brother being killed. Having been on friendly terms with the Joasmee pirates,—indeed having been the mart for the sale of their plunder,—they were included in Sir W. G. Keir's treaty in 1819. They about the same time entered into a treaty with the Imaum of Muskat, and pay him an annual tribute of 9,000 dollars. There have been several wars of late between them and Rahmah bin Jaubir, of Demaum, near Kateef, who belonged to the same family. These were at one time settled through the mediation of the British Government, but the turbulent disposition of Rahmah could not remain quiet, and they again broke out with fresh violence, which ended in the death of that chieftain.

The island of Bahrein or Awal is between eighty and ninety statute miles in circumference, and about one-fifth of it is well watered, thickly inhabited, and partially cultivated; the remainder is either hilly or a desert—nearly equally divided.

There are the remains of several fine reservoirs and aqueducts built by the Portuguese, but falling fast to decay; as is the Portuguese fort, which has originally been a strong place, and protecting the Portuguese harbour, not now in use, having given way to that of Munama, near it. The only other ruins of any interest are those of a mosque built by the Alassar people.





The population of the island varies, but, from the best information I could obtain, with that of Muharag and Arad Famohay, amounts to sixty thousand men, consisting of the following tribes: the Uttoobees of Bahrein, the Shaikh's family; the Abookara, Al Zayed, Al Salata, Al Mahande, Mootsallema, Kaiser, Genahat, and some mixed tribes, in all said to be eighteen or twenty thousand men capable of bearing arms; the remainder, about forty or forty-five thousand, Bahreinees, are a mixed breed between Arab and Persian, mostly cultivators, merchants, and fishermen, who appear to possess more of the indolence and cunning of the Persian than the frank and open boldness of the Arab. The Arabs look with much contempt upon this class.

There are also in the Shaikh's pay about three hundred Siddees, and about eight hundred of the Beni Khalid Tribe. There are also about one hundred Banians, merchants and shop-keepers, at Munama. The Mahomedan religion of the sect of Omar is that of the place, but a large portion of the Bahreinees are Sheeas. The total number of men under the Shaikh's government, he possessing the several places on the coast already mentioned, amounts to about seventy thousand. The pearl fishery alone employs nearly thirty thousand men, there being under the Shaikh's government two thousand four hundred and thirty pearl boats, each employing from eight to twenty men. Bahrein is also a place of great trade, and has belonging to it twenty large boats, Buggalows and Buteels, from three hundred and fifty to one hundred and forty tons, mostly employed in the Indian trade; and about one hundred from forty to one hundred and twenty tons, employed in the trade of the Gulf. An account of the exports and imports will be found attached.

The Shaikh, Abdoolla bin Ahmed, resides at Muharag, on the island of that name, which is a large town, and contains about six thousand inhabitants.

The principal town on Bahrein is Munama, and is the port of the island, most of the merchants either residing, or having their karavan-seria there. Most of the imports are landed here, and a duty of five per cent. was in 1826 established on Indian produce, and most articles from the Persian Coast, Bussora, and Muskat.

The other principal town on the island is Raffar, situated on a hill seven miles distant, the residence of Shaikh Khaleefa, the nephew and partner in the government of Abdoolla bin Ahmed. It consists of a square fort or Ghuree, surrounded by habitations, chiefly occupied by his followers. Numerous other small towns and villages are scattered over the cultivated part of the island, but none of sufficient note to require remark. On the eastern side of the island are the ruins of a large town called Jow, formerly the residence of the Shaikhs, aban-





doned in 1800 for want of a sheltered port, and the inhabitants transferred to Muharag.

Off the islands, and mostly on the reefs, are situated springs of fresh water rising out of the sea; some are in two, three, four, and I have heard five, fathoms water. They obtain the water by holding a Mussuk over the mouth of a jar fixed over the spring.

The pearl fishery generally commences about the beginning of June, and is carried on with the greatest activity until October. During the period of the fishing, frequently pearls to the amount of from sixteen to twenty lakhs of dollars are obtained, and are exported in the manner mentioned in the account of the trade of the island. The Shaikh receives a small tax from every boat employed, besides having a number employed on his own account during the pearl fishery. It is all hurry, and the pearl bank exhibits an interesting sight; several thousand boats being seen at the same time, some sailing about, others at anchor, but all briskly employed.

The people of the island are much divided: those who are termed Arabs, and are not engaged in trade, are attached to the Shaikh and his Government; the other part, consisting of all those engaged in mercantile pursuits, and by far the most wealthy, are much dissatisfied, and it was by no means uncommon during the survey of the island for the people, when they thought themselves safe from being overheard, asking whether the English were not going to take possession of the island, and appearing both incredulous and disappointed when replied to in the negative.

The Shaikh also suspects such to be our view, as he cannot conceive why we should be at the expense and trouble of making these surveys, if we had no ulterior view. Bahrein is capable, under good government, of being very valuable, as the whole trade of the Arabian side of the Gulf might be centred in the island, which in itself is capable of the greatest improvement, and might be made to produce large quantities of wheat and barley, which grow in some few places, where cultivated, to the greatest perfection.

The soil of about one-fourth of the island is very rich, and, in proper hands, would be much improved, as the greater part, with the exception of the date plantations, a few barley, wheat, and clover fields, lies entirely waste. Much more of the island might be brought into cultivation by conveying the water by an aqueduct to those parts of the island now without it, and the springs at the reservoirs are fully equal to the supply. With the exception of the hills, and some small portions bordering on the sea, I do not think there is a part but what is capable of cultivation; but this is not ever likely to take place while the island remains under the present Government, as for want of encouragement





the people entirely neglect it. The island also produces citrons, pomegranates, mulberries, dates, figs, melons, and other fruits; also several kinds of vegetables. Cattle and poultry are also procurable, but rather dear, being brought from other places. The cloth bazar is pretty well supplied.

The islands of Muharag, Arad, and Samahoy are twelve miles round, and only separated at very high spring tides. They have a few date plantations on them, and about seven thousand five hundred inhabitants. There is very little water on them, most of that used being brought from Bahrein. There are two forts or Ghurees, one at Muharag, the other at Arad. Munama town is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 13' 50''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 36' 50''$  E.


The Shaikh has five war Buggalows, but can fit out fifteen or twenty. One of these is of about four hundred tons, and mounts twenty-two guns. The fortifications are a Ghuree at Muharag, on a sandy point, containing six or eight guns, and commanding the channel; two others, one at Arad and another at Samahoy, and a ruinous wall round the town. On Bahrein are Raffar, seven miles from Munama, and about fifty other Ghurees, with a number of towers in different parts; but their best defences are those supplied by nature in the reefs that surround the islands, as five hundred determined men might oppose the landing of as many thousands.

## TRADE OF BAHREIN.

The following is an account of the exports and imports of Bahrein, in the year 1824, as stated by the Company's Broker and the Shaikh's Vizier:—

EXPORTS.		IMPORTS.	
	German Crowns.	<i>From Hindoostan.</i>	German Crowns.
Pearls to India.....	1,200,000	Rice from Mangalore, 60,000	
Ditto to Arabia, Turkey, and Bussora .....	300,000	Morahs .....	65,000
Ditto to Persia .....	100,000	Rice from Bengal, 8,000 bags.	24,000
<i>Various Articles, to India, Sind, &amp;c.</i>		Sugar, 600 bags .....	12,000
Dry dates .....	15,000	Sugarcandy, 500 tubs .....	5,000
Tortoise-shell .....	3,500	Pepper, 400 morahs.....	10,000
Bahrein canvas .....	3,000	Solder or block tin .....	2,000
Shark-fins .....	2,000	Iron, 5,000 bars .....	10,000
<i>To Persia.</i>		Lead, 2,000 pigs .....	2,400
Bahrein canvas .....	3,000	Steel, 100 tubs .....	1,000
Mats .....	1,200	Plank, and ship timber ....	17,000
		Coir .....	5,000





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## Exports (contd.).

German Crowns.

Date syrup .....	2,000
Dry dates .....	1,200

*To Bussora.*

Bahrein canvas .....	5,000
Mats .....	1,200
Coarse coloured cloth .....	1,000

*To Al Quaat or Grane.*

Bahrein canvas .....	5,000
Mats .....	800

*To various places.*

Sundries to the amount of	5,000
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Total..1,651,900

## Imports (contd.).

German Crowns.

Cloth, blue and white, common and dungaree, 600 bales.....	100,000
Cinnamon .....	600
Other spices .....	4,000
Musk .....	2,000
Indigo .....	5,000
Turmeric, 400 bags .....	4,500
Camphor .....	4,000
Sandalwood .....	2,000
Drugs of various descriptions.	5,000
Tamarinds .....	2,000
Sundries ..	1,800

Total from India..284,300

*From the Red Sea and Muskat.*

Coffee, 1,520 guntras .....	93,000
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*From Muskat and the Persian Coast.*

Dry fruit, grain, and India produce* .....	200,000
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*From Bussora.*

Dates, grain,* &c. ....	200,000
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*From various places.*

Sundries .....	30,000
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Total..807,300


## SHOALS FORMING THE HARBOUR OF BAHREIN.

## JILLIA SHOAL.

Jillia Shoal, or Arad Reef, surrounds the islands of Samahoy, Arad, and Muharag, and forms the southern side of the entrance to the north-west harbour of Bahrein, and the northern to the south-eastern harbour. It is nearly dry in most parts at low-water. The north-western point is in lat. 26° 18' 40" N., long. 50° 37' 10" E.; the north-eastern in lat. 26° 18' 20" N., long. 50° 41' 50" E.; and the south-eastern in lat. 26° 10' N., long. 50° 44' 10" E. The tide at times sets strong towards this reef.

\* A great portion of these articles was again exported to India, Muskat, and other parts; but they are not mentioned in the exports, which are confined to the produce of the island and fishery.





## BLUFF GROVE.

A bluff grove of trees on Samahoy, generally called Arad Bluff, is a grove of date trees on the island of Samahoy, forming a bluff near the point. A small building stands on a mound near it. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 16' 50''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 39' 52''$  E.

## FASHT AL YARRON.


Fasht al Yarron, or Teignmouth Shoal. This is one of the most extensive shoals in the Gulf, extending nearly nineteen miles in a northerly and southerly direction, and thirteen miles wide in an easterly and westerly. It forms the northern boundary of the north-west port of Bahrein, and is nearly dry in most parts. The soundings within half a mile of it are from three to four fathoms, and it is very dangerous, being composed of hard rock and sand. To pass clear of the eastern end, when bound to Bahrein, keep Arad Bluff S. by W. until you get mid-channel between the Al Yarron and Jillia Shoals. The several parts of this shoal are in the following positions, viz. north point lat.  $26^{\circ} 32' 50''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 30' 38''$  E.; east point, lat.  $26^{\circ} 29' 50''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 39' 50''$  E.; west point, lat.  $26^{\circ} 27' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 24' 20''$  E.; south-eastern point, lat.  $26^{\circ} 22' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 23' 50''$  E.; south-western point, lat.  $26^{\circ} 15' 25''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 38' 10''$  E.

## GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR ENTERING THE NORTH-WESTERN PORT OF BAHREIN.

After crossing the pearl bank (which do in the meridian of  $50^{\circ} 50'$  E.), and sighting Arad Bluff, steer for it, keeping it S. by W. or S. by W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W. by compass, until you get to the southward of the Al Yarron or Teignmouth Shoal, or, if the Portuguese fort on Bahrein is visible, which it will be in moderately clear weather, bring it to bear SW. by S., when haul up about W. by N., or WNW., so as to keep the Al Yarron Shoal nearest to you, if the wind is fair, until the fort bears SSW.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W., or SSW.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W., being guided by your approach to the reefs; then steer right for it, until Arad Bluff bears SE. by E., when, if going into the inner harbour, keep it one point open on your starboard bow, until you near the inner harbour reef, which round. Your lead, and a good look-out, as the reef shows plain, must be your guides, taking care not to come under three and a half fathoms towards the inner harbour reef, which round pretty close, and anchor within it in three and a half or four fathoms, clay bottom.

The reefs generally show themselves very plainly, except when calm near high-water. I would always recommend ships entering the inner harbour at half ebb, or last quarter ebb, as all the dangers are





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then distinctly seen, but a stranger should not go in here without a pilot. To work in between the Al Yarron and Jillia Shoals, you should not approach the former nearer than three and a half fathoms, and the latter than three fathoms. After passing the north-western point of the Jillia Shoal you may work into three fathoms, until you get Arad Bluff E.  $\frac{1}{4}$  S., when four fathoms to the westward and three to the eastward, until you approach the inner harbour reef.

The western part of the north-western port of Bahrein is bounded by the Al Yarron and a reef running off from Bahrein. There is a narrow channel between them, having only two fathoms in some parts.

The south-eastern port of Bahrein is only used by boats, one part of the entrance being extremely narrow, and the navigation being intricate; a pilot should be taken for this port, as clear directions cannot be possibly given.

## DEMAUM.

Demaum is a small island on the southern side of Kateef Bay, with a small village abreast of it, both belonging to Rahmah bin Jaubir. The fort on the island is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 26' 30''$  N., long  $50^{\circ} 10' 30''$  E.

## TOWN AND ISLAND OF JIRHOOT.

The town and island of Jirhoot are situated in the bottom of Kateef Bay; the island is about four and a half miles long, and one broad. The town is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 33' 4''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 9' 5''$  E., and is about two and a half miles from the main, being separated by the channel to Kateef town. The island is thickly covered with date trees, and has several small forts besides the town.


## TOWN OF KATEEF.

The town of Kateef is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 33'$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 5' 5''$  E. It is situated at the back of the island of Jirhoot. There is, I believe, a channel for large boats to the town, but we were not allowed to examine it. This place belongs to the Chief of the Beni Khalid Tribe, who acknowledge the superiority of the Turks since the fall of Deriah. It has very little trade, as most of its dates supply the inland tribes.

## RAS JAMORA.

Ras Jamora, the north-western point of Kateef Bay, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 36' 27''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 13' 52''$  E.; variation  $4^{\circ} 50''$  W. It is a low point, with pretty good shelter under it in a north-wester. Within this point is a narrow gut, where small vessels may lie sheltered in all winds. To anchor within the point you should pass close to it, in three fathoms,





within one hundred yards, and as soon as round, come to and moor in three fathoms, the place being too narrow to lay at single anchor.

RAS ALLALY.

Ras Allaly is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 48' 20''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 59' 17''$  E. It is rather high, and forms the southern point of Dooat Booally or Booally Bay. Between this and Gebil Rummul is a very remarkable black rock, situated about three miles from the beach.

GEBIL RUMMUL.

Gebil Rummul is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 55' 40''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 37' 30''$  E. It is a high, sandy mountain, situated about fifteen miles inland, and nearly opposite to Ras Booally. The Bay of Booally is within these, and has deep water, but there are a number of shoal patches extending from the shore to the distance of two or three miles.

RAS BOOALLY.

Ras Booally is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 17' 22''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 41' 15''$  E. It is a low point, forming the south-eastern point of the island of the same name, and the north-western entrance to a bay bearing its name. It may be known by a small ruin about a quarter of a mile from its point. A spit runs near three miles off this cape.

JEZEERAT GINUA.

Jezeerat Ginua forms the south-eastern entrance of this inlet. It is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 21' 56''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 20' 55''$  E. It is above twenty-five feet above the level of the sea, and formed of sandstone rock. Between this and Jezeerat Booally is a deep bight, but full of shoals, so as to render it unnavigable even for boats.

RAS MOOSALAME.

Ras Moosalame is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 25' 28''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 19' 50''$  E. It is a low point, and forms the north-western entrance of a small inlet of the same name, within which is an island of this name, inhabited by about five hundred men of the Beni Khalid Tribe, under two Shaikhs, acknowledging the authority of the Shaikh of Kateef. They have a small Ghuree, and support themselves chiefly by fishing.


RAS-ool-GHAR.

Ras-ool-Ghar is a remarkable point of broken land, and off it ends the chain of dangerous shoals. It is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 32' 20''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 14' 50''$  E. About three or four miles to the south-east are two remarkable date trees, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 30' 28''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 16' 20''$  E.

GEBIL MENAFIR.

Gebil Menafir is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 35' 40''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 1'$  E. It is high, and





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can be seen twelve or thirteen miles off. This bay contains several detached shoals, which render it unsafe to approach.

## RAS TANNOJIB.

Ras Tannojib is a high bluff point, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 50' 10''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 54' 33''$  E., and is fronted by reefs and broken patches, with some deep boat channels among them.

## RAS SUFFANA.

Ras Suffana is a point of the coast forming the entrance to an inlet of the same name, but cannot be approached except in boats; it is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 0' 40''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 35' 50''$  E.

## GEBIL.

Gebil is a mountain a few miles inland from Ras Mushab, and very remarkable. It is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 10' 55''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 26'$  E.

## RAS MUSHAB.

Ras Mushab is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 11' 43''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 28' 53''$  E. It is formed by two small, sandy, low islands.

*Remarks on the Coast from Khore el Kuffagee to Ras Mushab.*—From Khore el Kuffagee to Ras Mushab this coast is safe and clear, except two small shoals off the latter. In running down, after passing Khore el Kuffagee, you should get into the stream of twelve fathoms, and not come under until you reach Gebil, when it is necessary to keep out to sea, and run out in the stream of eighteen fathoms, keeping a sharp look-out ahead for shoal spots, the coast being fronted from Ras Mushab to Ras-ool-Ghar with patches dry in many parts, and having deep water between them; but in some parts they do not show themselves. It is dangerous to get near them with the wind blowing hard on the shore, as a very heavy sea runs, and every winter numbers of the native vessels get wrecked about this dangerous part of the coast. The northern part of this dangerous bank of shoals is in lat. about  $28^{\circ} 14' 30''$  N., and long.  $48^{\circ} 45' 30''$  E., and continues without intermission to Ras Baldana, which is a dry point of the reef in lat.  $27^{\circ} 52'$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 9' 30''$  E. After this they become now detached, but it is unsafe to come near the coast until you pass Ras-ool-Ghar, when it becomes now clear, and you may near it to seven fathoms until you reach Ras Moosalame, from whence it will be necessary to keep out in eight fathoms until you get near Ras Booolly, from which a long spit extends. After passing it, you may keep in any depth from eight to ten fathoms, until you reach Ras Tannora, the north-western point of Kateef Bay.

## JEZEERAT OMALMARADAIN.

Jezeerat Omalmaradain is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 40' 33''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 34' 40''$  E. It is low, and about one-third of a mile long. Off the end of it is a





small and nearly dry patch, which makes it necessary to be careful in passing it in the night.

JAZEERAT EL GARROW.

Jazeerat el Garrow is a small low island, only a few hundred yards round, with the soundings deepening towards it, which renders it dangerous to approach in the night, there being twenty fathoms within half a mile of it. It is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 49' 27''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 42' 25''$  E.

KHORE EL KUFFAGEE.

Khore el Kuffagee is a small creek with sand, one fathom and a half, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 24' 55''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 22' 8''$  E. Here ends the authority of the Shaikh of Grane, and that of the Shaikh of Kateef or head of the Beni Khalid Tribe begins. From Ras-ool-Ghar to this place the coast is safe to approach to seven fathom soundings; outside that depth generally soft, but hard and irregular within it.

RAS.

Ras is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 29' 25''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 21' 5''$  E. It is low, and a spit runs off it to about one mile.

GEBIL BENAYE.

Gebil Benaye is a small and remarkable rock, about four miles inland, near the Khore.

KHORE BENAYE.

Khore Benaye is a small inlet, navigable for fishing-boats, having only six feet water at its entrance, but deep water within. It is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 39' 50''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 15' 55''$  E.

RAS-OOO-ZORE.

Ras-ool-Zore is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 44' 18''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 16' 20''$  E. It forms the south-eastern point of the above bay; it is low, with several hills near it. A spit runs nearly three miles off it in patches, and should not be approached under eight fathoms.

RAS-OOO-GILLA.

Ras-ool-Gilla forms the north-western point of a bay which is filled with patches of rock, and extremely dangerous to enter, there not being any safe anchorage. The Ras is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 52' 50''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 12'$  E. A spit extends about two miles off this point, and should not be approached under ten fathoms.

KUBBA ISLAND.

Kubba Island is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 3' 20''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 24' 45''$  E. It is about half a mile round, and is covered with long grass and brushwood; it has good fresh water on it, and a number of partridges. The soundings are rather irregular, increasing towards the island.





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## GUTTAR.

Guttar is a small, rocky, and dangerous shoal, nearly dry, in the fair-way, not more than half a mile over, and in the stream of fifteen fathoms. It is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 59' 20''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 11' 5''$  E.

## SHABEE.

Shabee is a small ruined fort, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 2' 50''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 5' 57''$  E. There are some wells of good water near this place. From Aboo Fatiera to this place the coast is safe to approach to a quarter of a mile.

## AL FAHIL.

Al Fahil is a small village, situated in a grove of date trees, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 7' 53''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 5' 4''$  E.

## FUNTASH.

Funtash is also a small village, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 9' 35''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 5' 18''$  E.

## ABOO FATIERA.

Aboo Fatiera is a small village, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 21' 15''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 4' 28''$  E.

*Remarks.*—Leaving Grane, and bound down the Arabian Coast to the southward, the first place you come to is Ras-ool-Lur, or Ras-ool-Lund. It is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 21' 15''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 4' 40''$  E., and forms the southern point of Grane Haven. The water is deep near it, and you may round it at a distance of a quarter of a mile. The point is low and sandy. From this to Aboo Fatiera, a small village, the coast is little elevated, and safe to approach to a few hundred yards, there being seven fathoms close to the beach.

## GRANE TOWN.

Grane Town (or Koweit), called by the Natives Al Quaat, is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 22' 52''$  N., long.  $47^{\circ} 40' 40''$  E., or  $25^{\circ} 15' 20''$  W. of Bombay, or  $7^{\circ} 39' 20''$  W. of Bassadore Point, in the Persian Gulf. It is a place of much importance, owing to the maritime spirit of its inhabitants. It has a considerable trade of its own, supplying most of the inland tribes with grain, coffee, and Indian produce. They are also the carriers for Bussora, and many other parts of the Gulf.

There are belonging to the port fifteen large Buggalows and Dows, from four hundred and fifty to one hundred tons; twenty Buteels and Buggalows, from one hundred and twenty to fifty tons; and about one hundred and fifty trading boats, from one hundred and fifty to fifteen tons. They navigate the Gulf of Persia, Red Sea, Coasts of Sind, Guzerat, and Malabar, and to Bombay.

Their imports consist of several articles of Indian produce, such as piece goods, rice, sugar, timber, spices, and cotton from India; coffee from the Red Sea; tobacco and dried fruits from Persia; grain and





dates from Bussora ; cloth, dates, and fish from Bahrein. Their exports are ghee and horses, from the inland tribes, and for other articles take specie, which they receive from the inland tribes in return for the articles imported.

The Government is despotic, and vested in the Shaikh, who acknowledges the Turkish Government, and pays a small tribute. The inhabitants are about six thousand in number, of the Uttoabee Tribe, and strict Mahomedans.

The present Shaikh, Jaubir bin Abdoolla bin Souba, is about fifty-one years of age, and is very intelligent. He succeeded his father, Abdoolla bin Souba, in 1812, and is much respected among his own people, and many of the inland tribes. The family of the Shaikh is ancient, they having been Shaikhs of a small tribe for four or five centuries, and first settled at Grane under Shaikh Ruheembaright about eighty years since, and built a small village. He governed them after this about ten years, and much increased his followers. He was succeeded by his brother, Souba, who built a wall round the village, and founded the present town. He governed about six years, and was succeeded by his son, Abdoolla bin Souba, under whose long and mild government the population was very much increased, and the maritime spirit to which it owes its present respectability took its rise. He died in 1812, after governing them for fifty years, much regretted, and was succeeded by his son Jaubir, the present Shaikh.

They acknowledge the authority of the Turks, and pay a tribute of forty bags of rice and four hundred frazils of dates annually. The Shaikh also receives an honorary dress from the Turkish Government yearly. They have enjoyed peace while all other parts of the Gulf have been embroiled, and to this they owe their maritime greatness. Cattle are to be procured good, but very dear.

From Grane to Khore el Kuffagee, along the Arabian Coast, the authority of the Shaikh of Grane is partially acknowledged by the Bedouin Tribe, who are mostly of the Al Ali, and a branch of the Beni Khalid, and some wandering parties of other tribes ; also some few straggling camps of the Montific Tribe, who come this way at certain seasons. The amount of imports to Grane is said to be about five lakhs of dollars, the exports are under one lakh. The variation of the compass at Grane in 1824 was  $5^{\circ} 22' W$ . Grane also takes a share in the pearl fishery.

#### OHAR ISLAND.

Ohar island lies about a mile and a half off the south-eastern point of Pheleechi, and a dry reef extends off it to about two and a half miles.

This should not be approached nearer than seven and a half fathoms, until the island of Ohar bears NW., when you may haul gradually round, not coming under six fathoms until it bears N., when run along





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in four or four and a half fathoms until you deepen into five or six fathoms, when you may continue to haul up, as you deepen your water, for Rassul, which pass at a distance of half a mile. If working, you may stand close over to the main, there being from four to seven fathoms within a few hundred yards of the beach, and four fathoms towards Pheleechi, after passing Rassul; and do not approach nearer than seven fathoms on the Grane side, and work to four on the opposite. In passing Ras Toosa (which forms the low point near the town), do not approach nearer than a mile and a half; when past it, haul in a little towards the town, and anchor off it in any depth from seven to ten fathoms.

## MUCHAN ISLAND.

Muchan island is a small dry sandbank, between Pheleechi and the main.

## PHELEECHI ISLAND.\*

The town of Pheleechi is in lat.  $19^{\circ} 26' 25''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 15' 50''$  E. The island is eighteen miles round, low, and surrounded by a mud flat, running off for a considerable distance, but shoals regularly in approaching it. Tolerable water is procured here, also a few sheep, fish, and poultry. It has about four or five hundred inhabitants, who are mostly fishermen, and are subject to the Shaikh of Grane, one of whose relations is Shaikh or governor. The western point of the entrance to the river Euphrates is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 55' 40''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 27' 18''$  E. It is very low, and scarcely discernible beyond three or four miles. It is nearly surrounded by a mud flat, running off to the southward for six or seven miles, nearly dry at low-water. The ground is clammy, and covered in most seasons with short grass and rushes, and is inhabited by straggling parties of Arabs, who reside about there principally for the sake of pasture for their cattle.

On the Euphrates side of the point the water appears to be rather gaining on the land, but on the side towards Khore Abdoolla the land appears to gain upon the sea; and from the information I have received from the pilots, and other intelligent natives, the mud flat on this side has extended considerably of late years, so that in a few years more what is now a mud flat, covered at spring tides, will probably be firm ground. The increase of the land on the side of Khore Abdoolla is also much greater than the loss on the side of the river. This remark, from all the information I have been able to obtain, applies equally to the opposite bank of the river, where the land is gaining ground. Khore Abofalla is nearly separated from the Euphrates by the above point, and when laying in one you may, from the top, see the masts of the vessels plainly in the other. The Khore is navigable to Woorba Island,

\* Vide also report on this island by Lieutenant J. Felix Jones, I. N., at pages 52 to 54 of this Selection.





where it divides into two branches, one called Khore Shetna, formed by Woorba Island and the main, which continues navigable for large boats above Bussora, and is supposed to be the canal described by Arrian in the voyage of Nearchus. The other branch is called Khore Boobian, for in the island of that name, which forms the western bank of both this and Khore Abdoolla, it is here narrow, but safe, having deep water in it, and after passing Woorba Island it branches off to the southward. It runs this way (and is not more than half a mile wide) with from three to seven fathoms at low-water spring tides, until it again enters the Gulf near the islands of Muchan and Pheleechi, when the passage is very intricate, owing to the number of knolls, nearly dry, and can only be used by the native boats at half flood. (The whole of these Khores are salt water). Nearly in the centre, but rather towards the eastern entrance of Khore Abdoolla, is an extensive and very dangerous shoal, called by the natives Fasht al Aich. The channel on the western side is formed by it and Boobian Khore el Giet. It has from three to five fathoms in it. Khore Abdoolla has regular soundings from three to eight fathoms. Ras-ool-Giet is the north-eastern point of Boobian Island. The western point of Khore el Giet is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 46' 53''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 17' 50''$  E. From this to the island of Pheleechi the flat extends a considerable distance off shore, and Boobian Island should not be approached nearer than five fathoms, as the in-draught of the flood is so great that a vessel would find it difficult to get an offing in a south-easter. You may anchor in any depth from four to six fathoms off Pheleechi, with the town SW. by W., but recollect the rise and fall are eleven feet.

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FROM THE EASTERN POINT OF THE EUPHRATES ALONG  
THE COAST OF PERSIA.

EASTERN POINT.

The eastern point of the Shat el Arab, or Euphrates, is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 57' 50''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 30' 23''$  E. It is low, and not perceptible more than six or seven miles off. It is a complete mudbank, and is gaining on the river, as it has extended nearly one mile further down during the last twelve or fifteen years. Several villages of the Chaab Arabs are situated near this point, and there are large quantities of cattle on its banks.

INSPECTOR'S CHANNEL.

Inspector's Channel is a gut, running out of the river into Khore Gufgah, having in it a fathom and a quarter at low-water, and at high is very narrow, especially where it enters the channels. It runs parallel with the shore, commencing about a mile and a half below the





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eastern point of the river. In case of necessity, a small vessel being driven into Khore Gufgah in a south-easter, and parting from her cables, might run for it at high-water, but I cannot recommend it except in case of necessity.

## MEYUNE SAND.

Meyune Sand, commonly called Bussora Bar, is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 49' 20''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 35' 57''$  E. Its southern point, measured trigonometrically from the western point of the river, E. by N., distant rather more than one mile, is a small hard sandbank, with only three feet on it at low-water. Between it and the Meyune is a small channel, running into the river, with soundings nearly the same as the regular channel; but it is easily found out if you are in this channel, as you will have hard soundings on the western side, whereas in the proper channel the ground is soft to the westward on the Abdoolla Bank. Care should be taken not to approach this bank in a south-easter and flood tide. Variation  $4^{\circ} 55'$  W. in 1827.

## ABDOOLLA BANK.

The Abdoolla Bank, or Mahrugaate Abdalla, is a long mudbank, forming the western side of the channel into the Euphrates. It extends to lat.  $29^{\circ} 46'$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 36' 10''$  E., and is dry at low-water spring tides to within about two and a half miles of the bar. It is safe to approach in working up the river to three fathoms, or two fathoms and three quarters.

## MAHRUGAATE ABADAN.

Mahrugaate Abadan is the eastern bank forming the entrance to the river, and is composed of hard sand, except towards the southern part, where it is a mixture of hard sand and stiff clay. Its southern point is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 45\frac{1}{2}'$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 42' 40''$  E. It is not safe to approach in working up on the flood tides nearer than three and a half fathoms; or immediately you shoal from mid-channel, and find the bottom getting hard, the helm should be put down.

## KHORE GUFGAH.

The entrance to Khore Gufgah is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 46'$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 44'$  E. It is formed by the Abadan on the west, and Ali Meidan on the east; has soundings from fifteen and eighteen fathoms in the southern part to two and a half at low-water at the upper, where a narrow channel runs into the Euphrates. This is an excellent mark, coming from the eastward, for making the river. If you cross the Ali Meidan in three and a half fathoms low-water, you will cross Khore Gufgah in eight or nine fathoms, and ought to keep down to the southward a little, as this is in the parallel of the Meyune. If you cross the Ali Meidan in four or four and a half fathoms, which is the best line, you will cross Khore





Gufgah in thirteen to fifteen or sixteen fathoms, according to the time of tide, and the tail of the Abadan in four to five fathoms, when a course west, if a flood tide, will bring you on the Abdoolla Bank, two and a half or three fathoms low-water, which is a fair berth for anchoring if the tide is not favourable for entering the river, as from this you can always run into Khore Abdoolla if it comes to blow hard from the SE., at which time no pilot will cross the bar.

## ALI MEIDAN.

Ali Meidan is an extensive flat of mud and sand, extending from lat.  $29^{\circ} 46' N.$ , long.  $48^{\circ} 46' 30'' E.$ , to lat.  $29^{\circ} 55' N.$ , long.  $49^{\circ} 5' E.$  From the shore the soundings are from seven fathoms on the southern part to two fathoms at five miles off shore. The soundings on this flat are regular, which has got it the name of Meidan: they scarcely vary, except at the edges, in the same parallel, all over the bank. The pilots always try to cross the bank in four or five fathoms, when bound to the river.

## KHORE BAMESHERE.

The western point of Khore Bameshere is in lat.  $30^{\circ} N.$ , long.  $48^{\circ} 38' 50'' E.$ ; the eastern in lat.  $29^{\circ} 59' 30'' N.$ , long.  $48^{\circ} 44' 30'' E.$  It was formerly used by trading vessels, and was navigable a considerable way up; but is now blocked by a bund near the Haffar Canal. It runs in from the Ali Meidan, the soundings not varying more than a quarter of a fathom, until you get as high as lat. about  $29^{\circ} 51' 30'' N.$ , when they deepen to five and seven fathoms, according to the time of tide, and decrease again to three and four fathoms at low-water as you near the points.

## KHORE SELEDGE.

Khore Seledge is a small river, whose entrance is nearly blocked up. It is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 59' 20'' N.$ , long.  $48^{\circ} 46' E.$ , and runs into the Karroon.

## DORAKASTAN.

Dorakastan is the land formed between the Bameshere and Bunda Monsure. Khore Seledge and Khore Dorakastan run through this trench, which is little more than a mudbank. The part to the eastward of Khore Dorakastan is named Bussaaf.

## KHORE DORAKASTAN.

Khore Dorakastan is a small river, running into the Karroon; it has one fathom at the entrance, at low-water, and three and four fathoms inside. Its entrance is in lat.  $30^{\circ} 1' 20'' N.$ , long.  $48^{\circ} 54' 30'' E.$

## KHORE MOOSA.

The entrance to Khore Moosa, or Moscs, is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 57' 10'' N.$ , long.  $49^{\circ} 4' E.$ , and runs up to the northward until it reaches Bunda Monsure,





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on the western, and the Dorak river on the eastern side. The soundings are from four to eighteen fathoms. In lat.  $30^{\circ} 22' 20''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 58' 45''$  E., is a rocky islet, with fifteen and eighteen fathoms close to it. The water is salt, and the banks all mud, and no landing on them except at high-water.

## BUNDA MONSURE.

Bunda Monsure is situated between Khore Moosa and the Karroon, in lat.  $30^{\circ} 17' 40''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 46' 20''$  E.

## ENTRANCE OF THE DORAK RIVER.

The entrance of the Dorak river is in lat.  $30^{\circ} 21' 10''$  N., long.  $48^{\circ} 55' 10''$  E. The town of Dorak, the residence of the Chief of the Chaab Arabs, is situated thirty-three miles NE. from the entrance, but about forty-four by the river.

## DEERA ISLAND.

Deera Island is low, with a swamp in the centre, in lat.  $30^{\circ} 4' 22''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 5' 50''$  E.

## BUNAH ISLAND.

Bunah Island is narrow and low. The centre is in lat.  $30^{\circ} 7' 48''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 10' 18''$  E. It is about three and a half miles long, and has the ruins of an old fort on it.

## KHORE WASTAH.

Khore Wastah is a deep-water gut, running up towards Deera Island, and between it and Khore Moosa.

Inside Deera and Bunah Islands there is a complete lagoon, in some parts with thirty fathoms water, in others not one, full of banks and sunken rocks; and as it can never be navigated, except by boats, no further description can be given.

## THE KARABAH.

The Karabah is a piece of broken ground, with irregular soundings of from five to sixteen or eighteen fathoms, situated below Khore Wastah and towards the Ali Meidan. The natives say that traditions mention a city formerly standing in this place, and say the irregularity of the soundings are caused by the ruins of the buildings. I mention this as a common tradition among the natives.

## RAS TULLOOB.

Ras Tulloob is a point of the main near Bunah island, in lat.  $30^{\circ} 7' 33''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 15' 6''$  E. It is low, with a few shrubs and brushwood growing near it. About three miles within it, to the northward, is the entrance of a river joining the Indian River, and where are some extensive ruins.





FASHT AL MARINAE.

The south point of Fasht al Marinae is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 56' 50''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 18' 55''$  E.

KHORE ARANZAL.

Khore Aranzal is a gut with one and a half and two fathoms at low-water, running between the last-mentioned shoal and the main, leading to the Bunah Island, where it suddenly deepens to seven and fourteen fathoms.

SAREEMA.

Sareema is a small cluster of banian trees, at the upper part of a bight, near Indian River, in lat.  $30^{\circ} 8' 37''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 29' 13''$  E., and forms the leading mark for boats bound to Indian River. Variation  $4^{\circ} 50'$  W.

ENTRANCE TO INDIAN RIVER.

The entrance to Indian River is in lat.  $30^{\circ} 4' 15''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 32' 12''$  E. It is fronted by one extensive flat, dry at low-water. The town of Indian is about thirty or thirty-five miles up the river, which winds about for several miles near the beach, so that when you have gone several miles up the river you are only a few hundred yards on the opposite side of the bank which separates the reaches.

RASSHIEL BARKAN.

Rasshiel Barkan is the south-western point of the flat that runs off Indian River, and parallel with the coast easterly to long.  $50^{\circ}$ , where it extends about a mile and a half off shore. It is composed of mud, and in some parts patches of sand and clay. The Ras, or south-west point, is in lat.  $30^{\circ} 1' 20''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 27' 50''$  E.

FUNNEL HILL.

Funnel Hill is a remarkable hill, on the high land of Ramus, in lat.  $30^{\circ} 21' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 1' 55''$  E.

DOOAT DELLIM.

Dooat Dellim is a bight, formed at the head of the Gulf above Dellim, and affords good anchorage in a north-wester, and tolerably good in a south-easter; soundings from three to four fathoms at low-water; bottom soft mud.

SHAHIEL SHAW.

Shahiel Shaw is a village, with a fort, situated in lat.  $30^{\circ} 4' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 11' 18''$  E., and now enjoys the trade with the inland parts for grain formerly centred in Dellim. There is a small creek here, which forms a harbour for the boats.





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## BUNDA DELLIM.

Bunda Dellim is in lat.  $30^{\circ} 1' 50''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 12' 15''$  E. It is a small village, and formerly was a place of considerable trade in grain; but since it has become a dependency of the Shaikh of Bushire, it has, from his despotic government, and the feud of the Shaikh's family, entirely fallen to decay, and the trade removed to Shahiel Shaw, which is under the Kwam Babahawn.

## RAS-OOI-TUMBA.

Ras-ool-Tumba is a low point, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 55' 14''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 11' 50''$  E., forming the southern point of Dooat Dellim. A small spit runs one mile off this point.

## KHORE LELATAING.

Khore Lelataing is a small rivulet, one mile from Ras-ool-Tumba; it has one fathom at the entrance, and two within it.

## GEBIL LELATAING.

Gebil Lelataing is the point of the high land nearly abreast of Ras-ool-Tumba; lat.  $29^{\circ} 57' 50''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 22'$  E.

## KHORE ABD.

Khore Abd is a small creek in lat.  $29^{\circ} 53' 33''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 14' 40''$  E., and has a fathom and a fathom and a half in it.

## KHORE SERINAE.

Khore Serinae is a small rivulet, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 50' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 18' 30''$  E. It has one fathom on the bar at the entrance, and two and three inside. This place agrees better than any other with the Brazina of Nearchus. Extensive ruins lie near the entrance of this place.

## IMAUM HUSSAIN.

Imaum Hussain is a remarkable mosque or tomb, near this place.

## KHOEE BANG.

Khoe Bang is a high mountain, and at a distance forms the mountainous cape generally set by navigators under the name of Cape Bang. It is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 45' 30''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 30'$  E.

## SOUS POSHUNE.

Sous Poshune, the Cape Bang of the charts, is a low rocky point, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 37' 8''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 28' 10''$  E. About three and a half miles to the ESE. of this is situated the dry bed of a river, near which there are some old ruins.

## KA HYDER.

Ka Hyder is a small village, with a fort, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 37' 8''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 33' 48''$  E., and has about one hundred inhabitants, mostly weavers.





## GONAVA.

Gonava is a large town, with very extensive ruins near it. A river runs up near the town. It has originally been a place of great importance, as the extensive ruins show. Even now the Shaikh can bring from one thousand to twelve hundred horsemen into the field. He is dependent on the Shaikh of Bushire. There is a considerable trade with other ports in horses and grain from this place. A large mosque, situated two miles to the north of the river, is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 33' 25''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 36'$  E.

## KHORE KHALATA.

The entrance to Khore Khalata, or Gonava River, is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 31' 40''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 36' 6''$  E. It has one fathom at the entrance, and two inside at low-water.

## BUNDAREGT.

Bundaregt is a small town in lat.  $29^{\circ} 24' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 40' 35''$  E. Two small sandy islands point this town, forming a dry harbour for vessels drawing not more than one fathom, which enter at high-water, and lie aground on the ebb.

## KHORE GASSAIR.

Khore Gassair is rather a large rivulet. Its entrance is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 11' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 40' 50''$  E. It has a fathom and a quarter at low-water at the entrance, and two and a half and three fathoms inside at low-water.

## KHORE ROHILLA.

Khore Rohilla is a small river, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 8' 10''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 42' 10''$  E.

## KHORE KHODHIMA.

Khore Khodhima, or Old Rohilla, is an inlet, with several sandbanks inside; lat.  $29^{\circ} 6' 25''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 40' 1''$  E.; soundings one to three fathoms.

## RAS ROHILLA.

Ras Rohilla is a low sandy point, with a mound near it, in lat.  $29^{\circ} 4' 30''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 41' 25''$  E. From Ras Rohilla to Bushire extends a flat, with two and three fathoms water on it at high-water, and dry in parts at low. In standing along it, three and a half and four fathoms is a guide in the day, but you should not come under five fathoms in the night.

## BUSHIRE.

The flagstaff of the Residency at Bushire is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 0' 15''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 51' 30''$  E. It is a town of considerable importance, being the





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port where all the British and foreign trade with Persia centres. It is walled in, and about two miles in circumference. Its bazar is well supplied from the country with all sorts of provisions and fruits, and a number of merchants reside here, who carry on a very extensive trade; caravans arrive and depart daily. There is no water in the town that is drinkable—all is brought from places about two or three miles distant. The Shaikh or governor has, in addition to Bushire, all the places on the coast from Bunda Dellim to Halilla, under his authority, and several places fifteen or sixteen miles inland. His government is despotic in the extreme, and having four ships, besides several large Buggalows, of his own, he engrosses most of the freight, as he will not allow the merchants to ship their goods on any other vessel until his are loaded. The anchorage is in a road formed by two banks, two and a half miles off the town, having from four to two and a half fathoms at low-water, soft muddy bottom. The following directions will conduct a ship into the roads, should she not be able to obtain a pilot; but I should always recommend a pilot being obtained:—

## DIRECTIONS FOR GOING INTO BUSHIRE INNER ROADS.

A ship coming from the northward, with a northerly wind, should stand along the bank extending off Rohilla Point in a line of four fathoms, until she gets the flagstaff to bear N. 77° E., shipping in the inner roads N. 41° E., or the Old House or Sand Island N. 47° E.; then haul up N. 57° E. (in doing which you will cross over hard sand), until the flagstaff bears E., Old House N. 46° E., shipping N. 39° E. (In crossing the hard sand, should a vessel decrease her water to less than two and a half fathoms, she should bear away more for the town, and haul up immediately she increases that depth.) When the above bearings are on, haul up as high as N. 19° E., carrying soundings from two and three quarters to three fathoms, until the flagstaff bears S. 45° E., Old House N. 60° E., shipping N. 62° E. You may then with the ebb tide bear away for the shipping, keeping a good look-out for the point of the reef, which is nearly dry at low-water; but should the flood be running, it would be advisable for a vessel to keep up about three quarters of a point to windward of the shipping, and bear away when the point is abreast of her.

A ship coming from the southward, with a southerly breeze, may stand along the low land in a line of three and a half or four fathoms until the flagstaff bears N. 37° E., shipping N. 12° E., House on Shaikh Shaad N. 28° E.; then bear away N. 4° E. until the flagstaff bears S. 36° E., shipping N. 52° E., Old House N. 51° E. (In standing along this course, a ship will decrease her soundings at low-water to two and a





half fathoms, then increase to four and a half fathoms, with the above bearings on.) She may then haul up for the shipping.

The marks for the shipping in the inner roads are given in case of it being too hazy to see the old house on the northern end of Shaikh Shaad Island.

*Anchorage Bearings.*—Flagstaff S.  $16^{\circ}$  E., house on Shaad N.  $51^{\circ}$  E., eastern part of the tower S.  $25^{\circ}$  E. Variation in 1827,  $4^{\circ} 12'$  W.

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KARRACK ISLAND.

Karrack Island is about four and a half miles long, and rather high in the centre; the fort is situated in lat.  $29^{\circ} 15' 20''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 18' 50''$  E. It was built by the Dutch, and is in pretty good repair. Good water is plentiful, and poultry may be procured. Pilots for Bussora are also procured at this place. It is under the Government of Bushire. The anchorage in a north-wester is good in eight fathoms; in a south-easter you are obliged to shift round into the channel between it and Korgo. Variation  $4^{\circ} 15'$  W.

KORGO.

Korgo is a sandy island, laying in a north and south direction, separated from Karrack by a channel a mile and a quarter wide. It is two and a half miles long, and half a mile wide, and surrounded by a reef to the distance of a large half mile.

From this island to Bussora Bar the navigation is clear, taking care to be guided in approaching the banks by the several descriptions of them.

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## PART II.\*

## LEAVING BUSHIRE.

Leaving Bushire, of which the Residency flagstaff is in lat.  $29^{\circ} 0' 30''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 51' 30''$  E., you pass along a low coast, with soundings regular and safe, in three and a half fathoms, until you come to Ras Rushire, five miles distant.

## RAS RUSHIRE.

Ras Rushire is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 55' 50''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 50' 32''$  E., and is a low point, planted with date trees, with a small reef of rocks extending one mile from it, which should not be approached nearer than three and a half fathoms.

## RUSHIRE, OLD FORT.

The old fort of Rushire is now in ruins, and was built by the Portuguese. It is about four and a half miles from Bushire. You may approach the shore here to within half a mile, in three and a half fathoms.

## RAS HALILLA.

Ras Halilla is in lat.  $28^{\circ} 50' 30''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 54'$  E., and forms the northern point of Halilla Bay. The village of Halilla, which has a square fort, is about two-thirds of a mile from the point. Halilla Bay is situated between this and Khore Kwoire, and affords good shelter in north-westers. The best anchorage is with Halilla Point S.  $79^{\circ}$  E. true, and Ras Halilla N.  $31^{\circ} 21'$  true, in three or three and a half fathoms at low-water, soft muddy bottom. Good water is procurable here from a well near the date grove. Between Ras Halilla and Khore Kwoire there is a small island near the shore, with two fathoms inside it, where boats not requiring more than five feet water lay sheltered. The authority of the Shaikh of Bushire ends here, and the Tangassier District commences.

## HALILLA PEAK.

Halilla Peak is a remarkable mountain, the north part forming a peak, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 40' 10''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 38' 40''$  E., and is a well known landmark.

## KHORE KWOIRE.

Khore Kwoire is a small creek, dry at the entrance at low-water, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 47' 25''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 4'$  E.; variation in 1827,  $3^{\circ} 47'$  W.

\* Dated 5th October 1835.





RAHMAH'S TOWER.

Rahmah's Tower is a small round tower, built by that chief, about half a mile from Khore Kwoire.

BASHEE.

Bashee is a small village, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 39' 10''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 6' 10''$  E.

TANGASSIER.

Tangassier is a small town under the Asses Ears, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 31' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 8' 22''$  E. Here the Tangassier District ends.

ASSES EARS.

The Asses Ears are two small passes on the high land; they may be known from a third small peak rising by their side. They are in lat.  $28^{\circ} 29' 50''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 15' E.$ , and are a well known landmark.

KAGOOR.

Kagoor is a small village, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 18' 40''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 17' 30''$  E.

LUIR.

Luir is a small village, about one mile to the south of Kagoor.

KHORE JAYHIRA.

Khore Jayhira is a small fresh-water river, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 9' 35''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 21' 10''$  E.

RAS-OOL-KHAN.

Ras-ool-Khan is a low sandy point, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 2' 5''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 22' 30''$  E., under which vessels not drawing more than twelve feet water may find shelter in a north-wester, but should be careful how they enter this bay, as there are one or two small rocky shoals, with only ten or fifteen feet water on them. This anchorage is called Bunder Khan, and from hence commences Burdistan Bank.

RAS YABREEN.

Ras Yabreen is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 55' 40''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 28' 40''$  E., and is a low point. Jezeerat Yabreen is separated from it by a channel with ten or twelve fathoms water in it, but has not more than five or six feet at the entrance. This island is the commencement (to the northward) of the islands and banks which form the Burdistan Reef. The islands may be approached to four and a half or five fathoms in the day, but you should not come under seven fathoms in the night.

*General Remarks on the Navigation from Bushire to Jezeerat Yabreen.*—Leaving Bushire, and being clear of the pilot in three and a half or four fathoms, stand down along the coast (if with a fair wind) in that depth until you pass Bushire Point, when it deepens into





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five and a half fathoms. A course now S. by E. will take you fairly down to the line of ten fathoms on the Burdistan Bank, which should be crossed in this depth.

If a beating wind, you should not stand off into more than twenty-eight fathoms, and inshore at night into less than eight fathoms, unless above the Asses Ears, in which case you may stand into five or six fathoms; in the day-time, you may approach the shore to four fathoms, being to the southward of the Asses Ears. Twenty-eight fathoms off shore, to five or six fathoms inshore in the day-time, and seven or eight fathoms in the night, will be safe working, until you reach Yabreen Island.

## JEZEERAT MULGASSAB.

Jezeerat Mulgassab is a low, narrow island, about five and a half miles long, extending from Yabreen Island, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 50' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 32'$  E. Within is a narrow channel with twelve or fourteen fathoms, but blocked up at each end. You may approach this island to five fathoms in the day, and seven in the night.

## MONAKEELA, OR MONGELLER.

Monakeela, or Mongeller, is a low, sandy island, joined on to Mulgassab by a reef nearly dry at low-water. It has date trees on it, and the ruins of an old building, and is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 49' 15''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 33' 10''$  E.; variation  $3^{\circ} 40'$  W. in 1827. High-water full and change 7h. 50m.; rise and fall seven feet. It may be seen about eight or nine miles from the deck of a ship of four hundred tons.

## RAS MOOSALYEE.

Ras Moosaljee is a low point within the reefs on the main, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 53' 20''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 32' 50''$  E. About a mile and a half to the eastward is a small sandy island of the same name.

## MULGURRAM.

Mulgurram is a low point of the main, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 50' 30''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 38'$  E. South-west a mile and a half is Jezeerat Mulgurram, a small woody island. There is a gut between it and the point, with ten fathoms in it, and there is a fathom and a half at low-water on the bank without it. In this gut the Congoon boats are laid up when dismasted for the season.

## GEBIL DERING, OR HUMMOCKS OF KENN.

Gebil Dering, or the Hummocks of Kenn, form a well known landmark, in lat.  $28^{\circ} 3' 55''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 47' 27''$  E. (the centre hummock). When the centre hummock bears N.  $26^{\circ}$  W. true, you are clear of the reef or foul ground, and may stand in on that line to five fathoms.





## FUNNEL HILL.

Funnel Hill is a knob on the range of high land near the coast, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 51' N.$ , long.  $51^{\circ} 47' 51'' E.$  It is useful as a mark for anchoring under the lee of the reef in a north-wester, and also for a clearing mark.

## BURDISTAN REEF, OR FOUL GROUND.

Burdistan Reef, or Foul Ground, extends from Monakeela to long.  $51^{\circ} 52' 30'' E.$  It also extends to the south as far as lat.  $27^{\circ} 41' N.$ , and is dry in many parts at low-water. It is formed of hard sand and rocks, and is dangerous to approach in the night under ten fathoms, as you shoal quickly. Within that depth, the gap mentioned by McClure is very small, and may have filled up since his time. In a north-wester, if you wish to anchor, you should do so under the tail of the reef, with the following bearings, where you will lay sheltered:—centre hummock of Kenn, N.  $26^{\circ} W.$ , or a little open to the eastward of Funnel Hill; Square Tower Knob in the deep gap of high land, N.  $10^{\circ} W.$ , Battoonah Tower, near the beach, N.  $3^{\circ} E.$  true bearing, in five fathoms; or, if you like, you may run further in on the bearing of the latter; but this is the best place to weigh from in case of a south-easter coming on, as you may run out SW. or W. by S. from it until you deepen your water, by crossing the bank.

## SQUARE TOWER KNOB.

Square Tower Knob is a gap of high land of a zigzag form, and is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 59' 10'' N.$ , long.  $51^{\circ} 50' E.$

## BATTOONAH TOWER.

Battoonah Tower is a small Martello tower, at the village of the same name. It is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 49' 30'' N.$ , long.  $58^{\circ} 53' 35'' E.$

## SUGAR-LOAF.

Sugar-loaf is a detached conical hill, on the main, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 50' 28'' N.$ , long.  $51^{\circ} 59' 10'' E.$

## RAS BURDISTAN.

Ras Burdistan is an elevated bluff point, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 49' 30'' N.$ , long.  $52^{\circ} 2' 5'' E.$

## CONGOON.

Congoon, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 49' 20'' N.$ , long.  $52^{\circ} 8' 45'' E.$ , is a town situated in a deep bay near Cape Burdistan. Its inhabitants are Mahomedans, Arabs of the Beni Hussan, Beni Khalid, Albuya, Albusnarif, Albuyareh, Alyia, Beni Ahmood, Abadaly, Kasheanaria, and Nussoor Tribes, and its present Shaikh's name is Jubarra. The number of inhabitants is about fourteen hundred. The whole country along the coast from Cape Burdistan to Aseeloo is under this place.





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Several of the finest Buggalows in the Gulf belong to this port, and they carry on a very extensive trade, principally as carriers to Bombay and the Malabar Coast, and to most of the ports in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The bay is perfectly sheltered from north-westerly winds, by Cape Burdistan, and the reefs off it, and partially from south-easters by Ras-ool-Mara. The best anchorage is with the north-western tower of the town NE. by compass, and Burdistan fort and the Sugar-loaf or conical hill nearly in one N.  $57^{\circ}$  W., in four or four and a quarter fathoms. Supplies of indifferent cattle are procurable, and excellent water. Rugged Peak, over Congoon, is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 57' 12''$  N., long.  $51^{\circ} 59' 5''$  E.

## RAS-OOI-MARA.

Ras-ool-Mara is a low, sandy point, with date trees on it, distant one mile and two-thirds from the town, and forms the south-east point of the bay, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 46' 56''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 10' 15''$  E.

## MAHALOO.

Mahaloo is a small village in lat.  $27^{\circ} 44' 40''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 14' 20''$  E. It contains about one hundred inhabitants, of the Joasmee Tribe.

## JAYNAAT.

Jaynaat is a small town in lat.  $27^{\circ} 42' 40''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 16' 55''$  E., contains about five hundred men of the Bootambee Tribe, has several trading boats belonging to it, and has tolerably good anchorage off it, in ten fathoms, in a north-wester. A small reef of rocks, forming a boat harbour, extends off this town.

## GEBIL PERAI.

Gebil Perai, or Barn Hill, is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 46' 33''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 20' 35''$  E. It is a remarkable barn-shaped hill, well known to all who frequent the Gulf.

## RAS LASWAET.

Ras Laswaet is a projecting point of the land, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 41' 28''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 18' 20''$  E. It is safe to approach to four fathoms, about two hundred yards off shore.

## RAS ANKTOR.

Ras Anktor, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 40' 20''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 20''$  E., is a low point. Between it and Ras Laswaet is formed a small bay, where boats anchor.

## SHILLAN.

Shillan is a small deserted village, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 39' 59''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 14' 20''$  E.

## TAURIE.

Taurie, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 38' 52''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 16' 40''$  E., is a small town,





situated in a bay, affording excellent shelter in a north-wester, and indifferently good in south-easters. It is inhabited by about three hundred and fifty Arabs of the Nussoor Tribe; affords a few supplies, and has excellent water. To the NW. of the town are very extensive ruins, said to have been a Portuguese town: if so, it must have been one of importance, from the appearance of the ruins. In many parts the rock has been excavated for residences in the hot season, and the pass in the hills appears to have been fortified in a manner much beyond the abilities of the natives, at least of the present day. Wells have been also sunk to the depth of forty or fifty fathoms, through the rock. Very high up on the hills reservoirs in ruins are very numerous. On the whole, it has all the appearance of having been a large and flourishing town. Several trading boats of various sizes belong to Taurie.

## BARAK.

Barak is a small town, situated about three miles to the SSE. of Taurie, and contains about two hundred inhabitants, of the Nussoor Tribe.

## NAKLE TAKY.

Nakle Taky, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 29' 48''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 32' 21''$  E., is a small village, with a Ghuree, dependent on Aseeloo. It contains about seventy people, of the Nussoor Tribe.

## ASEELOO, OR ASSALOO.

Aseeloo, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 27' 42''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 33' 45''$  E., is one of the principal towns on the coast. It is situated at the NW. entrance of the Bay of Aseeloo; is nearly a mile in length, and contains about nine hundred men, of the Al Aram and Bosamut Tribes;—the latter, about four hundred in number, emigrated to this place from Bahrein about three years back. They have a number of trading vessels, and take a share in the pearl fishery. The only export is tobacco, brought down from the interior. The town is fronted by a reef, about one thousand yards off shore, within which is a basin with one and a half and two fathoms water, where their boats lay. The anchorage before the town is good in a south-easter, but a very heavy sea rolls in in a north-wester. About two miles and a half up the bay from the town, with Aseeloo Notch bearing N.  $12^{\circ}$  to N.  $15^{\circ}$  W., in three and a half or four fathoms, you lie pretty well sheltered. Supplies of fresh provisions and water are procurable. The ruins of a Portuguese town, with two fortified hills belonging to it, are situated near this town.

## ASEELOO OR ASSALOO NOTCH.

Aseeloo Notch is a remarkable hill in the high land nearly over the town. The extreme point of the fall\* is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 33' 6''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 42' 30''$  E. This landmark is so well known to navigators as to

\* Query 'hill'?





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require no further description. A pass into the interior winds round near it.

## ASEELOO, OR NABEND BAY.

Aseeloo, or Nabend Bay, is formed by Nakle Taky and Aseeloo on one side, and Cape Nabend on the other. It is five miles wide, and rather more in depth. Several villages are situated round it. The depth of water is from eleven to two and a half fathoms. In the middle is a rocky bank, with three and a half fathoms least water on it. In towards the bank, that runs off the shore all round to the distance of one thousand yards, the ground is generally clay or mud, but in the middle of the bay hard sand, with patches of rock. There is no danger whatever within it, or at the entrance. The shore abreast of Nakle Taky and Aseeloo should not be approached under seven fathoms. After the Notch bears N., you may keep in any depth to three and a half fathoms, and with the Notch from N. 10° to N. 15° W. is the best anchorage for a ship in a north-wester, from three to four fathoms, mud. In a south-easter you are sheltered in all parts of the bay.

## NAKLE HAGHEL.

Nakle Haghel is a small village, with a tower, in lat. 27° 23' 18" N., long. 52° 43' 15" E. It is subject to the Shaikh of Congoon, and contains one hundred and fifty of the Beni Malah Tribe. Several small villages within this, and a short distance from the shores of the bay, are subject to Congoon, and contain altogether about nine hundred or one thousand men, of the Beni Mullak and Beni Tamine Tribes.

## NABEND TOWN.

Nabend Town is situated on the southern side of the bay, in lat. 27° 23' 27" N., long. 52° 41' 50" E. It is a small town, dependent on Aseeloo, and contains about two hundred and forty men, of the Al Aram and Al Bakalif Tribes. It has a few small trading boats; cattle, poultry, and good water are procurable.

## RUFFAR VILLAGE.

Ruffar village is situated on the south side of the bay, near Cape Nabend, in lat. 27° 33' 36" N., long. 52° 40' 45" E., and contains about sixty men, of the Al Aram Tribe.

## RAS NABEND, OR CAPE NABON.

Ras Nabend or Cape Nabon, in lat. 27° 22' 52" N., long. 52° 39' 39" E., is a bold, projecting point, and forms the southern point of the bay. The rocky bank does not extend more than eight hundred yards off it, and even on that there is from three to two fathoms, close to the cape. A ship running into the bay should round it in about seven fathoms in





a south-easter, but not under nine in a north-wester, as a heavy sea drives right on for it.

A REMARKABLE SINGLE TREE.

A remarkable single tree, on the higher land over Cape Nabon, is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 20' 52''$  N., long.  $52^{\circ} 41' 27''$  E.

CAPE NABON TO SHEWER.

From Cape Nabon to Shewer anchorage in lat.  $27^{\circ} 6'$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 2' 12''$  E., the coast is steep, having in some parts twenty fathoms within less than a quarter of a mile of the beach, and affords no place for anchorage until you reach the place above mentioned, when you can lay well sheltered in a north-wester, but quite exposed in a south-easter. The coast all along the port is one continued chain of rocky cliffs, with here and there a small sandy bay of fifty or sixty yards in length.

SHEWER BAY.

Shewer Bay is a small bay, sheltered by a projecting point from north-westerly winds, but quite exposed to south-easters. The best anchorage is about eight fathoms, the Point NW. by W., off shore half a mile. Shewer village, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 4' 10''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 9' 30''$  E., is a small village, containing about one hundred men, of the Abualank Tribe, and has a few fishing-boats. Good anchorage in a north-wester will be found to the NW. of the town, in seven or eight fathoms.

SHEWER TO BUNDA UPSAATAAN.

From Shewer to Bunda Upsaataan, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 59'$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 17' 17''$  E., there is no town or village. Ships may anchor at every four or five miles between these places, sheltered from north-westerns. Bunda Upsaataan is a deep bight, and affords good shelter in a north-wester, in four and a half or five fathoms, and in a south-easter the water is quite smooth, the wind blowing over the land. In this bay is a small town, called Tamba.

NAKHEELLOO.

Nakheeloo is a town situated on a point, and has about eight hundred inhabitants, of the Aboosemate Tribe. It has several trading boats belonging to it. The Shaikh is independent, except of the Persian Government. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 52' 13''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 22' 32''$  E.

BUSHEAB, OR SHAIKH SHAAB ISLAND.

Busheab, or Shaikh Shaab Island (the village of Sazal, the north-east end, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 48' 7''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 15' 20''$  E.), is twelve nautical miles long, and two and a half broad. It has nine villages, contains four hundred and twenty-five men, of the Aboosemate Tribe, and is subject to Nakheeloo. The principal village is Geeroot, near the south-east





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end. The outer parts of the island are rocky, and loose stones, except at the western end, which contains good soil. The centre is a valley, with good soil, and cultivated. The inhabitants are civil, but great cheats. Good water, and some few supplies, are procurable. The anchorage off the east end is well sheltered from north-westers, and that at the north-east part from both north-westers and south-easters; but the ground is bad, and it will always be prudent to lay with a long scope of cable out.

## SHITWAR, OR CHITWAR.

Shitwar, or Chitwar, is a small island, separated from Busheab by a narrow channel, having three or four fathoms in it. The passage is about one-third over from Shitwar, but as the spit from Busheab runs some distance out past the island, it is not considered safe, unless to persons who have been through it before, as the reef does not always show, and the soundings have little or no change until you are upon it. The west point of Shitwar is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 47' 19''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 16' 54''$  E.

## STRAITS OF BUSHEAB.

The Straits of Busheab are formed by the islands of Busheab and Shitwar and the main. They are nearly nine miles wide at the western part, and five and a half between the spit off the north-east of Busheab and Nakheeloo, its narrowest part; they are fourteen miles in length, and have soundings from thirty-two to five fathoms; in mid-channel the soundings are from thirty-two to sixteen fathoms. The soundings at the distance of one mile from the shore are quite regular, and in no part is there danger outside of five fathoms, which is outside the small bank that runs along the side of Busheab. On the tail of the spit running off the north-east end of Busheab there are four fathoms water, and it shoals gradually on it, until you near the shore to two-thirds of a mile, when it shoals to two fathoms. No other danger exists in this fine channel, which until this time has been little known to Europeans.

## JEZZAR.

Jezzar is a considerable village, containing about two hundred men, of the Alubalal Tribe, and is subject to Nakheeloo. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 50'$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 26' 45''$  E.

## ISLAND OF IDERABIA.

The village on the north side of the island of Iderabia is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 41' 49''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 31' 18''$  E. The island is low, and about ten miles in circumference. It has about one hundred inhabitants, of the Abadaly Tribe, and is subject to Cheroo.

## STRAIT OF IDERABIA.

The Strait of Iderabia is formed by the island and the main. It has





regular soundings all over until you approach the reef of Ras-ool-Cheroo, when you suddenly shoal from seventeen to ten, five, and four fathoms, under which depth a vessel should not go. There is no danger outside five fathoms towards the island, or four fathoms on the spit, the channel between these having from twenty-two to seven fathoms. The narrowest part is between the island and Cheroo Reef, being there only one mile wide. A course one-third over from the island, in passing Ras-ool-Cheroo, will be found the best.

RAS-OOO-CHEROO.

Ras-ool-Cheroo, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 41' 31''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 36' 38''$  E., is a long, low, projecting sandy point, and forms the Bay of Cheroo. A sandy reef runs off from it in a WSW. direction, with soundings of from one and a half to five fathoms on it; but there is no danger on it in or outside three and a half fathoms, as it shoals after you are on it gradually to that depth. Outside of six fathoms the water suddenly deepens to ten, thirteen, and seventeen fathoms.

CHEROO.

Cheroo village is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 42' 15''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 46' 2''$  E. It is situated at the bottom of a bay, formed by the Ras or Cape of the same name. It contains about one hundred and fifty men, of the Abadaly Tribe; the Shaikh resides at another village inland. It was formerly, as well as Inderabia, subject to Nakheeloo, but threw off the yoke about eight months since. It is the best anchorage in a north-wester in the Gulf, and affords tolerable supplies and water. It has a few trading boats.

MORNINGTON'S SHOAL, OR SUMBURO.

Mornington's Shoal, or Sumburo, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 32' 43''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 46' 2''$  E. It has not less than six fathoms on it, and deepens gradually into twenty-two. It is about one mile long, and rather more than half a mile broad, composed of sand and coral rock.

JELLA ABADÉ.

Jella Abade is a small village, with several towers on the hill over it, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 42' 39''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 46' 30''$  E. It is inhabited by about three hundred men, of the Beni Ahmaade Tribe, has a few boats, and affords small quantities of cattle and poultry. It has good water, and is well sheltered from north-westerns.

Ghes, or Kenn.

The north-east part of Ghes, or Kenn, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 33' 1''$  N., long.  $53^{\circ} 54' 45''$  E. It is subject to Charrak, and inhabited by about one hundred men, of the Al Ali Tribe. It is well wooded, and from the sea has the prettiest appearance of any island on this side the Gulf. It





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has three villages: one on the north-east side, called Dae, is exactly one mile west of our latitude and longitude station. The island has plenty of good water, and many of the wells are near the beach. The fleet composing the expedition against the pirates in 1820 watered here, and it was found fully competent to supply a much larger demand. The soil is good, but in consequence of there having been no rain the last season, there is at this time little verdure. Barley and vegetables are cultivated, and off the island abundance of very fine fish is caught. The island is twenty-one miles in circumference, and safe to approach to eight fathoms all round. A reef projects off the island nearly all round, having from five to one and a half fathoms water. On the outer edge you have eight fathoms, soft ground, and immediately shoal to five fathoms, so that no vessel ought to come nearer than eight fathoms. It extends furthest off the west end, the outer part being one mile off shore; at no other part does it extend beyond half a mile, and the soundings are regular towards it. The variation at this place was  $3^{\circ} 40' W.$  (February 5th, 1827.)

## CHARRAK HILL.

Charrak Hill, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 33' 7'' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 9' 54'' E.$  (a small hillock on the centre), is a remarkable round hill, situated within the range of hills nearest the coast, and is a well known landmark.

## CHANNEL BETWEEN KENN AND THE MAIN.

The channel between Kenn and the Main is seven miles wide, in its narrowest part, with soundings of from thirty-six to five fathoms. In working through it, ten fathoms towards the island, and fourteen or fifteen fathoms towards the main, will be good guides in the night; in the day you may stand in close to the shore on the main, and to seven or eight fathoms towards the island. There is no danger on the main but a small spit near Gella Abade, which does not extend above three quarters of a mile off shore.

## TAWOONA.

Tawoona, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 42' 15'' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 15' E.$ , is a small town at the entrance of Charrak Bay, situated round the fort, which is built on a rock near the beach, and is inhabited by about one hundred and eighty men, of the Beni Baphar Tribe. It has a few trading boats, and was, during the time the pirates were in power, in alliance with them.

## CHARRAK.

Charrak, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 42' 52'' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 11' 16'' E.$ , is situated at the bottom of the bay of the same name. It is a place of some trade, and has six Buggalows, from sixty to one hundred and twenty tons, and twenty smaller trading vessels, belonging to it. It contains about nine





hundred men, of the Al Ali Tribe. About three hundred and sixty of these are fighting men; the remainder fishermen and traders. Supplies can be procured here, as well as pretty good water. These people being of the same tribe as the pirates of Amulgavine, were closely connected with them during the time they were in force.

DJRD.

Djrd, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 39' 15''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 25' 40''$  E., is a small village on the Charrak side of Cape Djrd or Certes, and contains one hundred men, of the Al Ali Tribe. It has a few small trading boats, but the people are principally fishermen.

RAS-OOO-DJRD, OR CAPE CERTES.

Ras-ool-Djrd, or Cape Certes, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 35' 52''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 26' 6''$  E., is a high projecting headland, when viewed at a distance, but when close terminates rather abruptly in a low point. It forms the south-eastern point of Charrak Bay, and the western point of Mogoo Bay. A reef runs off this point rather more than three-quarters of a mile. A ship, in rounding it, should not come under five fathoms.

CHARRAK BAY.

Charrak Bay is about four miles deep, and formed by Ras-ool-Djrd on one part, and Ras Tawoona on the other. The soundings are from twelve to three fathoms to a mile off the shore: under that distance, except near Charrak town, the ground is foul, and some small patches of rocks lay scattered about.

MOGOO.

Mogoo, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 35' 9''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 25' 34''$  E., is the western town in the bay of the same name, situated nearest to Ras-ool-Djrd. It is small, and inhabited by about two hundred and sixty men, of the Joasmee Tribe. They have a few trading boats, but live principally by fishing, and the pearl fishery, in which they are employed as divers.

DUAN.

Duan is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 34' 35''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 37'$  E. It is at the bottom of Mogoo Bay, inhabited by about a hundred and forty men, of the Al Ali Tribe, chiefly fishermen and cultivators.

RAS-OOO-ETTEE.

Ras-ool-Ettee is the fall towards the sea of the high land over Ras Bostana, and what is generally set by navigators for the latter. The whole of the high land generally called Cape Bostana or Bestian is called by the natives Gebil-ool-Ettee. On the high land a copper mine, said to have been worked by the Portuguese, is said still to exist.





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## RAS BOSTANA.

Ras Bostana is a low point, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 28' 30''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 40'$  E., forming the south-east point of Mogoo Bay. It is safe to round at a distance of three quarters of a mile, in six or seven fathoms.

## MOGOO BAY.

Mogoo Bay, formed by Ras-ool-Djrd on the western side, and Ras Bostana on the south-east, is a deep bay, with soundings from nine to three fathoms, and has good anchorage in north-westers abreast the town of Mogoo, in four fathoms, with Ras-ool-Djrd bearing about  $W. \frac{1}{2} N.$

## BOSTANA.

Bostana is a small village, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 29' 52''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 35' 44''$  E. A few supplies may be obtained here. It contains a hundred men, of the Manzeek Tribe, principally employed in fishing.

## POLIOR SHOAL.

The centre, or shoalest part of Polior Shoal, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 26' 5''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 37' 15''$  E. It is distant from the low point of Ras Bostana three miles, and from the north point of Polior Island seven miles. A line carried from the centre of Polior to the low point of Ras Bostana passes over the two and a quarter fathom patch. The shoal is composed of sand and rocks, and is six miles long, and two miles broad, extending in a westerly, south-easterly, and northerly direction. The channel on either side is safe, but for large ships that next to the island is the best, and they should not come under sixteen fathoms towards the shoal at night. The inshore channel has from seven to eleven fathoms in it, regular soundings.

## POLIOR ISLAND.

The north point of Polior Island is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 20' 30''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 36'$  E., the south point in lat.  $26^{\circ} 15' 30''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 35' 15''$  E. The island is apparently of volcanic origin, and has no water. A rocky patch extends a mile off the north-east end, with soundings of from seven and eight fathoms to one fathom. On the south-eastern side you may anchor close to the shore, sheltered from a north-wester, but it would be unsafe in the event of a sudden change of wind to the south-east, as the anchorage is so close to the shore that there would be very great risk of the vessel being thrown on the rocks.

## NOBEUZE, OR NOBFLEURE.

The centre of Nobeuze, or Nobfleure, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 11' 30''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 30' 40''$  E. It is a small island, with a high lump hill on its centre. It is surrounded by a reef, having from one and a half to





seven fathoms on it. Outside the reef you may anchor in sixteen or twenty fathoms; it should not be approached nearer than twenty-five fathoms, unless you intend to anchor, and in the day-time.

SURDE, OR SURDY.

The south-east point of Surde or Surdy is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 56' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 38' 40'' E.$  It is an island formed something the same as most in the Gulf, being composed of coarse rocks and sand, with very little soil. A mile and a quarter to the westward of the south-east point are the ruins of a town, and nearly in a line to the northward, on the opposite side of the island, are the ruins of another town, and a mosque; there are also wells of fresh water on the north-western part of the island. This island, it is said, had once near a thousand inhabitants, but was depopulated by the pirates. There is anchorage nearly all round the island, but the ground is rocky, and bad for holding; the best is to the southward. The island is surrounded by a reef, extending two-thirds of a mile off shore. The island is about four miles long, and two and a quarter broad.

BOSTANA TO SHINAS.

From Bostana to Shinas the land is low, and safe to approach to about one mile, in six or seven fathoms.

SHINAS.

Shinas, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 32' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 49' 20'' E.$ , is a small town, subject to Lingah, and contains about one hundred and seventy men, of the Alfarrish Tribe, principally employed as fishermen. A few supplies are obtainable here.

YESHKA.

Yeshka is a small town, situated close to the cape of the same name. It is subject to Lingah, and contains about sixty men, of the Alfarrish Tribe. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 33' N.$ , long.  $53^{\circ} 30' E.$ \*

LINGAH.

Lingah, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 32' 50'' N.$ , long.  $54^{\circ} 59' 10'' E.$ , is one of the most considerable towns on this coast, and has a considerable trade with most parts of Arabia. It sends Buggalows and other vessels to India, and takes a very large share in the pearl fishery. It contains about seven hundred men of the Joasmee Tribe, of the original people of the Allieny Tribe about three hundred, and two hundred and fifty of the Alfarrish Tribe. It sends thirty boats to the pearl fishery, and employs all those belonging to the opposite coast from Ras-ool-Khyma to Shargah. It imports and exports annually to the amount of near two lakhs of dollars in pearls, and about one-third that amount in grain, dried fruits, and tobacco. The amount of the customs for the

\* Query,  $54^{\circ} 30' E.$  ?





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last year was thirty-one thousand dollars. The duties are about five per cent. on most articles imported or exported. The imports are articles of Indian produce, dates, and grain. Supplies are procurable here. The people are mostly Wahabees, and the Shaikh is of the Joasmee Tribe, and nearly related to Sultan bin Suggur, the chief of the tribe, and were always connected with the pirates. The anchorage, abreast the town, in six fathoms, is well sheltered in a north-wester, but a chopping sea comes in in a south-easter. There is a basin, dry inside at low-water, where most of their boats lay up. They are not bigoted, and the Shaikh appeared a very intelligent man. The place is much increasing as a trading port.

## KOONG.

Koong is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 34' 40''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 1' 30''$  E. It is now in ruins, but was formerly a flourishing place. The Portuguese had a factory here when in power in the Gulf. Good water is easily procurable. Here you lay near the shore in six fathoms.

## BUNDER MULLIM.

Bunder Mullim is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 38' 20''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 9' 20''$  E. It is a small town, under Ras Showly, and has a trade in salt. It has about three hundred inhabitants. The bank on the Persian side, forming the channel into Bassadore, begins to shoal off this place.

## LITTLE TOMB.

The centre of the Little Tomb is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 14' 50''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 16'$  E. It is moderately elevated, is about a mile and a half in length, and has irregular soundings from twenty-eight to five fathoms. There is no danger near it.

## GREAT TOMB.

The north point of the Great Tomb is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 16' 28''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 24'$  E. The island is of an irregular triangle, the three sides being about two and a half miles each. The island is well stocked with antelopes, and there is good water on it. A banian tree stands in about the centre of the southern side. The anchorage is pretty good to the south-east and west, but on the northern part a spit runs off about three quarters of a mile, otherwise that part is steep. To the channel between it and two and a half fathoms, on the Bassadore flat, is seven and a quarter miles, but the safe channel is not more than six and a half, as the bank shoals very suddenly at this part.

## A SMALL SHOAL.

A small shoal patch, with six fathoms on it, bears nearly N. from the Little Tomb, distant eleven miles, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 25' 30''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 15' 40''$  E.





## BOMOSA.

The Peak or Saddle of Bomosa is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 55' N.$ , long.  $55^{\circ} 8' 50'' E.$  This island is low, except the remarkable saddle peak, and some small hummocks. It is surrounded by a reef near a mile off, and indifferent anchorage may be found under it.

## BASSADORE.

The Point of Bassadore is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 39' 10'' N.$ , long.  $55^{\circ} 22' E.$  It is the north-western point of Kishm Island, and bears  $N. 17^{\circ} 20' W.$  from the south-west point of the island, and from the Great Tomb  $N. 4^{\circ} W.$  true bearing. The variation of the compass was  $3^{\circ} 41'$  in 1827. This place was once a flourishing Portuguese settlement, and the ruins of the town are still in existence. In 1821, the force stationed in the Gulf for keeping down the pirate tribes was removed to this place from Sallack, and was withdrawn in 1823; since when it has been the head quarters of the Indian Naval Squadron in the Gulf. They have a tolerable hospital and store-houses, and some houses occupied occasionally by the commanders of the vessels stationed there. There is a small bazar, and middling supplies. The place is the most healthy on the island of Kishm, but far from being a desirable station.

To go into Bassadore from the southward with a fair wind, after the Great Tomb bears  $SSE. \frac{1}{2} E.$ , steer over the flat  $NW.$  by  $N.$  to  $NNW.$ , if in a large ship; and while the Tomb is in sight, keep it  $SSE.$  until Bassadore Point bears  $NE. \frac{1}{2} E.$ ; then steer, keeping it a little open on the starboard bow. If you deepen to eight or nine fathoms, edge over to the northern bank until you begin to shoal again, keeping a good look-out for the beacon on the point of the dry part of the southern bank, and distant about thirteen hundred yards from the Point. You may round this at any distance from a cable-length to a quarter of a mile, when haul in for the anchorage abreast of the hospital, or a little above it, in seven fathoms. You should be careful to be ready to anchor immediately you are across the gut, which has twelve to sixteen fathoms in, and is immediately without the anchoring ground.

In crossing the flat from the Great Tomb, there is a remarkable notch in the high land of the Persian Coast, which, if seen, is an excellent mark, by keeping it  $N.$  by  $W. \frac{1}{2} W.$  by compass, until Bassadore Point bears  $NE. \frac{1}{2} E.$ , when proceed as above.

If coming from the southward, with a strong south-easter, cross the flat close, as above directed, being careful not to come under three fathoms until you get Bassadore Point  $NE.$ , and the highest hummock  $E.$  by  $N.$ , when haul your wind, and stand to the northward until the Point bears about  $E.$  by  $N.$ , and you shoal to five fathoms on the north





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bank, when work between it and eight or nine on the south side, until round the beacon, when anchor as before directed.

To sail into Bassadore from the northward, after passing Lingah with a fair wind, steer about E. by N. to ENE., until Bassadore Point is seen, when steer for it, attending to the directions given above. When coming from the southward, the soundings in the channel are from eight to three and a half fathoms, until you approach Bassadore, when they deepen as before described.

There is another passage along the island of Kishm, and within the shoal part of the Bassadore flat, by keeping along shore in four to six fathoms until the large hummock bears N.  $73^{\circ}$  E., true bearing, and Bassadore Point N.  $12^{\circ}$  E. true, when steer across the bank W. by N., or W. by N.  $\frac{1}{2}$  N., until you deepen over it, or the notch on the Persian Coast bears N. by W.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W., when proceed as above directed. I would not recommend this channel except in cases of chase, or other necessity, unless to a person well acquainted with it.

## CLARENCE STRAITS.

Leaving Bassadore to proceed through Clarence Straits, weigh, if you have a fair wind, at slack water, and steer about N. by E. until you shoal into about five fathoms on the northern bank, when keep along about E. in five to six fathoms, on the edge of that bank, until you get the date grove at Drakoon to bear true S.  $26^{\circ}$  E. This carries you safely past Goree, a shoal of hard sand, on which there is not more in some parts than a fathom and a half. After passing this you may steer along the Kishm shore at a distance of a little more than half a mile, until Lucy's Peak, on the island of Kishm, bears S.  $44^{\circ}$  E. true bearing, when you are off the entrance of the narrow straits or Khore Goran, when, if going through them, steer towards the mosque, keeping it a little open on your starboard bow. The soundings between the banks until you enter the jungle are five to seven fathoms. You must now be guided by your distance from the shore, keeping most on the larboard shore until you pass the second opening or channel on that side; then keep rather nearest the starboard shore, or near to mid-channel, until you open into the main channel beyond Inderabia Fort, on the Kishm shore.

To proceed through the main strait, or Khore Manaffee, you should keep rather towards the larboard bank, in soundings of from six to eight fathoms, until you pass a dry sandy islet off the islands fronting Kammeer; then run along the island at a distance of a quarter of a mile, in soundings of from seven to ten fathoms, until you get to the end of it, when you will see the fort of Inderabia on Kishm, bearing true S.  $47^{\circ}$  E.; then steer for the extreme point of the island of Kishm, keeping in soundings of from six to fifteen fathoms. When you have





closed to the Kishm shore, steer about E. by S.  $\frac{1}{2}$  S., until off the village of Peypusht, attending particularly to your soundings, and not coming under six fathoms. You may now steer along the Kishm shore in soundings of from six to twelve or thirteen fathoms, at a distance of a large quarter of a mile, until you come to the village of Durgaum. You must now steer out NE. by E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E. to NE. by E.: this will carry you out of the straits, in soundings of from six to eleven fathoms.

Mosha.

Mosha is a village opposite Bassadore, with a few inhabitants, mostly fishermen and wood-cutters. From this to the commencement of the jungles the coast is uninhabited. The jungles begin about thirteen miles above this place, and continue on the Persian side to about lat.  $26^{\circ} 57' 30''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 47'$  E.

KAMMEER.

Kammeer is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 56' 40''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 40' 20''$  E., and belongs to the Imaum of Muskat. It has large mines of sulphur, and very large quantities are annually exported.

AN OLD MOSQUE.

An old mosque stands in lat.  $27^{\circ} 40'$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 9'$  E. In this old building were found written up the names of many persons, supposed to be of the old English factory, some of them dated as far back as 1727.

SESOOR.

Sesoor is a small village, with a town, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 9'$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 16'$  E. It has about one hundred inhabitants, mostly fishermen.

BUNDER ABBAS.

Bunder Abbas is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 10' 35''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 18' 48''$  E. It was once a town of great trade and importance, but has much fallen off: it still has a considerable trade, the amount of customs averaging eight to ten thousand German crowns. Tobacco and dried fruits from Persia are exported; English piece goods and China and India goods to the amount of two or three lakhs of rupees are the imports. These things find their way into the interior of Persia by this route, since the disturbances at Bushire.

This place is said to be increasing in trade. There are very extensive ruins of the old English factory, which must have been a very superior building; there are the ruins of two block houses in front of it. The old Dutch factory is now the palace of the Imaum of Muskat, who farms the place from the Persian Government. It has a fluctuating population of about four or five thousand people, mostly Arabs and Persians, but there are a few Banians and Armenians settled here.





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## ORMUS.

Ormus was an island formerly the grand emporium of the Portuguese commerce and power in the Gulf of Persia and Coast of Arabia. The fort, built by the Portuguese, is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 5' 55''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 29' 5''$  E. It is a barren rocky island, covered with salt, except the north-east part, which is low and sandy. It has no water, except what is saved in reservoirs during the rains. There are a number of these reservoirs in good repair, and the ruins of some hundreds, which show what the place has been. The old Portuguese lighthouse is still standing, though fast falling to decay. Large quantities of salt are exported from this island to all parts of the Gulf, and Coasts of Arabia; the Imaum of Muskat, to whom it belongs, keeps a garrison of about one hundred men in the fort. There are about four hundred inhabitants, mostly employed in the salt trade, and as fishermen; they are strict Mahomedans. There is good anchorage to the eastward of the fort in a north-wester, and to the westward in a south-easter.

## ISLAND OF KISHM.

The island of Kishm (Jazeerat Towile of the Arabs, Jazeerat Dras of the Persians, and the Oaracta of Arrian) was visited by Nearchus in his voyage from the Indus to the Euphrates. Arrian states that at that time it produced abundance of corn, vines, and fruit of all descriptions. The Greeks, with their usual superstition, stated the tomb of the first monarch of the island, named Erythras, was then in existence, and from which they named the Gulf the Erythrian Sea. The island is fifty-four miles long, and thirty-two wide in the broadest part, and nine in the narrowest. Before the pirates became so powerful, it had about seventy small towns and villages, and a population of about twenty thousand inhabitants. A very great part of these were weavers; others cultivated the soil; and others were fishermen. Most of these were destroyed, or obliged to seek shelter elsewhere, during the time the pirates were in power: many are now returning; but the island will never be what it is said to have been again. It belongs to the Imaum of Muskat.

## GOREE.

Goree is a small village, producing a few dates, vegetables, and other supplies, about five miles from Bassadore.

## DRAKON.

Drakoon is a similar village, about a mile and three quarters above Goree.

## POINT NAKOONA.

Point Nakoona is a small projecting point, about a mile past Drakoon.





KONNASEER.

Konnaseer is a small village, inhabited by a few families of fishermen, and wood-cutters, about three quarters of a mile above Point Nakoona.

TURSOO.

Tursoo is a large village, producing dates, vegetables, and a few supplies, a mile and a quarter from Konnaseer.

CHANNOO.

Channoo is a small village, about three and a half miles further up the channel. The people, about seventy in number, are weavers and wood-cutters.

LUCY'S PEAK.

Lucy's Peak is a remarkable peak about two miles inland, and five and a quarter from the village of Channoo.

GORAM.

Goram is a small village, said to have formerly been a Portuguese station, at the entrance of the straits of the same name; it may be known by an old mosque. There are some reservoirs, and after rain there is plenty of good water here.

LUFT.

Luft is a fortified village or town on the side of a hill, at the eastern entrance of Khore Goram. It had several towers and a wall down one side the hill, besides a Ghuree. Colonel Smith and Captain Wainright, in 1809, despising their enemy, thought to carry it at once by escalade, but they were beaten off with considerable loss, and the men obliged to lay on the beach, not being able to embark them for the enemy's fire. The *Fury* and other cruisers were now brought in, and with the gunboats battered the place, when, after some time, it surrendered. Luft now contains only about two hundred inhabitants, has a few boats, and is the residence of the principal Shaikh on the island. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 53' N.$ , long.  $55^{\circ} 51' 10'' E.$

*Remarks on the Navigation, &c. from Goram to Luft.*—The whole of the centre, between Kishm and the Persian Coast, is full of small jungle islands, some having narrow channels, with six and eight fathoms water, between them. Up these the wood boats go, and this place supplies about three-fourths of the Gulf with firewood.

INDERABIA.

Inderabia fort is about two miles from Luft, and belongs to the Imaum of Muskat.

Inderabia Point is about a mile and a quarter from the fort, and is





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the northern point of the Luft and Goram Channel. After passing this point three miles is a mosque, and an old ruined house.

## PEYPUSHT.

Peypusht is a small village, nearly a mile inland, where some cattle and poultry may be obtained. It is six and a half miles from the mosque.

## ZANOBEE.

Zanobee is a village, where cattle and poultry may be procured. It contains about one hundred inhabitants. It is about two and a half miles from Peypusht, and nearly a mile and a half inland.

## DURGAUM.

Durgaum is a fishing village, on the beach, six and a half miles from Zanobee; it has about one hundred and twenty families, very poor.

## KISHM.

The north point of the island of Kishm is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 59' 30''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 14'$  E. Off it are two islets, and here is a place where vessels of three or four hundred tons might, in case of necessity, be hauled on shore to repair.

## TOWN OF KISHM.

The town of Kishm is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 57' 10''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 18' 50''$  E. It is the principal town on the island, and contains about two thousand inhabitants. It has little trade, but is frequented by the trading vessels passing up and down the Gulf. Most of its inhabitants are sailors and fishermen: the former employ themselves on board the vessels belonging to Muskat, and other parts of the Gulf. A number of villages in various parts of the island are under the government of the Shaikh of this place. It was here, during the panic consequent on Captain Thompson's failure at Beni Boo Ali, the troops were removed, and were perched on a rock, where I have known a thermometer to burst at  $160^{\circ}$  when suspended to a tent rope. After five or six officers, and half the men, had died, they were removed to Sallack. The anchorage is good in a north-wester, but a chopping sea comes in with a south-easter; a bank runs in front of the town.

## ISLAND OF LARRACK.

The island of Larrack is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 53' 30''$  N., long.  $54^{\circ} 25' 10''$  E. The fort is on the north side; the island has water on it, and is barren. Good anchorage may be found under it in a north-wester or south-easter.

## BUNDER SHUSA.

Bunder Shusa is a small bay, twelve miles from the point off Kishm





town. To the westward it is fronted by two or three rocky islets, on the largest of which is a reservoir for water. Inside there is a fathom and a half and two fathoms water at low tide; native vessels take shelter here in blowing weather. This I consider to be Nearchus' second anchorage on the island of Oaracta, on the ninety-third day from the Indus. The village of Shusa, where a few cattle and poultry may be procured, is two miles further to the westward.

## MESSAIM.

Messaim is five and a half miles further WSW., and is of a similar description to Shusa.

## RAS KHARGOO.

Ras Khargoo is opposite to Angaum, and forms the eastern point of the entrance into Angaum, round a rocky spit, with from three and a half fathoms to a fathom and a half. It runs about half a mile off it.

## ANGAUM.

Angaum is a rocky island, similar to most in the Gulf. It is five miles long, in a SSW.  $\frac{1}{2}$  W. direction, and two and a half miles broad. It has several wells of water in it,—the best is in a valley, about a quarter of a mile distant NNW. from the south-east point of the island; there are some reservoirs near the old mosque, which are generally full in the rainy season. The island is uninhabited, but had a town near the old mosque until destroyed by the pirates. There is excellent anchorage near the old mosque, which is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 41' N.$ , long.  $55^{\circ} 55' 52' E.$ ; variation  $3^{\circ} 37' W.$  in 1828. Wild goats are found on this island.

## ANGAUM SOUND.

Angaum Sound is formed by the islands of Angaum and Kishm, and the channel at the south-east entrance is two-thirds of a mile wide. To enter and sail through this channel, steer in about mid-channel, with soundings from six to twelve fathoms, until you get Ras Khargoo NE. by E.  $\frac{1}{2}$  E., when keep most towards Angaum, steering towards the mosque point, which round at a distance of a quarter of a mile, having good soundings close to it. After rounding the mosque, keep in mid-channel, and steer through when the mosque on Angaum bears S.  $32^{\circ}$  W. true. There is a hard bank, with three fathoms on it, three-fourths over the channel towards Kishm, to work through. Do not approach the Angaum shore at the entrance nearer than one-third of a mile, in five fathoms, or the Kishm shore under five fathoms, until you get Ras Khargoo ENE., when you may work to a quarter of a mile of either shore, until past the mosque point, when you ought not to come nearer than three quarters of a mile to Angaum or Kishm. The sound





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at this part is three miles wide, clear working ground, and four and a half from shore to shore.

RAS SALLACK.

Ras Sallack is a low rocky point, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 41' 15''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 48' 30''$  E. It is safe to approach to five fathoms.

SALLACK VILLAGE.

Sallack Village is two and a half miles to the westward of the cape, and has good water. The troops were removed from Kishm to this place, and after a few days to Bassadore, the anchorage being too much exposed for the shipping. Cattle, poultry, and fish are procurable, also a few vegetables in the cold season.

RAS TARKAOM.

Ras Tarkaom village is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 38' 30''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 38' 10''$  E. It is a small point and fishing village; off this begins the bank commonly called Bassadore Flat.

RAS KHARROON.

Ras Kharroon is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 34' 10''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 28'$  E. You may pass it for the inner channel to Bassadore. Half a mile from here are several salt hills, and boats load with salt for the Arabian Coast.

RAS DRUSTERKOOK.

Ras Drusterkoon is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 32' 45''$  N., long.  $55^{\circ} 24' 30''$  E. It is the south-western point of Kishm. A bank, dry at low-water, commences running off from this point to Bassadore Point, between which and the southern bank of the channel into Bassadore is a narrow channel, with soundings from three to ten fathoms at low-water, except about two and a half miles from Bassadore Point, when it contracts to about three hundred yards wide, with a fathom and a half and two fathoms in it.

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CENTRE OF THE PERSIAN GULF, AND THE PEARL BANKS.

The centre of the Gulf towards its head is clear of dangers, except such as have been already described with the coast and islands, with soundings varying from nine to twenty-six fathoms above the parallel of  $28^{\circ}$ .

BIDDULPH'S GROUP.

Biddulph's Group are called so from Captain Biddulph, of Her Majesty's sloop *Hesper*, being the first person who visited and made any remarks on them; they are three in number, as follow.





*Hargose.*

Hargose is a small, sandy, and rocky island, surrounded by a reef of rocks. It is at high-water not more than two hundred yards over. The anchorage near it is bad, being hard rock and sand. It is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 55' 30''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 44'$  E.

*El Kraing.*

El Kraing is about three quarters of a mile long, and, like Hargose, surrounded by a reef, extending off all except the south end, two and a half miles. Under the southern end is pretty good anchorage in eight fathoms, low-water, and you may catch good fish at this place. It is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 42' 10''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 51' 10''$  E.; variation  $4^{\circ} 55'$  W. in 1825.

*El Krong.*

El Krong is similar to the last; but within the reef, off, and surrounding it, is a basin or boat harbour, in which the pearl fishing-boats take shelter in bad weather. It is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 38' 10''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 51' 10''$  E. Between this island and El Kraing is a safe channel, having ten fathoms in it.

ZAZARINE, OR FARSEE.

Zazarine, or Farsee, is a small island, composed of sand and rock. It is half a mile over, and is surrounded by a reef a mile off shore all round it; it has bad anchorage in fifteen fathoms, mud. The island abounds in fish, and is frequented by turtle. It is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 58' 40''$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 8' 10''$  E.

KEYN, OR ARABEE.

Keyn, or Arabee, is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 46'$  N., long.  $50^{\circ} 9' 20''$  E. It is similar in every respect to Zazarine, and has bad anchorage in eighteen fathoms.

JENNEE.

Jennee is a small sandy island, similar to the others, and surrounded by a reef, having soundings round it from thirteen to seven fathoms; the anchorage bad. It is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 20' 30''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 50' 15''$  E.

YEREDDEL.

Yeredel is rather smaller than Jennee, and the reef not quite so extensive, with similar soundings; and is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 10' 30''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 53' 10''$  E.

ROCKY BANK.

A rocky bank, having barely one fathom water on it, bears from El Krong W.  $17^{\circ}$  S., twelve and a half miles, in lat.  $27^{\circ} 34' 20''$  N., long.  $49^{\circ} 36' 20''$  E., in its north-eastern part. It extends WSW. five and a half miles, and has eight fathoms close to it, sand and mud, on its northern side.





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## NEARLY EAST OF EL KRON.

Nearly east of El Kron, distant eight or nine miles, is a small patch, with only five fathoms on it.

*Remarks.*—From lat.  $27^{\circ} 39' N.$ , long.  $49^{\circ} 24' E.$ , to the island of El Kron, northerly to the Boosafaa or Durable Shoal, to the south-east enclosing the islands of Yeredel, Jennee, and the Mullamael Shoals, is full of patches and shoals, and should not be attempted to be navigated at night, nor yet in the day, without a pilot, unless well acquainted with the place.

## ROCKY KNOLL.

Rocky Knoll is very small, and nearly dry, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 59' 30'' N.$ , long.  $49^{\circ} 56' 30'' E.$ ; soundings ten and seven fathoms close to it.

## THREE SMALL PATCHES.

Three small patches extend from lat.  $27^{\circ} 13' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} E.$ , in a south-west direction, nine miles.

## A SHOAL.

A shoal, the shoalest part of which has two and a half fathoms on it, lies in lat.  $27^{\circ} 8' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 9' 30'' E.$  It is three miles long, in a north-east direction.

## MULLAMAEL SHOAL.

The shoalest part of Mallamael Shoal, two and a quarter fathoms, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 59' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 16' 40'' E.$  This shoal is oblong, and has soundings in the other parts from three to seventeen fathoms, very irregular.

## BOOSAFAA, OR DURABLE SHOAL.

The northern part of Boosafaa or Durable Shoal is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 59' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 24' 20'' E.$ , and extends six miles S.  $30^{\circ} E.$  true. It has barely one fathom on it at low-water. In approaching it from the northward, the soundings shoal suddenly after twenty fathoms. The ship *Durable*, Guthrie, Master, was lost here in 1817, which was the first of the shoal's existence being known to Europeans.

## EPHERAH PEARL BANK.

Epherah Pearl Bank is a bank of rocks, and considered one of the richest of the pearl banks. It has sixteen fathoms water to the northward, and ten to the southward. On the bank, the soundings are irregular, from four to eight fathoms. The centre of the bank is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 50' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 37' 30'' E.$  It is about five miles over from north to south, and about ten miles from east to west.

## FASHT SURRAH.

Fasht Surrah is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 40' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 36' E.$ , to lat.  $26^{\circ} 36' N.$ ,





long.  $50^{\circ} 23' E.$  Its widest part is two and a half miles over, and soundings two to four fathoms. It is composed of rocks and sand.

FASHT EL NOWAH.

The centre of the dry part of Fasht el Nowah is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 32' 10'' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 19' 30'' E.$  It extends N. by W. and S. by E. five miles, its widest part east and west being three and a half miles. It is more than half dry, and the other part has one to two fathoms on it. It fronts Kateef Bay, and there is a channel with four and five fathoms water between it and the Fasht el Yarron, or Teignmouth Shoal.

ROCKY BANK.

The centre of a rocky bank, with soundings from nine to ten fathoms, and eighteen to the northward and fifteen to the southward, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 53' 50'' N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} 49' E.$  It has no danger.

ROCKY BANK.

Another rocky bank, with over-falls from six to twenty fathoms on its centre, lies in lat.  $26^{\circ} 54' N.$ , long.  $51^{\circ} E.$  It extends to E. by N. and W. by S. about six miles each way.

OVERFALL BANK.

Overfall Bank is a rocky bank, extending from lat.  $26^{\circ} 48' N.$ , long.  $51^{\circ} 8' E.$ , to lat.  $26^{\circ} 36' N.$ , long.  $51^{\circ} 45' E.$ , and has soundings of from nine to twenty fathoms on it, rocky bottom.

THE PEARL BANK.

The Pearl Bank commences at the island of El Kron, and continues, varying in breadth, to abreast of the town of Shargah. Its widest part is among what are called Mandes Islands, and the narrowest off Jazeerat Boo Ali. The richest fishing grounds are what are usually termed the Bahrein Banks; they extend from lat.  $27^{\circ} N.$ , long.  $50^{\circ} E.$ , to the eastern end of Overfall Bank. The Overfall Bank is one of the richest, but is only fished in very fine weather, being deep water, and far off shore; next to it is the Epherah Bank, where some of the most valuable pearls have been found. About three thousand boats are at times out on the banks, and each boat contains from five to fourteen men. As the banks are free for all, so all the maritime people of the Gulf take a share in the fishery; and it is an enlivening scene to see the boats at anchor, and sailing about—all employed. The whole of the Pearl Bank is composed of broken corally rock and sand; in a few places you find a patch of mud. The soundings are in most parts irregular, from twenty-two to four fathoms.





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*Remarks.*—The centre of the Gulf, off the Pearl Bank, is clear of danger, with soundings, over a bottom of mud, from twenty at the upper part to forty and fifty fathoms through most of the other parts, to eighty fathoms off the Quoins. At the entrance the Gulf abounds with all kinds of fish, which are cheaply purchased from the boats.

## INHABITANTS OF THE GULF OF PERSIA.

The inhabitants on the Arabian side are Mahomedans of all sects, Wahabee, Soonee, and Sheea. In most of the ports are to be found Banian merchants, also Jews and Armenians. The trade of the Gulf is extensive, and most of those maritime places which have not the means or a demand among themselves are the carriers for the other places. Some of the finest of the Buggalows trading from the Gulf to India belong to these places. At the time the pirates were in power, there were not more than one hundred and twenty Buggalows and Buteels belonging to the Gulf of above seventy tons: three-fourths of these belonged to Grane, Bahrein, and Muskat.

Since a regular force has been kept in the Gulf to keep the pirates down, they have increased to near six hundred; and the trade with India, particularly with the Malabar Coast and Bombay, has become very considerable. The Arabs take off every year a large part of the rice grown in Malabar, and large quantities of timber, for which they pay in dates or hard cash, but mostly the latter. I may add here, that though the pirates are kept down, they are not suppressed, and if opportunity offered they would soon be up again. They possess some of the finest vessels in the Gulf. One thing—the surveys of the Gulf will in future times prevent their escape among the islands and shoals, as they did before, while the Officers of the Indian Navy, from constantly navigating the Gulf, will be able to follow them wherever they go.

## WINDS AND CURRENTS.

At the head of the Gulf, during the months of November, December, January, and part of March, the winds blow alternately from north-west and south-east, but with no regularity, as during those periods when it blows hard the wind will be in opposite directions within a very short distance. During these strong breezes, which seldom last beyond four days in the north-westerns, the air is clear, cold, and bracing; in the south-easters the air is generally moist, and rainy. When the winds are





light the weather is generally hazy. From the middle of March to September, the winds are mostly from the north-west, sometimes blowing very hard. Southerly winds seldom blow after March. You have also occasionally land and sea-breezes. From the middle of May to the end of June the wind called the grand Shamall blows: this is a continued north-west wind, and at times blowing with great fury, in hard gusts,—at other times light. It must have much altered since McClure's time, who speaks of ships being unable to show sail above their courses to it at all parts above Bushire.

The tides are quite regular at Bushire—it is high-water at full and change at 7h. 50m.; at Karrack 9h. 20m., at Dillum 10h. 20m., half way between that and the bar off Khore Mooza at 11h. 10m., and at Bussora Bar at 12h. 10m. The same remarks apply from the island of Kenn or Ghes up to Bushire, so far as regards the winds, with the exception that they are much lighter, except in the winter months, when they blow hard, and often in heavy squalls. Except inshore, the tides here are more irregular, being much influenced by the winds from Kenn down to the Quoins. The winds hang in those months most to the eastward and westward, when blowing strong from the north-west and south-east above, taking the direction of the coast, and near the entrance are frequently at north-east and south-west. Strong easterly breezes occasionally blow in the hot season, and the land winds, particularly on the Arabian Coast, are hot and blasting.

At the head of the Gulf the thermometer ranges from 48° to about 76° in the cold months, and from 85° to 110° in the hot; at the lower part the range in the hot weather is much the same, and from 54° to 78° in the cold.

At the entrance of the Gulf, and outside of it from Muskat to the Quoins, the tides and currents are variable and uncertain (except on the Persian Coast, where there is a regular tide), and depend much upon the winds. When calm, or light winds blow near the entrance of the Gulf, the influence of the tide is felt across the whole from coast to coast.

#### PRODUCE.

Until the unsettled state of Turkish Arabia and Persia, and the recent ravages of the plague, a brisk trade was carried on in the Gulf, in silk, dried fruits, gums, dates, and horses, from Bushire in Persia; the same, with copper and many other similar articles, from Bussora, to a very large amount; to these may be added pearls and specie, to the amount of sixty or eighty lakhs of rupees annually. For this the owners took British manufactures; China produce; rice and timber from Malabar;





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indigo, rice, sugar, British piece goods, and country chintz from Bengal and the Coromandel Coast; and though I have not now sufficiently correct data, I believe at one time the exports from British India to the Gulf were little short of eighty or ninety lakhs of rupees. As the place gets settled, this trade will revive. About fifteen hundred to two thousand five hundred African slaves are brought into the Gulf every year by the way of Muskat, besides which I believe two or three hundred girls are brought from the Malabar Coast, Kutch, and even Bombay—at least I have frequently been told so by Arabs and others. A great portion of these are children.

Fruits are in their seasons very plentiful at the head of the Gulf, particularly on the banks of the Euphrates, and at Bushire: they consist of nectarines, peaches, apricots, apples, pears, grapes of various sorts, plums, melons, quinces, and many others; carrots, turnips, occasionally cabbages, beet, and various sallads, are also to be had in season; onions, cucumbers, and the usual native vegetables. The meat on the Arabian Coast is mostly good; on the Persian Coast only occasionally so, and it is also dear. The poultry at the head of the Gulf is very large and fine; low down very indifferent. Fish in all parts plentiful, and excellent.

WITHOUT THE GULF.—PERSIAN COAST FROM ORMUS  
TO RAS OR CAPE JASK.

Leaving the eastern anchorage of Ormus, course E. by S., along shore, in soundings from ten to five and six fathoms, with the mouth of the Minnow river bearing true NE. The coast from Ormus to this place is long and jungly, with creeks and swamps, and a flat running off a mile and a half.

## MINNAE FORT.

Minnae Fort is situated on a hill fifteen miles inland, and the custom house, up to which native boats of fifteen or twenty tons go, is seven miles up the river. The eastern point of the entrance is in lat.  $27^{\circ} 6'$   $48''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 47' 10''$  E. This is a place of some trade, particularly in grain, and dried fruits from Kermaunshaw. Some large boats load off the entrance of the river, but most of the produce is sent to Bunder Abbas in smaller boats, and shipped off from thence. The port is under the Imaum of Muskat. Minnow itself is a large place, and though only fifteen miles in a line inland, is nearly thirty by the winding of the river; and this, from the circumstance of the boats being obliged to come down with the tide, corroborates Patra de la Valles' account, in 1621, of its being two days' journey from the sea. This is





the river Anamis of Arrian, where Nearchus arrived on the eightieth day after quitting the Indus, and where he hauled his fleet on shore to repair, and afterwards went inland and joined Alexander, and after ten days he again put to sea. I should think the place where the present custom house stands must have been the place of the Grecian camp, and Mina or Minnow probably the place of Alexander's encampment.

KHARRON.

Kharron is a small village, with a port for small trading boats, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 54' N.$ , long.  $56^{\circ} 58' 30'' E.$  The soundings from Minnow river to this place are regular, from four to eight fathoms off the edge of the flat, which extends two miles off shore.

KAISRAK.

Kaisrak is a small village, eight and a half miles from Kharron.

YARROWN.

Yarrow is a small village, four miles from Kaisrak, inhabited by about sixty fishermen.

GRON.

Gron is a small town in lat.  $26^{\circ} 35' 40'' N.$ , long.  $57^{\circ} 5' 45'' E.$  It has a grove of date trees inland of it. A few cattle and poultry may be procured here from Kharron. To this place the soundings are regular, from five and a half to ten fathoms.

KONAREE.

Konaree is a fort and town, situated up a river. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 15' N.$ , long.  $57^{\circ} 18' 30'' E.$  The entrance to the small river leading to it is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 15' 50'' N.$ , long.  $57^{\circ} 6' E.$  The soundings two miles off shore are eight and ten fathoms, and regular from five to twelve fathoms between Gron and this place.

JIBBUL SERRAOWR.

Jibbul Serraowr is a remarkable hill, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 8' 49'' N.$ , long.  $57^{\circ} 19' 30'' E.$

RAS AYSHEER.

Ras Aysheer is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 1' 45'' N.$ , long.  $57^{\circ} 11' 50'' E.$  From Konaree river to this place a flat runs off, with patches of rock nearly dry, four and a half miles; soundings off it five to fifteen fathoms.

JIBBUL BEES.

Jibbul Bees is a high hill inland, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 9' 10'' N.$ , long.  $57^{\circ} 38' 10'' E.$

KOOR MOOBARUK.

Koor Moobaruk is a remarkable, isolated rock, situated on a low sandy flat, and has a remarkable perforation on its eastern corner,





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which, when the rock bears N. 44° W., can be seen completely through. It is in lat. 57° 19' 55" N., long. 25° 51' 55" E.

## RAS-OOŁ-KHORE.

Ras-ool-Khore, commonly called Cape Moobaruk, is the south-eastern point of a small creek, with a fathom to a fathom and a half water within it. The Ras also forms the eastern point of the bay, as Ras Jask forms the western. It is in lat. 25° 47' 5" N., long. 57° 20' 10" E. The soundings from Ras Aysheer to this cape are from twenty to six fathoms, and the coast is safe to approach to the distance of a mile.

## ROCKY SHOAL, OR TERNATE'S SHOAL.

Rocky Shoal, or Ternate's Shoal, is a small rocky shoal, about five hundred yards over, with a fathom and a half water on it, and soundings of seven to four and a half fathoms within it, and three to ten without it, stiff clay bottom. It is in lat. 25° 43½' N., long. 57° 29' 20" E. Inshore, abreast of this, a rocky bank runs off the shore a mile and a half.

## QUOIN HILL.

A remarkable quoin-shaped hill lies in lat. 25° 49½' N., long. 57° 43' E.

## JASK TOWN.

Jask Town is a town of some trade, in lat. 25° 38' 50" N., long. 57° 46' 40" E. At this place water and a few bad supplies may be obtained. It belongs to the Imaum of Muskat, and horses and several sorts of dry fruit, as well as ghee and some cotton, are exported from it. The soundings in the bay from Ras-ool-Khore, except what have been described, are from seven to eight and four fathoms; the anchorage off the town is in five fathoms; the fort N. 43° E., Quoin Hill N., true bearings.

## RAS JASK, OR CAPE JASK.

Ras Jask or Cape Jask is a low projecting rocky point, in lat. 25° 37' 55" N., long. 57° 47' 10" E. It has a small ruin on it, and there are some remarkable banian trees about three miles inland. Four miles on the western side from the pitch of the cape is a salt-water creek, running into a sort of lagoon, about eight or nine miles within. There is a narrow channel over the banks at its entrance, with six feet water; within are from one and a half to three fathoms. On the western side of the cape is a flat, with three and four fathoms on it, shoaling off gradually to ten and twenty, but no danger if attention is paid to the lead. The anchorage off Jask Town is good in a south-easter, while that on the eastern side the cape, and close in shore, is of the very best in a north-wester. You lay half a mile off shore in five or six fathoms, mud. It is high-water at 5h. 50m. full and change; rise of tide about five feet. The variation in 1829 was 2° 40' W.





## WITHOUT THE GULF.—ARABIAN COAST.

In Part I. of this Memoir I have mentioned that the high land forming the southern entrance into the Gulf is by the Arabs called Ras-ool-Jibbul. It is the same as seen by Alexander's fleet, as described by Arrian, from the seventy-eighth station of the fleet from the mouth of the Indus, and which I believe to be under Ras-ool-Khore, near Kohurba-reak. It was about the fleet standing over to this promontory that the dispute arose between Nearchus and Onesicritus, his colleague. It was by the Greeks called Maceta—it was also called Asabo; and the whole ridge from Huffar to Musseldom is the Black Mountains of Ptolemy, Musseldom, or that part near the termination or cape, being named Maceta or Maketa. Having premised so far, it is necessary to add, that at present two points of the same ridge of land bear the same name. The whole of these mountains are indented with coves and inlets, some small, others very extensive, and all with deep water within them, even close to the rocks: they produce nothing.

The inhabitants are a different race in many respects from the Arabs in the neighbourhood, and have a different language; they live upon fish, dates, and a little barley when they are rich enough to procure it; they are excessively poor, and rice is nearly unknown to them. Most of the women have never left the hills and coves. They are very ignorant, and their huts, which are built of loose stones, about four feet high, are little better than pigsties.

A small pocket looking-glass was given away at one of the villages, and was evidently the first that had ever been seen at that place: the men and women assembled in crowds, and were like a set of monkeys, examining it on both sides—sometimes shouting with laughter, at other times looking very serious.

They are very civil, and at the changes of the season emigrate from one side of the hills to the other. They have little clothing, and appear in the extreme of poverty, yet contented. Some of the men in the date season employ themselves in Batinah and other parts of the low country, in getting in the date harvest, yet all return to their barren hills; and so much does the love of this miserable place seem to be implanted in the inhabitants, that I was informed seldom or never is a man known to leave his home further than a few short voyages in the Gulf. During the period the pirates were in power, about two hundred of the people of these mountains were in their boats. The people have some small flocks of lean goats, which are allowed to run about the rocks, but come when called by their owners. There is little water among the hills, and that brackish.





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## RAS GOBERHINDEE, SOUTH POINT.

Ras Goberhindee, South Point, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 18' 30''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 35'$  E. It is a high bluff, forming the northern point of Dooat Shesah. It has seventeen fathoms water four yards off its base. The Persian Coast is nearer this point than anywhere else in the Gulf, being twenty-seven miles across.

## DOOAT SHESAH.

Dooat Shesah is the first inlet to the southward of Cape Musseldom, is near seven miles deep, and about twenty-two or twenty-three round. It has seven small coves within it, varying in depth from half a mile to a mile and a half. There is a small village with a few huts at the bottom of the inlet. The soundings over the inlet are thirty-four to forty fathoms. In some of the small coves it is the same, and in two of them there are ten and sixteen fathoms close to the shore, the bottom hard sand and rock. On the north-west side of the inlet there are two or three small rocky islets. The bottom of this inlet is separated from Colville's Cove by a ridge of about two-thirds of a mile, and from the bottom of Elphinstone Inlet by a ridge not more than two hundred yards at the base, and about three hundred feet high. The natives have a sheep track over.

## RAS KASAH.

Ras Kasah is a projecting rocky point, forming the southern point of Dooat Shesah. It is rugged, and has twenty-six fathoms water close to it; about a mile off there are sixty fathoms. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 14' 20''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 33\frac{1}{2}'$  E.

## OMAL PHEERRIM, COMMONLY CALLED FILLAM ROCK.

Omal Pheerrim, commonly called Fillam Rock, is a rocky islet, high in the centre, in lat.  $26^{\circ} 10' 12''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 36' 30''$  E. It is three and a quarter miles off Ras Bashine, the nearest shore. The soundings between them are thirty-two fathoms near the cape, fifty in mid-channel, and thirty-eight near the rock outside. The soundings are thirty-four close to the rock, and sixty to seventy fathoms one and two miles off.

## RAS BASHINE.

Ras Bashine is a projecting rocky point, forming the northern point of Dooat Rathrat, or Bradford's Cove. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 10' 40''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 38''$  E. It is steep, with soundings a few yards off of twenty to thirty fathoms.

## DOOAT RATHRAT, OR BRADFORD'S COVE.

Dooat Rathrat, or Bradford's Cove, is an inlet something similar to those before described. Round a rocky point, on its north-west side,





is an inner cove, two miles deep, and about six round, the soundings, on hard bottom, being thirty-three to ten fathoms, the latter close to the inner shore of the small cove. The whole cove is three and a half miles deep, and about sixteen round. There are in it two or three smaller coves, one of which, at the bottom, half a mile deep, has nine fathoms in it; the soundings are all over rocky bottom, and are from eighteen to thirty-six fathoms. There is a small village with a few huts here.

RAS DALLAA.

Ras Dallaa is a long, narrow ridge, forming a craggy point, and being the south point of Dooat Rathrat, and the northern point of Dooat Guzzerat. It is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 7' 38''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 33' 20''$  E. The soundings are thirty-two fathoms close to the point.

DOOAT GUZZERAT, OR MALCOLM'S INLET.

Dooat Guzzerat, or Malcolm's Inlet, is the most extensive of all the estuaries on this side the mountains. It is more than nine miles deep: at the entrance it is two miles wide, increasing to three and a quarter within. In other places it has several coves and bays: two of these are about three miles deep, and form the inner part of the inlet into two branches. The whole is about forty-three miles round. In the body of this inlet the soundings are thirty-three to twenty-four fathoms in the coves, and near the shores twenty-six to eighteen and ten fathoms; and at the bottom of one cove, close in, are seven fathoms. The whole of the rocks are high, and in many parts difficult to get up. There are two small villages in the north-western branch, the bottom of which is separated from Elphinstone Inlet, within the Gulf, by a ridge a mile and a quarter at the base, but not more than one hundred yards at the top; sloping down on both sides. It is also separated from Dooat Rathrat by a ridge wall from four hundred to about eighty yards thick. At this place we first heard the people call from one side to the other in a very shrill voice, and which we were informed they could so modulate as to be heard some miles among the hills. The bottom, like that of all the other coves, is hard sand and rock. There is at the bottom of this cove a remarkable hill, usually called Fillam Peak.

RAS SERKAN.

Ras Serkan is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 5' 24''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 32' 35''$  E. It is a high and bold headland, forming the southern point of Dooat Guzzerat. There are thirty and thirty-four fathoms close to it.

DOOAT KUBBAL.

The northern point of Dooat Kubbal is a mile and a quarter NNE. off Ras Seenmed, the opposite point, and there are close to it twenty fathoms. The cove is three and a half miles deep, and has soundings of





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from twenty-six to thirteen and six fathoms in it, over a bottom of rocks and sand. There is no village here, but there are inhabitants on the hills above.

## RAS SEENMED.

Ras Seenmed, the south point of Dooat Kubbal, is in lat.  $26^{\circ} 1' 20''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 29' 30''$  E. It is a high, bluff, and bold craggy point, and has twenty and twenty-six fathoms close to it.

## RAS MERWEE.

Ras Merwee is a point forming the northern part of a deep irregular bay, ending at Lima Town. The point is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 58' 10''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 30'$  E. A small rocky islet lays off this point, and there are twenty-seven and sixteen fathoms close to it.

## LIMA.

Lima is a small village of huts, made of stones, and very small, and built up the side of a hill, which gives it a picturesque appearance. It has about one hundred families of the hill tribes, and is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 55' 25''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 28' 50''$  E. It is in the bottom of the bay formed by Ras Merwee and Ras Lima. Between the former and the town there is a projecting point, off which are some rocky islets. The soundings throughout the bay are twenty to five fathoms close to Lima, over a rocky, sandy bottom.

## RAS LIMA.

Ras Lima is a long, rugged, rocky point, running off from the town nearly due east. It is in some parts sixty or eighty feet high. The point is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 55' 30''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 31' 30''$  E. There is a small islet a quarter of a mile from them; there is a deep channel between them, but unsafe, owing to the irregularity of the tides. The soundings are, off the islet, twenty-four to thirty-four fathoms.

## RAS SUMMOOTEE.

Ras Summootee is the north point forming the Bay of Lima Khodima. It is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 54' 37''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 30' 36''$  E.; soundings near it twenty-seven to twenty-three fathoms. Within this, at the bottom of the bay, is Lima Khodima, at which place there is a little flat land, and a few date trees. The contrast from all the high and black rock before you come to it, and after leaving it, makes it appear a little Paradise in this rocky wilderness. In the bay are soundings twenty to eight fathoms, and rather better ground than in the other places. The bay is two and a quarter miles deep, and about a mile to a mile and a half wide. Above this is a high, remarkable, peaked hill, usually called Lima Peak.

## RAS KHODIMA.

Ras Khodima, the southern point of the bay, is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 53' 40''$  N.,





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long.  $56^{\circ} 29' 40''$  E. It is moderately high, and rugged, and has seventeen fathoms water off it.

RAS SHERRIAT.

Ras Sherriat is the north point of a small cove of the same name. It is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 50'$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 27' 10''$  E.; soundings off it seventeen fathoms, hard rocky bottom.

DOOAT SHERRIAT.

Dooat Sherriat is a cove a mile and a half deep, about one mile wide within, and one mile between the points at the entrance; the soundings twenty fathoms at the entrance, to four fathoms at the bottom.

JIBBUL HUFFAR, OR SULKY PEAK.

Jibbul Huffar, or Sulky Peak, is a high peak, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 48'$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 24' 35''$  E.

*Remarks.*—From Dooat Sherriat to Khore Malak the land is full of small indentures, some going three quarters of a mile in, and having twelve to fifteen fathoms water, but otherwise of no note; outside the soundings are thirty to seventeen fathoms.

KHORE MALAK, NORTH POINT.

The north point of Khore Malak is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 46' 40''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 26' 30''$  E. It is a small cove, one mile deep, with eight and four fathoms in it. From this to Ras Huffar the coast is steep, with soundings of from thirty to fifteen fathoms.

RAS HUFFAR.

Ras Huffar, the point of the cove of the same name, is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 43' 30''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 22' 40''$  E. It is moderately high, the soundings off its point being ten fathoms.

DOOAT HUFFAR.

Dooat Huffar is a cove running up north within the cape of the same name. It is half a mile wide, and two and a quarter long; the soundings within are regular, eight to five fathoms. This is the last cove off the Ras-ool-Gebal; and at its southern point, Ras Saoote, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 41' 40''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 22' 50''$  E., ends the range. Across this part of the land to Ras-ool-Khyma the distance is only sixteen miles. After leaving this place, the country begins to be flat and cultivated, and continues so until past Burka.

CURRENTS.

The currents along the whole coast of Ras-ool-Gebal much depend on the state of the wind by which they are influenced: when the wind





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is strong, they generally run with it, but when it is light, and near calm, the tide prevails, although irregular, more particularly after you get out of the influence of the in-draught and out-set of the Gulf. It is a coast that should only be navigated where there is an object for it, for though attended with little or no danger, yet in calms the great depth of water and bad ground render it bad and inconvenient for anchorage, if found driving towards the shore; consequently a mid-channel course, or more towards the Persian Coast, is by far the best when running for or from the Gulf.

## COAST OF BATINAH.

## DIBBAH.

Dibbah, the first town on the Batinah Coast, is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 37' 25''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 20' 20''$  E. From Ras Laoote to the town of Dibbah, and from it to Ras Dibbah, the coast forms a deep bay, with regular soundings of from twenty to three fathoms, sandy bottom. The coast now gets low, and is covered with date groves, and at this place we found good water, and the finest cattle I have met with in the Gulf; and, for the season, fair supplies of vegetables. The inhabitants have a few trading boats here, and supply some of the Bedouin Tribes with grain. The place belongs to the Imaum of Muskat, whose nominal revenue from it is about four thousand German crowns; but it is not always paid. A fort named Jilla Hirshee is situated about two-thirds of a mile to the northward.

## RAS DIBBAH.

Ras Dibbah is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 35' 40''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 25' 50''$  E. It is a rocky point, forming the south-east extreme of Dibbah Bay. There is a small rocky islet a quarter of a mile off it: between them is a boat channel. One mile to the westward, within the bay, is a remarkable white patch in the rocks forming the cape; the soundings near it are five to ten fathoms. Two miles to the southward of Ras Dibbah is the fort and village of Rual; a mile and a half further Reema; six miles to the southward of which is a similar place, called Chunum; between which and Khore Fukaun are the villages of Beddya and Zebana, between which villages there is a rocky islet half a mile off shore. The soundings from Ras Dibbah to Khore Fukaun are regular, eight fathoms, about a mile off shore.

## KHORE FUKAUN.

The town of Khore Fukaun is situated in a small bay, formed by the Ras of that name. It is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 20' 45''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 25' 40''$  E. It is a place of some trade, and has a Khore, or boat harbour, secure from





all winds, half a mile deep, with two and three fathoms water in it. This place has about four hundred inhabitants. It has a few trading boats. About fifty of the inhabitants are Banians. It belongs to the Imaum of Muskat, whose nominal revenue from it is about three thousand German crowns. Excellent water, and pretty good supplies of cattle and poultry, are to be had here; also excellent fish. Ras Khore Fukau is a rocky point, rather high, one mile north-east of the town, and forms the extreme of the bay. Between Ras Khore Fukau and Fedjeerah are three villages, Sunmeum being the one nearest that place. The whole coast is abundantly planted with date groves, and the soundings off it regular to five fathoms, half or three quarters of a mile off shore.

#### FEDJEERAH.

Fedjeerah is a small fort and village, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 7' 30''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 23' 40''$  E. It has about one hundred and fifty inhabitants, mostly fishermen and cultivators.

#### RHUDAL KULBA.

Rhudal Kulba is a fort and village, in lat.  $25^{\circ} 4' 20''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 24' 26''$  E. It has about one hundred inhabitants, who are fishermen and cultivators. A few supplies may be obtained at all these places.

#### KHORE KULBA, AND FORT.

Khore Kulba Fort is a fort on the side of a creek, into which boats of twenty or thirty tons can go. It has some trade, particularly with the inland tribes, about two hundred inhabitants, and is in lat.  $25^{\circ} 0' 50''$  N., long.,  $56^{\circ} 24' 26''$  E. Supplies of cattle and poultry may be obtained here. Off these last three places, the soundings are regular to four fathoms, three quarters of a mile off shore. Between this and Shinas are successively situated the forts and villages of Maharac, Kuthrawain, Aboobugarrah, and Huggur. At each of these places the number of the inhabitants varies from seventy to one hundred, some employed in the coasting trade, others as fishermen and cultivators. A few supplies may be obtained at all these places.

#### SHINAS.

Shinas is a fort and town in lat.  $24^{\circ} 44' 41''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 33' 18''$  E. It is noted in the annals of the expedition of 1809 as the place where many men fell from the enemy being undervalued. This place, as also the whole of the Batinah Coast, belongs to the Imaum of Muskat. His nominal revenue is about three thousand German crowns. Water and supplies are to be had here. The place has a good deal of coasting trade, has a number of boats belonging to it, and contains about five hundred inhabitants. The country is pretty well cultivated near it, and the anchorage is good in six fathoms, clay bottom. From Shinas





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to Hoosafine the coast is low, well planted with date trees, and the soundings regular to four and five fathoms, three quarters of a mile off shore.

## HOOSAFINE.

Hoosafine is a fort and rather large village in lat.  $24^{\circ} 37' 45''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 36' 50''$  E. It has a few small trading boats, and about two hundred inhabitants. Supplies and water may be had here. The anchorage is good in six fathoms, mud.

## NABBINE.

One mile and a quarter to the southward is the fort and village of Nabbine, containing about sixty inhabitants. The coast is safe to navigate within a mile of the shore along to Hoomook, a village in lat.  $24^{\circ} 31' 15''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 41' 48''$  E.

## LUAR.

Luar is a large fort, with a town two miles inland, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 30' 53''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 39' 48''$  E. It is a place of some importance, and the nominal revenue of it, and the places attached to it, is about seven thousand German crowns; but it is a very small portion that goes to the Imaum.

## MAGGAESE.

Maggaese, a fort and town in lat.  $24^{\circ} 27' 40''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 46' E.$ , has about six hundred inhabitants. It is, with some villages adjacent, a mart and manufactory of the cotton canvas used by the Arabs for sails to their vessels. It has a great trade in this, and the canvas is considered better than that of Bahrein. About forty to sixty thousand German crowns' value of it is exported every year. The place yields the Imaum a nominal revenue of two thousand German crowns. Cattle and poultry are procurable here, also good water. From Hoomook to this the soundings are regular to four and five fathoms, a little more than half a mile off shore. The anchorage is in five fathoms, mud. Between this place and Sohar are the villages of Farska and Ras Sallan, each containing about sixty inhabitants, mostly fishermen and cultivators. The soundings along the coast are regular to Sohar, there being twenty-five fathoms ten miles off shore, and four and five within a mile of it.

## SOHAR.

Sohar is the principal town on this part of the coast, containing in and around it about four thousand inhabitants. It is in lat.  $24^{\circ} 21' 40''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 52' 3''$  E. It is a place of great trade with the inland tribes. It has about forty large boats belonging to it, besides a great number of coasting traders, and is so strong in its resources as frequently to be in open rebellion to the Imaum of Muskat. His revenues from





it are near thirty thousand German crowns, but he is frequently years without receiving them, and nothing but his naval force would ever get him one crown of it. The country is very plentifully stocked in fine cattle and poultry; and grapes, dates, limes, oranges, and many other fruits and vegetables, are abundant in their seasons. Fish is also very plentiful, and the water very fine. The anchorage in the road is in six fathoms, soft mud. About fifteen miles off shore, abreast of Sohar, is a bank, with twelve fathoms water, where they go to fish. Most of the villages within twenty miles either way on the coast are under the government of the Shaikh or Chief of Sohar.

SOHAR PEAK.

Sohar Peak is a high conical hill, inland from Sohar, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 17' 16''$  N., long.  $56^{\circ} 38' 43''$  E.

SUARAH.

Suarah is a village of about one hundred inhabitants, situated on the coast, about three miles from Sohar. Between this and Sohar, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 10' 20''$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 0' 50''$  E., are two other small villages, each containing forty or fifty inhabitants. Sahaam has about one hundred, and has some small boats belonging to it.

MAYKILIFF.

Maykiliff is a small fort and village in lat.  $24^{\circ} 7' 27''$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 4' 26''$  E. From Sohar to this place the coast continues low, thickly studded with date groves. The soundings off the coast are regular to five fathoms within a mile of the shore. Between this place and Ras Hayara, in lat.  $24^{\circ} 4' 17''$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 9' 50''$  E., is the village of Diel, containing about forty inhabitants. The village of Ras Hayara is large, and has many boats of about twenty tons belonging to it. Supplies and water may be obtained.

GASSBEYHER.

Gassbeyher is a village in lat.  $24^{\circ} 2' 20''$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 12' 54''$  E. Four miles to the SSE. is the village of Khoohoor, and between it and Kaderrah, Ahassa and three other villages, at all of which cattle may be procured. The country continues the same as to appearance and cultivation. The soundings off the coast are regular.

KADERRAH.

Kaderrah is a village of about one hundred inhabitants, in lat.  $23^{\circ} 53'$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 29' 45''$  E. The usual supplies may be obtained here, and it is under the Chief of Suik.

SUIK.

Suik is, next to Sohar, the largest place on this coast, and is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 51' 7''$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 32' 35''$  E. It contains about three thousand





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inhabitants, but the influence of the chief, who is a cousin of the Imaum, extends over the Bedouins of the interior, to the amount of near ten thousand. He is of more political influence and power than any chief in the Imaum's dominions. There is blood between them, and though acknowledging the Imaum as his chief and sovereign, he only renders him such obedience as suits his convenience. He is a fine-looking man, about thirty years of age. His name is Souf bin Biddoo. He was very attentive to our wants, and professed much attachment to the British Government. His revenues are about eight to ten thousand dollars for the places he holds on the coast, and he has about double that sum from his family estates in the interior. He is much beloved by his followers, and many think him most likely to succeed the Imaum in his Arabian territories. There are two or three forts at this place, and they are guarded with much vigilance. Suik has some trade with Bussora and the Malabar Coast, and it imports large quantities of Malabar rice from Muskat, which is again disposed of to the Bedouins from the interior, who bring down ghee and hard coin in exchange for it. Supplies of cattle and poultry are in great plenty here, as well as water; grapes pomegranates, melons, figs, and various other fruits, as well as vegetables, are plentiful in their seasons; and fish is plentiful at all times. The anchorage is in six fathoms, abreast the fort, a mile and a quarter off shore.

## MESSNA.

Messna is a small town and fort in lat.  $23^{\circ} 46' 20''$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 45' E$ . Between Suik and this place are situated successively the villages of Gubban, Oodam, Howiade, and Shessie, each having from fifty to one hundred inhabitants, and under the Chief of Suik. Messna has about a hundred and fifty people in it, and a number of coasting boats belonging to it. The soundings off the coast are quite regular. About two miles from Messna is Hewabby, the last village before you come to the Swady or Burka Islands. As you approach the first of the islands the soundings near them towards the shore are shoal.

## SWADY ISLANDS.

The largest of the Swady Islands, usually called the Burka Islands, which is highest, and has a rock on it like a turret, is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 47' 10''$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 53' E$ . There are several rocks in this group, and no channels between them. Outside of them, and between them and the Islands, the soundings are from ten to eighteen fathoms, and safe to work through.

## BURKA ISLANDS.

The centre of the largest of the Burka Islands, usually called the western range of the Swadys, is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 50' 20''$  N., long.  $58^{\circ} 4' E$ .





Between these islands and the shore the soundings are regular, fifteen fathoms near the islands, to five a mile off shore.

## JAZEERAT JEUNE.

The Jazeerat Jeune Islands, usually called the eastern range of the Swadys, extend four miles in an east and west direction. The west point is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 50' 25''$  N., long.  $58^{\circ} 9' 25''$  E. Between this and the Burka Islands the channel is four miles wide, with twelve to twenty fathoms in it.

## DAMINIATTE ROCKS.

The centre of the Daminiatte Rocks, usually called the Damiceette Rocks, is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 50' 48''$  N., long.  $58^{\circ} 15' 25''$  E. A small reef runs round these, safe to approach to ten fathoms. Between these rocks and Jazeerat Jeune the channel is a mile and three quarters wide, with soundings ten to eighteen fathoms in it. Between these rocks and the shore the channel is eight miles wide, with soundings of from seven to sixteen fathoms.


## BURKA FORT AND TOWN.

Burka Fort and Town are in lat.  $23^{\circ} 42' 25''$  N., long.  $57^{\circ} 59' 30''$  E. It is a town of large size, and has the summer residence of the Imaum in it. The neighbourhood is well cultivated. It was at this place the assassination of the Imaum's elder brother took place. The chief is often in rebellion, and there appears very little attachment to the Imaum here. Fruits, limes, and vegetables are abundant here, in the proper season, and the place is considered healthy. The population varies, as they come to this place from Muskat and Muttra in the hot season. The Imaum's revenue from this place is about eight thousand German crowns. Three miles to the eastward of Burka is the small town of Swady, containing about four thousand inhabitants, and subject to the Chief of Burka. Five and a quarter miles further to the eastward, and abreast of Jazeerat Jeune, is a ruined fort. The soundings between the coast and the islands are regular, from sixteen to five fathoms, sandy, and at times clay bottom.

## SEIB.

Seib is a small town, in lat.  $23^{\circ} 41' 10''$  N., long.  $58^{\circ} 17' 40''$  E., and is the last place in Batinah. It has a number of boats of all sizes belonging to it, is well inhabited, and gives the Imaum a revenue of four thousand German crowns. A very large portion of the market boats for Muskat load here, the place being convenient for the people of the cultivated parts of the interior. The hot springs are a few miles inland from this place. The soundings between this place and the Daminiatte Rocks are from six to fifteen fathoms. Eight and a half miles from Seib, in the bottom of a bay, is the village of Hael, inhabited





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by fishermen; about three miles further to the NE. is another small fishing village.

## FAHILL ISLAND.

Fahill Island, called by Europeans Muttra Island, is a rocky island, about a quarter of a mile long, two and a half miles off shore, with a channel between them, with soundings of from twenty to fourteen fathoms in it. It is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 42' 12''$  N., long.  $58^{\circ} 36' 10''$  E., and is an excellent mark for making Muskat. From Burka to this place, and for twenty or thirty miles off shore, the currents set strong to the westward during the months of June, July, August, and September; at other times they are irregular, sometimes setting one way, sometimes another.

## SHAYTAYFEE.

Shaytayfee is a fine village, with some good houses in it, in a small bay formed by Ras Muttra, to the SE. The bay has soundings of from six to two fathoms close to the shore. It is a quarter of a mile wide at the entrance, and a third of a mile deep. The Imaum has a cannon foundry at this place, and there are several large trading boats belonging to it.

## RAS MUTTRA.

Ras Muttra forms the north-western point of Muttra Bay. It has three rocky islets off it, and is a high, bold headland.


## ARBUG.

Arbug is a handsome town, principally inhabited by wealthy merchants, and their dependents. It is situated in a small bay between Ras Muttra and Muttra Town. It has a pretty picturesque appearance. There are two or three forts and towers for its defence, which add much to the prospect from sea. The houses are good, and most of the rich shipowners reside here.

## MUTTRA.

Muttra is a large and wealthy town, at the bottom of the bay of the same name. It is distant from Muskat two and a half miles, there being a road over a pass to connect them, though canoes and other boats are the usual modes of communication. The town is two-thirds of a mile long, and contains not less than fifteen to eighteen thousand inhabitants. About one thousand of these are Banians from Sind and Kutch, settled here for the purpose of trade. As I shall speak of the exports and imports under the head of Muskat, I will only add that Muttra has about fifty trading boats, of from three hundred to thirty tons, and the Imaum's revenue, principally from customs, in 1827, was sixty-two thousand German crowns.





MUTTARAH.

Muttarah is a small village, inhabited by merchants and their slaves, in a small cove, a quarter of a mile to the eastward of Muttra.

RIAM.

Riam is a village, inhabited by merchants and their slaves, in a small cove, one mile ENE. of Muttra. In this cove there are three fathoms water a cable-length from the shore. The north-east point is also the east point of Muttra Bay.

KHULBOO.

Khulboo is a small town, also inhabited by merchants and ship builders. It is situated in a cove formed by the north-east point of Riam Cove and Ras Muskat. The cove is half a mile wide, and half a mile deep, and has soundings of ten fathoms across the entrance to three fathoms inside, a cable-length from the shore.

RAS MUSKAT.

Ras Muskat is the west point of Muskat Cove, and is high and bluff, with three and four fathoms water close to it.

RAS SEERAH.

Ras Seerah is the north-west point of Muskat Island, and east point of the cove. It is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 38' 50''$  N. The island from this point to the gap in Muskat Cove is one mile long, and a quarter of a mile wide in the broadest part.

FISHERMAN'S ROCK.

Fisherman's Rock is about two hundred and eighty yards off the bluff of Ras Seerah, and twenty off the low rocky point. There is a small boat channel, with two and a half fathoms, between them. Outside the rock there are seven fathoms within five yards of it. You should pass close round it going into the cove.

MUSKAT COVE.

Muskat Cove is formed by Ras Muskat on the east, and Fisherman's Rock and Ras Seerah on the west, Muskat Island forming the whole of that side, while the cape running out from Muskat and Khulboo forms the other. It is rather more than three quarters of a mile wide between the points on the west side. Between a small point with a half-moon and other batteries on it, and Jilla Farsah, is a bay where the ships and large boats are laid up and repaired, being sheltered from most winds. In the cove there is room, exclusive of the bay just described, for forty or fifty sail of ships and large vessels, the soundings shoaling from thirteen and fourteen fathoms at the entrance to three fathoms about a quarter of a mile from the bottom of the cove. The cove is





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one mile deep, and, except abreast the half-moon battery, is nearly the same breadth as at the entrance. The best anchorage for a ship only going to stop a few days is in eight or nine fathoms, mid-channel, between the fort on Muskat Island and the half-moon battery; for ships landing cargo, a berth in six fathoms, a little within the battery, rather over towards Muskat Island, would be the best,

## MUSKAT.

Muskat is the capital of the Kingdom of Oman, and the residence of the Imaum or Sultan. It is situated at the bottom of the cove of the same name, and is in lat.  $23^{\circ} 38' 5''$  N., long.  $58^{\circ} 40' 20''$  E.


It is in some parts well built, and is a place of great trade. The Imaum's palace is on the water side, and is a good but plain building. On the top of a high hill, on the western side, is a large fort, originally built by the Portuguese, called Jilla Farsah, and on the east side, over the gap, is another very strong fort, named Jilla Ali. Several small towers and forts are scattered about on the hills, and over the pass to the SE. Though barren rocks and buildings are all that are to be seen, yet at few places do you get better supplies,—fruit in the season in the greatest abundance, and some at all times of the year, particularly limes, and remarkably fine pomegranates; vegetables, though of the country sort, are very good, and plentiful; beef and mutton of the finest quality; the poultry, though small, is good; and fish of the finest quality, and at all times, in the greatest abundance.

The population of Muskat is constantly fluctuating. At times it amounts to near thirty thousand souls; at other times there is not more than ten or twelve thousand. There are about two thousand Banians settled here, who carry on a thriving trade. They are patient and enduring, and have little or no expenses. They are brokers to most of the Arab merchants, and generally agents to any European ship that trades to this place. Some of them have great influence with the Imaum, who finds it greatly to his interest, and the benefit of his revenues, to give them every encouragement. There are twelve or fourteen merchant ships and brigs belonging to the port of Muskat, of from one thousand to two hundred tons burden.

To the small places before described, there belong nearly two hundred large trading boats, that trade to India, Kutch, the Coast of Mukran, Sind, the various ports in the Gulf of Persia and the Red Sea, the island of Zanzibar, and the Coast of Africa. The ships trade to Bengal, the Isle of France, Bourbon, and Malabar Coast.

The imports are piece goods, both of British and Indian manufacture, indigo, timber, rice, sugar-candy, sugar, coffee, spices, dried fruits, dates,





salt, pearls, and slaves. A large quantity of ghee, and some cotton, are also imported from Sind and Kutch. Most of these articles are either sold to the inland tribes, or again exported coast-ways along the Imaum's territory, or into Persia or Turkish Arabia. The exports are gums, drugs, dates, dried fruits, sharkfins, salt, salt fish, and asses,—the latter generally to the Isle of France or Bourbon.

To give some idea of the trade, I need only mention what the amount paid by the Banian who farmed the customs was in 1827, viz. one lakh and eighty-eight thousand German crowns. Muskat takes off from Mangalore and the Malabar Coast annually about four or five hundred thousand morahs of rice, besides immense quantities of timber, pepper, and cardamoms. A large quantity of the Mysore coffee is also exported from the Malabar Coast by vessels belonging to Muskat and its dependencies.


The Imaum himself is one of the principal merchants of the place: a very great portion of the trade is in his hands, and also much of that to Bourbon and the Isle of France. The inhabitants are Arabs of various tribes, and mostly Mahomedans of the Soonee sect; and though many Shaikhs from the Mukran and Persian Coasts are settled here, all under the present Imaum are alike protected.

Synd Saeed bin Sultan, the present Imaum or Sultan, succeeded his elder brother, who was appointed by his cousin Biddoo bin Jaaf, in 1806 or 1807. He is now about fifty-two or fifty-three years of age, of a most prepossessing appearance, and gentlemanly manners, and is possessed of considerable abilities. He is a careful politician: he watches carefully all political events in India or Arabia, and, as far as he can, turns them to the advantage of his Government. He is much attached to the English, both from personal feelings, and gratitude for the assistance they have given him at various times.

The Imaum has established a very respectable naval force, which is, with the island of Zanzibar, his principal care and study. His navy consists of one seventy-four (I believe now sent to England as a present to the king); the *Shah Allum*, a double-banked frigate of fifty guns; the *Caroline*, of forty guns; *Piedmontese* and *Mustafa*, of thirty guns each; *Rahmany*, corvette, of twenty-two guns; three brigs and schooners, of eight to twelve guns each; besides four war Buggalows and six Buteels, carrying from four to ten guns each. He has also several merchant vessels. His dominions extend from the 22nd to the 27th degree of N. lat., and from the 55th to the 60th degree of E. long., comprising what is usually termed the Kingdom of Oman, and has a sea coast of near five hundred miles.

The island of Zanzibar, on the Coast of Africa, some small places on





that coast from Jask to Churbaron, the Coast of Mukran, the islands of Kishm and Ormus, Kammeer, Bunder Abbas, and Minah or Minoo, on the Coast of Persia, are under his government.

The whole of the male population in his territory are about eight hundred thousand: one-third of these are most probably slaves. The chiefs in his own dominions are very turbulent, and it is not often he can get any revenue from places off the coast;—even these during his expeditions against Mombassa have been in open rebellion, particularly Sohar, Suik, and Burka. The chief of the latter place actually seized his son and nephew, whom he had left in charge of the Government; and there are several of his own near relations particularly who are his greatest enemies.

As he has no children by his wife, it is generally thought some of his near relations will succeed him in Arabia, and his sons will be settled on the island of Zanzibar, which is of late the Imaum's favourite residence, and on which he is forming plantations of sugar, coffee, and indigo, and with so much success that it promises fair to be one of the most valuable islands on this side the Cape of Good Hope.

The Imaum keeps up at Muskat, and in his various forts, about fifteen hundred Beloochees: these are all the soldiers who receive pay;—his subjects, as in all Arab countries, are bound to follow him to war, but, like the highlanders of old, it is only when their own immediate chief orders them.

The total of the Imaum's revenue is said to be near seven lakhs of German crowns, but one lakh may be allowed for short of collection; Muskat, Muttra, Zanzibar, and the slave trade, are his only certain sources of revenue, and they may be estimated as follows:—

	German Crowns.
Muskat, external, by customs.....	180,000
Muttra, ditto ditto .....	60,000
Muskat and Muttra, internal .....	20,000
Zanzibar Island .....	220,000
Slave Trade .....	80,000
Average annual receipts from other places, about .....	50,000

Total . . . German Crowns 610,000

As far as Zanzibar goes, the revenue is every year improving. The Imaum has been frequently at war, and with varied success, with the Bahreinees, Mombas, and the pirates. Himself and tribe are a brave race, but the generality of his subjects are arrant cowards; so much so as to make it a proverb with the Arabs—"As great a coward as a Muskateec." There is little more to add than that the Imaum has Treaties





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NAVIGATION OF THE GULF OF PERSIA.

with the Government of India\* and the Isle of France. He is much liked by all foreigners who visit him. The Americans in the year 1833 sent a sloop of war and schooner to make a treaty† with him. The Imaum has two sons and some daughters by his concubines. One of them, Hilal bin Syud, takes a part in the government.

\* Vide pages 248 to 259 of this Selection.

† Vide pages 262 to 264 of ditto.





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SLAVE TRADE.

PAPER

RELATIVE TO THE

MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,

BETWEEN THE YEARS 1820 AND 1844,

FOR EFFECTING THE

SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE  
IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

PREPARED, IN OCTOBER 1844, BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,

RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

TO WHICH ARE APPENDED,

Copies of the Engagements entered into

WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,

BETWEEN THE YEARS 1822 AND 1851,

BY HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT,  
THE ARAB CHIEFS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, AND THE  
GOVERNMENT OF PERSIA,

FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE ABOVE OBJECT.

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## SLAVE TRADE.

THE first obligation imposed upon the Arab Chieftains in the Persian Gulf, with reference to the Traffic in Slaves, was the provision forming Article IX. of the General Treaty of 1820.\* The words are "The carrying off of slaves, men, women, and children, from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature."

This Article has ever been understood and held as forbidding only the carrying off of men, women, and children as slaves, and the transporting them in vessels, when so carried off, although the words may be said to bear the same comprehensive sense of forbidding the carrying off of slaves, and the transporting of slaves, however procured, in vessels; but even this most extended acceptation cannot be construed into forbidding the purchase of slaves, and the transport of them overland, unless indeed the last clause, which provides that the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature, embraces everything. The Arabic sentence bears precisely the same meaning, and is liable to the same opposite constructions.

It would be manifestly unjust to enforce this Article, imposing the same punishment on dealing in slaves as on piracy, whilst at the same time the Imaum of Muskat, the Turks, the Persians, and all the Arabs not included in this Treaty, are allowed to carry on the trade. The effect, moreover, would be only to benefit the latter, by throwing the trade into their hands.

The following observations upon this subject, made by Captain McLeod, Resident in the Gulf in 1823, hold good to the present day:—

"But in whatever sense the words of the Treaty may be understood by either party, I am convinced that our utmost endeavours to abolish the Slave Trade amongst the parties to the Treaty will be ineffectual as long as the other powers of the Gulf persist in it. We may, perhaps, put a stop to the carrying off of slaves, but their purchase and transport

\* Vide pages 78 to 80 of this Selection.





we never can prevent: the slaves will be disguised and concealed in a thousand ways, so that it will be impossible for us to detect them; and I doubt whether more harm than good might not be done to the cause of humanity by stopping boats, and searching them for slaves, because it would in all cases occasion such disgust and offence as would involve a great risk of a renewal of hostilities.

"I do not believe that any of the parties to the Treaty do carry off slaves,\* all those they possess being purchased at Muskat and other places. But at all events it would be difficult, even in the former case, to detect them,—in the latter next to impossible; and with all our efforts we shall find it impracticable to put a stop to a traffic which is sanctioned by their religion and by immemorial custom, unless it were relinquished by the common consent of the *whole* of the Chiefs of this Gulf."

Finally, the Bombay Government thus declared, in its letter No. 393, dated 26th March 1823†:—

"The Article relating to the Slave Trade does certainly not bear the construction that has hitherto been put on it. It evidently only alludes to descents made on the Coast of Africa for the purpose of making slaves. This is justly declared to be plunder and piracy,—terms which it would have been an abuse of language to apply to any trade, however detestable, as long as it was peacefully conducted. In this sense the Article must be understood, but every infringement of it, when clearly established, must be resented as a case of piracy would be."

On the 29th August 1822 a Treaty‡ was concluded with His Highness the Imaum of Muskat by Captain Moorsby, of His Majesty's ship *Menai*, under the instructions of the Government of the Isle of France.

A letter was received from His Highness the Imaum of Muskat at Zanzibar in July 1837, complaining of the aggressions committed by

\* The Joasmees have been accused of stealing and carrying off slaves from the African Coast, but the crime was not proven. They are nevertheless supposed to have been frequently guilty of it.

† Again, the opinion of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, as conveyed in the 9th paragraph of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, dated 22nd March 1841:—"That with regard to those chieftains who entered into engagements with Sir W. G. Keir in 1820, it would not be prudent or right abruptly, and until by friendly communications a sufficient ground shall have been laid for such a course, to declare all trading in slaves to be piracy and plunder, and to attempt to enforce Article IX. according to the English version of the Treaty, which indeed has been found not to correspond with the native wording; and considering that it has not in consequence been acted upon for the last twenty years, the force of that Article must be considered as in a great measure suspended."

Suffice it to say, that not one single seizure has been made under its provisions, although twenty-four years have elapsed since the date of its formation, and the trade continues to flourish.

‡ A copy of which is annexed.





the subjects of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur upon the inhabitants of that coast. Although it was not considered expedient to throw any obstacles in the way of the intercourse so long carried on by the Joasmees with the Coast of Africa, yet it was intimated to His Highness, in reply, that he was fully justified in taking such measures as he considered best adapted to protect his subjects from aggressions of the nature complained of.

A few days subsequent to the receipt of the above, a statement was made to the Resident by an individual named Abdoolla bin Iwuz (professing to be a person of some rank from the African Coast), regarding the alleged outrageous proceedings of the crews of some Joasmee boats, in having carried off two hundred and thirty-three young girls, under the pretence of marriage, and subsequently disposed of them as slaves upon their return to the Gulf. On the Joasmee Agent, who happened at the time to be at Bushire, being summoned, and Article IX. of Sir W. G. Keir's Treaty with the pacificated Arabs brought to his notice, he denounced the complainant's statement as an unqualified falsehood. He did not mean to deny the fact of slaves having been brought up from the Coast of Berbera, but declared that they had been regularly purchased from two tribes in that neighbourhood, at war with each other, who were in the habit of selling all the prisoners that fell into their hands. He further denounced Abdoolla bin Iwuz as an impostor, without any letters or credentials, who would have returned to Muskat without lodging any complaint had Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur been willing to make him a small present. Although, notwithstanding the inquiries which were immediately instituted, no proofs could be established to bring the charge home to the Joasmees, who were either innocent of the offence, or had found means of concealing the truth from the Government Agent, yet the case had its effect, inasmuch as it opened a wide field for investigation into the nature and extent of the traffic in slaves, and led to some discoveries which were duly taken advantage of.

The result of this inquiry led to the belief that the Somalees, from whom a great part of the supply appeared to be drawn, were a free people (according to Mahomedan law), and could not become slaves without violence. The conclusion to be drawn therefrom was, that those conveyed to the Persian Gulf must either be kidnapped or purchased while prisoners of war,—a practice to which, even among the generality of Mahomedans, a degree of turpitude attached, which, if argued and insisted upon, would tend materially to diminish and circumscribe the trade.

With a view to prevent the recurrence of such a case as that which formed the subject of Abdoolla bin Iwuz's complaint, Shaikh Sultan bin





## SLAVE TRADE.

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Suggur, Rashid bin Humeed, Muktoom bin Butye, and Khaleefa bin Shakboot, the Chiefs of Ejman, Debaye, and Aboothabee, were induced to enter into and sign an Article of an Agreement, dated 17th April 1838, conceding to our cruisers the right of searching and detaining vessels upon the high seas in all cases where their crews might be suspected of having been engaged in the kidnapping of slaves, and at the same time to admit the further right of seizing and confiscating them in case the suspicion proved to be well founded.

Up to this time (A. D. 1838) vessels engaged in the Slave Trade were (according to the Treaty concluded by Captain Moresby, of His Majesty's ship *Menai*, with His Highness the Imaum, on the 29th August 1822) liable only to seizure if found "to the eastward of a line drawn from Cape Delgado passing east of Socotra, and on to Diu Head, the western point of the Gulf of Cambay"; but as a further advance toward circumscribing the field for the prosecution of the Slave Trade in these quarters, and diminishing the number of marts for the sale and purchase of human beings, the Resident, in July 1839, succeeded in engaging the Maritime Arab Chiefs, viz. Sultan bin Suggur, of Ras-ool-Khyma, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, of Aboothabee, Muktoom bin Butye, of Debaye, and Abdoolla bin Rashid, of Amulgavine, to accede to the wishes of the British Government, by attaching their seals and signatures to a new engagement,\* Article I. of which gave to our vessels the right of search beyond a line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing two degrees seaward of the island of Socotra, to Pussem, on the Mukran Coast; Article II. rendered vessels belonging to the above chiefs, or their subjects, found with slaves on board beyond the limits specified, liable to seizure and confiscation; and Article III. made the sale of Somalees an act of piracy.

To this engagement, which modified and formed an addition of three new Articles to the Treaty concluded by Captain Moresby in 1822, the Imaum was induced to become a party in December of the same year. Under the sanction of Government, it was subsequently intimated to the several chiefs subscribing to the treaties, that instructions had been issued to the British Political Agent at Muskat, that on all occasions where suspicion might arise of any of their vessels touching at Muskat having Somalees on board, he should without delay obtain the sanction

\* The warmest commendation of the Honorable the Governor in Council was communicated to the Resident, Captain Hennell, for his valuable exertions in obtaining such extensive concessions, whereby Government had it in its power effectually to exclude this nefarious trade on the long line of coast extending from Bombay to Cape Paperia. A very considerable traffic in slaves had long been known to have been carried on, more particularly from Africa, with the Portuguese settlement of Diu, with the port of Mandvee in Kutch, and with those in Sind.





of His Highness the Imaum for an immediate inquiry into the facts of the case; and in the event of the suspicion proving well founded, make an application to His Highness to lay an embargo upon such vessels, until a reference could be made either to the Persian Gulf Residency, or to the Government.

The practicability of inducing His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf, to prohibit and abolish the traffic in slaves altogether, was at one time brought under consideration, but the following arguments and facts, urged at the time, proved the utter inutility of so partial a measure :—

That in the first place it would be impracticable to induce His Highness the Imaum of Muskat and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf to put to an end the traffic in slaves without such a large pecuniary sacrifice being made on the part of the British Government as would most likely be considered altogether inexpedient; and in the second place, that were such a sacrifice made, the humane and philanthropic objects of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council would still be defeated by further impediments and difficulties, for which no remedy could probably be found.

Article IX. of Sir W. G. Keir's Treaty of 1820, as before mentioned, had never been held binding to the fullest import of which it could bear the application.

Since that date a period of seventeen years had passed over without the question having been agitated, and thus the several parties concerned had acquired a sort of prescriptive right, never questioned by the Government, to consider that Article IX. was inserted solely with the view of guarding against the forcible carrying away of individuals for the purpose of selling them as slaves, and not meant to prohibit altogether a traffic which is not only in accordance with the letter and spirit of their religion, but which long continuance and custom have rendered almost indispensable to their domestic comfort.

Assuming, however, that Article IX. of the Treaty of 1820 bears the interpretation best suited to our views and policy, and that our right to act upon it, although allowed to lie so long in abeyance, is nevertheless liable to be called into operation whenever we may consider it expedient to do so, still it must be borne in recollection that even on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf alone, neither His Highness the Imaum, nor the Chiefs of Sohar, Kateef, or Koweit, are parties to this Treaty, and therefore their consent to a total prohibition of the traffic in our fellow-creatures could only be obtained by means of negotiation, and the offer of such advantages as would in their estimation compensate for the loss they sustained, in the surrender of a practice uniting





both profit and convenience. A great proportion of the revenue of His Highness the Imaum is drawn from this source, and he is said to have declared, that in consequence of his having allowed himself to enter into the agreement with Captain Moresby, of the Royal Navy, engaging to prohibit the Slave Trade with European Powers within certain limits, he has sustained a diminution on his revenue to the extent of 100,000 crowns, and that he is resolute in his determination not to afford any further concession upon this point. But even admitting that, either through our influence, or the payment of an annual pecuniary compensation, the parties alluded to consented to enter into an engagement for the total suppression of the Slave Trade, it is to be feared that the attainment of the humane objects contemplated by the Government would be still as distant as before. The reason for entertaining this opinion is, that the only effect of the prohibition, if it could be enforced in the ports on the Arabian side of the Gulf, would be to throw the whole of this infamous traffic into the hands of the inhabitants of Bussora and Mohumrah (subjects of the Ottoman Porte), and those of Bushire, Congoon, Aseeloo, and Lingah, the principal seaports of Persia. It is unnecessary to observe, that in the present state of our relations with both these Governments\* no interdiction of the traffic in question could be carried into effect, unless under the express sanction of their respective authorities. Taking, however, into consideration, that the sale and purchase of slaves is not only permitted by the tenets of their faith, but that the discontinuance would greatly abridge what habit and custom have led their subjects to value as a domestic convenience, for some time at least it is hopeless to look for such a sanction being afforded. In addition to these impediments, there exists the probability that were the inhabitants in the Gulf to relinquish the traffic at present carried on in slaves, the place of their vessels would be immediately occupied by those from the Red Sea, the Coasts of Mukran, Sind, &c. &c. It may at the same time be reasonably anticipated, that even those powers whose consent to our views may be exacted or purchased will exhibit little more than a nominal adherence to their engagements, unless compelled to do so by our own maritime force. This, however, would involve the necessity of greatly augmenting the number of the vessels of war employed in those seas, and in all probability be attended with the constant risk of entangling us in disputes with the local Governments dependent on Persia, Turkey, and Egypt.

As the inhabitants of Koweit, Bussora, Congoon, Aseeloo, and

\* Since this Paper was written, the Persian Government has entered into a Convention with the British Government, authorising the search and seizure, by British men of war and by vessels of the Indian Navy, of Persian vessels suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade. A copy of this Convention is annexed.—*Editor*.





Lingah carry on the traffic in question to a considerable extent, and as these ports are subject to the authority of the Turkish and Persian Governments, it would be useless attempting to enter into any negotiations affecting this branch of their commerce, unless through our Ministers at the Courts of Constantinople and Tehran.

The following review of our powers by the foregoing treaties, which form the only restrictions to the Slave Trade, will prove how little calculated these are, from being so very partially directed, to suppress or even check the Slave Trade in these quarters, although they should have the fullest effect in excluding it from the entire shores of India, including the newly acquired possessions. The Restrictive Slave Trade Line from Delgado to Pussem leaves a track or road sufficiently large for the safe and convenient navigation of the vessels engaged in the traffic; and circumstances of distress, or other unavoidable cause, moreover, exempt the vessel\* found beyond it from the penalties laid down by the Treaty. This line, too, affects only the boats of Muskat, and the ports situated between Ras-ool-Khyma and Aboothabee inclusive. Those of the ports on the Coast of Persia and Turkey, such as Lingah, Congoon, Asceloo, Kowcit, and Bussora, are bound by no engagements whatever, or restricted to no particular limits.

The agreement concluded in April 1838, although it provides against kidnapping on the part of those chiefs subscribing, or their subjects, does not in the letter preclude them from purchasing slaves from others who have kidnapped them, and the difficulties which on the one hand offer to the cruisers in making the distinction, and discovering the actual men-stealers, and on the other the facilities to the latter in escaping detection (for a very large portion of the slaves have been kidnapped—that is, as prisoners of war, have been sold by those into whose hands they have fallen), may be conceived.

Article III. of the Treaty of 1839 precluded the parties subscribing from the sale or purchase of Somalees *in toto*,† that tribe, from profess-

\* No cruisers have hitherto been ever assigned to watch the boundary line laid down in Article II., nor, in consequence, also, has any seizure been yet made under its provisions. In any case of seizure, however, another obstacle would appear to present itself to the legal infliction of the penalty specified, in the great difficulty of establishing by proof, such as would be required in a court of law, that the slaves, men, women, and children, are intended for sale, in order to subvert the statement of the commander or owner that such are their own, or the wives, concubines, or personal attendants, male or female, of the other free men on board, or that the males are slaves employed in the navigation of the vessel, and forming a part of its crew.

† In cases where, from insurmountable difficulties and lengthened delays, little hopes exist of obtaining the surrender of the vessels or persons of those who have been convicted of embarking or selling Somalee slaves, it was recommended "that the excuse urged by their chief of the absence of the delinquents should not be admitted, but that he should be held responsible.





ing the faith of Islam, being, according to Mahomedan law, considered Hoor, or free, in contradistinction to Negroes or Abyssinians, who came under the denomination of Abud, or bondsmen. The proportion of the former to the two latter is perhaps as one to one hundred, and these are probably kidnapped or purchased as prisoners of war. There is, however, much doubt whether in actual fact any great degree of moral guilt is considered to attach to Musulmans engaging in this traffic. The discovery of an individual of the Somalee Tribe, even when in possession of one of the chiefs subscribing to this agreement, or his subjects, and his consequent restoration to liberty, must be necessarily very rare, and to be accomplished only in spots within the sphere of immediate surveillance and supervision of our Native Agents. With a view to give a more full effect, however, to these restrictions, such as they are, valuable suggestions, as hereafter extracted\* from the Records of the Residency, have from time to time been made, having for their object also the eventual and total suppression of the nefarious traffic.

In all the negotiations which have hitherto been entered into with His Highness the Imaum and the independent Maritime Chieftains of the Arabian Coast, the main object in view has been in the first place wholly to exclude this hateful traffic from all places subject to, or dependent upon, the British Government; and in the next to narrow as much as possible the facilities of carrying it on within those limits which have hitherto been recognised by us as legitimate in all our intercourse with them. The free and unmolested traffic in slaves between the Imaum's possessions on the African Coast and the ports in the Persian Gulf, within the restrictive line, has always been contended

for their act; and, in the event of his persisting in a refusal to produce them, liable to the infliction of a fine of twice the market value of the unhappy individual who has been dragged away into slavery, in direct violation of a solemn agreement. To such a plan, however, there exists the difficulty regarding the disposal of the fine when paid; and it was at the same time suggested "that it might, provided no legal objection interposed, be applied to the purchase and liberation from slavery of such Somalees as their present owners in different parts of the Gulf might be disposed to part with." But it may be questioned whether such an arrangement, while it served to check the traffic in Somalees, among those subscribing to the agreement, would not tend to encourage it among those not parties to the same. A better plan, therefore, would appear to offer itself for the disposal of the fine alluded to, when recovered, in the payment of the amount into the hands of the individual liberated, on his return to his native country, as a compensation for the temporary loss of his liberty, and the hardships and inconvenience he has suffered. "The only other alternative, excepting a prohibition against all or any of the vessels of the offending chief or his subjects proceeding to the Coast of Africa on any pretext whatsoever, would be to seize the Buggalows belonging to individuals once proved guilty of bringing up Somalee slaves to the Gulf, wherever they might thereafter be found. His Highness the Imaum would probably gladly interdict their visiting Zanzibar and other places belonging to himself in the vicinity, and would give our ships authority to seize such vessels as might infringe this prohibition."

\* Vide page 646 *et seq.*





for by all the members of the several treaties which have been entered into touching this trade; therefore no interference with the native vessels in the Gulf having slaves on board existed on our part, excepting in cases where it could be proved that these had been kidnapped by the crews, or their carrying Somalees for sale. The difficulty attending the production of proof touching the former exception (unless by the aid of qualified Agents at Zanzibar, and on the African Coast) is fully admitted; but there is no possibility of passing an individual of the Somalee Tribe for a Negro, and therefore a thorough search of the vessel suspected of having any on board must always tend to their discovery.

Little prospect exists of persuading the Arabian Chiefs to resign of their own accord a practice consonant to their social and religious habits, and at the same time uniting profit with convenience. So long as the Shaikhs on the coast are satisfied they are not likely to incur a positive injury or loss from us, in consequence of their continuing the existing traffic in slaves, they will not consent to any arrangements having in view its abolition; but were a declaration on the part of the British Government made, intimating its being considered expedient and right that the purchase and sale of human beings by the independent Maritime Chiefs of Arabia should cease after a certain period, and that any infractions of such a prohibition would be punished, it would probably be submitted to without opposition, although rather as an act of authority it were useless to attempt to oppose or contend against than from any conviction of the justice or propriety of the demand.

Next to such a measure as the above, a great check, if not a total stop might be put to the traffic in slaves, on the part of the independent chiefs on the Arabian Coast of this Gulf, were advantage to be taken of the declaration made by His Highness the Imaum regarding the irregular proceedings of the Joasmees on their coasts, to obtain from His Highness a notification prohibiting these boats from visiting his African possessions on any pretext whatever, and giving authority to our vessels of war to seize any such boats found cruising within the limits of his territories. So far as it can be ascertained, the only places where slaves can be procured are within such limits, and on the coast of Berbera. As the inhabitants of the latter country are Somalees, all vessels belonging to most of the Arabian Shaikhs of this Gulf are liable to seizure if found with one individual of the latter description on board. But that part of the Gulf of Aden and Zanzibar are only visited by native vessels from this Gulf at certain seasons of the year (from November to May), and therefore arrangements might be made by the political authority at the former port for the due surveillance of the Berbera Coast. Were it plainly notified to the independent Maritime Arabian Chiefs that His Highness the Imaum had interdicted their





vessels from visiting his possessions in Africa, and that the British Government was prepared to enforce such an interdict by the seizure of all boats attempting to break through or evade it, it would certainly check to a great extent the traffic in human flesh, so far as they were concerned, as the price of slaves in the Muskat market is probably too high to allow of their being exported from that port for sale in the Persian Gulf at a remunerating profit.

It ought not, however, to be concealed that such a measure as the one suggested would be very restricted in its operation, and afford but a small mitigation to the general trade in slaves in the Persian Gulf. The total number of native vessels belonging to the independent Arabian Chiefs visiting Zanzibar and the Arabian Coast does not exceed eight, a number which cannot carry one-seventh part of the slaves said to be annually disposed of at Bussora and in the other ports of this sea.\* The traffic in question is principally carried on by the boats belonging to Soor and other places between Ras-ool-Hud and Muskat, subject to His Highness the Imaum, and which of course, as well as all Persian and Turkish vessels, would be quite unrestricted by any measure of

\* *Extract of a Letter from Colonel Robertson to Government, No. 35 P. D., dated 4th March 1842.*—"Captain Hennell's plan for enlisting the Imaum in our attempt to hinder the Arab Chiefs from trading in slaves appears to me to be merely calculated to throw the trade into the Imaum's hands.

"To put down the Slave Trade, therefore, it is useless to check the carriers of one-seventh part of the trade, while the carriers of the other six-sevenths are not checked. It is obvious, indeed, that such a check would only transfer the other seventh to the hands and enterprise of other persons, and that the trade itself would not be checked. Whatever measure, therefore, we adopt, to put down this trade, ought to have a general application and bearing. A check on one individual, and not on all traders, should be deemed no check at all. But to obtain a right for stopping all traders through treaties and negotiations would be an endless task, and in many cases one that is altogether impossible. I am decidedly of opinion, therefore, that the shortest and simplest form of check we shall ever be able to impose is to obtain possession of the seaports, or line of Coast of Africa, whence the slaves are exported, and to prevent the arrival there of slaves from the interior, or the sale of them. Such a position would be but little expensive, I think, in comparison to the system of search at sea, and in harbours (even of African harbours), and would enable us, without a single treaty with any of the rulers of the Arabian Coast and Persian Gulf, to put down the whole traffic through its present channel.

"How such a command of the African ports is to be acquired I am unable to say. Possibly it may be deemed impracticable; but if it is not, it presents, in my estimation, the most effectual method of carrying our point.

"Lord Palmerston's offer to the Imaum of Muskat of £2,000 a year for three years appears to me to be totally inadequate to cover the losses which that chieftain would sustain by the abolition of the Slave Trade; for almost all his subjects are slaves, and he sells as well as exports them to Arabia and the Persian Gulf. We should therefore consider the whole value of his subjects annually sold by him, and not merely the custom duties of his ports, exacted from other slave dealers, if we adopt a pecuniary principle of remuneration for inducing him to abandon his Slave Trade."





the nature of that suggested to be employed in the case of those Shaikhs who have treaties on the subject with us; so that while the Muskat, Turkish, and Persian Ports remain open markets for slaves, the diminution which we may perhaps succeed in effecting on the Arabian side of the Gulf will be most likely met by a nearly corresponding addition to the traffic of the places above alluded to.

Were it, however, possible to obtain from the Turkish and Persian Governments a prohibition to the sale of slaves in the several ports belonging to them in the Persian Gulf and river Euphrates, and at the same time to receive authority for our vessels of war to enforce such an interdict, I should entertain every hope, with the aid of an efficient squadron, of seeing the Slave Trade in this quarter completely suppressed in the course of a very few years.

#### EXTRACTS FROM THE RECORDS OF THE RESIDENCY AT BUSHIRE.

Slaves imported into Persia, through the southern ports, are of two kinds,—the Somalee, or African from the Coast of Zanzibar, the territory principally of the Imaum of Muskat; and Hubshee, or Abyssinian, from the shores of the Red Sea, Judda, Hodeida, Mocha, &c.

Slaves are but rarely kidnapped by the crews of the boats in which they are shipped for exportation, or indeed by the merchants themselves immediately on the coast, but by people employed for that purpose in the interior. A proportion are prisoners made in the petty wars between hostile tribes, and sold by them into slavery.

Muskat and Soor are the principal primary ports to which slaves, from whencesoever shipped, whether Zanzibar or the Red Sea, are brought, and whence they are eventually carried into Turkey, Persia, Sind, the Arab States, and even our own territories on the Western Coast of India. The boats conveying them make coasting voyages, selling individuals of their live cargo at the several ports at which they may touch. Of the above countries, Turkey consumes by far the greater proportion, Bussora and Bagdad being the largest marts.

No vessels proceed direct to Zanzibar from any of the Persian ports, with the exception of Lingah, whence three or four boats are annually despatched, each returning with about seventy slaves.

The season for the Gulf traffic in slaves is included between the 1st July and the 1st November.

At Bushire and the other Persian ports there are no particular spots allotted for slave markets, nor day fixed for the sale. On the arrival of a boat, the owner takes the slaves, or a number of them, forming his





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cargo, to a hired dwelling, where they are sold privately, or to a Karavanserai, where they are publicly exposed for sale. Should the market happen to be overstocked, or the owner find any obstacle to the expeditious disposal of his property, they are re-shipped, and conveyed to Mohumrah or Bussora, or even to Bagdad, at either of which places they are pretty certain of finding a ready sale.

The treatment of the African slaves is at no time either severe or cruel. During the sea voyage they are not bound, or kept under particular restraint. Rice, dates, and fish in sufficient quantities form their food, and a coarse cloth round the middle of the body constitutes their only clothing.

From the moment of their purchase at their eventual destination, however, their condition is materially improved, and, considered in the light of valuable property, liable to loss from sickness or death, they are comfortably provided for, and amply fed by their masters. They in return work hard, willingly, and well, and are apparently happy and contented.

Mules are furnished for their conveyance when purchased for re-sale in the interior. The males are employed in all hard and out-door work; the females in cooking and other domestic, but menial duties, and but very rarely as concubines, except among the poorer and lower classes.

The Hubshee slaves of either sex are at all times much cared for, well clothed, and well fed, and treated by their masters with almost equal attention with the members of their own families.

The males are early sent to school, and, having learnt to read and write, are employed in the performance of house duties as Peish Khidmuts, &c., and not unfrequently, if intelligent, in the most trustworthy situations, as supercargoes of vessels, stewards, and superintendents. The females are most generally retained as concubines, or employed as attendants in the Harem, in bringing Kaleeoons, and other light duties. The honesty and intelligence of the Hubshee slaves are almost proverbial.

Nubian and Hubshee eunuchs are rare, of very great price, and only purchased for the service of the king, nobles, and very rich merchants.

Boys are made eunuchs previous to their embarkation, and it is reported that in consequence of the ignorance of the operators, and the cruel mode of operation, of ten thus mutilated one only on an average survives.

The following statement of the number annually imported and sold in the Persian ports is the result of inquiries made at Bushire :—

	Africans.	Abyssinians.
At Bushire.....	250	25
At Lingah.....	350	15
At Congoon.....	150	10
At Bunder Abbas.....	300	20





And allowing an importation of one hundred, or one hundred and fifty of the former, and ten of the latter, to Aseeloo and the other numerous small ports, would give a total of one thousand one hundred and fifty and eighty respectively annually imported into Persia through the ports in the Gulf; but this by no means forms the whole number that find their way into the interior of that country. The large number of pilgrims that proceed annually to Mecca and Kerbelah return with slaves, averaging rich and poor one to each pilgrim.

An estimate of the number of slaves conveyed annually to Koweit, Bussora, and Mohumrah may be pretty accurately formed from the following abstract statement, derived from a register which was kept during a portion of one season at Karrack, during the period that island was occupied by the British Troops:—

*Abstract Statement, showing the number of Boats belonging to particular Ports, which arrived at Karrack in August, September, and October 1841, having Slaves on board.*

Number of Vessels belonging to each Port.	Greatest Number in one Boat.	Least Number in one Boat.	Number of Slaves.			Average of Slaves per Boat.	Remarks.
			Males.	Females.	Total.		
6 to Koweit.....	40	5	38	65	103	17	Of these boats, there were five bound for Koweit (or Grane), and 119 (or all the rest) for Bussora. The boats in general appear to have set out from the ports to which they belong.
36 to Soor.....	28	2	212	143	355	10	
16 to Muskat.....	42	1	92	74	166	10½	
1 to Island of Hamrah..	12	12	2	10	12	12	
2 to Khaboora.....	5	2	6	1	7	3½	
6 to Sohar.....	44	4	33	54	87	14½	
20 to Lingah.....	27	1	72	122	194	9½	
1 to Muharag.....	40	40	20	20	40	40	
1 to Charrak.....	23	23	6	17	23	23	
15 to Ras-ool-Khyma ..	26	1	62	81	143	9½	
1 to Aboothabee.....	1	1	..	1	1	1	
1 to Bahrein.....	1	1	..	1	1	1	
1 to Mogoo.....	1	1	1	1	2	1	
1 to Kishm.....	2	2	..	2	2	2	
2 to Yemen.....	11	11	6	5	11	11	
1 to Amulgavine.....	2	2	2	..	2	2	
111 boats.....	..	..	552	597	1,151	..	
6 other places.....	..	..	26	42	68	22½	
117.....	44	1	578	639	1,217	10½	

The aggregate here may be fairly increased by one-half on account of the lapse of a portion of the season before the register was commenced, and on account of boats conveying slaves which probably proceeded direct to their destination without touching at Karrack, and would thus amount to 1,828.





Supposing that the trade in slaves with the ports on the Arabian Coast since 1831, when an estimate was made by Major Wilson, then Resident, has not materially altered, we shall have, in addition to the above,—300 slaves to Bahrein; 30 to Ras-ool-Khyma; and supposing 100 more to the ports of Debaye, Amulgavine, Ejman, and Aboothabee; total 430; making a grand total of 3,488 annually received in Persia, and five or six small towns of Arabia only.

Large as this number may appear, it is allowed, with regret, that if any error has been made it has been on the side of detraction, and not of exaggeration; and it must be further remembered, that it does not include the slaves brought to Muskat for sale on the spot, or for exportation, as before stated, to the ports of Sind, and even India.

The improved means of gaining information, and the greater earnestness with which the attention of the British Political Agent has been directed to the traffic in slaves, would account for the apparent increase in the number of individuals now annually imported when compared with estimates of former years.

Of African slaves imported, the number of males bears a pretty equal proportion to that of the females.

Of Hubshees, the greater number are females, in the proportion, perhaps, of two to one.

*Price of Africans at Zanzibar.*

Boys from seven to ten years of age .....	7 to 15 dollars.
Ditto ten to twenty ditto .....	15 to 30 „
Full grown men .....	17 to 20 „

The females are somewhat more valued than the males: a good stout lass will sell for 35 or 40 dollars. The profit on the above at Muskat is twenty per cent., and at Bussora and Bushire never less than fifty per cent.

The Hubshee females are much prized for their beauty, and symmetry of figure; their value from 60 to 200 dollars, or indeed to any amount. The males also are much valued; their price from 50 to 150 dollars, and upwards.

The slaves of either sex, whether Hubshee or African, of an age exceeding twenty years, on their first sale, are of less comparative value, from their being at that mature age less tractable, and taking less kindly to the language, religion, and customs of their masters.

A tax, amounting to about half a dollar, is levied upon every slave at the ports of Bussora, Bushire, Lingab, Bunder Abbas, and Muskat.

While every attempt is being made to confine and suppress the Slave Trade in these and all other foreign quarters, it is worthy of remark, that notwithstanding every precaution, and the risk of severe punishment,





the traffic in slaves is being carried on, although to a very limited extent, on our shores: Negroes and Abyssinians are imported into India, and Indian boys and females exported in return for the latter. An adequate estimate may be formed from the accompanying statement, showing those only which have within the last three or four years been discovered and restored to home and liberty at one port alone (Muskat), through the exertions of our late very intelligent Agent, the Jew Khojah Reuben.\*

In the month of February 1841, the Government of Bombay directed that a strict investigation should be made, with a view to ascertain the correctness of a report which had reached the Home Government, that vessels belonging to His Highness the Imaum of Muskat were in the habit of bringing Negro slaves from Africa for sale at Bombay, and of taking back Hindoo females for the same purpose at Zanzibar.

The following is the result of the first inquiries, in the words of the Resident, Captain Hennell:—

"It is with much regret that I have ascertained, from the statement made by Khojah Reuben, that there is but too much reason to believe that the reports made to Her Majesty's Government are not without foundation. I must, however, still report my firm conviction that His Highness the Imaum is not in the slightest degree aware that such a nefarious traffic is carried on by his vessels.

\* May-June 1839.—An Indian girl recovered from slavery. She had been purchased, then five years old, at Mangalore, five years previous, by Abdoola bin Khaleefa, an inhabitant of Ras-ool-Khyma, from Saeed, the servant of Syud Jaffer, a Dullal or broker of that place. On his arrival at Muskat, dreading the consequences of this proceeding, he voluntarily gave her up to the Native Agent there. The owner of the Buteel in which she had been brought at the same time entered a protest of his entire ignorance of the circumstances under which the child had been embarked in his vessel. She was returned to the place of her nativity in 1841.

An Indian girl liberated by the Native Agent after she had been publicly sold in the slave market at Muskat.

January-February 1842.—Through the laudable exertions of Khojah Reuben, the Native Agent at Muskat, two Indian girls were liberated from slavery, and subsequently restored to their homes. The one had been decoyed and kidnapped, and quietly embarked from Calcutta; the other, from Mangalore, had been sold or given away by her stepmother.

February 1843.—Another Indian girl released from slavery at Muskat. Belonging, as she did, to the Imaum's sister, the Native Agent was compelled to pay her value, but did so under a protest. The money was subsequently recovered.

May 1843.—An Indian girl was recovered by the Shaikh of Bunder Abbas from some Persian pilgrims on their way into the interior. She was sent to the charge of the Native Agent at Muskat, who forwarded her to the Presidency.

June 1843.—Four Indians were discovered to be in slavery at Muskat; nor was it until the lapse of an entire year that their liberation could be effected, notwithstanding repeated remonstrances addressed to Syud Soweeynee, the Governor. The peremptory orders issued by his father, His Highness the Imaum, at the representation of the British Government, had at length the desired effect.

July 1843.—A Malabaree woman released from slavery, and sent to Bombay.





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"So far as I can learn, the manner in which slaves are introduced into our Indian possessions is by the males being classed on board the Arab vessels on which they are embarked as part of the crew, while the females are passed off as their wives. As a large portion of the crew of native boats is frequently composed of Negroes, it must of course be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any examining officer to ascertain whether the Africans on board are *bona fide* seamen, or brought for sale. I am told, moreover, that so little repugnance is in general entertained by the Negroes themselves to be sold out of the vessels bringing them, that both males and females readily join in the deception, and, if interrogated, seldom if ever fail to corroborate the statement of the Nakhoda or commander as to their composing part of the equipage of the vessel or boat.

"It was at the same time admitted that great difficulty was experienced in kidnapping and embarking Indians; that few only were obtained annually, and these only by stealth.

"The Agent further stated that a great number of Negro and Abyssinian slaves were yearly landed in Bombay, the females being dressed up as men; while others, he asserted, were passed through the guards by means of bribes.

"The purchasers of such slaves are said to be generally from Lucknow and the Deccan.

"The country craft which trade between the Gulf and Bombay and the Malabar Coast almost all touch at the principal ports within the Gulf, and at Muskat and Soor, either to take in water or goods, before they strike across the Arabian and Indian Seas. Some of these belong no doubt to chiefs with whom we have treaties; but by far the greater number of this description of boats on that line are the property of horse-dealers and other merchants of Bussora, Koweit (or Grane), Bushire, Bahrein, and other smaller places on these shores, and of Bombay, &c.

"The temptation presented to these traders of taking a few slaves to India is very obvious, for the risk, at present at least, is next to nothing. The market being shut, the contraband importation of slaves must yield something, though but little beyond the usual profit, to those who venture on it. The facility with which slaves can be purchased in Lingah, Kishm, Muskat, Soor, and other ports, and secretly conveyed on board, is not greater than that with which they can be landed on the coast of India. There is no effective arrangement in operation for searching such vessels as carry these slaves, either at sea by our cruisers, or on arriving at Bombay or elsewhere; and even if a very expensive establishment were maintained at sea, and in all the bays and landing-places along the whole coast of Western India, for inspect-





ing large boats, and every little boat which touches the shore, means would still be found, and an agency kept at work, to defeat, with considerable success, these endeavours."

In June of the year 1841, the *Kheleeya Kussum*, a native ship, under British colours, whose owner, Iwuz bin Humzan, was on board, arrived at Muskat from Mocha, and the Persian passengers landed forty-five male and female slaves.

The owner, on the circumstance being discovered and brought to his notice, lost no time in substituting the flag and register of His Highness the Imaum for those of the British Government, from a consciousness, probably, that he had rendered himself and vessel subject to heavy penalties, for his infraction of the regulations existing in Great Britain and her dependencies against the Slave Trade. No further steps were taken in the matter, further than that His Highness the Imaum withdrew the protection of his flag at the request of the British Government. The owner, upon this, after incurring much loss from detention, and constantly under dread of impending punishment, adopted the Mocha colours, obtained from the Shereef, and eventually sold his vessel.

This was probably not the first case, nor has it been the last, in which the protection and character of the British flag have been made subservient to the interests of slave-owners; nor can ignorance of the rules and regulations of Government with reference to the Slave Trade be fairly urged as an excuse by the owners and commanders for becoming parties to such nefarious transactions.

It may with confidence be asserted that, with very few exceptions, ships under British colours, owned by natives of India, or naturalised subjects, commanded by European officers, and having an Arab or native supercargo, carry a certain proportion of slaves, not perhaps intended for sale, but as the concubines or personal attendants of the latter; further, that a certain proportion of the crews of Buggalows carrying the British pass and colours, trading between India and the ports of the Persian Gulf, are slaves. It is needless to remark the facility with which a few destined for sale at Bombay or elsewhere could be entered on board as sailors, and the difficulty of making the distinction, unless the individuals would themselves come forward and assert their natural rights.





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ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY HIS HIGHNESS THE  
IMAUM OF MUSKAT WITH THE BRITISH GOVERN-  
MENT, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE  
TRADE.

*Articles of an Engagement proposed under date the 29th August 1822  
by Captain FAIRFAX MORESBY, commanding His Britannic  
Majesty's ship Menai, to His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT,  
for the Prevention of the Slave Trade.*

### ARTICLE I.

The Imaum to agree that all external traffic in slaves shall cease  
and be abolished for ever from his dominions and dependencies.

### ARTICLE II.

The Imaum to agree that all vessels carrying the flag of His Highness,  
or belonging to or navigated by his subjects, found or convicted of being  
engaged in the traffic of slaves to other places than his dominions, shall  
be considered as pirates, and confiscated; the owners, captain, and  
officers, shall be treated as pirates, and have their goods and property  
forfeited to the Imaum.

### ARTICLE III.

That all other persons serving on board such vessels as seamen, or in  
any capacity, who shall not give information of such unlawful trans-  
actions to the Imaum or his governors, within three months after the  
period of the termination of the voyage, shall be punished by fine,  
imprisonment, and corporal infliction.

### ARTICLE IV.

His Highness engages to appoint at such places as His Majesty the  
King of Great Britain may wish, habitations for the residence of Consuls,





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Agents, and others charged with the suppression of the Slave Trade by English subjects; such Consuls, Agents, or others, are to receive the assistance, on application, of His Highness the Imaum, or his Lieutenant Governor, or others, for the apprehension and detention of all English subjects who may attempt the traffic.

ARTICLE V.

That no individual may plead ignorance of the limit within which the Slave Trade is confined, the Imaum to agree that all vessels under His Highness' flag, commanded or owned by any of his subjects, found trading in slaves to the southward of the parallel of Cape Delgado, His Highness' most southern possession in Africa, or to the eastward of a line drawn from that cape, past the east point of the Isle Socotra, on to the Persian shore, shall be liable to seizure and confiscation by any of His Britannic Majesty's cruisers, or officers of customs, or others deputed by any of His Britannic Majesty's governors, and dealt with the same as if such ship or vessel seized was navigated under the English flag.

ARTICLE VI.

His Highness the Imaum must engage to publish, in all the dominions and dependencies of his Government, the present Treaty, and to consider it equally binding on them all; and finally to agree that the Treaty is provisional until ratified and confirmed by His Majesty's Ministers on the part of the King of Great Britain, which ratification is to be forwarded without loss of time to His Highness the Imaum; nevertheless the Treaty is to be carried into full effect from the present date.

(Signed) FAIRFAX MORESBY,  
Captain, His Majesty's Ship *Menai*.

*Muskat, 29th August 1822.*

*Translation of an Arabic Paper prepared by His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, and signed and sealed by His Highness on the 7th September 1822, purporting to contain, on the one side, the substance of each of the above Requisitions made on His Highness by Captain MORESBY, and on the other, His Highness' Assent to the same.*

*Requisitions made on His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, by Captain MORESBY, of His Majesty's ship Menai, Commissioner,*

*Answers under His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT's Hand and Seal, to the Requisitions made by Captain MORESBY, of His Majes-*





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*vested with full powers by His Excellency Sir ROBERT FARQUHAR, Bart., Governor of the Island of Mauritius.*

*ty's ship Menai, Commissioner, &c.*

ARTICLE I.

That you (the Imaum of Muskat) do instruct all the governors and authorities throughout your dominions to prohibit the sale of slaves by your subjects to Christians of every description.

ARTICLE II.

That you do issue orders to all your officers throughout your dominions, as well in Zanzibar as in other places, that if they discover the owners of any Arab vessels buying slaves for the Christian market, they do take possession of such vessels, with whatever they may contain, and send them to you (the Imaum), with their commanders and crews, for punishment.

ARTICLE III.

That it be made imperative upon the crews of all ships that shall clandestinely transport slaves to Christian countries, to give, on their return to the Arab port whence they set sail, information of such traffic to the governor or authority at that port, that he may punish the commanders of such ships; also, that on failing to give this information, they (the crews) shall themselves suffer punishment.

ARTICLE IV.

That you give me a written

I.

I did write last season to all my officers, positively prohibiting the sale of slaves to any Christian nation, and I will repeat those orders.

II.

I will send orders to all the officers throughout my dominions, that if they find (the owners of) any Arab vessels buying slaves for sale in Christian countries, they must take possession of all such vessels, and inflict punishment on the commanders (owners) thereof, even though they be bound for Madagascar.

III.

I will instruct my officers, and publish generally, such instructions throughout my dominions, that the crews of any vessels carrying slaves for sale in Christian countries be enjoined on their return to the Arab port to give information to the authority at such port, that he may punish the commanders, and that if they come to be detected in concealing such information, they (the crews) shall themselves suffer punishment.

IV.

The authority you require, per-





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authority from yourself, addressed to the Governor of Zanzibar, and all other your governors in that quarter, that they do permit us (the British) to appoint on our own part an Agent at every such place in those countries as we shall see fit, and that they do allow such Agents a place of residence, in order that we (they) may have intelligence of all vessels that may be found conveying slaves to Christian countries.

ARTICLE V.

That you give us a written authority from yourself, permitting us to seize all vessels that we may find laden with slaves for sale in Christian countries, after the expiration of four months from the date of such permission.

ARTICLE VI.

That you do instruct all your governors, that on the sailing of all vessels from their ports, a statement in writing shall be given to the commander, certifying what port they have left, and whither they are bound, in order that if our ships meet such vessels laden with slaves bound for Christian countries, and unfurnished with such written statement, they (British ships) may seize them; such ships, if found within the line of Madagascar and in the seas adjacent to Zanzibar and Lamoch, to be carried into Muskat for punishment there, but all vessels found beyond Madagascar, and in the seas of the Isle of France, shall be taken possession

mitting the settlement of an Agent on your part in Zanzibar and the neighbouring parts, for the purpose of having intelligence and watching the traffic in slaves with Christian nations, is granted, and I now give it to Captain Moresby.

V.

The authority you have required, permitting (to you) after the expiration of four months, the seizure of all vessels laden with slaves bound for Christian countries, is hereby granted to Captain Moresby.

VI.

I will write to my governors regarding the statement to be given in writing to all ships departing on a voyage, certifying from what port they have come, and whither they are bound, and you may seize every vessel you may fall in with beyond Madagascar, and in the sea of Mauritius, after four months from the date of the permission contained in the answer to Requisition V., above acceded to, and you may carry in to me for my disposal any ship you may meet even on this side (the Isle of France), provided she have not the written statement required from the governor of the port whence she sailed.





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of by them (British ships) after four months from the date of the permission required in the preceding requisition (V.).

(Signed) SYUD SAEED.

Seal of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat.

Dated 7th September 1822.

(True translation)

(Signed) WM. SIMSON,

Deputy Persian Secretary to Government.

*Additional Requisition made by Captain MORESBY on His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, on the 8th September 1822, and agreed to by His Highness on the 10th of the same month.*

*Additional Requisition by Captain MORESBY.*

*Answer by His Highness the IMAUM.*

That it may be understood in the most comprehensive manner where Arab ships are liable to seizure by His Majesty the King of England's cruisers, after the expiration of four months, the Imaum to authorise that the King of England's cruisers finding Arab ships with slaves on board to the eastward of a line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing (60) sixty miles east of Socotra, on to Diu Head, forming the western point of the Gulf of Cambay (unless driven by stress of weather), shall be seized and treated by His Majesty's cruisers in the same manner as if they were under the English flag.

I permit to the Captains of His Majesty the King of England's cruisers, to seize vessels to the eastward of the line drawn by Captain Moresby, but confine the permission to the King of England's cruisers, and not the Company's.

(Signed) SYUD SAEED.

Seal of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat.

Seal of Captain Moresby.

(Signed) F. MORESBY,  
Captain, His Majesty's Ship *Menai*.

10th September 1822.





*Translation of a Letter without date, but addressed in September 1822 by His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT to His Excellency Sir ROBERT T. FARQUHAR, Governor of the Isle of France.*

If any ships belonging to my people carry slaves to Christian countries, I have fully permitted you to order your vessels to seize any Arab vessels having a cargo of slaves beyond Madagascar, after four months after date of this letter.

*Translation of a Letter addressed on the same occasion by His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT to the GOVERNOR OF ZANZIBAR, &c.*

Whoever receives this letter at Zanzibar, at Quiloo, or any parts within my dominion, it is to let you know, that I have permitted my friends the English to keep an Agent in any part of my country they may choose, and you are to give a house to the English Agent, and wherever he may stay you are to pay him great respect, and no one must refuse to receive the Agent.

*On the 17th December 1839, His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT consented to the three following Articles being added to the foregoing Treaty for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, concluded by His Highness with Captain MORESBY in September 1822.*

I agree that the following Articles be added to the above Treaty, concluded by Captain Moresby on the aforesaid date.

ARTICLE I.

That the Government cruisers, whenever they may meet vessels belonging to my subjects beyond a direct line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing two degrees seaward of the island of Socotra, and ending at Pussem, and shall suspect that such vessel is engaged in the Slave Trade, the said cruisers are permitted to detain and search it.

ARTICLE II.

Should it on examination be found that any vessel belonging to my subjects is carrying slaves, whether men, women, or children, for sale, beyond the aforesaid line, then the Government cruisers shall seize and confiscate such vessel and her cargo. But if the said vessel shall pass beyond the aforesaid line, owing to stress of weather, or other case of necessity, not under control, then she shall not be seized.





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ARTICLE III.

As the selling of males and females, whether grown up or young, who are "Hoor," or free, is contrary to the Mahomedan religion, and whereas the Somalees are included in the "Hoor," or free, I do hereby agree that the sale of males and females, whether young or old, of the Somalee Tribe, shall be considered as piracy, and that four months from this date, all those of my people convicted of being concerned in such an act shall be punished as pirates.

*Dated 10th Shuwal 1255 A. H. (corresponding with the 17th December 1839 A. D.).*

Seal of His  
Highness the  
Imaum of  
Muskat.

(True translation)

(Signed) S. HENNEL,.  
Resident, Persian Gulf.

MEMORANDUM.—*Under date the 18th August 1845, His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT addressed the following letter to Captain HAMERTON, relative to an omission which had been discovered to exist in Article IV.\* of the Arabic version of the Treaty concluded by His Highness with Captain MORESBY in September 1822.*

A. C.

Your excellent letter has reached, and your friend understood its contents. You say that you have received a letter from the mighty Government, containing orders to you to bring to our notice that in Article IV. of the Treaty we concluded with Captain Moresby in the year 1822, it is mentioned in the English version that it is incumbent on us, and our heirs and governors, to assist in apprehending English subjects engaged in the Slave Trade, but that such is not mentioned in the Arabic version (translation) of the Treaty. My friend, not considering it necessary to alter the Treaty, nevertheless we consider it is incumbent on us, our heirs, and governors, that we should assist to apprehend English subjects who may be engaged in the Slave Trade.

Therefore, whoever shall be accredited from the Government, and

\* Vide page 655 of this Selection.





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require assistance from us, shall receive it accordingly. Whatever you may require, let us know ; and peace on you.

*Dated 4th Shaban 1261 A. H. (corresponding with the 18th August 1845 A. D.).*

(Signed) SYUD SAEED.

(True translation)

(Signed) A. HAMERTON, Captain,

Her Majesty's Consul, and Honorable Company's Agent  
in the Dominions of the Imaum of Muskat.

*Further Agreement\* concluded at Zanzibar with His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, on the 2nd October 1845, by Captain ATKINS HAMERTON, of the 15th Regiment Bombay N. I., on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty, for the Suppression, from and after the 1st January 1847, of the Exportation of Slaves from His Highness' African Dominions.*

*Agreement between Her Majesty the QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, and His Highness SYUD SAEED bin SULTAN, the Sultan of Muskat, for the termination of the export of Slaves from the African Dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat.*

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, being earnestly desirous that the export of slaves from the African dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat should cease, and His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, in deference to the wishes of Her Majesty and of the British nation, and in furtherance of the dictates of humanity which have heretofore induced him to enter into Engagements with Great Britain to restrict the export of slaves from his dominions, being willing to put an end to that trade, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Muskat having resolved to record with due form and solemnity this further restriction of the export of slaves, and Her Majesty having given due authority to Captain Hamerton, her representative at the Court of the Sultan of Muskat, to conclude an Agreement with His Highness accordingly, His Highness Syud Saeed bin Sultan, for himself, his heirs and successors, and Captain Hamerton,

\* Under date the 5th September 1848 an Act was passed by the British Parliament, for giving effect to the provisions of this Agreement. A copy of this Act (Cap. CXXVIII. Anno Undecimo et Duodecimo Victoriae Reginae) is annexed.—*Editor.*





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on behalf of the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, her heirs and successors, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat hereby engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the export of slaves from his African dominions, and to issue orders to his officers to prevent and suppress such trade.

ARTICLE II.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat further engages to prohibit under the severest penalties, the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia; and to use his utmost influence with all the Chiefs of Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, in like manner to prevent the introduction of slaves from Africa into their respective territories.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat grants to the ships of Her Majesty's Navy, as well as to those of the East India Company, permission to seize and confiscate any vessels, the property of His Highness or of his subjects, carrying on Slave Trade, excepting only such as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island, in  $1^{\circ} 57'$  (one degree and fifty-seven minutes) south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Souga Munara, or Pagoda Point, in  $9^{\circ} 2'$  (nine degrees and two minutes) south latitude, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea.

ARTICLE IV.

This Agreement to commence and have effect from the 1st day of January 1847 (one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven) of the year of Christ, and the 15th day of the month of Mohurum 1263 (twelve hundred and sixty-three) of the Hijree.

*Done at Zanzibar, this 2nd (second) day of October 1845 (one thousand eight hundred and forty-five) of the year of Christ, and 29th day of Rumzan 1261 (twelve hundred and sixty-one) of the Hijree.*

(Signed) SYUD SAEED.

Seal of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat.





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On behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, her heirs and successors.

(Signed) ATKINS HAMERTON,  
Captain.

Seal of Captain  
Hamerton.

ANNO UNDECIMO ET DUODECIMO VICTORIÆ REGINÆ.  
CAP. CXXVIII.

*An Act for carrying into effect\* the Agreement between HER MAJESTY and the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, for the more effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade.* [5th September 1848.]

WHEREAS on the second day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, an Agreement was concluded and signed at Zanzibar, between Captain ATKINS HAMERTON, of Her Majesty's Royal Navy,† on behalf of Her Majesty the QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, and his Highness SYUD SAEED bin SULTAN, the Imaum of Muskat, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat hereby engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the export of slaves from his African dominions, and to issue orders to his officers to prevent and suppress such trade.

ARTICLE II.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat further engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, and to use his utmost influence with all the Chiefs of Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, in like manner to prevent the introduction of slaves from Africa into their respective territories.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat grants to the ships of Her Majesty's Navy, as well as those of the East India Company, permission to seize and confiscate any vessels, the property of His Highness or of

\* Instructions to the Commanders of the Honorable East India Company's ships, for carrying into execution the provisions of this Act, will be found at the end of this Selection.—*Editor.*

† For "Her Majesty's Royal Navy," read "15th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry."—*Editor.*





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his subjects, carrying on Slave Trade, excepting such only as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island, in  $1^{\circ} 57'$  south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Souga Munara, or Pagoda Point, in  $9^{\circ} 2'$  south latitude, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea.

ARTICLE IV.

This Agreement to commence and have effect from the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven of the year of Christ, and the fifteenth day of the month of Mohurum, one thousand two hundred and sixty-three of the Hijree.

*Done at Zanzibar, this second day of October, one thousand eight hundred and forty-five of the year of Christ, and twenty-ninth day of Rumzan, one thousand two hundred and sixty-one of the Hijree.*

(Signed) SYUD SAEED bin SULTAN,

Imaum of Muskat.

(Signed) ATKINS HAMERTON, Captain,

On behalf of Her Majesty the QUEEN OF  
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, Her Heirs  
and Successors.

*And whereas it is expedient and necessary that effectual provision should be made for carrying into execution the provisions of the said Agreement :—*

I. Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That it shall be lawful for the commanders and other officers of Her Majesty's ships of war, or of the East India Company, to visit, and detain in any seas, except within the limits exempted by the terms of Article III. of the said Agreement, any merchant vessel belonging to the subjects of the Imaum of Muskat, which shall upon reasonable grounds be suspected of being engaged in the export of slaves from the African dominions of the Imaum of Muskat, or the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, excepting such only as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies,

Power to Commanders of Ships of War and of the East India Company to visit Vessels belonging to Subjects of the Imaum of Muskat, within certain limits, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade.





the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island, in  $1^{\circ} 57'$  south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Souga Munara, or Pagoda Point, in  $9^{\circ} 2'$  south latitude, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea, or any vessel fitted out for that purpose, and to send or carry away such vessel, together with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, for the purpose of such vessel being brought to adjudication as hereinafter mentioned.

II. And be it enacted, That it shall be lawful for the High Court of Admiralty of England, and for all Courts of Vice-Admiralty in any dominions of Her Majesty beyond the seas, including those Courts of Vice-Admiralty within the territories under the Government of the East India Company, to take cognisance of and try any such vessel which shall be detained or captured for the violation of the said Agreement, and to condemn any such vessel to Her Majesty, and adjudge as to the slaves found therein, in like manner, and under such and the like rules and regulations as are contained in any Act or Acts of Parliament in force in relation to the suppression of the Slave Trade by British-owned ships, as fully as if all the powers and provisions contained in such Acts were re-enacted in this Act as to such High Court of Admiralty or Courts of Vice-Admiralty.

III. And be it enacted, That every person who shall wilfully and corruptly give false evidence in any examination or deposition had, or affidavit taken in, any proceeding under the said Agreement, or under this Act, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and being thereof convicted, shall be subject and liable to all the punishments, pains and penalties to which persons convicted of wilful and corrupt perjury are liable; and every such person may be tried for any such perjury, either in the place where the offence was committed, or in any colony or settlement of Her Majesty near thereto in which there is a Court of competent jurisdiction to try any such offence, or in Her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench in England; and that in case of any prosecution for such offence in Her Majesty's said Court of Queen's Bench, the venue may be laid in the county of Middlesex.

IV. And be it enacted, That the pendency of any suit or proceeding instituted for the condemnation or restitution of any ship or cargo, or slaves, taken, seized, or detained by virtue of the said Agreement, or the final adjudication, condemnation, or judgment or determination thereupon, may be pleaded in bar, or given in evidence under the general issue, and shall be deemed in any Court whatever to

As to the Trial of Vessels engaged in the Slave Trade.

Persons giving false Evidence deemed guilty of Perjury.

Pendency of Suits to be a Bar to any Proceedings instituted for the recovery of the Vessels detained.





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be a complete bar in any action, suit, or proceeding, whether instituted by any person or persons for the recovery of any such ship, vessel, or cargo, or of any damage or for any injury sustained thereby, or by the persons on board the same, in consequence of any capture, seizure, or detention, or anything done under or in pursuance of the provisions of the said Agreement.

V. And be it enacted, That any ship or vessel which shall be condemned as aforesaid may be taken into Her Majesty's Service, upon payment of such sum as the Lord High Admiral or the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty shall deem a proper price for the same; or, if not so taken, shall be broken up and demolished, and the materials thereof shall be publicly sold in separate parts, and the proceeds thereof shall be paid to such person or persons as the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury may appoint to receive the same.

VI. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel employed or engaged in such illicit traffic in slaves, in violation of the said Agreement, shall be seized by any ship or vessel belonging to Her Majesty or the East India Company, and afterwards condemned, there shall be paid to the captors the net proceeds to which Her Majesty is entitled, the same to be distributed in the manner hereinafter directed for the distribution of bounties on slaves taken on board the said vessels.

VII. And be it enacted, That there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or the commanders, officers, and crews of the ships of the East India Company, a bounty of five pounds for every man, woman, and child slave seized and found on board any ship or vessel taken and condemned in pursuance of the provisions of the said Agreement and of this Act; such bounty to be issued and paid by order from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, and to be distributed to and amongst the captors aforesaid, in such manner and proportions as Her Majesty shall think fit to order by any Order in Council, made or to be made, or by any Proclamation for that purpose.

VIII. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel which shall have been seized and condemned under the provisions of the said Agreement shall have been or shall be demolished, and the materials thereof publicly sold in separate parts, as well as her cargo, there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of





those of the East India Company, in addition to the amount of the proceeds of such sale, as hereinbefore mentioned, a further bounty on the tonnage of such ship or vessel at the rate of thirty shillings for every ton of such tonnage.

IX. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel having no slaves on board shall have been seized and condemned under the provisions of the said Agreement, there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, an additional bounty upon the tonnage of such ship or vessel, at the rate of four pounds for every ton; and the tonnage of all such vessels shall be ascertained according to the mode of ascertaining the admeasurement of British vessels, either by the principal officer of the customs at the port where the vessel may be at the time of condemnation, or in default thereof by the best evidence which can be obtained: Provided always, that in every case in which any ship or vessel shall be seized with slaves on board, in which the bounty calculated upon the number of slaves shall be less than the bounty calculated upon the tonnage, the commanders of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, making the seizure, may elect to take the bounty calculated according to tonnage, instead of the bounty which would be payable upon the number of slaves on board.

X. And be it enacted, That all bounties payable under this Act shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, and of the ships of the East India Company, and such bounties shall be issued and paid by order from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

XI. And be it enacted, That the said bounty, as also all bounties payable under any of the Acts for the abolition or suppression of the Slave Trade, shall not hereafter be charged with Treasury fees or Exchequer fees of any description.

XII. Provided always, and be it enacted, That in order to entitle the captors to receive the said bounty money, the tonnage of the ship or vessel so seized and condemned shall be proved to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by producing a copy, duly certified, of the sentence or decree of condemnation, or by such documentary or other evidence as they may deem satisfactory.





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XIII. Provided always, and be it enacted, That in order to entitle the captors to receive the said bounty money on slaves, the number of men, women, and children so taken, delivered over, and condemned, shall be proved to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by producing a copy, duly certified, of the sentence or decree of condemnation, and also a certificate under the hand of the proper officer or officers, military or civil, who may be appointed to receive such slaves.

Copy of Sentence of Condemnation to be produced to the Treasury.

XIV. And be it enacted, That where any slaves, or persons treated as slaves, shall be seized on board any ship or vessel taken and condemned in pursuance of the said Agreement and of this Act, but who shall not have been delivered over in consequence of death, sickness, or other inevitable circumstance, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, if to their discretion it shall seem meet, to direct payment of one moiety of the bounty which would have been due in each case respectively if the said slaves had been delivered over.

In certain cases Treasury may order one Moiety of the Bounty to be paid.

XV. Provided also, and be it enacted, That any party or parties claiming any benefit by way of bounty under the provisions of this Act, or of any share of the proceeds of any vessel confiscated in pursuance of the provisions of the aforesaid Agreement, may resort to the High Court of Admiralty for the purpose of obtaining the judgment of the said Court in that behalf; and that it shall be lawful for the Judge of the said High Court of Admiralty to determine thereon, and also to hear and determine any question of joint capture which may arise upon any seizure made in pursuance of this Act, and also to enforce any decrees or sentences of the said Vice-Admiralty Courts relating to any such seizure.

Parties claiming benefit under this Act may resort to the Court of Admiralty.

XVI. And be it enacted, That all the provisions, rules, regulations, forfeitures, and penalties respecting the delivery by Prize Agents of accounts for examination, and distribution of prize-money, and the accounting for and paying over the proceeds of prize, and the per-centage due thereon to Greenwich Hospital, shall be extended to all bounties and proceeds to be distributed under the provisions of this Act to the officers and crews of any of Her Majesty's ships and vessels of war.

Regulations and Penalties to which Prize Agents are liable extended to Bounties, &c. under this Act.

XVII. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel belonging, in whole or in part, to subjects of the Imaum of Muskat, shall have been detained and brought to adjudication by any officers of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, or of

Treasury may order payment of Costs awarded for Vessels detained, but not condemned.





those of the East India Company, and the said ship shall be restored by sentence of the Court, it shall be lawful for the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by warrant signed by any three or more of them, to direct payment to be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of any costs or damages which may be duly awarded: Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall exempt such officer from his liability to make good the payments so made when lawfully called upon, either by the parties interested therein or by order of the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

XVIII. And be it enacted, That when any seizure shall be made by any of the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, and judgment shall be given against the seizer, or when such seizure shall be relinquished by him, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, if to their discretion it shall seem meet, by warrant, signed by any three or more of them, to direct payment to be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of such costs and expenses as the seizer may have incurred in respect of such seizure, or any proportional part thereof.

#### ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE ARAB CHIEFS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.—1838 to 1847.

*Agreement with SHAIKH SULTAN bin SUGGUR, Chief of Ras-ool-Khy-ma, ceding to British Cruisers the right of searching his Vessels upon the high seas, when suspected of having Slaves on board; and also ceding the right of Seizure and Confiscation, in the event of the suspicion being proved to be well founded.*

In the event of vessels connected with my ports, or belonging to my subjects, coming under the suspicion of being employed in the carrying off (literally "stealing") and embarkation of slaves, men, women, or children, I, Sultan bin Suggur, Shaikh of the Joasmee Tribe, do hereby agree to their being detained and searched, whenever and wherever they may be fallen in with on the seas, by the cruisers of the British Government; and further, that upon its being ascertained that the






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crews have carried off (literally "stolen") and embarked slaves, their vessels shall be liable to seizure and confiscation by the aforesaid cruisers.

*Dated Shargah, 17th April 1838 A. D. (corresponding with the 22nd Mohurum, A. H. 1254, Mahomedan Era).*

The  of SULTAN bin SUGGUR.

(True translation)

(Signed) S. HENNELL,  
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

*Agreement for the Suppression of the Slave Trade in the Persian Gulf, entered into by SHAIKH SULTAN bin SUGGUR, Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, dated off Ras-ool-Khyma, 3rd July 1839.*

I, Sultan bin Suggur, Shaikh of the Joasmee Tribe, do hereby declare that I bind and pledge myself to the British Government, in the following engagements :—

ARTICLE I.

That the Government cruisers, whenever they may meet any vessel belonging to myself, or my subjects, beyond a direct line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing two degrees seaward of the island of Socotra, and ending at Cape Guadel, and shall suspect that such vessel is engaged in the Slave Trade, the said cruisers are permitted to detain and search it.

ARTICLE II.

Should it on examination be proved that any vessel belonging to myself or my subjects is carrying slaves, whether men, women, or children, for sale, beyond the aforesaid line, then the Government cruisers shall seize and confiscate such vessel and her cargo. But if the aforesaid vessel shall pass beyond the aforesaid line owing to stress of weather, or other case of necessity not under control, then she shall not be seized.

ARTICLE III.

As the selling of males and females, whether grown up or young, who are "Hoor," or free, is contrary to the Mahomedan religion, and whereas the Somalee Tribe is included in the "Hoor," or free, I, Sultan bin Suggur, do hereby agree, that the sale of males and females, whether young or old, of the Somalee Tribe, shall be considered as piracy ;





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and that after four months from this date, all those of my people convicted of being concerned in such an act shall be punished the same as pirates.

Seal of



SULTAN bin SUGGUR.

(True translation)

(Signed) S. HENNELL,  
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

A similar Agreement to the above was entered into by SHAIKH KHA-  
LEefa bin SHAKBOOT on the 1st July 1839; and by SHAIKH MUKTOOM of  
Debaye, and SHAIKH ARDOOLLA bin RASHID of Amulgavine, on the 2nd  
of the same month.

(Signed) S. HENNELL,  
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

*Translation of an Engagement\* entered into by SHAIKH SULTAN bin  
SUGGUR, Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma and Shargah, for the Abo-  
lition of the African Slave Trade in his Ports.—Dated the 30th  
April 1847.*

It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident in the  
Persian Gulf, that certain Conventions have lately been entered into by  
His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, and other powers, with the British  
Government, for the purpose of preventing the exportation of slaves  
from the African Coast and elsewhere; and it having moreover been  
explained to me, that in order to the full attainment of the objects  
contemplated by the aforesaid Conventions, the concurrence and co-  
operation of the chiefs of the several ports situated on the Arabian Coast  
of the Persian Gulf are required: accordingly I, Shaikh Sultan bin  
Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe, with a view to strengthen the bonds  
of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do here-  
by engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coast of Africa  
and elsewhere, on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my sub-  
jects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of  
Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British  
Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my  
subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade,

\* On the 1st August 1849, an Act for carrying into effect the provisions of this Engagement  
was passed by the British Parliament. A copy of this Act (12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> Victoria, Cap.  
LXXXIV.) is annexed.—*Editor.*





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they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coast of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

*Dated this 14th day of Jumadee-ool-Awul 1263 A. H. (or 30th day of April 1847 A. D.).*

(True translation)

(Signed) S. HENNELL,  
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

L. S.

SHAIKH SULTAN bin SUGGUR.

The five following Maritime Arab Chiefs entered into engagements precisely similar to the above, on the dates mentioned opposite their respective names :—

- 1, SHAIKH MUKTOOM, of Debaye, on the 30th April 1847.
- 2, SHAIKH ABDOL AZEEZ, of Ejman, on the 1st May 1847.
- 3, SHAIKH ABDOOLLA bin RASHID, of Amulgavine, do.
- 4, SHAIKH SYUD bin TAHNOON, of Aboothabee, on the 3rd May 1847.
- 5, SHAIKH MAHOMED bin KHALEEFA, of Bahrein, on the 8th May 1847.

(Signed) S. HENNELL,  
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

12° & 13° VICTORIÆ.

CAP. LXXXIV.

*An Act for carrying into effect Engagements between HER MAJESTY and certain ARABIAN CHIEFS in the Persian Gulf, for the more effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade.*

[1st August 1849.]

WHEREAS, on the thirtieth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was concluded between Major S. HENNELL, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of Her Majesty the QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, and SULTAN bin SUGGUR, Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma and Shargah, in the Persian Gulf, the Chief of the Joasmee Arabs, whereby it was agreed as follows :—

“ I, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe, with a view





to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the said thirtieth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was also concluded between Major S. Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and Muktoom bin Butye, Shaikh of Debaye, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Muktoom bin Butye, Shaikh of Debaye, with the view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the first day of May, in the said year one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was also concluded between the said Major S. Hennell, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Abdool Azeez bin Rashid, Shaikh of Ejman, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Abdool Azeez bin Rashid, Shaikh of Ejman, with the view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those





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belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the said first day of May, an Engagement was concluded by the said Major S. Hennell, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, Shaikh of Amulgavine, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Abdoolla bin Rashid, Shaikh of Amulgavine, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the first day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the third day of May, in the said year one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was concluded by the said Major S. Hennell, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, Chief of Aboothabee, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Syud bin Tahnoon, Shaikh of the Beniyas, Chief of Aboothabee, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my





subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the eighth day of May, in the said year one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was concluded by the said Major S. Hennell, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa bin Suleman, Chief of Bahrein, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Mahomed bin Khaleefa bin Suleman, Chief of Bahrein, with the view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas it is expedient that effectual provision should be made for carrying into execution the provisions of the said several Agreements: Be it therefore enacted, by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That it shall be lawful for the commanders and other officers of Her Majesty's ships of war, or of the East India Company, to visit and detain in any seas any vessel belonging to either of the said respective Chiefs, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe, Muktoom bin Butye, Shaikh of Debaye, Abdool Azeez bin Rashid, Shaikh of Ejman, Abdoolla bin Rashid, Shaikh of Amulgavine, Syud bin Tahnoon, Shaikh of the Beniyas, Chief of Aboothabee, Mahomed bin Khaleefa bin Suleman, Chief of Bahrein, or to any of their subjects or dependents, which shall, upon reasonable grounds, be suspected of being engaged in the traffic in slaves, or having been fitted out for that purpose, and to send or carry away such vessel, together with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, for the





purpose of such vessel being brought to adjudication as hereinafter mentioned.

II. And be it enacted, That it shall be lawful for the High Court of Admiralty of England, and for all Courts of Vice-Admiralty in any dominions of Her Majesty beyond the seas, including those Courts of Vice-Admiralty within the territories under the Government of the East India Company, to take cognisance of, and try any such vessel which shall be detained or captured for the violation of the said Agreements, and to condemn any such vessel to Her Majesty, and adjudge as to the slaves found therein in like manner, and under such and the like rules and regulations as are contained in any Act or Acts of Parliament in force in relation to the suppression of the Slave Trade by British-owned ships, as fully as if all the powers and provisions contained in such Acts were re-enacted in this Act as to such High Court of Admiralty or Courts of Vice-Admiralty.

III. And be it enacted, That every person who shall wilfully and corruptly give false evidence in any examination or deposition had or affidavit taken in any proceeding under the said Engagements or this Act, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and, being thereof convicted, shall be subject and liable to all the punishments, pains and penalties to which persons convicted of wilful and corrupt perjury are liable; and every such person may be tried for any such perjury, either in the place where the offence was committed, or in any colony or settlement of Her Majesty near thereto in which there is a Court of competent jurisdiction to try any such offence, or in Her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench of England; and that in case of any prosecution for such offence in Her Majesty's said Court of Queen's Bench, the venue may be laid in the County of Middlesex.

IV. And be it enacted, That the pendency of any suit or proceeding instituted for the condemnation or restitution of any ship or cargo, or slaves, taken, seized, or detained by virtue of the said Agreements, or the final adjudication, condemnation, or judgment or determination thereupon, may be pleaded in bar or given in evidence under the general issue, and shall be deemed in any Court whatever to be a complete bar in any action, suit, or proceeding, whether instituted by any person or persons for the recovery of any such ship, vessel, or cargo, or of any damage, or for any injury sustained thereby, or by the persons on board the same, in consequence of any capture, seizure, or detention, or anything done under or in pursuance of the provisions of the said Agreements.

V. And be it enacted, That any ship or vessel which shall be condemned as aforesaid may be taken into Her Majesty's Service, upon payment of such sum as the Lord High Admiral or the Lords





Commissioners of the Admiralty shall deem a proper price for the same; or, if not so taken, shall be broken up and demolished, and the materials thereof shall be publicly sold in separate parts, and the proceeds thereof shall be paid to such person or persons as the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury may appoint to receive the same.

VI. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel employed or engaged in such illicit traffic in slaves, in violation of the said Agreements, shall be seized by any ship or vessel belonging to Her Majesty or the East India Company, and afterwards condemned, there shall be paid to the captors the net proceeds to which Her Majesty is entitled, the same to be distributed in the manner hereinafter directed for the distribution of bounties on slaves taken on board the said vessels.

VII. And be it enacted, That there shall be paid to the commander, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or the commander, officers, and crews of the ships of the East India Company, a bounty of five pounds for every man, woman, and child slave seized and found on board any ship or vessel taken and condemned in pursuance of the provisions of the said Agreements and of this Act, such bounty to be issued and paid by order from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, and to be distributed to and amongst the captors aforesaid, in such manner and proportions as Her Majesty shall think fit to order by any Order in Council made or to be made, or by any Proclamation for that purpose.

VIII. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel which shall have been seized and condemned under the provisions of the said Agreements shall have been or shall be demolished, and the materials thereof publicly sold in separate parts, as well as her cargo, there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, in addition to the amount of the proceeds of such sale as hereinbefore mentioned, a further bounty on the tonnage of such ship or vessel at the rate of thirty shillings for every ton of such tonnage.

IX. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel having no slaves on board shall have been seized and condemned under the provisions of the said Agreements, there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, an additional bounty upon the tonnage of such ship or vessel at the rate of four pounds for every ton; and the tonnage of all such vessels shall be ascertained according to the mode of ascertaining the admeasurement of British vessels, either by the principal officer of the customs at the port where the vessel may be at the time of condemnation, or in default thereof by the best evidence which can be obtained: Provided always, that in every case in which any ship or vessel shall





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be seized with slaves on board in which the bounty calculated upon the number of slaves shall be less than the bounty calculated upon the tonnage, the commanders of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, making the seizure, may elect to take the bounty calculated according to tonnage, instead of the bounty which would be payable upon the number of slaves on board.

X. And be it enacted, That all bounties payable under this Act shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, and of the ships of the East India Company, and such bounties shall be issued and paid by order from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

XI. And be it enacted, That the said bounty, as also all bounties payable under any of the Acts for the abolition or suppression of the Slave Trade, shall not hereafter be charged with Treasury fees or Exchequer fees of any description.

XII. Provided always, and be it enacted, That in order to entitle the captors to receive the said bounty money, the tonnage of the ship or vessel so seized and condemned shall be proved to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by producing a copy, duly certified, of the sentence or decree of condemnation, or by such documentary or other evidence as they may deem satisfactory.

XIII. Provided always, and be it enacted, That in order to entitle the captors to receive the said bounty money on slaves, the number of men, women, and children so taken, delivered over, and condemned, shall be proved to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury by producing a copy, duly certified, of the sentence or decree of condemnation, and also a certificate under the hand of the proper officer or officers, military or civil, who may be appointed to receive such slaves.

XIV. And be it enacted, That where any slaves, or persons treated as slaves, shall be seized on board any ship or vessel taken and condemned in pursuance of the said Agreements, and of this Act, but who shall not have been delivered over in consequence of death, sickness, or other inevitable circumstance, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, if to their discretion it shall seem meet, to direct payment of one moiety of the bounty which would have been due in each case respectively, if the said slaves had been delivered over.

XV. Provided also, and be it enacted, That any party or parties claiming any benefit by way of bounty under the provisions of this Act, or of any share of the proceeds of any vessel confiscated in pursuance of the provisions of the aforesaid Agreements, may resort to the High Court of Admiralty for the purpose of obtaining the judgment of the





said Court in that behalf, and that it shall be lawful for the Judge of the said High Court of Admiralty to determine thereon, and also to hear and determine any question of joint capture which may arise upon any seizure made in pursuance of this Act, and also to enforce any decrees or sentences of the said Vice-Admiralty Courts relating to any such seizure.

XVI. And be it enacted, That all the provisions, rules, regulations, forfeitures, and penalties respecting the delivery by Prize Agents of accounts for examination, and the distribution of prize-money, and the accounting for and paying over the proceeds of prize and the percentage due thereon to Greenwich Hospital, shall be extended to all bounties and proceeds to be distributed, under the provisions of this Act, to the officers and crews of any of Her Majesty's ships and vessels of war.

XVII. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel belonging in whole or in part to the beforementioned chiefs, or their subjects or dependents, shall have been detained and brought to adjudication by any officers of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, or of those of the East India Company, and the said ship shall be restored by sentence of the Court, it shall be lawful for the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by warrant signed by any two or more of them, to direct payment to be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of any costs or damages which may be duly awarded: Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall exempt such officer from his liability to make good the payments so made, when lawfully called upon, either by the parties interested therein, or by order of the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

XVIII. And be it enacted, that when seizure shall be made by any of the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, and judgment shall be given against the seizer, or when such seizure shall be relinquished by him, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, if to their discretion it shall seem meet, by warrant signed by any two or more of them, to direct payment to be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland of such costs and expenses as the seizer may have incurred in respect of such seizure, or any proportional part thereof.





*Instructions to Commanders of the Honorable East India Company's Ships, for carrying into execution the Provisions of the Act\* of XI. and XII. Victoriæ, Cap. 128, entitled "An Act for carrying into Effect the Agreement between Her Majesty and the Imaum of Muskat, for the more effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade"; also for carrying into execution the Provisions of the Act† of XII. and XIII. Victoriæ, Cap. 84, entitled "An Act for carrying into effect Engagements between Her Majesty and certain Arabian Chiefs in the Persian Gulf, for the more effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade."‡*

I. You are required to make yourselves fully acquainted with the different provisions of these Acts of Parliament, and to guide yourselves accordingly by them in all your acts, when you meet or fall in with any vessels belonging to the Imaum of Muskat, or any of his subjects, or with vessels belonging to any or either of the Arabian Chiefs therein named, engaged in the Slave Trade, or fitted out for the purpose, contrary to the provisions of these Acts.

II. Your attention is to be directed to Article III. of the Agreement with the Imaum dated 2nd October 1845, as set out in the Act.

III. And also to the provisions of the 1st Section of these Acts, which empower the commanders of the ships of war of the East India Company to visit vessels belonging to the subjects of the Imaum, within the limits therein specified, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, and also to visit vessels belonging to the chiefs, or the subjects of the chiefs named in Act XII. and XIII. Victoriæ, Cap. 84.

IV. You will visit and detain, in any seas, except within the limits exempted by the terms of Article III. of the said Agreement contained in Act XI. and XII. Victoriæ, Cap. 128, any merchant vessel belonging to the subjects of the Imaum of Muskat, which shall, upon reasonable grounds, be suspected of being engaged in the export of slaves from the African dominions of the Imaum of Muskat, or the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, excepting such only as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island, in 1° 57' south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Souga Munara, or Pagoda Point, in 9° 2' south latitude, including the Islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea, or any vessel fitted out for that pur-

\* Vide pages 662 to 668 of this Selection.

† Vide pages 671 to 678 of ditto.

‡ These Acts are dated the 5th September 1848 and the 1st August 1849.





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pose, and to send or carry away such vessel, together with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, for the purpose of such vessel being brought to adjudication, as in the Act mentioned.

V. On detaining any vessel visited by you under the aforesaid provisions and instructions, you will take possession of the ship's papers, making a list thereof according to Form No. I., and certifying the same by your signature.

VI. You will also draw out a declaration according to Form No. II., stating the circumstances attending the capture, and mentioning the date when, and the place where it was made, and you will certify the same by your signature.

VII. In sending or carrying away such vessel, with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, for the purpose of adjudication, you will do so without delay, and send or carry her with them to the nearest port or place where a British Court of Vice-Admiralty may be established, and, on your arrival at such port or place, you shall duly report your arrival, and deliver up to the proper authorities there the vessel, with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, to be dealt with according to law, and you shall abide such further instructions on the subject as shall be given you.

VIII. The officer in charge of the slave vessel is, at the same time of delivering up the vessel to the proper authorities, to deliver also the ship's papers, and certificates thereof, and the captor's declaration of capture.

IX. The circumstances attending the seizure of any vessel under these Acts of Parliament must be fully reported to the officer under whose orders you are serving, and a duplicate of the report must be sent, at the earliest opportunity, to the Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy at Bombay.

Given under my hand, at Bombay, this                      day of

Commodore,  
Commander in Chief I. N.

FORM NO. I.

*Certificate containing a List of Papers to be made out in duplicate, one copy to be delivered to the Master of a detained Vessel, as soon as possible after seizure, the other to be delivered to the Court before which the Vessel is taken for adjudication.*

I, the undersigned                      holding the rank of  
in the Indian Navy, and commanding the H. C. ship





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do hereby certify that on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_  
being in latitude \_\_\_\_\_ and longitude \_\_\_\_\_  
of Greenwich, I seized the \_\_\_\_\_ whereof  
is Tindal, and that she had on board, at time of capture,  
slaves, namely—

Males.....

Females.....

Total ....

If no Slaves be on board,  
state the fact.

Here specify and de-  
scribe the papers found on  
board, according to num-  
ber.

I further certify that the papers which I  
have numbered, 1 to \_\_\_\_\_ inclusive, are the whole  
of the documents, letters, and writings seized on  
board, which are hereunder specified and de-  
scribed, namely—

No. 1,

2,

3, &c.

Signed by me the

day of

Commanding H. C. ship

FORM NO. II.

*Declaration to be made by the Commander of the H. C. Ship at the time  
of seizure, and delivered to the Court before which the Vessel is taken  
for adjudication.*

I, the undersigned \_\_\_\_\_ holding the rank of \_\_\_\_\_  
in the Indian Navy, and commanding the H. C. ship \_\_\_\_\_  
duly authorised by the Act of Parliament dated the \_\_\_\_\_  
for the suppression of the Slave Trade, do hereby declare, that on the \_\_\_\_\_  
day of \_\_\_\_\_ being in latitude \_\_\_\_\_ and  
longitude \_\_\_\_\_ of Greenwich, I seized the \_\_\_\_\_  
whereof \_\_\_\_\_ is Tindal, for having violated the said  
and I further declare that the vessel had on board,  
at the time of seizure, a crew of \_\_\_\_\_ persons, \_\_\_\_\_ passengers, and  
slaves, as follows—

Males.....

Females.....

Total ....

Here insert any particu-  
lars worthy of notice, as  
to the state in which the  
Vessel was found, and any  
facts as to the circum-  
stances or causes of seizure.

And I do also declare that I found this vessel  
in the following state :

Given under my hand this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_

Commanding H. C. ship





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SOHAR.

*Engagement entered into by SYUD SUIF bin HUMOOD, Chief of Sohar, for the Abolition of the Slave Trade at his Ports, dated the 22nd May 1849.*

ARTICLE I.

It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, that certain Conventions have lately been entered into by the Ottoman Porte, and other Powers, with the British Government, for the purpose of preventing the exportation of Slaves from the Coast of Africa and elsewhere; and it having moreover been explained to me, that in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid Conventions, the concurrence and co-operation of the chiefs of the several ports situated on the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf are required: accordingly I, Syud Suif bin Humood, Chief of Sohar, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere, on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 29th Rujub 1265 (or the 21st June 1849, A. D.).

ARTICLE II.

And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them, and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated the engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

*Dated this 20th day of Jumadee-ool-Akhur 1265 A. H. (or 22nd day of May 1849 A. D.).*

L. S.

(Signed) SYUD SUIF bin HUMOOD.

(True translation)

(Signed) S. HENNELL,  
Resident, &c.





ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE PERSIAN  
WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, FOR PREVENT-  
ING THE IMPORTATION BY SEA OF SLAVES INTO  
PERSIAN PORTS.

*Letter\* from HAJEE MIRZA AGHASEE to Lieutenant Colonel FAR-  
RANT, Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the Court  
of Tehran, dated June 12th, 1848.*

Your communication regarding Negroes has been received, and its contents fully understood.

With a view to the request made by you, my sincere and esteemed friend, and solely on account of the sincere friendship and good feelings I entertain towards you, I did not consider it proper to withhold or delay the fulfilment of your desire, and exerted my endeavours to preserve the existing friendship between the two exalted Governments of Persia and England, by laying your request in detail at a most fortunate time before His Majesty &c. &c. the Shah (may his dominion and sovereignty be everlasting!).

An imperative order has been issued, which evinces the exceedingly great favour entertained towards you, my honoured friend, by his Majesty &c. &c. the Shah, which it is evident will always increase. The importation of slaves by sea alone is forbidden, and imperative orders will be issued to the Governors of Fars and Arabia, that hereafter strict prohibition should be observed that no Negroes should be either imported or exported, except by land.

This affair, in fulfilment of the request of that esteemed friend, has, thank God, been concluded through the countless favour of His Majesty &c. &c. the Shah, towards you, and by my exertions.

But the Persian Ministers, in equal proportion, require that, by the true friendship of the Ministers of the British Government, when they make a request it will also be acceded to.

Translated by  
(Signed) JOSEPH REED.

\* NOTE.—This communication was addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Farrant, under the authority of an autograph letter from His Majesty Mahomed Shah, the late Shah of Persia, to Hajee Mirza Aghasee, dated the 12th June 1848.





*Firman issued by His Majesty the SHAH OF PERSIA to HOUSEN KHAN, Governor of Fars, dated the 12th June 1848.*

To the high in rank, the pillar of nobility, &c. &c., Housen Khan, the Controller of the State affairs, and Governor of Fars, who has been exalted and supported by the distinguished favours of His Majesty &c. &c. the Shah, be it known,—

That it is a long time since that a request for the abolition of the importation of Negroes by sea was made on the part of the Ministers of the British Government to the Ministers and authorities of this kingdom, but their request during this long period has not obtained an answer or (our) consent.

But in consequence of the favour entertained by our august sovereignty &c. &c. towards the high in rank, the sincere well-wisher of the State, the chosen among Christian nobles, &c. &c., Colonel Farrant, Chargé d'Affaires of the English Government, on account of his respectful conduct and manner of proceeding which have been made manifest, and purely for the regard we entertain for him, we have accepted and complied with his request, and we have ordained that henceforward that high in rank shall warn all merchants and persons passing to and fro to discontinue to bring Negroes by sea, and that they shall not export or import Negroes except by land, which is by no means forbidden. That high in rank will be held responsible for the fulfilment of the orders contained in this communication.

*Written in the month of Rujub 1264.*

Translated by  
(Signed) JOSEPH REED.

*Firman issued by His Majesty the SHAH OF PERSIA to MIRZA NUBEE KHAN, Governor of Ispahan and Persian Arabia, dated 12th June 1848.*

To the high in rank, the superior of Generals, the esteemed of the Sovereign, Mirza Nubee Khan, Chief of the Civil Law Court, and Governor of Ispahan and Arabia, who has been honoured by the favour of the pure mind of the King of Kings, be it known: That at this time the high in rank, the noble and exalted, possessed of dignity, the pillar of Christian nobles, the cream of the great ruler of Christendom, the undoubted well-wisher of the State, Colonel Farrant, Chargé d'Affaires





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of the exalted English Government, who enjoys the unbounded favour of His Majesty the Shah, whose resplendent mind is desirous to gratify him, made a friendly request on the part of the Ministers of that exalted Government to the Ministers of His Majesty the Shah, &c. &c., that with a view to preserve the existing friendship between the two exalted States, a decree should be issued from the source of magnificence (the Shah), that hereafter the importation of the Negro tribes by sea should be forbidden, and this traffic be abolished.

In consequence of this, it is ordered and ordained that, that high in rank, after perusing this Firman, which is equal to a decree of fate, it will be incumbent on him to issue positive and strict injunctions to the whole of the dealers in slaves who trade by sea, that henceforth by sea alone the importation and exportation of Negroes into the Persian dominions is entirely forbidden, but not by land. Not a single individual will be permitted to bring Negroes by sea without being subjected to severe punishment.

That high in rank must in this matter give peremptory orders throughout his Government, and not be remiss.

*Written in the month of Rujub 1264 (June 1848).*

MEMORANDUM.—These Firmans were confirmed by His Majesty the present Shah of Persia, after his accession to the throne.

*Agreement with the Persian Government, concluded, in August 1851, by Lieutenant Colonel SHEIL, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of Tehran, for the search and seizure of Persian Vessels suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade; approved by Her Majesty's Government in the month of October 1851.*

*Convention concluded between Colonel SHEIL and AMEER-E-NIZAM, for the detention and search of Persian Vessels by British and East India Company's Cruisers.*

The Persian Government agrees that the ships of war of the British Government and of the East India Company shall, in order to prevent the chance of Negro slaves, male and female, being imported, be permitted for the period of eleven years to search Persian merchant vessels in the manner detailed in this document, with the exception of Persian Government vessels, not being vessels the property of merchants, or the





property of Persian subjects,—with those Government vessels there is to be no interference whatever. The Persian Government agrees that in no manner whatever shall any Negro slaves be imported in the vessels of the Persian Government.

The Agreement is this :—

I. That in giving this permission to search mercantile vessels, and those of subjects, the search shall from the first to the last be effected with the co-operation, intervention, and knowledge of Persian officers, who are to be on board vessels of the English Government.

II. The merchant vessels shall not be detained longer than is necessary to effect the search for slaves. If slaves should be found in any of those vessels, the British authorities are to take possession of them, and to carry them away, without detaining or causing them (that is the people of the ship importing slaves) any other damage besides that of depriving them of the slaves. The vessel itself in which the slaves have been imported shall, by the co-operation and knowledge of the officers of the Persian Government, who are on board of the British cruisers, be delivered to the authorities of the Persian ports, who are there on the part of the Persian Government; and the authorities of this (the Persian) Government are to punish and fine, in a manner suitable to the crime he has committed, the owner of that slaving vessel who has acted in contravention of the commands of His Majesty the King of Persia, by importing slaves.

The British ships of war are not in any manner to interfere with the Persian trading vessels without the co-operation of the Persian Government officers; but the Persian Government officers must not on their part be remiss in the duty committed to them.

This Convention is to be in force for a period of eleven years, and after these eleven years have expired, and the stipulated period has elapsed, if the Persian vessels shall be interfered with, for even a single day beyond the eleven years, it will be opposed to the course of friendship with the Persian Government, and to the maintenance of her rights, and this Government will make a demand for satisfaction.

If the slaves who have been heretofore in Persia, and are now there, should, from the present date, and henceforward, wish to proceed by sea on a pilgrimage to Mecca, or to India, or travel by sea, they must, with the knowledge of the British Resident in Bushire, procure a passport from the officer at the head of the Persian Passport Office in Bushire, and no exception shall hereafter be taken to any slave holding a passport. The passport (regulation) obtained with the knowledge of the British Resident at Bushire is, like the other stipulations written above, to be for a period of eleven years.

This agreement of the right of search, and the appointment of the





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Persian Government officers to be on board the British cruisers, will come in force on the 1st of Rubee-ool-Awul 1268 (January 1st, 1852).

From the date of this document, to the above date, there is no right of search.

The Articles written in this document have from first to last been agreed to by both parties, and confirmed by the Ministers of both Governments, and nothing is to be done in contravention thereof.

*Written in the month of Shuwal 1267 (August 1851).*

Done in duplicate, signed, and  
sealed by MEERZA TUKEE  
KHAN.

AMEER-E-NIZAM, of the Persian  
Government. Dated as above.

JUSTIN SHEIL,  
Her Britannic Majesty's Minis-  
ter Plenipotentiary and Envoy  
Extraordinary at the Court of  
Persia.



